2025 (4) TMI 1670 - SC - Indian Laws

Refusal to quash the order - abatement of the criminal proceedings - Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act - whether the acts complained of are reasonably connected to or performed in the purported discharge of the official duties of the accused persons so as to attract the statutory protection afforded by the said provisions? - HELD THAT - A plain reading of Section 170 of the Police Act reveals that the legislature in its wisdom has sought to afford a statutory safeguard to certain public functionaries including Commissioners Magistrates Police Officers and Reserve Police Officers. The provision is categorical in its stipulation that where any offence is alleged to have been committed or any wrong alleged to have been occasioned by such officials in the discharge of their duties or in the exercise of their lawful authority no court shall entertain any prosecution or suit against them without the prior sanction of the Government - The protective mantle of Section 197 of the CrPC however is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto. Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do not attract the bar imposed under Section 197 of the CrPC. This Court in B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar 1979 (7) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT observed that the words any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty employed in Section 197 of the CrPC are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. This Court observed that if these words are construed too narrowly the section will be rendered altogether sterile for it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence and never can be . In the wider sense these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC read with Section 170 of the Police Act this Court in D. Devaraja observed that not every offence committed by a police officer automatically gets this protection. The safeguard under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is limited. It applies only if the alleged act is reasonably connected to the officer s official duties - The language of both Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of official duty as well as for the acts purported to be done in the discharge of official duty and/or acts done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority . Sanction becomes mandatory if there is a reasonable connection between the act and the officer s official duties even if the officer acted improperly or exceeded his authority. Therefore if a complaint against a police officer involves actions reasonably related to his official role the Court cannot take cognisance unless sanction from the appropriate Government has been obtained under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act. In the present case it is evident that the actions attributed to the accused persons emanate from the discharge of their official duties specifically in connection with the investigation of criminal cases pending against the complainant. As previously observed a mere excess or overreach in the performance of official duty does not by itself disentitle a public servant from the statutory protection mandated by law - the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the alleged offences against the accused persons without the requisite sanction for prosecution in the instant case. The absence of the necessary sanction vitiates the very initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused persons. Admittedly the alleged incident pertains to the period of 1999-2000. Accused Nos. 1 3 and 4 have since passed away. The proceedings now survive solely against accused Nos. 2 and 5. It is pertinent to note that both accused No. 2 and accused No. 5 retired from service long ago on attaining the age of superannuation; accused No. 2 superannuated in the year 2015 and is presently 71 years of age while accused No. 5 retired in the year 2020 and is now 64 years old. In these circumstances no meaningful purpose would be served by prolonging the criminal prosecution against them. Accordingly the ends of justice would be adequately met in the instant case by quashing the proceedings against accused Nos. 2 and 5. The impugned order dated 17.03.2021 passed by the High Court in Criminal Petition No. 4512 of 2020 preferred under Section 482 of the CrPC is hereby set aside - Appeal allowed.

Summary

ISSUES:

Whether the learned Magistrate was justified in taking cognisance of offences against police officers without prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act.Whether the acts alleged against the accused police officers were committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty" so as to attract statutory protection requiring prior sanction.Whether the absence of prior sanction vitiates the initiation of criminal proceedings against police officers accused of alleged police excess and related offences.Whether the delay in filing the complaint affects the validity of the prosecution.Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in light of the accused officers' retirement and the facts of the case.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

The Court held that the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the offences without the prior sanction contemplated under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act, as the alleged acts were "reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty."The Court affirmed that the protection under Section 197 CrPC and Section 170 Police Act extends to acts "done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority," and sanction is mandatory if a reasonable nexus exists between the act and official functions, even if the officer exceeded authority.The Court rejected the High Court's conclusion that prior sanction was unnecessary, clarifying that the acts complained of fall within the ambit of statutory protection and thus require sanction before prosecution.The Court recognized the inordinate delay in filing the complaint but did not base its decision solely on this ground.The Court quashed the proceedings against the accused officers who had retired, holding that no meaningful purpose would be served by prolonging prosecution against them.

RATIONALE:

The Court applied the statutory framework of Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, which mandate prior government sanction before prosecuting public servants for offences committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty" or "under colour or in excess of such duty or authority."The Court relied on precedents including Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur, D. Devaraja, Bakhshish Singh Brar, and Gurmeet Kaur, which clarify that the protection is not absolute but applies where there is a reasonable nexus between the act and official duty, even if the act exceeds authority.The Court emphasized that the protective provisions are designed to shield public servants from "harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous proceedings" to enable fearless discharge of official duties.The Court noted that acts "manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto" do not attract the protection of prior sanction, but found that in the instant case the acts complained of were connected with official functions, namely investigation and related police duties.The Court distinguished between acts connected to official duty and acts entirely unconnected, holding that the former require prior sanction for prosecution even if excessive or wrongful.The Court considered the accused officers' retirement and advanced age as factors militating against continuation of prosecution, concluding that quashing the proceedings would meet the ends of justice.