2025 (5) TMI 265 - HC - Service Tax

Invocation of extended period of limitation in terms of proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 73 of the Act of 1994 - requriement to determine the tax liability either within the prescribed period of one year in terms of clause (b) of Sub-Section (4B) of Section 73 or the Authority was required to show at least prima-facie that it was not possible for him to determine the liability within the said prescribed period - HELD THAT - In the present case there is no dispute on facts that the determination of liability has been done after almost three and half years. In the counter affidavit there is no whisper even to prima-facie satisfy this Court that it was not possible for the Taxing Authority to determine the tax liability within prescribed period of one year at first instance. Conclusion - The impugned order determining service tax liability after a delay of over three years without any justification was liable to be quashed. Application allowed.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this matter are:

(a) Whether the Taxing Authority was obliged to determine the service tax liability within the prescribed limitation period under clause (b) of Sub-Section (4B) of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994, or at least prima facie demonstrate that it was not possible to do so within that period;

(b) Whether the extended period of limitation invoked by the Taxing Authority under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 was valid in the absence of any explanation or evidence justifying delay beyond the prescribed period;

(c) The applicability and interpretation of the phrase "where it is possible to do so" in Sub-Section (4B) of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994, particularly regarding the mandatory nature of the limitation periods for adjudication of service tax liability;

(d) The relevance and binding nature of precedents from coordinate Benches of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court's refusal to interfere with such decisions, especially in relation to the quantum of tax involved;

(e) Whether the impugned order determining service tax liability after a delay of over three and a half years from the issuance of the show cause notice is sustainable in law.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (a) and (b): Obligation to determine tax liability within prescribed limitation period and validity of extended period invoked

The legal framework governing the determination of service tax liability is Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994. Sub-Section (4B) specifically prescribes that the Central Excise Officer shall determine the amount of service tax due:

"(a) within six months from the date of notice where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under sub-section (1);

(b) within one year from the date of notice, where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under the proviso to sub-section (1) or the proviso to sub-section (4A)."

The petitioner challenged the order-in-original determining service tax liability after approximately three and a half years from the issuance of the show cause notice, contending that the Taxing Authority failed to comply with the prescribed limitation period or to demonstrate prima facie that it was not possible to adjudicate within the prescribed one-year period.

The Court noted the absence of any averment or evidence in the counter affidavit to justify the delay or to show that it was impossible to determine the liability within the prescribed period. The Court emphasized that the limitation period is not an absolute bar but that the Department bears the burden to show that determination within the prescribed time was not feasible.

Precedents relied upon by the petitioner from coordinate Benches of this Court (including M/s Kanak Automobiles Private Limited, Pawan Kumar Upmanyu, and M/s Power Spectrum) were examined. These judgments consistently held that while the limitation period under Section 73(4B) is not absolute, the Taxing Authority must demonstrate the impossibility of adjudication within the prescribed period before invoking extended limitation.

The Court reproduced relevant paragraphs from the M/s Power Spectrum judgment, which highlighted that the legislature's use of "where it is possible to do so" implies that the adjudicating authority should ordinarily decide the matter within the stipulated time unless genuine reasons exist, such as voluminous evidence, non-availability of officers, or other legitimate impediments. Mere delay without justification or keeping the matter in cold storage is impermissible.

Thus, the Court held that the extended period invoked without any justification or prima facie showing of impossibility to adjudicate within one year was not sustainable.

Issue (c): Interpretation of "where it is possible to do so" in limitation provisions

The Court analyzed the phrase "where it is possible to do so" appearing in Sub-Section (4B) of Section 73, relying on precedents from the Delhi High Court and Gujarat High Court. These authorities interpreted this phrase as a recognition that practical difficulties might sometimes prevent determination within the prescribed period, but such difficulties must be bona fide and demonstrable.

The Court noted that the legislature did not prescribe an absolute time limit but allowed for flexibility where determination within the period was not feasible. However, this flexibility does not permit indefinite delay or arbitrary extension of limitation periods. The adjudicating authority must act diligently and not keep cases pending without valid reasons.

In the present case, no such valid reasons or explanations were furnished by the Department, rendering the delay unjustified.

Issue (d): Applicability and binding nature of precedents and Supreme Court's refusal to interfere

The petitioner relied on judgments from coordinate Benches of this Court, which have consistently held that the limitation periods under Section 73(4B) are to be adhered to unless impossibility is shown. The petitioner also referred to the Supreme Court's refusal to interfere in an SLP challenging the Kanak Automobiles Private Limited judgment, particularly noting that the Supreme Court considered the quantum of tax involved in refusing intervention.

The Court acknowledged that while the Supreme Court's refusal to interfere was based on the quantum of tax (Rs. 86 lakhs in that case), the present case involved a much smaller quantum (Rs. 5.27 lakhs), thereby strengthening the petitioner's position under the ratio of the coordinate Bench judgments.

The Court also noted submissions by the Additional Solicitor General that the Supreme Court's observations were limited to the Department and related to monetary limits for appeals under the CGST Act, which did not affect the binding nature of the limitation principles under the Finance Act, 1994.

Issue (e): Sustainability of the impugned order passed after delay

Given the absence of any explanation or evidence justifying the delay of over three and a half years in adjudicating the service tax liability, the Court held that the impugned order was liable to be set aside.

The Court applied the principles established in the cited precedents and the statutory mandate under Section 73(4B), concluding that the Department failed to discharge its burden to justify the extended period of limitation.

Consequently, the Court set aside the order-in-original and the consequent demand for service tax, interest, and penalty raised against the petitioner.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court crystallized the following key legal principles and determinations:

"When the legislature has used the expression 'where it is possible to do so', it means that if in the ordinary course it is possible to determine the amount of duty within the specified time frame, it should be so done. The legislature has wisely not prescribed a time limit and has specified such time limit where it is possible to do so, for the reason that the adjudicating authority for several reasons may not be in a position to decide the matter within the specified time frame, namely, a large number of witnesses may have to be examined, the record of the case may be very bulky, huge workload, nonavailability of an officer, etc. which are genuine reasons for not being able to determine the amount of duty within the stipulated time frame. However, when a matter is consigned to the call book and kept in cold storage for years together, it is not on account of it not being possible for the authority to decide the case, but on grounds which are extraneous to the proceedings."

"In the opinion of this court, when the legislature in its wisdom has prescribed a particular time limit, the CBEC has no power or authority to extend such time limit for years on end merely to await a decision in another case. The adjudicatory authority is required to decide each case as it comes, unless restrained by an order of a higher forum."

Further, the Court emphasized that the limitation period under Section 73(4B) is not absolute but the Department must prima facie demonstrate the impossibility of adjudication within the prescribed period before invoking extended limitation.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the impugned order determining service tax liability after a delay of over three years without any justification was liable to be quashed.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the demand for service tax, interest, and penalty quashed.