2025 (5) TMI 532 - SCH - Income Tax

Proceedings u/s 153C - issuance of the notice was preceded by the drawl of a Satisfaction Note by the jurisdictional AO - importance of material recovered in the course of a search or a requisition made and a right to reassess u/s 153A and 153C - Distinction between Section 153A and Section 153C - As decided by HC 2024 (4) TMI 461 - DELHI HIGH COURT abatement of the six AYs or the relevant assessment year would follow the formation of that opinion and satisfaction in that respect being reached. Invocation of Section 153C in respect of AYs for which no incriminating material had been gathered or obtained is flawed. Satisfaction Notes also fail to record any reasons as to how the material discovered and pertaining to a particular AY is likely to have a bearing on the determination of the total income for the year which is sought to be abated or reopened in terms of the impugned notices. Respondents have erroneously proceeded on the assumption that the moment any material is recovered in the course of a search or on the basis of a requisition made they become empowered in law to assess or reassess all the six AYs years immediately preceding the assessment correlatable to the search year or the relevant assessment year as defined in terms of Explanation 1 of Section 153A. The said approach is clearly unsustainable and contrary to the consistent line struck by the precedents noticed above. HELD THAT - There is a gross delay of 250 215 and 267 days respectively in filing the Special Leave Petitions which has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners. Even otherwise we see no good reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the High Court. Special Leave Petitions are accordingly dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits. Pending applications if any also stand disposed of.

Summary

The Supreme Court, through Justices J. B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, dismissed the Special Leave Petitions due to a "gross delay of 250, 215 and 267 days respectively" in filing, which was "not satisfactorily explained by the petitioners." Additionally, the Court found "no good reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the High Court." Consequently, the petitions were dismissed both "on the ground of delay as well as merits," and all pending applications were disposed of.