2025 (5) TMI 993 - HC - GST

Scope of present petition - Levy of tax on amounts earmarked as fund expenses reimbursable to the Petitioner - case of petitioner is that impugned order wrongly taxes the entire amount earmarked for fund expenses by treating such reimbursements as consideration for supply of services by the Petitioner to the fund - whether the said expenses would constitute part of the management fee or not? - HELD THAT - Questions such as what are the kind of establishment expenses which have been incurred and whether they are being incurred by the Petitioner for payment of its own employees or there are any separate service providers being engaged on behalf of the firm would require a factual determination which is outside the scope of this writ petition. The correspondences itself would show that from time to time the Petitioner has taken different stands as to how the establishment charge would either be a one-time establishment charge or would it be one-time set up fee etc. There is no consistent stand on behalf of the Petitioner. The question whether any of the expenses incurred either on actuals or as a lumpsum in percentage terms would have to be construed as Fee or not and whether it has to be taxed or not would require a scrutiny of the records of the Petitioners. The accounts of the Petitioner would need to be gone into to see as to whether the demand is valid or not. The impugned order is clearly an appealable order under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act 2017. In the opinion of this Court the interpretation of such agreements which involves a factual analysis are beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. There is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. Neither is there any violation of principles of natural justice. Under such circumstances there is no ground for interference with the impugned order in writ jurisdiction - The Petitioner is however permitted to avail of its appellate remedy in accordance with law. Conclusion - i) The interpretation of such agreements which involves a factual analysis are beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. There is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. ii) The question whether any of the expenses incurred either on actuals or as a lumpsum in percentage terms would have to be construed as Fee or not and whether it has to be taxed or not would require a scrutiny of the records of the Petitioners. The accounts of the Petitioner would need to be gone into to see as to whether the demand is valid or not. iii) The Petitioner is permitted to avail of its appellate remedy in accordance with law. Petition disposed off.

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this matter revolve around the validity and jurisdiction of the impugned order issued by the Principal Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax, which demands tax on amounts earmarked as fund expenses reimbursable to the Petitioner. Specifically, the issues include:

1. Whether the impugned order wrongly taxes the entire amount earmarked for fund expenses by treating such reimbursements as consideration for supply of services by the Petitioner to the fund.

2. Whether the impugned order suffers from lack of jurisdiction due to misinterpretation of the Investment Management Agreement and related agreements, particularly concerning the distinction between management fees and operational or establishment expenses.

3. Whether the impugned order violates principles of natural justice or is otherwise amenable to interference under writ jurisdiction.

4. The correctness of the Petitioner's varying positions in different communications regarding the nature and timing of establishment expenses or one-time setup fees.

Issue-wise detailed analysis:

1. Jurisdiction and Interpretation of the Investment Management Agreement

The legal framework primarily involves the provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the contractual terms of the Investment Management Agreement dated 19th September 2017. The Petitioner challenged the impugned order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on grounds of jurisdictional error and misinterpretation.

The Court examined clauses 3 and 4 of the Investment Management Agreement, which distinctly define the management fees payable to the Investment Manager and the operational expenses chargeable to the fund. Clause 3 details the annual investment management fee, specifying rates and payment mechanisms, while Clause 4 addresses operational expenses incurred either directly by the fund or indirectly by the Investment Manager on behalf of the fund, to be charged on an actual basis.

The Petitioner's contention was that the impugned order conflates reimbursable operational expenses with management fees, thereby improperly taxing amounts that are merely pass-through reimbursements. The Court noted the Petitioner's reliance on Annexure K (private placement memorandum) illustrating a clear separation between management fees and establishment or operating expenses, with establishment expenses capped at 3.5% of capital commitments and operating expenses charged on actual basis.

However, the Court observed that determining whether certain expenses constitute management fees or reimbursable operational expenses entails a factual inquiry beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. This includes scrutiny of the nature of establishment expenses, whether they relate to the Petitioner's own employees or third-party service providers, and the accounting treatment thereof.

2. Consistency of the Petitioner's Stand on Establishment Expenses

The Respondents highlighted contradictory positions taken by the Petitioner in three separate communications dated 20th January 2020, 22nd July 2022, and 1st August 2022. These communications variously described the establishment expenses as a one-time fee to be charged at the closure of the scheme, with differing views on the timing and accrual of the fee.

The Court reproduced these communications, noting the lack of a consistent stance by the Petitioner on whether the establishment expenses are a one-time setup fee or a recurring charge, and the timing of their accrual. This inconsistency undermines the Petitioner's claim of a clear contractual distinction and complicates the question of whether such expenses should be treated as taxable consideration.

3. Scope of Writ Jurisdiction and Principles of Natural Justice

The Court emphasized that the writ petition challenges an administrative order passed under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, which is appealable under Section 107 of the Act. The scope of writ jurisdiction is limited to examining jurisdictional errors, violation of natural justice, or legal errors apparent on the face of the record.

Given that the dispute involves intricate contractual interpretation and factual determination of accounts, the Court held that these issues are not amenable to adjudication in writ jurisdiction. There was no finding of lack of jurisdiction or violation of natural justice in the impugned order.

4. Availability of Appellate Remedy

The Court noted that the impugned order is appealable and permitted the Petitioner to file an appeal within 45 days along with the requisite pre-deposit. It also clarified that the appeal shall not be dismissed on limitation grounds if filed within the stipulated period and shall be decided on merits. The Court refrained from making any observations that would prejudice the appellate authority's final adjudication.

Significant holdings:

"The interpretation of such agreements which involves a factual analysis are beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. There is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. Neither is there any violation of principles of natural justice. Under such circumstances there is no ground for interference with the impugned order in writ jurisdiction."

"The question whether any of the expenses incurred either on actuals or as a lumpsum in percentage terms, would have to be construed as Fee or not and whether it has to be taxed or not would require a scrutiny of the records of the Petitioners. The accounts of the Petitioner would need to be gone into to see as to whether the demand is valid or not."

"The Petitioner is permitted to avail of its appellate remedy in accordance with law."

The Court established the principle that contractual interpretation involving factual inquiries and accounting scrutiny is not suitable for determination under writ jurisdiction. It reaffirmed that administrative orders under the GST Act are subject to appeal, and such appellate remedies must be exhausted before judicial interference.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction to entertain the factual and contractual disputes raised, while allowing the Petitioner to pursue its remedy through the statutory appellate process. The impugned order was held not to be vitiated by jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice.

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