2025 (5) TMI 1447 - SC - Indian Laws

Freedom of speech and expression - Legality and propriety of the direction of the High Court to the appellant to take down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by the High Court - HELD THAT - A three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering the issue of live streaming of court proceedings in Swapnil Tripathi Vs. Supreme Court of India 2018 (9) TMI 2157 - SUPREME COURT . The Bench observed that our legal system subscribes to the principle of open justice and highlighted that right to access justice flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution would be meaningful only if the public gets access to the proceedings unfolding before the courts. Right to know and receive information is a facet of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Therefore the public is entitled to witness court proceedings involving issues having an impact on the public at large or even on a section of the public. In a recent decision this Court in Imran Pratapgadhi Vs. State of Gujarat 2025 (3) TMI 1483 - SUPREME COURT highlighted the importance of freedom of expression and the duty of the courts to uphold such freedom. This Court observed that sometimes Judges may not like spoken or written words but still it is the duty of the courts to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). Except the courts there is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens. The courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression. Though the contention of the appellant is that it is an intermediary in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with Section 79 of the Information Technology Act 2000 providing only technical infrastructure that host the platform and does not (a) publish add or remove content on the platform (b) decide which users are vested with certain technical privileges or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on the platform thereby not liable for any third party information data or communication link made available or hosted by it we are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit. Conclusion - The High Court s direction to the appellant to take down/delete the impugned pages and discussions was unwarranted disproportionate and lacked reasoned justification. Mere hosting of critical commentary or secondary source material on ongoing proceedings without clear demonstration of real and substantial risk of prejudice to the trial or administration of justice cannot be treated as interference or contempt. Appeal allowed.

Summary

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this appeal primarily revolve around the legality and propriety of the High Court's direction to the appellant to take down certain web pages and discussions hosted on its platform. These pages related to ongoing court proceedings and contained critical commentary on judicial orders. The issues can be delineated as follows:

1. Whether the publication and hosting of comments and discussions on the appellant's platform concerning ongoing court proceedings constitute interference in court proceedings and violate the subjudice principle.

2. Whether the High Court's direction to the appellant to take down/delete the impugned pages and discussions amounts to a justified preventive measure or an unwarranted restriction on freedom of speech and expression under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution.

3. Whether the appellant, as an intermediary under the Information Technology Act, 2000, can be held liable for third-party content hosted on its platform in the context of the subjudice principle and contempt of court.

4. The scope and limits of the doctrine of contempt of court, particularly criminal contempt, in relation to criticism of judicial orders and court proceedings published on public platforms.

5. The balance to be struck between the right to free speech, the right to know, and the administration of justice, including the principle of open justice.

Each of these issues is analyzed below in detail.

Issue 1: Interference in Court Proceedings and Violation of the Subjudice Principle

The legal framework concerning the subjudice principle and interference in judicial proceedings was extensively considered. The Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision which laid down that for an order of postponement or injunction to be justified under the subjudice principle, there must be a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the fairness of the trial or the proper administration of justice, and that reasonable alternative methods will not prevent such risk.

The High Court had taken a prima facie view that the comments on the judicial order and the discussions on the appellant's platform amounted to interference in court proceedings and violated the subjudice principle, bordering on contempt. This was primarily because the appellant was a party to the suit and the content was hosted on its platform.

The appellant contested this view, emphasizing that it merely provided technical infrastructure as an intermediary and did not author, edit, or monitor the content. The Court noted that the High Court did not demonstrate how the hosted content posed a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the pending proceedings. The impugned order lacked reasoned analysis on this crucial aspect.

The Court underscored that open debate and discussion, even on subjudice matters, are essential in a democratic society, subject to reasonable restrictions. The doctrine of subjudice is not absolute and must be applied with caution to avoid undue curtailment of free expression.

Issue 2: Validity of the Direction to Take Down the Pages and Impact on Freedom of Speech and Expression

The Court examined the constitutional protections under Articles 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and 21 (right to life and personal liberty, which includes the right to information and open justice). It referred to landmark precedents that balance freedom of expression with the administration of justice, including the principles laid down in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd. and Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd.

The Court reiterated that preventive injunctions or postponement orders restricting publication are permissible only when there is a real and imminent danger to the fairness of trial or administration of justice. Such orders must be reasoned, proportionate, and limited in duration.

The High Court's direction was found to be unreasoned and disproportionate, lacking any demonstration of necessity or proportionality. The Court emphasized the importance of the right to know and the role of the media and digital platforms in facilitating public discourse and transparency in judicial processes.

Further, the Court observed that the impugned pages consisted of secondary source material and publicly available information, which further undermined the justification for their removal.

Issue 3: Liability of the Appellant as an Intermediary under the Information Technology Act, 2000

The appellant contended that it was an intermediary under Section 2(1)(w) and protected under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, providing only technical infrastructure without editorial control over content. The Court refrained from delving deeply into this issue as it was part of the pending suit, but noted that this aspect could have bearing on the overall proceedings.

The Court implicitly recognized the intermediary's role and the principle that mere hosting of content without control or authorship does not automatically amount to violation of the subjudice principle or contempt.

Issue 4: Contours of Criminal Contempt and Criticism of Courts

The Court extensively reviewed the definition of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which includes acts that scandalize or tend to lower the authority of any court, or interfere with judicial proceedings or administration of justice.

Judicial precedents, including Re S. Mulgaokar and the concurring opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer, were cited to elucidate the principles guiding contempt jurisdiction. These include:

• The court's discretion to use contempt powers sparingly and only where justice is jeopardized by gross or unfounded attacks on judges.
• The need to balance free criticism of courts with protection against malicious, scurrilous, or intimidating attacks that obstruct justice.
• The recognition that fair and reasonable criticism, even if erroneous, is not contemptuous.
• The media's indispensable role as an intermediary and the necessity of allowing free play within responsible limits.
• Judges should not be hypersensitive to criticism and should respond with judicial rectitude rather than punitive measures.

The Court emphasized that criticism of courts and judicial orders is a vital democratic right and that courts should welcome constructive debate, even on subjudice matters, provided it does not amount to scandalizing or obstructing justice.

Issue 5: Balancing Open Justice, Freedom of Speech, and Administration of Justice

The Court reaffirmed the constitutional principle of open justice as the cornerstone of the judicial system, citing the nine-Judge Bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and the three-Judge Bench in Swapnil Tripathi regarding live streaming of court proceedings.

Open courts foster public confidence, transparency, and accountability in the judiciary. The right to know and receive information is a facet of freedom of speech and expression and is essential for participatory democracy.

The Court noted that while the right to open justice is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable restrictions, such restrictions must be narrowly tailored and justified by real and substantial risks to the fairness of judicial proceedings.

The Court cautioned against disproportionate or unreasoned orders that could have a chilling effect on free speech and the right to information, especially in the digital age where platforms like the appellant's play a critical role in disseminating information.

Conclusions and Final Determinations

The Court concluded that the High Court's direction to the appellant to take down/delete the impugned pages and discussions was unwarranted, disproportionate, and lacked reasoned justification. The direction was set aside.

The Court held that mere hosting of critical commentary or secondary source material on ongoing proceedings, without clear demonstration of real and substantial risk of prejudice to the trial or administration of justice, cannot be treated as interference or contempt.

The Court preserved the core constitutional principles that freedom of speech and expression, including the right to criticize judicial orders, is fundamental and must be zealously protected, subject only to narrowly tailored and justified restrictions.

The Court emphasized the importance of open justice, transparency, and the right to know as fundamental to the democratic process and the administration of justice.

In the words of the Court, "Courts, as a public and open institution, must always remain open to public observations, debates and criticisms. Infact, courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism."

The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.