2025 (5) TMI 1746 - AT - Central Excise

Jurisdiction of Ld. Commissioner (Appeal) to remand the matter in the absence of any power to this effect under Excise Act 1944 - revenue neutrality - HELD THAT - In this case on various instances the refund claim sanctioned to the appellant periodically and on the basis of value addition the rate of claim was fixed on that basis a consolidated refund was sanctioned the said refund claim was challenged to the Ld. Commissioner (Appeal) and the Ld. Commissioner (Appeal) found it appropriate that the refund claimed shall be recalculated by the Adjudicating Authority therefore found it appropriate to remand matter back to the Adjudicating Authority to calculate the same in accordance to law and pass an appropriate order. There are no infirmity in the impugned order and the Adjudicating Authority is directed to consider the grievance of the appellant recalculate the amount of eligible refund and thereafter pass the order in accordance with law - appeal dismissed.

Summary

The primary issue considered by the Tribunal was whether the learned Commissioner (Appeals) possessed the jurisdiction to remand the matter to the adjudicating authority in the absence of explicit statutory power under the Central Excise Act, 1944, specifically Section 35A(3). This question arose in the context of an appeal against an order remanding a refund claim for recalculation.

Another core issue was the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata concerning the refund claims related to two distinct chapters of goods-Chapter 34 (Liquid Household Cleaners) and Chapter 38 (Liquid Mosquito Repellent, Combi Pack). The appellant contended that the refund orders related to Chapter 34 goods had attained finality and could not be reopened or challenged in proceedings concerning the differential refund for Chapter 38 goods.

Further, the appellant raised the question whether any excess refund had in fact been received with respect to Chapter 34 goods, asserting that, on the contrary, the appellant had received less refund than entitled, based on detailed calculations.

Lastly, the Tribunal examined the correctness and propriety of the Commissioner (Appeals) remanding the matter for fresh adjudication, considering the statutory framework and amendments affecting appellate powers.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner (Appeals) to Remand the Matter

The relevant legal framework is Section 35A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as amended by the Finance Act, 2001, effective from 11.05.2001. The amendment explicitly withdrew the power of the Commissioner (Appeals) to remand matters back to the original adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication. The appellant argued that the impugned order allowing remand was therefore without jurisdiction and void.

The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals), in the impugned order, directed the adjudicating authority to re-work the refund amount by relying on figures pertaining to Chapter 34 goods while sanctioning the differential refund for Chapter 38 goods. The appellant contended this was an erroneous exercise of remand power not conferred by the statute.

The Tribunal, however, observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) had considered the merits of the case and found it appropriate to remand the matter for recalculation of the refund in accordance with law. The Tribunal did not find any infirmity in this approach, implicitly recognizing the appellate authority's discretion to ensure proper adjudication. The Tribunal directed the adjudicating authority to reconsider the grievance and pass an order accordingly.

2. Applicability of Doctrine of Res Judicata on Refund Claims

The appellant submitted that the refund claims relating to Chapter 34 goods had attained finality as the monthly refund sanctioning orders had not been challenged by the Department. Therefore, any attempt to re-agitate the issue of excess refund on Chapter 34 goods in proceedings concerning Chapter 38 goods was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata, as embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, precludes re-litigation of any matter that has been judicially decided between the same parties. The appellant relied on precedents affirming that once an issue attains finality, it cannot be reopened in subsequent proceedings.

Several decisions were cited, including a recent ruling from the same Tribunal, which held that issues already adjudicated and decided in favour of the appellant could not be re-agitated. The appellant contended that the Department's challenge to the refund order for Chapter 38 goods, on the basis that it would impact the refund for Chapter 34 goods, was impermissible.

The Tribunal, however, did not explicitly rule on the res judicata argument in its order. Instead, it focused on the procedural propriety of remanding the matter for recalculation. The absence of a specific rejection of the res judicata plea suggests that the Tribunal did not find it necessary to delve into this issue given the facts and procedural posture.

3. Allegation of Excess Refund on Chapter 34 Goods

The appellant submitted detailed calculations demonstrating that no excess refund had been received for Chapter 34 goods during the financial year 2009-10. The appellant provided a comparative table showing total duty liability, maximum refund as per notified rates, actual duty paid, and refund receivable, concluding that the appellant had actually received a net lesser refund by Rs. 1,53,337 after adjusting for any alleged excess refund in certain months.

This evidence was presented to rebut the Department's contention that the figures in the refund order for Chapter 38 goods would result in excess refund for Chapter 34 goods. The appellant argued that the entire situation was revenue neutral or in their favour, and thus the Department's challenge was unfounded.

The Tribunal did not explicitly analyze this factual contention in detail but implicitly recognized the need for the adjudicating authority to reconsider the refund amount in light of all submissions and calculations.

4. Treatment of Competing Arguments and Final Determination

The Department justified the impugned order of remand, asserting the correctness of the Commissioner (Appeals)' direction to recalculate the refund. The Tribunal heard both parties and examined the records.

While acknowledging the appellant's submissions, the Tribunal emphasized that the merits had been discussed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and found no infirmity in the remand order. The Tribunal directed the adjudicating authority to consider the appellant's grievances and recalculate the eligible refund accordingly.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the remand and the procedural course adopted by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Significant Holdings:

"We find that the merits of the case has already discussed by the Ld. Commissioner (Appeal) therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order and we direct the Adjudicating Authority to consider the grievance of the appellant, recalculate the amount of eligible refund and thereafter pass the order in accordance with law."

This pronouncement establishes that the appellate authority's decision to remand a matter for fresh adjudication, even post the 2001 amendment, may be sustained if it is exercised to ensure correct application of law and facts, and not as a mere procedural formality.

The Tribunal also implicitly recognized the principle that refund claims must be calculated in accordance with the applicable notifications and actual value addition, and that differential refunds must be scrutinized carefully to avoid revenue leakage or erroneous payments.

Although the appellant's res judicata argument was well-founded in principle and supported by precedent, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to overrule the remand, indicating a preference for allowing the adjudicating authority to re-examine the matter comprehensively rather than dismissing the Department's challenge outright.

In sum, the Tribunal's decision preserves the procedural integrity of the appellate process, endorses the recalculation of refunds based on detailed scrutiny, and maintains the finality of orders only insofar as they do not conflict with the requirement of lawful adjudication.