2025 (5) TMI 1900 - SC - Indian Laws

Seeking to grant for anticipatory bai - allegations of criminal conspiracy corruption and misappropriation of public funds - High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to grant anticipatory bail - confessional statement of one accused implicating another co- accused - Scope and applicability of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Allegations of third-degree methods - admissibility and evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC - HELD THAT - It is incumbent that there are other materials also which would render support or substantiate the case of the confession. However it is subject to the standard of proving as contemplated by law. If this is the position the court should look into the statements alleged to have been given by the co-accused and that too before a police officer during the course of investigation with great care and circumspection. The said statements are directly hit by Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Particularly the statement given by any one of the accused persons and recorded by the police officer during the course of investigation cannot be relied upon by the prosecution except subject to the limitations provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement given by an accused involving himself in the crime and also implicating third person cannot be proved legally in the court. It will be in direct conflict with Sections 25 and 26 respectively of the Evidence Act. If such evidence or confession cannot be proved then the occasion for utilizing such statement against another person would not arise. From the above exposition of law the following emerges - (i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information report can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC as held in Nandini Satpathy 1978 (4) TMI 236 - SUPREME COURT . (ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the CrPC would ordinarily be of two kinds it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature. (iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence respectively as held in Pakala Narayana Swami 1939 (1) TMI 13 - BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL then it amounts to confession. (iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused. (v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co- accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co- accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act only at the stage of trial where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co- accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence. (vi) Furthermore because such confessional statements are not evidence in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu 1949 (2) TMI 11 - PRIVY COUNCIL such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh 1952 (3) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act are fulfilled. (vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act as doing so would militate against the general principle that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario whatsoever. (viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement i.e. it is neither a confession nor an admission the statement being one under Section 161 would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr.PC. and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re- examination of such accused person alone as held in Mahabir Mandal 1972 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused implicates another co-accused the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused as there can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath nor in the presence of the co-accused the same cannot be tested by cross- examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration a statement of one accused person against another co-accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu 1949 (2) TMI 11 - PRIVY COUNCIL i.e. when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co-accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement . (ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Salim Khan 1999 (12) TMI 888 - SUPREME COURT have held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs if the police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C.. However such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C. and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu. (x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under Section 161 of the CrPC for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an accused person or likely to be an accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because there may be situations where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the CrPC may not be an accused but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts where it emerges from the material on record that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner. Allegations of third-degree methods Besides the above we would also like to make ourselves very clear that the investigating agency shall not adopt any third-degree methods or shall not coerce or exert any undue pressure or bring any undue influence on any of the witnesses or any of the co-accused to make statements that may suit the State. Tomorrow if any complaint is made before the court in this context with some cogent material be it the trial Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court the same shall be viewed very seriously. It is expected of the investigating agency to carry out a fair impartial and transparent investigation more particularly in accordance with law. Before we close this matter we make it further clear that if the petitioners are ultimately arrested remanded and thereafter sent to judicial custody and if any regular bail application is filed the same shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law. It is needless to say that the principles of grant of anticipatory bail substantially differ from the principles of grant of regular bail. It is for the Court concerned to apply the correct principles of law so far as the grant of regular bail is concerned and decide the same accordingly. With the aforesaid these Special Leave Petitions are disposed of. If the petitioners have any further apprehension that they may be ill-treated they can approach the High Court and obtain the very same relief that the High Court has granted in favour of the other witnesses. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 7534 OF 2025 1. This petitioner has already been arrested in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 registered at CID Police Station Mangalagiri Guntur District State of Andhra Pradesh. 2. We are informed that the petitioner was arrested and remanded to judicial custody. While reminding him to judicial custody the investigating officer did not pray for any police remand. After being remanded to judicial custody according to the State the investigating officer has now moved an application seeking police remand of the petitioner. 3. We do not say anything in this regard because it will be for the Court concerned to consider whether once an accused is remanded to judicial custody whether thereafter the Investigating Officer can pray for police remand or not. Be that as it may if any application for regular bail is filed by the petitioner the same shall be looked into by the Court concerned on its own merits by applying the well-settled principles of grant of regular bail in accordance with law. With the aforesaid the Special Leave Petition is disposed of. Pending applications if any shall also stand disposed of.

Summary

Issues Presented and Considered

The core legal questions considered by the Court are:

(i) Whether the petitioners are entitled to anticipatory bail in connection with allegations of criminal conspiracy, corruption, and misappropriation of public funds under the Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the newly enacted Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023;

(ii) The scope and applicability of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in relation to confessional statements made by co-accused persons, particularly whether such statements can be relied upon at the stage of anticipatory bail or regular bail;

(iii) The admissibility and evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) made by accused persons and their use in bail proceedings;

(iv) The impact of alleged political vendetta or mala fides on the grant of anticipatory bail;

(v) The propriety of custodial interrogation of accused persons in cases involving serious allegations of corruption and conspiracy;

(vi) The conduct of the investigating agency, specifically allegations of third-degree methods or coercion during investigation;

(vii) The distinction between principles governing anticipatory bail and regular bail, and the discretion of courts in granting such relief.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

1. Entitlement to Anticipatory Bail in Serious Corruption and Criminal Conspiracy Allegations

The legal framework governing anticipatory bail is well-established: it is an extraordinary remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances when the court is convinced that the allegations are frivolous or baseless. The petitioners faced allegations under Sections 409, 420, 120-B IPC (now corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), and various sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prosecution case, as detailed in the FIR and investigation reports, involved suppression of established liquor brands, preferential allocation of orders to favored brands, manipulation of procurement processes, and alleged kickbacks totaling approximately Rs. 3,200 crores.

The High Court, after detailed consideration of the evidence and submissions, found a prima facie case against the petitioners. The Court emphasized that the investigation was at a crucial stage, and custodial interrogation was necessary to unravel the conspiracy and prevent interference with witnesses. The petitioners' cooperation with the investigation was noted but not considered sufficient to negate the need for custodial interrogation.

The Court also acknowledged the petitioners' claims of political vendetta but held that political bias alone is insufficient to grant anticipatory bail when substantial prima facie evidence exists. The Court underscored that courts must balance the possibility of political vendetta against the gravity of allegations and evidence on record.

Thus, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order denying anticipatory bail, holding that the discretion was exercised judiciously.

2. Applicability and Interpretation of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act Regarding Confessional Statements of Co-accused

Section 30 of the Evidence Act provides that when multiple persons are tried jointly for the same offence, a confession by one implicating others may be considered against all. The Court examined the scope and limitations of this provision in detail. It emphasized that:

• The confession must be relevant, admissible, and duly proved against the maker;
• The accused must be jointly tried for the same offence;
• The confession must implicate both the maker and the co-accused;
• Such confessions are not "evidence" per se but may be considered as one element among others;
• The confession can only be used prudently to reinforce other evidence.

The Court criticized the High Court's approach of considering such confessions at the anticipatory bail stage, holding that this is improper because the conditions for admissibility and proof of confession are usually established only during trial. The Court clarified that confessional statements made during police interrogation are inadmissible unless made in the presence of a magistrate and free from inducement or coercion, as per Sections 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act.

Therefore, the Court held that confessional statements of co-accused cannot be relied upon at the bail stage to establish a prima facie case.

3. Admissibility and Use of Statements Under Section 161 Cr.P.C. in Bail Proceedings

The Court distinguished between statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. made by witnesses and those made by accused persons. It held that:

• Statements of witnesses under Section 161 may be considered at bail stage to assess the prima facie case;
• Statements of accused persons under Section 161, which are often in the nature of admissions or confessions, are governed by the Evidence Act and generally inadmissible unless made in strict compliance with evidentiary safeguards;
• Admissions by one accused cannot be used against another co-accused except under the narrow exceptions provided by law;
• Exculpatory statements by accused persons implicating others are of no evidentiary value against the co-accused and cannot be relied upon;
• The Court cautioned that reliance on statements of accused persons under Section 161 for bail decisions must be exercised with great care to avoid prejudicing the investigation or trial.

Thus, the Court clarified that police statements of accused persons cannot be used indiscriminately at the bail stage to establish guilt or implicate co-accused.

4. Political Vendetta and Mala Fides as Grounds for Grant of Anticipatory Bail

The petitioners argued that the prosecution was motivated by political vendetta. The Court acknowledged that political bias is a relevant consideration but held that it cannot override substantial prima facie evidence of serious offences. The Court observed that in political rivalries, allegations of bias are common, but the court must look at the totality of evidence to determine whether the prosecution case is frivolous or baseless. Only when the court is convinced that the allegations are without substance and motivated solely by mala fide considerations should political vendetta influence the grant of anticipatory bail.

5. Custodial Interrogation and Its Necessity in Corruption Cases Involving Influential Persons

The Court emphasized the importance of custodial interrogation in cases involving serious corruption allegations and influential accused. It noted that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more effective in eliciting information and uncovering broader conspiracies than questioning under bail protection. The Court recognized the investigating agency's apprehension that anticipatory bail might allow accused persons to influence witnesses or impede investigation. It held that custodial interrogation is essential to confront accused with evidence and ensure a fair and effective investigation.

6. Allegations of Third-Degree Methods by Investigating Agency

The Court expressed strong disapproval of any coercive or undue pressure tactics by the investigating agency. It underscored the requirement for a fair, impartial, and transparent investigation conducted strictly in accordance with law. The Court warned that any substantiated complaints of third-degree methods would be taken seriously by all courts, including this Court.

7. Distinction Between Anticipatory Bail and Regular Bail Principles

The Court clarified that principles governing anticipatory bail differ substantially from those applicable to regular bail. While anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy granted sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, regular bail is considered after arrest and remand, based on the merits of the case. The Court noted that if petitioners are arrested and apply for regular bail, the courts must apply the appropriate principles and decide on merits without being influenced by the anticipatory bail order.

Significant Holdings

"The established legal principle is that anticipatory bail is not granted as a matter of routine; it should only be provided when the Court is convinced that exceptional circumstances warrant such an extraordinary remedy."

"Political vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant considerations while considering the plea of anticipatory bail. However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail."

"Such disclosure statements made by co-accused can indeed be taken into consideration as investigative leads and, further, may be admissible during trial under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is erroneous to say that confessional statement made by the accused during interrogation cannot be considered or looked into to connect the other co-accused."

"We are of the considered opinion that such a confession if any cannot be looked into at the stage of anticipatory bail or even regular bail... Before a confession is taken into consideration against a co-accused, the said confession has to be duly proved against the maker... which can only be ascertained in the course of trial."

"Statements of an accused person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by virtue of ordinarily being in the form of either an admission or a confession cannot be looked into qua another co-accused... The fundamental canon of criminal jurisprudence is that a statement of one accused person cannot be used against another co-accused person."

"Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438. In corruption cases concerning influential persons, effective interrogation of the suspect is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which are likely to be concealed."

"The investigating agency shall not adopt any third-degree methods or shall not coerce or exert any undue pressure or bring any undue influence on any of the witnesses or any of the co-accused to make statements that may suit the State."

"If the petitioners are ultimately arrested, remanded and thereafter sent to judicial custody and if any regular bail application is filed, the same shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law."

In conclusion, the Court upheld the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, emphasizing the seriousness of allegations, the necessity of custodial interrogation, the limited role of political vendetta as a ground for bail, and the strict evidentiary standards governing the use of confessional and police statements at the bail stage. The Court also underscored the requirement for lawful and fair investigation free from coercion, and clarified the distinction between anticipatory and regular bail principles for future proceedings.