2025 (5) TMI 1915 - AT - Service Tax

Levy of service tax - amounts recovered as a penal charge which are charged with the intention to make good for the losses and to also act as a deterrent to ensure that buyer or supplier do not violate the terms of contract - HELD THAT - The penal implications under contract cannot be identified as such an agreement. The payment towards delayed performance of service is only one condition of the contract and thus cannot be called as the act of tolerating the delay of service. Hence the disputed amount is not susceptible to service tax. In the case of Food Corporation of India Vs. Surana Commercial Co. and others 2003 (9) TMI 812 - SUPREME COURT the Hon ble Supreme Court pointed out that if a party promises to abstain from doing something it can be regarded as a consideration but such abstinence has to be specifically mentioned in the agreement. Reliance is also placed on Circular No. 178/10/2022-GST dated 03.08.2022 and Circular No. 214/1/2023-ST dated 28.02.2023 wherein it was clarified that the charges collected on account of non-performance of work within agreed stipulated time are not susceptible to tax. It is a trite law that circulars are binding on the department. In the present case also the agreements do not specify what precise obligation has been cast upon the appellant to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or a situation. It is no doubt true that the contracts may provide for penal clauses for breach of the terms of the contract but as noted above there is a marked distinction between conditions to a contract and considerations for a contract . Thus the retention amount by the appellant does not undergo a change after receipt it remains as condition to the contract . Hence cannot be called as consideration to the contract . Conclusion - No service tax is attracted under the provisions of Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act. Once the service tax can not be levied the imposition of interest and penalty also cannot be sustained. Appeal allowed.

The core legal questions considered in this appeal are as follows:

1. Whether the amounts collected by the appellant as liquidated damages or penalty for delay in supply of goods or services constitute a 'Declared Service' under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994, and thus attract service tax.

2. Whether the penal charges collected by the appellant can be regarded as "consideration" for rendering any taxable service under the definition of service in Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994.

3. Whether the contractual clauses imposing liquidated damages amount to an independent agreement to tolerate or refrain from an act as required under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

4. The applicability and binding nature of departmental circulars clarifying the taxability of such penalty or liquidated damages.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

Issue 1 & 2: Taxability of Liquidated Damages under Section 66E(e) and Definition of Consideration under Section 65B(44)

The relevant legal framework includes Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994, which defines "Declared Services" to include any agreement to tolerate or refrain from an act, and Section 65B(44) which defines "service" as any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration. Explanation (a) to Section 67 clarifies that "consideration" includes any amount payable for taxable services provided or to be provided.

The appellant contended that the liquidated damages collected are penal in nature, intended to deter breaches of contract and compensate for losses, and do not represent consideration for any service provided by the appellant. The appellant emphasized the absence of a "quid pro quo" or any activity undertaken by it in exchange for these amounts, thus negating the existence of a taxable service.

The Tribunal examined the nature of the contractual clauses imposing liquidated damages and held that such penal provisions are conditions of the contract rather than independent agreements to tolerate or refrain from acts. The payment of liquidated damages is triggered by breach of contract and does not amount to the appellant undertaking any activity or service in exchange for the amount collected.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court judgment in the South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. case, which affirmed that penal clauses are safeguards for commercial interests and do not constitute consideration for a service. The Court observed that "the penal clauses are in the nature of providing a safeguard to the commercial interest... It is not the intention of the appellant to impose any penalty upon the other party nor is it the intention of the other party to get penalized."

The Court further noted that the purpose of liquidated damages is to ensure compliance with contractual terms, and the recovery of such amounts cannot be equated with provision of any service. There is no activity carried out by the appellant to receive compensation, nor any intention on part of the other party to breach the contract and pay damages.

Issue 3: Requirement of an Independent Agreement to Tolerate or Refrain from an Act

The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court decision in Food Corporation of India Vs. Surana Commercial Co., which held that a promise to abstain from doing something can be consideration only if specifically mentioned in the agreement. In the present case, the agreements did not specify any obligation on the appellant to tolerate or refrain from an act independently; the penal clauses were merely conditions within the contract.

The Tribunal concluded that the contractual penal clauses do not amount to an independent agreement contemplated under Section 66E(e). The retention of amounts as liquidated damages remains a contractual condition and cannot be treated as consideration for a declared service.

Issue 4: Binding Effect of Departmental Circulars

The Tribunal relied on Circular No. 178/10/2022-GST dated 03.08.2022 and Circular No. 214/1/2023-ST dated 28.02.2023, which clarified that charges collected for non-performance within stipulated time are not taxable. The Tribunal emphasized that such circulars are binding on the department and reinforce the non-taxability of liquidated damages.

Treatment of Competing Arguments

The Department acknowledged that the issue is no longer res integra but urged dismissal of the appeal, relying on the impugned orders. The Tribunal, however, found the appellant's submissions and supporting precedents more persuasive. The Tribunal distinguished penal charges from consideration for service and underscored the absence of any independent agreement to tolerate or refrain from acts as required under the statute.

Significant Holdings

The Tribunal held: "We hold that penal implications under contract cannot be identified as such an agreement. The payment towards delayed performance of service is only one condition of the contract, and thus cannot be called as the act of tolerating the delay of service. Hence, the disputed amount is not susceptible to service tax."

Further, quoting the Supreme Court in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd., the Tribunal emphasized:

"The penal clauses are in the nature of providing a safeguard to the commercial interest of the appellant and it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that recovering any sum by invoking the penalty clauses is the reason behind the execution of the contract for an agreed consideration. It is not the intention of the appellant to impose any penalty upon the other party nor is it the intention of the other party to get penalized."

It was also held that "the retention amount by the appellant does not undergo a change after receipt, it remains as 'condition to the contract'. Hence cannot be called as 'consideration to the contract'."

Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that no service tax liability arises under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 on liquidated damages collected for delayed performance.

Consequently, the imposition of interest and penalty on such amounts was also held unsustainable.

The impugned order confirming the service tax demand was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

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