2025 (6) TMI 671 - HC - Indian Laws

Seeking to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 - dismissal for want of prosecution - Dishonour of cheque(s) - repeated absence of the complainant or his counsel - Legality of Dismissal of Complaint for Want of Prosecution under Section 256 CrPC - Legal maxims - HELD THAT - It is not in dispute that the applicant/complainant had instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which was duly registered and proceeded to the stage of issuance of summons. The respondent eventually entered an appearance and was granted bail. The matter was fixed for framing of notice under Section 251 CrPC. Furthermore it is well settled that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be exercised to circumvent specific statutory provisions or to revive proceedings already concluded by an order of acquittal passed under Section 256 CrPC. In PadmabenAjit bhai Patel v. State of Gujarat the Hon ble Supreme Court reiterated that inherent jurisdiction must be sparingly exercised and not in cases where specific remedies are available. The repeated absence of the complainant the failure to avail statutory remedy and the unexplained delay together do not present a case of procedural irregularity or miscarriage of justice warranting exercise of this Court s extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. While the applicant may have perceived hardship such hardship flows from his own conduct in failing to appear and prosecute the complaint. The legal maxim actus curiae neminemgravabit cannot be invoked where the default is entirely attributable to the party. Moreover the maxim interest reipublicaeut sit finislitium also guides that litigation must attain finality. Additionally the court takes note of the legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights is fully applicable in the present case. The applicant having been negligent and indolent in pursuing his case is now estopped from claiming equitable relief under the garb of inherent powers. The present application if allowed would amount to nullifying the effect of an acquittal granted under a valid statutory provision and would undermine the legislative intent behind Section 256 CrPC which seeks to balance the complainant s right of prosecution with the accused s protection against harassment and undue delay.

Summary

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this matter include:

1. Whether the dismissal of the complaint under Section 256 CrPC for want of prosecution, following the complainant's repeated absence, was legally justified.

2. Whether the criminal revision filed against the dismissal order was maintainable under the provisions of the CrPC.

3. Whether the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked to set aside the dismissal order and restore the complaint, circumventing the statutory appeal mechanism.

4. The scope and limits of judicial discretion in dismissing complaints for default, particularly in cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

5. The applicability of legal maxims and principles governing procedural diligence, finality of litigation, and the exercise of inherent powers.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

Issue 1: Legality of Dismissal of Complaint under Section 256 CrPC for Want of Prosecution

The complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was dismissed by the trial court on 19.01.2018 due to the complainant's absence on six consecutive hearing dates. The relevant statutory provision, Section 256 CrPC, empowers the magistrate to dismiss a complaint if the complainant fails to appear and prosecute the case.

The Court noted that the complainant and his counsel were absent on 13.11.2017, 27.11.2017, 13.12.2017, 08.01.2018, 12.01.2018, and 19.01.2018. Although the complainant argued that some absences were due to the presiding officer's leave and inadvertence, the Court emphasized that a litigant must exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting a case, especially one involving quasi-criminal liability under Section 138 NI Act.

The trial court had shown leniency by granting opportunities on 08.01.2018 and 12.01.2018, yet the complainant failed to appear on the final date. The Court found that the dismissal was within the trial court's jurisdiction and was not a result of any procedural irregularity or miscarriage of justice. The dismissal resulted in an order of acquittal in favor of the accused, consistent with the statutory scheme.

Issue 2: Maintainability of Criminal Revision Against the Dismissal Order

The applicant filed a criminal revision against the dismissal order, which was dismissed by the revisional court on the ground that such revision was not maintainable under Section 401(4) CrPC. The revisional court held that the proper remedy was an appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC.

The Court concurred with this view, relying on the statutory language of Section 378(4) CrPC, which provides that in complaint cases where an order of acquittal is passed, the complainant may appeal to the High Court only after obtaining special leave. The Court further cited authoritative precedents, including the Madras High Court's decision and several Supreme Court rulings (Damodar S. Prabhu, Subash Chand, and Mallikarjun Kodagali), which uniformly establish that revision is not the remedy against acquittal in complaint cases.

Issue 3: Invocation of Inherent Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to Restore Complaint

The applicant sought to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to set aside both the dismissal order and the revisional court's order and restore the complaint. The Court analyzed the scope of Section 482 CrPC, emphasizing that it is a residual power to prevent abuse of process or to cure gross injustice but cannot be used to circumvent specific statutory remedies or revive proceedings concluded by lawful orders.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in Padmaben Ajitbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, which underscores that inherent jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and not where a specific remedy is available. Since the applicant failed to avail the statutory appeal remedy under Section 378(4) CrPC, the Court held that the invocation of Section 482 CrPC was impermissible.

The Court further reasoned that allowing restoration would undermine the legislative intent behind Section 256 CrPC, which balances the complainant's right to prosecute with the accused's protection from harassment and undue delay.

Issue 4: Exercise of Judicial Discretion and Treatment of Absence

The applicant contended that the absence was neither deliberate nor wilful but inadvertent, caused by the presiding officer's leave and repeated adjournments. The Court acknowledged this but held that inadvertence or a bona fide slip of memory does not excuse persistent absence over six hearings, especially when opportunities were granted.

The Court applied the legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights) and emphasized that the complainant's negligence in prosecuting the complaint disentitles him to equitable relief.

It also invoked actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) and interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is in the interest of the state that there be an end to litigation) to underline the importance of finality and procedural discipline.

Issue 5: Competing Arguments and Findings on Abuse of Process

The respondent argued that the present application was an abuse of process, seeking to bypass the statutory appeal mechanism by invoking inherent powers. The Court agreed, noting that the applicant deliberately chose a circuitous route instead of filing the appeal within the prescribed time.

The Court also observed that the complainant's repeated absence caused harassment to the accused and wasted judicial time, justifying the dismissal. The Court declined to set a precedent that would allow litigants to override statutory protections through inherent jurisdiction.

Significant Holdings

"The learned trial court was within its authority under Section 256 CrPC to dismiss the complaint for default, which resulted in an order of acquittal."

"The revisional court rightly held that the revision was not maintainable against an order of acquittal in a complaint case, and that the proper remedy lay in preferring an appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC, subject to grant of special leave by the High Court."

"Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be exercised to circumvent specific statutory provisions or to revive proceedings already concluded by an order of acquittal passed under Section 256 CrPC."

"The legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt-the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights-is fully applicable in the present case."

"Allowing restoration at this stage would amount to nullifying the effect of an acquittal granted under a valid statutory provision and would undermine the legislative intent behind Section 256 CrPC."

In conclusion, the Court held that the dismissal of the complaint for want of prosecution was legally valid, the criminal revision was not maintainable, and the inherent jurisdiction could not be invoked to restore the complaint. The applicant's failure to prosecute diligently and to avail the statutory appeal remedy disentitled him from equitable relief, and the application was accordingly dismissed.