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2025 (6) TMI 1889 - Board - SEBILiability of Noticee for contraventions committed by the Company in relation to the issuance of Redeemable Preference Shares (RPS) to the public without complying with the provisions of the Companies Act 1956 and the SEBI Act 1992 - Noticee qualifies as an officer who is in default - Meaning of officer who is in default as per section 5 of the Companies Act 1956 - HELD THAT - A perusal of Section 5 of the Companies Act 1956 indicates that the expression Officer who is in default would mean managing director or managing directors whole time director or whole time directors the manager the secretary or any person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act and would also include any person charged by the Board with the responsibility of complying with the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 5(g) of the Companies Act further stipulates that where the company does not have any of these officers specified in clauses (a) to (c) all the directors would be deemed to be officers in default. It is noted that the Noticee failed to avail the opportunity of hearing provided at the time of passing of the Final Order. The said order did not identify any officer in default and held all the directors/ promoters liable for issuance of the RPS. However on the basis of the information obtained from Ministry of Corporate Affair s website it is noted that Mr. Mohammad Qamar was the Managing Director of TRIL for the relevant period (2011-12). Further the Final Order does not bring forth the involvement of the Noticee in the issuance of RPS as a director or otherwise. In addition thereto the material on record also does not show the involvement of the Noticee in the issuance of the RPS during the relevant period. In the Final Order (or in other material available on record) there is no mention that the Noticee was the Managing Director or Whole Time Director or was a person charged by the Board with the responsibility of complying with the provisions of the Companies Act. In other words without any finding that the Noticee is an officer in default the liability imposed under Section 73(2) cannot be invoked on him. Consequently the question of violations by the Noticee of Section 60 read with 2(36) Section 56 73(1) 73(3) of the Companies Act read with Section 27(2) of the SEBI Act does not arise. Thus the present proceedings against the Noticee are liable to be disposed of. As noted above since the Noticee was not an officer who is in default and is not liable for the alleged violations I am of the view that the remaining submissions made by the Noticee do not require further consideration.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in the judgment are: a. Whether the Noticee is liable for the contraventions committed by the Company in relation to the issuance of Redeemable Preference Shares (RPS) to the public without complying with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the SEBI Act, 1992. b. Whether the Noticee qualifies as an "officer who is in default" under Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956, thereby attracting joint and several liability for refund of monies collected through the RPS issue under Section 73(2) of the Companies Act. c. Whether the directions issued against the Noticee, including refund of money with interest, market access restrictions, and other penalties, are legally sustainable. d. The validity of the proceedings against the Noticee in light of his claimed role in the Company and the absence of specific findings identifying him as an officer in default. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Liability of the Noticee for contraventions committed by the Company in issuance of RPS Legal Framework and Precedents: The issuance of RPS was deemed a public issue under the first proviso to Section 67(3) of the Companies Act, 1956. Consequently, compliance with Sections 60 read with 2(36), 56, 73(1), 73(2), 73(3) and Section 27(2) of the SEBI Act was mandatory. Section 73(2) mandates repayment of monies collected without requisite permissions, jointly and severally by the company and every director who is an officer in default. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the Interim and Final Orders were passed against the Company and its directors/promoters for non-compliance. However, the Final Order did not specify the role or involvement of the Noticee in the issuance of RPS. The Noticee contested his liability, asserting he was neither a promoter nor a director, and only an employee performing clerical duties. Key Evidence and Findings: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs records showed that the Company had a designated Managing Director, Mr. Mohammad Qamar, during the relevant period. The Noticee failed to demonstrate his involvement in the issuance of RPS or any role as a director or promoter. The Noticee also did not avail the hearing opportunity during the Final Order proceedings. Application of Law to Facts: Since the issuance of RPS was a public issue, the liability to repay money with interest lies with the company and its officers in default. The absence of evidence showing the Noticee as an officer in default or any involvement in the issuance disentitles SEBI from holding him liable. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Noticee's claim of non-involvement and non-directorship was considered alongside the statutory definition of "officer who is in default." The Tribunal found the Noticee's submissions before the SAT and before SEBI inconsistent but ultimately focused on the statutory criteria rather than mere titles or claims. Conclusion: The Noticee is not liable for the contraventions as he was not an officer in default and did not have involvement in the issuance of RPS. Issue 2: Whether the Noticee qualifies as an "officer who is in default" under Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956 Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956 defines "officer who is in default" to include managing directors, whole-time directors, managers, secretaries, persons directing the Board, or those charged by the Board with compliance responsibilities. Clause (g) extends liability to all directors if the company lacks officers in clauses (a) to (c). The Tribunal relied on the Hon'ble SAT decision in Pritha Bag vs SEBI, which held that without a finding that a person is an officer in default, Section 73(2) liability cannot be invoked against them. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal observed that the Company had a designated Managing Director during the relevant period and that the Final Order did not identify the Noticee as an officer in default. The material on record did not show the Noticee's involvement in the issuance of RPS or any responsibility assigned by the Board. Key Evidence and Findings: Ministry of Corporate Affairs data confirmed the presence of a Managing Director. No evidence linked the Noticee to any official capacity qualifying him as an officer in default. The Noticee's own submissions acknowledged the presence of a Managing Director who managed the Company's affairs. Application of Law to Facts: Since the Company had a Managing Director, liability under Section 73(2) is primarily on that officer. The absence of any finding or evidence that the Noticee was an officer in default precludes liability. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Noticee's argument that only the Managing Director or designated officers can be held liable was accepted. The Tribunal rejected the imposition of liability on all directors/promoters indiscriminately without specific findings. Conclusion: The Noticee does not qualify as an officer in default under Section 5 and cannot be held liable under Section 73(2). Issue 3: Validity of the directions issued against the Noticee including refund, interest, and market restrictions Legal Framework and Precedents: SEBI's powers under Sections 11(1), 11(4), 11B read with Section 19 of the SEBI Act empower it to issue directions for refund, interest, and market restrictions in cases of securities law violations. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the Final Order directed the Noticee to refund amounts with 15% interest and imposed a four-year market ban. However, these directions were based on the presumption of the Noticee's role as promoter/director without substantiating evidence or specific findings of default. Key Evidence and Findings: The Noticee had not gained monetary advantage or unfair benefit. The FIR registered against the Noticee was disposed of with no case made out. No unresolved grievances against the Noticee were shown. The Final Order did not specify any document or resolution signed by the Noticee authorizing the RPS issuance. Application of Law to Facts: Since the Noticee is not an officer in default, the directions for refund and market restrictions lack legal basis. The Tribunal emphasized the requirement of specific findings before imposing such penalties. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Noticee's contention that debarment for violation of Section 73 is not supported by law was considered. The Tribunal did not delve into this submission further as the primary issue of liability was dispositive. Conclusion: The directions against the Noticee are not sustainable and are set aside. Issue 4: Validity of proceedings against the Noticee in light of his role and absence of specific findings Legal Framework and Precedents: Principles of natural justice require that allegations be supported by evidence and specific findings before imposing penalties. The Hon'ble SAT's order remitting the matter for fresh consideration underscored this requirement. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted variance in the Noticee's submissions before SAT and SEBI but focused on the absence of any material or findings establishing his role as director or promoter. The Noticee was not afforded an opportunity to contest specific allegations at the Final Order stage. Key Evidence and Findings: Lack of any document or resolution signed by the Noticee for issuance of RPS. The Noticee's role was limited to clerical work as per his submissions. The FIR against him was closed without charges. Application of Law to Facts: The absence of specific findings and evidence against the Noticee renders the proceedings against him unsustainable. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal did not find it necessary to consider further submissions due to the dispositive nature of the liability issue. Conclusion: The proceedings against the Noticee are liable to be disposed of without any directions. 3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS The Tribunal held: "Unless and until a finding is given that the appellant is an officer in default, the mandate provided under Section 73(2) cannot be invoked against the appellant." "In the absence of any finding that the Noticee was entrusted to discharge the application contained in Section 73 of the Companies Act, the direction to refund the amount alongwith interest from the Noticee is wholly illegal." "The Final Order does not bring forth the involvement of the Noticee in the issuance of the RPS during the relevant period." "Without any finding that the Noticee is an officer in default, the liability imposed under Section 73(2) cannot be invoked on him." "Since the Noticee was not an officer who is in default, and is not liable for the alleged violations, the remaining submissions made by the Noticee do not require further consideration." "I, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Sections 11(1), 11(4) and 11B read with Section 19 of the SEBI Act, hereby dispose of the present proceedings against the Noticee, without issuance of any direction." Core principles established include the necessity of specific findings identifying an individual as an officer in default before imposing liability under Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, and that mere directorship or promoter status without evidence of default does not attract such liability. The judgment reinforces adherence to procedural fairness and the requirement of evidence-based findings before imposing penalties under securities laws.
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