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2025 (7) TMI 4 - HC - Service TaxMaintainability of petition - Article 226 of the Constitution of India - availability of alternative remedy - Dismissal of appeal on the ground of time limitation - HELD THAT - Sub-section 1 of Section 86 of the Finance Act has provided for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. It has inter-alia provided that an assessee aggrieved by an order passed by a Commissioner of Central Excise Appeals under Section 85 of the Finance Act may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order within three months from the receipt of the order. The Order-in-Appeal dated 02.12.2024 has also mentioned that an appeal against the Order in Appeal would lie under Section 86 of the Finance Act to the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal CESTAT at Kolkata within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appeal against is communicated. It is thus clear the petitioner-assessee had the remedy of preferring a statutory appeal against the Order-in-Appeal dated 02.12.2024 under Section 86 of the Finance Act before the CESTAT. Yet the petitioner firm-assessee has preferred the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the Order-in-Original dated 02.12.2024 before this Court. The issues of maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes have come up for discussion in M/s Godrej Sara Lee Limited 2023 (2) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT . It has been observed that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution of India. Article 226 does not in terms impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. It has been held that though the exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner yet the mere fact that the petitioner before the High Court in a given case has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It has been held that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition and that the rule which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by the statute is a rule of policy convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. It has been observed that there is a fine but real distinction between the two distinct concepts entertainability and maintainability of a writ petition and the same is not to be lost sight of. The objection as to maintainability goes to the root of the matter and if such objection is found to be of substance the Court would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand the question of entertainability is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts writ remedy being discretionary. After making a survey of a number of decisions it has been observed that when the writ petition raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary the High Court can entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy is not availed of. It has been observed that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law then it should be decided by the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available. The date 01.04.2024 is a crucial one as it was on that day the Order-in-Original dated 21.03.2024 was communicated or received by the petitioner-assessee giving rise to the cause of action to prefer an appeal within normal period of limitation of two months and within extended period of limitation of further one month. In view of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act the day 01.04.2024 is to be excluded while calculating the period of two months plus one month. Therefore the period of two months plus one month has to be reckoned by excluding the date 01.04.2024 - it is not in doubt that the date of filing of the appeal by the petitioner-assessee on 01.07.2024 is within extended period of limitation of one month beyond the normal period of limitation of two months under sub-section 3A of Section 85 of the Finance Act. The Appellate Authority could not have held that the period of two months from 01.04.2024 expired on 31.05.2024 and the extended period of one month expired on 30.06.2024. The impugned order is not sustainable - petition allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
- Whether the appeal filed by the petitioner-assessee against the Order-in-Original dated 21.03.2024 was time-barred under sub-section (3A) of Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994, considering the date of receipt of the order and the period of limitation prescribed therein. - Whether the extended period of limitation of one month beyond the normal two months' period can be invoked and whether the appeal filed on 01.07.2024 falls within this extended period. - Whether the failure to file an application for condonation of delay along with the appeal memo filed on 01.07.2024 is fatal to the maintainability of the appeal and whether such defect is curable. - Whether the Appellate Authority was correct in rejecting the appeal without going into the merits solely on the ground of limitation. - Whether the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable despite the availability of statutory remedies under the Finance Act and the Central Excise Act. - The correct method of computation of limitation periods under statutory provisions, particularly the interpretation of "month" as per the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the application of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act regarding commencement and termination of time. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Timeliness of the Appeal under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act Legal Framework and Precedents: Sub-section (3A) of Section 85 mandates that an appeal against an Adjudicating Authority's order relating to service tax, interest, or penalty must be presented within two months from the date of receipt of the order. The proviso allows the Commissioner (Appeals) to permit filing within a further one-month period on sufficient cause being shown. The computation of limitation is governed by the General Clauses Act, 1897, specifically Sections 2(35) and 9, which define "month" as a calendar month and provide rules for excluding or including days in limitation calculations. The Supreme Court decisions in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Himachal Techno Engineers and others and Tarun Prasad Chatterjee vs. Dinanath Sharma clarify the interpretation of "month" and the exclusion of the first day in computing limitation. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted that the impugned Order-in-Original was communicated to the petitioner on 01.04.2024. The appeal was filed on 01.07.2024. The Appellate Authority had erroneously calculated the two-month limitation period as expiring on 31.05.2024 and the extended one-month period on 30.06.2024, thus holding the appeal time-barred. The Court applied Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and excluded the date of receipt (01.04.2024) from the computation. Consequently, the two-month period expired on 01.06.2024 and the extended one-month period expired on 01.07.2024, the date on which the appeal was filed. Therefore, the appeal was within the extended limitation period. Application of Law to Facts: The Court held that the Appellate Authority's strict day-counting approach was inconsistent with the statutory interpretation principles and the General Clauses Act. The appeal, filed on the last permissible day of the extended period, was timely. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The respondent argued the appeal was filed beyond the extended period and thus barred. The Court rejected this, relying on statutory interpretation and authoritative precedents. Conclusion: The appeal was not time-barred and the Appellate Authority erred in rejecting it on limitation grounds. Issue 2: Effect of Non-filing of Condonation Application Along with Appeal Memo Legal Framework and Precedents: Rule 3-A of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires an appeal filed beyond limitation to be accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Kumar held that non-compliance with this rule is a curable defect, allowing subsequent filing of the condonation application. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The petitioner did not file the condonation application with the appeal on 01.07.2024 but filed it subsequently on 26.11.2024, prior to disposal of the appeal. The Court held that this cured the defect and the appeal could not be dismissed in limine for the initial omission. Application of Law to Facts: The Court observed that the Appellate Authority disposed of the appeal on 02.12.2024, after the condonation application was filed, thus the defect was no longer extant. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The respondent did not dispute the curability but relied on limitation. The Court emphasized the distinction between filing and entertaining an appeal and the discretion to condone delay. Conclusion: The failure to file the condonation application with the appeal memo was a curable defect and did not justify dismissal without hearing on merits. Issue 3: Distinction Between Filing and Entertaining Appeal and Pre-deposit Requirement Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, applicable to the Finance Act, requires a pre-deposit of 7.5% of the duty or penalty in dispute before the Commissioner (Appeals) entertains the appeal. The Supreme Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineers Works Ltd. clarified that "entertain" means to admit for consideration or to proceed on merits, distinct from mere filing or receipt of appeal. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The petitioner made the pre-deposit on 23.09.2024, before the appeal was entertained. The Court held that the appeal was properly filed on 01.07.2024 and entertained only after fulfillment of the pre-deposit condition. Application of Law to Facts: The Court distinguished the date of filing from the date of entertaining the appeal, validating the appeal's procedural correctness. Conclusion: The pre-deposit requirement was complied with before entertaining the appeal, and the appeal was validly admitted. Issue 4: Maintainability of Writ Petition Despite Availability of Statutory Remedies Legal Framework and Precedents: Article 226 of the Constitution confers plenary discretionary power on High Courts to issue writs. The Supreme Court in M/s Godrej Sara Lee Limited vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority clarified that availability of statutory remedies is not an absolute bar to maintainability of writ petitions, especially when pure questions of law arise and factual investigation is unnecessary. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged the availability of statutory appeal remedies under Sections 85 and 86 of the Finance Act and the Central Excise Act but held that since the present case involves a pure legal question of limitation calculation without disputed facts, the writ petition is maintainable. Application of Law to Facts: The petition was filed within the statutory limitation period for appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The Court exercised discretion to entertain the writ petition for expeditious resolution of the legal issue. Treatment of Competing Arguments: The respondent argued for dismissal on grounds of alternative remedy. The Court distinguished between maintainability and entertainability, emphasizing the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction. Conclusion: The writ petition is maintainable and not barred by availability of statutory remedies. Issue 5: Correct Computation of Limitation Period and Application of General Clauses Act Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 2(35) and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 govern the definition of "month" and the method of calculating time periods in statutes. The Supreme Court decisions in State of Himachal Pradesh and Tarun Prasad Chatterjee clarified that "month" means calendar month, not fixed days, and the first day is excluded in computation when "from" is used. Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court applied these principles to the limitation period under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, holding that the two-month and one-month extended period must be calculated as calendar months excluding the date of receipt. This interpretation aligns with legislative intent and avoids mechanical day counting. Application of Law to Facts: The appeal filed on 01.07.2024 was within the extended limitation period computed in accordance with the General Clauses Act. Conclusion: The limitation period was incorrectly computed by the Appellate Authority; the correct calculation supports the petitioners' case. 3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS "The statutory prescription contained in Section 85 of the Finance Act would prevail in any such situation" and "a period of sixty days may not, always, be equal to two months." "The word 'entertain' means to 'adjudicate upon' or to 'proceed to consider on merits' and not 'initiation of proceeding' alone." "The defect of non-filing of the application for condonation of delay is a curable defect and if the required application is filed subsequently the appeal can be treated as presented in accordance with the requirement contained in Rule 3-A Order 41 of the Code." "The High Courts, depending on the fact situation involved in each particular case, have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. Mere availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition." "When the period prescribed is 'months' and not 'days', the period would expire on the corresponding date in the subsequent month, and the first day is excluded from computation." Final determinations:
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