2025 (7) TMI 214 - AT - Service Tax

Nature of work carried out - appellant was carrying out works related to plumbing fixtures tiling doors flooring railing work water proofing etc to the incomplete structures given by the main contractor - work orders executed by the appellant for M/s SMCC Constructions India Ltd and M/s Takenaka India Pvt Ltd - original works or completion and finishing services - work contract services provided to Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad - eligibility for exemption under N/N. 25/2012-ST dated 206.2012. Whether the work orders executed by the appellant for M/s SMCC Constructions India Ltd and M/s Takenaka India Pvt Ltd were in the nature of original works or was it completion and finishing services? - HELD THAT - It is evident that the appellant was given the shell of a building and he was to carry out all the necessary activities to complete the building including the final finishing works. It cannot be said that the appellant carried out finishing work only as contended by the department. In this context we draw support from Tribunal s decision in the case of Kalpakaaru Projects Pvt Ltd vs Pr. Commissioner CGST Delhi South 2025 (5) TMI 1832 - CESTAT NEW DELHI wherein the Tribunal had the opportunity to examine similar issue as to whether such works carried out by the appellant can be considered as original works - the demand in respect of the issue cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. Whether the work contract services provided to Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad was eligible for exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 206.2012? - HELD THAT - The facts in the instant case are that the Rashtriya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad has been set up by an Act passed by the UP-State Legislature. In this context Hon ble Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court of Patna in Shapoorji Pallonji Co. Pvt Ltd vs Commissioner of Customs Central Excise Service Tax Others 2023 (10) TMI 748 - SUPREME COURT examined the definition of governmental authority where it was held that IIT Patna and NIT Rourkela qualify as governmental authorities under the Exemption Notification and thus the service tax paid by SPCL for construction services is refundable. In the instant case it is an admitted fact that the RKUMP is a governmental authority and the benefit of the exemption contained in Notification 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 is available to the appellant. Hence respectfully following the decision of the Apex Court the demand is not sustainable. Once the demand under both the issues are set aside no penalties are liable to be imposed. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

Summary

The core legal questions considered by the Tribunal were twofold: (i) whether the work orders executed by the appellant as a sub-contractor for M/s SMCC Constructions India Ltd and M/s Takenaka India Pvt Ltd constituted 'original works' or merely completion and finishing services under the Service Tax Valuation Rules; and (ii) whether the works contract services provided to Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad (RKUMP) were eligible for exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, particularly regarding the definition and status of RKUMP as a 'governmental authority' within the meaning of the exemption notification.

Regarding the first issue, the relevant legal framework comprised Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, which defines 'original works' and prescribes the valuation methodology for service tax on works contracts. The appellant contended that the scope of 'original works' included all new constructions and related activities such as earthwork, plumbing, tiling, carpentry, and finishing works, which were integral to completing a new building. The Department argued that the appellant's work was limited to completion and finishing services, which attract a lower abatement (30% instead of 60%), thus leading to a differential demand.

The Tribunal examined the nature of the appellant's work orders and noted that the appellant was provided with skeletal structures and was responsible for comprehensive construction activities including plumbing, tiling, doors, flooring, railing, waterproofing, and other finishing works. The Tribunal relied on a prior decision where similar facts were considered and held that such activities amounted to 'original works' rather than mere finishing services. The Tribunal emphasized that the appellant effectively converted incomplete structures into fully functional buildings, which falls squarely within the ambit of 'original works' as per Rule 2A(ii)(A). The Tribunal also noted that the appellant had opted for the 60% abatement under Rule 2A(ii), which was consistent with the nature of the work performed.

In applying the law to the facts, the Tribunal found that the Department's characterization of the appellant's work as finishing services was incorrect. The appellant's activities were essential to the completion of new constructions and thus qualified as original works. The Tribunal further observed that this valuation was consistent with previous audits and that the demand on this issue was unsustainable both on merits and limitation grounds. Consequently, the demand related to the first issue was set aside.

On the second issue, the legal framework involved the interpretation of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, particularly entries 12 and 12A, which provide exemption from service tax for services provided to certain governmental authorities. The key question was whether RKUMP qualified as a 'governmental authority' under the exemption notification. The definition of 'governmental authority' had evolved during the relevant period, initially requiring 90% or more government participation and that the entity be set up by statute to carry out functions under Article 243W of the Constitution (functions entrusted to municipalities). Later amendments expanded the definition to include authorities set up by statute or established by government with 90% participation to carry out such functions.

The appellant argued that RKUMP was established by the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature under the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, and was thus a statutory body dedicated to the welfare of agriculturists, facilitating the sale of agricultural produce. The appellant contended that RKUMP was a governmental authority within the meaning of the exemption notification and thus entitled to exemption from service tax on the relevant works contract services.

The Department contended that RKUMP was not a governmental authority as it did not meet the 90% government participation criterion and did not carry out functions entrusted under Article 243W; further, the constructed facilities were commercial in nature, generating revenue through mandi fees and other charges. The Department also argued that the exemption under entry 14(d) for post-harvest storage infrastructure was inapplicable as the construction related to shops, offices, and cafeterias, not storage facilities.

The Tribunal undertook a detailed examination of the Supreme Court's recent authoritative interpretation of the term 'governmental authority' in the context of the exemption notification. The Supreme Court clarified that the amended definition was deliberately drafted to expand the scope of exemption to include authorities set up by statute without the strict requirement of 90% government participation or carrying out municipal functions under Article 243W. The Court emphasized the disjunctive nature of the definition, interpreting the word "or" in the clause as indicating alternatives rather than cumulative conditions. It rejected the Department's restrictive interpretation that sought to read the conditions conjunctively.

The Tribunal applied this authoritative interpretation and found that RKUMP, being a statutory body established by the State Legislature for the welfare of agriculturists, qualified as a governmental authority under the exemption notification. The Tribunal also noted the absence of any evidence indicating that RKUMP's activities were commercial in nature to the extent that would disqualify it from exemption. The Tribunal accordingly held that the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST was available to the appellant for the works contract services provided to RKUMP.

Regarding the limitation aspect, the appellant argued that the extended period for demand under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was not applicable as there was no suppression or fraud. The Tribunal did not find merit in the Department's invocation of extended limitation, particularly since the appellant had been registered and regularly discharged service tax liabilities. This further supported the setting aside of the demand related to RKUMP.

On penalties and interest, since the demands on both issues were set aside, the Tribunal held that no penalties or interest were leviable.

Significant holdings include the Tribunal's reliance on the Supreme Court's detailed interpretation of the definition of 'governmental authority' in the exemption notification, affirming the principle that the word "or" in statutory definitions must be given its natural disjunctive meaning. The Tribunal quoted the Supreme Court's reasoning extensively, underscoring that "the word 'or' employed in clause 2(s) manifests the legislative intent of prescribing an alternative" and that "the long line of clause 2(s) governs only sub-clause (ii) and not sub-clause (i)."

Further, the Tribunal established the principle that finishing and completion activities integral to making a new building fully functional qualify as 'original works' under Rule 2A(ii)(A), entitling the service provider to the 60% abatement on the service portion of the works contract.

In conclusion, the Tribunal held that the appellant's work orders for the main contractors constituted original works, and the appellant was entitled to the 60% abatement under Rule 2A(ii)(A). The works contract services provided to RKUMP were exempt from service tax under Notification No. 25/2012-ST, as RKUMP was a governmental authority within the meaning of the notification. Consequently, the demands confirmed by the Commissioner were set aside, and the appeal was allowed without imposition of penalties or interest.