2025 (7) TMI 858 - AT - Customs

Levy of penalty u/s 112(a) of Customs Act 1962 - alleged omission / commissions of the appellants-CHA s whereby duty-free goods imported under the Advance Authorisation Scheme were diverted into the local market - active collusion with the so-called High Sea Sellers - allegation supported with evidences or not - HELD THAT - It is true that the provisions of the IPC are not directly applicable to the Customs Act 1962. The two Acts operate in their own fields. One deal with criminal matter and the other with issue of taxation where mens rea may not always require to be shown for the imposition of penalty. Further it is seen that sec. 112 of the Customs Act 1962 speaks of omission only whereas section 107 of the IPC refer to illegal omission . Hence there is a difference in subject or context between the two Acts. Even if that be so the sections of the IPC mentioned above gives a sense of the basic ingredients of the terms abet and omission which would approximate to the use of term active collusion mentioned in the impugned order. The presumption of innocence is a background assumption of our legal system. From the allegations against the appellant it is seen that there is nothing to prove that there was a common intention between the appellant or any of the others involved or that they worked in concert to ensure that the goods imported in the name of M/s Kalp Impex under the Advance Authorisation scheme was to be diverted for home consumption. The statements of the appellants show a feeble acknowledgement of the illegality allegedly being indulged in by the importers etc it is not backed by evidence. As a rule of prudence while examining the evidentiary value of a statement it is desirable to seek corroboration of such evidence from other reliable evidence placed on record more so when the impugned order disputes a claim of retraction of the statements made by the appellants. The act or stake was not just a violation of his obligation as a CB but was done with knowledge of the illegality. The evidence in this regard can be both / either direct or circumstantial so long as common intent is discernable. However the evidence does not show that the appellants had a common intention along with the importer and High Seas Seller to do or omit to do any act which act or omission would render such goods liable to confiscation under section 111 or abets the doing or omission of such an act. This being so the charge of active collusion with the High Sea Sellers is not proved and hence the penalty imposed against the appellants under section 112(a) of the Customs Act 1962 merits to be dropped. The penalty imposed on the appellants are set aside - Appeal allowed.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered by the Tribunal in these appeals are:

- Whether the appellants, who are Customs House Agents (CHAs), committed acts or omissions that rendered imported goods liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962, specifically under clauses (d), (m), and (o).

- Whether the appellants abetted the commission of such acts or omissions, thereby attracting penalty under section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.

- Whether the appellants' conduct amounted to "active collusion" or conspiracy with the importer and High Sea Sellers to divert duty-free imported goods into the local market in violation of the Advance Authorisation Scheme and relevant Customs notifications.

- The applicability and interplay between the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004 regarding penal consequences for conduct of CHAs.

- The requirement of mens rea (common intention or knowledge) for imposing penalty under section 112(a) for abetment or omission.

- The sufficiency and nature of evidence required to establish abetment, conspiracy, or active collusion under the Customs Act, 1962.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Whether the appellants' acts or omissions rendered the goods liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The relevant legal framework includes section 111 of the Customs Act, which lists acts or omissions rendering goods liable to confiscation, and section 112(a) which penalizes persons who do or omit acts causing such confiscation or abet the same.

The impugned order alleged that the appellants, as CHAs, presented High Sea Seller (HSS) agreements without proper authorization or verification, facilitated clearance of duty-free goods under the Advance Authorisation Scheme, and arranged transportation contrary to the importer's instructions, thereby aiding diversion of goods into the local market.

The appellants argued that omissions such as not meeting the importer, lack of written authorization, or deviation in transportation destination do not fall within the mischief of section 111(d), (m), or (o), and thus do not render goods liable to confiscation.

The Tribunal noted that the role of the appellants was limited to procedural lapses and omissions in verification and authorization, without direct evidence implicating them in diversion or misuse of the Advance Authorisation Scheme. The importer and High Sea Sellers were found responsible for diversion, but the appellants' involvement was not shown to be part of a deliberate scheme to evade duty.

Hence, while some procedural violations under the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004 were evident, the threshold for rendering goods liable to confiscation due to the appellants' acts was not met.

Issue 2: Whether the appellants abetted or were actively colluding with the importer and High Sea Sellers, attracting penalty under section 112(a).

Section 112(a) penalizes any person who does or omits any act rendering goods liable to confiscation or abets such acts or omissions. The term 'abet' is not defined in the Customs Act, but the General Clauses Act refers to the Indian Penal Code (IPC) definition, which involves instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid.

The impugned order alleged "active collusion" by the appellants with the High Sea Sellers, implying conspiracy or abetment. The Tribunal examined the IPC provisions on abetment (section 107), criminal conspiracy (section 120-A), and acts done with common intention (section 34) to understand the necessary mental element.

The Tribunal emphasized that to establish abetment or conspiracy, there must be evidence of common intention or active participation in the illegal act. Mere omissions or procedural lapses without such common intention do not suffice.

The evidence did not show that the appellants shared a common intention with the importer or High Sea Sellers to divert goods or evade duty. Statements by officials of the importer and High Sea Sellers did not implicate the appellants in a conspiracy or deliberate wrongdoing. The appellants' statements showed only a weak acknowledgment of procedural irregularities, without corroboration.

Therefore, the charge of active collusion was not substantiated, and the penalty under section 112(a) for abetment was not justified.

Issue 3: The interplay between the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004.

The Tribunal observed that the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004 impose disciplinary obligations on CHAs, and violations may attract penalties or revocation of license even without mens rea. These regulations serve as a special law regulating CHAs' conduct.

The Customs Act, 1962 is a general statute dealing with customs duties and penalties for evasion or improper importation. When a special law and a general law operate in the same field, the principle of harmonious construction applies, giving precedence to the special law unless the general law clearly intends otherwise.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that while the appellants' procedural violations under the Regulations could attract disciplinary action, penal action under the Customs Act for abetment requires proof of common intention or knowledge of illegality. The two regimes can operate concurrently but have distinct standards and consequences.

Issue 4: Requirement of mens rea and evidentiary standards for penalty under section 112(a).

The Tribunal highlighted that although mens rea is not always essential for penalty under the Customs Act, when penalty is imposed for abetment or conspiracy, a mental element of common intention or knowledge is necessary.

The appellants' conduct must be shown to have been done with knowledge or reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation, or that they intentionally aided or instigated such acts. Mere negligence or procedural lapses without such knowledge do not attract penalty under section 112(a).

The evidence on record lacked direct or circumstantial proof of such mens rea or common intention by the appellants. The Tribunal also noted the principle of presumption of innocence and the need for corroboration of statements.

Issue 5: Treatment of competing arguments and final application of law to facts.

The appellants contended that their omissions did not amount to abetment or render goods liable to confiscation, and that there was no evidence of collusion. The revenue argued that mens rea was not essential and that the appellants violated licensing regulations and Customs Act provisions, justifying penalty.

The Tribunal found the appellants' arguments persuasive, emphasizing the absence of evidence of common intention or conspiracy. It distinguished procedural violations under the Regulations from penal liability under the Customs Act.

Applying the law to the facts, the Tribunal concluded that the appellants' acts and omissions did not satisfy the requirements of section 112(a) for penalty, and the charge of active collusion was unproven.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

- "When the legislature makes a special law, the presumption is that a general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless that intention of the legislature is stated very clearly. The specific prevails over the general."

- "To show 'active collusion' it has to also be shown that there was a common intention amongst the alleged collaborators involved in the evasion of duty."

- "The provisions of the IPC mentioned above gives a sense of the basic ingredients of the terms 'abet' and 'omission' which would approximate to the use of term 'active collusion' mentioned in the impugned order."

- "There is nothing to prove that there was a common intention between the appellant or any of the others involved, or that they worked in concert to ensure that the goods imported in the name of M/s Kalp Impex under the Advance Authorisation scheme was to be diverted for home consumption."

- "It has to be shown that the act was done in reference to their common intention to do an illegal act or that the CB had a stake in the outcome of the illegality... However, the evidence does not show that the appellants had a common intention along with the importer and High Seas Seller to do or omit to do any act which act, or omission would render such goods liable to confiscation under section 111, or abets the doing or omission of such an act."

- "The charge of 'active collusion' with the High Sea Sellers is not proved and hence the penalty imposed against the appellants under section 112(a) of the Customs Act 1962, merits to be dropped."

- The penalty imposed on the appellants under section 112(a) is set aside.