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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 24 Records
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1952 (9) TMI 46 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sment. There are other considerations which have to be seen at the time of declaring an assessee to be a defaulter or otherwise and for the reasions that I have given already. 18. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 200/-. Soni, J. 19. I agree. 20. It is a grave thing to interfere in the orderly administration of justice by the ordinary or social Tribunals constituted by the Legislature. If these Tribunals or the functionaries appointed under the Special Acts do not perform their duties they may be compelled by an appropriate writ to do so. Where, however, they are acting within the limits of the powers assigned to them fay the Legislature and have exercised their discrection, this Court will not sit in judgment over them and will not ordinarily interfere unless the discretion has been exercised so capriciously or in such an outrageous manner as to attract the extraordinary Jurisdiction of this Court.
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1952 (9) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... gal remedy is available. They are meant to supplement not to supersede legal remedies. They are meant to promote the orderly administration of justice by the duly constituted Tribunals of the land, and are not in tended to by-pass them See Elvertons case. With regard to the accommodation for the payment of Income Tax, the discretion is vested in the Income Tax Officer under Section 45 and 46 of the Income Tax Act. This Court can only compel him to exercise his discretion, but cannot direct him as to the manner in which that discretion is to be exercised See Julius v. The Bishop of Oxford. Petition dismissed. lvertons case. With regard to the accommodation for the payment of Income Tax, the discretion is vested in the Income Tax Officer under Section 45 and 46 of the Income Tax Act. This Court can only compel him to exercise his discretion, but cannot direct him as to the manner in which that discretion is to be exercised See Julius v. The Bishop of Oxford. Petition dismissed.
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1952 (9) TMI 44 - HYDERABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ive his consent. In support of this there is the affidavit of the defendant also. It is just possible that the plaintiff may be able to prove that the defendant did give his consent to this compromise. In my opinion this is clearly a case which could be regarded as a case where one of the parties could be said to have practised fraud upon the Court. As such the Court would have jurisdiction under its inherent powers to make enquiry and correct its own proceedings. I, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the lower Court and remand the case to the Court of Small Causes for enquiring into the fact as to whether there was a compromise as alleged and decide the case according to law. If the lower Court comes to the conclusion that the defendant gave his consent, then the decree would stand; otherwise the case would have to be heard and judgment pronounced after proper trial. The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this revision. Advocate's fee ₹ 25.
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1952 (9) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e property was not revenue loss and that that loss could not be treated as a bad debt. The circumstances in the present case are entirely different. In this case, it is clear that the Income-tax Tribunal was fully justified in inferring that the property acquired from the Rohelkhand Ice Factory was sold by the assessee as payment of the loan advanced and was converted into cash very soon afterwards when it became feasible to do so. Consequently our answer to the questions referred by the Tribunal is as follows - 1. On the statement of the case and on the construction of the Articles of Association of the assessee the transaction of purchase of the Match Factory and the subsequent sale of those premises in different bits could legally be held to be a transaction entered into by the assessee in the course of its money-lending business. 2. That, in the circumstances of the case, the receipts of the assessee by the resale of the premise of the Match Factory were revenue receipts.
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1952 (9) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a note of it. In spite of several representations made in writing by the appellants to revise such decision, it has still stuck to it. It has relied on the said resolution even at the hearing before the learned Judge. In all these circumstances the Court, in my opinion, can ask the municipality not to give effect to the said resolution and the notice under Article 226 of the Constitution. 84. In the result, therefore, this appeal, in my opinion, should fail on a preliminary ground, namely, that no appeal lies from an order passed by a single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution. As for the merits of the order passed by Bose, J. that portion of the order which directs the municipality to forbear from giving effect to the resolution and the notice, except the portion of it which deals with the question of closing down of the municipal slaughter-house, should stand. The rest of the order of the learned Judge should be set aside and the appeal disposed of on those terms.
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1952 (9) TMI 41 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the proprietor to manage it in any way he chooses. But I am not persuaded that it is not a 'reasonable' restriction when public interests warrant it. As at present advised, therefore, and having regard to the provisions in Clause (5) of Article 19, I would uphold (sic) the contention of learned counsel, as a general proposition, and rule the Act 'ultra vires' on that basis. It is however unnecessary to discuss this point any further in view of the conclusion I have arrived at on the validity of the recommendation made by the Court of Wards and the Notification of the State Government based on that recommendation. 58. In the result the declaration made by the State Government in Notification 9876-R., dated 7-12-1951 of the Revenue Department, should be pronounced ultra vires and must be quashed. Possession of the Estate should be restored to the petitioner. The petitioner "shall have the costs of this petition, as directed by the learned Chief Justice.
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1952 (9) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it must be exercised bona fide and reasonably and within the compass of the Act. The Board in the present case did not contravene these principles, nor can it be said that it acted arbitrarily or capriciously. It took the decision after due considerations of the facts. 35 The contention that the proviso to Section 6 (1) infringes the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution has no force. To accept this argument would mean that no discretion can be allowed to an authority. Nor do I see any force in the contention that Article 19(1)(f) which provides that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property has been violated in the present case. The tax has been imposed according to law and the proviso to Section 6 (1) is a proviso for the purpose of the collection of the tax. It is not a novel proviso. Provisions like this occur in other statutes imposing tax. 36. For the reasons given above, I would also dismiss the two applications.
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1952 (9) TMI 39 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... "according to the terms of the award". This, however, is not by way of asking the Court to enforce the award. The plaintiffs are merely showing their 'bona fides' by expressing their willingness to comply with the condition imposed by the arbitrator. On the admitted genealogy the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a half share in the property without subjecting themselves to this condition. In view of the award of the arbitrator they have thought fit to cut down their right. This is no reason why the Court should hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief at all. In my opinion, they are entitled to the relief as sought by them. 15. For the reasons which I have given this appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs. As directed at the commencement of my judgment, the plaint and the decree will be amended by inserting the property in Schedule D in accordance with the order of the Subordinate Judge dated 24-7-1946. Sarjoo Prosad, J. 16. I concur.
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1952 (9) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... led shall act in any case. In other words, the rules provide that no act can be done by a pleader who is merely instructed by another pleader but who has not filed a akalatnama in court or has not accepted a vakalatnama already filed. The right to plead, quite apart from acting, is specified in Rule 967. There is no question that the right to have inspection of a document is acting in the cause and an advocate who is merely instructed by another pleader who has. filed a vakalatnama but who has not filed one on his own account or has not accepted one already filed, has no right to have inspection of documents filed in a suit or proceeding. In my opinion, the learned judge was right in his conclusion and Mr. Rakshit was justified in refusing Mr. Ghose to have inspection of the documents. Both the contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant must fail and this appeal must be dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Sailendra Nath Guha Ray, J. 18. I agree.
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1952 (9) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by two recent decisions of this Court, both under the Bengal Money Lenders' Act, one reported in the case of -- 'Satish Chandra v. Riyasat Hossain' ILR (1949) Cal 487 and the other to be found in the case of -- 'Jadunath Roy v. Sm. Asbalata Devi', First Misc. Appeal No. 19 of 1948 decided by Sen and Chunder JJ. on 27-4-1950 (Cal) (P) not yet reported, where the above decision of the Judicial Committee was noticed, cited, considered and followed. 8. We hold, therefore, that under the law an appeal lay from the decision of the learned Munsif now challenged before us and as such the present application in Revision is not competent or maintainable. The preliminary objection is, accordingly, upheld and this Rule is discharged on that ground. 9. In the above view of the matter it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the other questions involved in this Rule. 10. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court. K.C. Das Gupta, J. 11. I agree.
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1952 (9) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he benefit of the service, or that others are likely to get a much larger benefit of the service, or that they do not need the benefit of the service provided. Though a fee is levied for supplying a service, it is strictly not price paid for obtaining the service, and it is not a recognised incident of 'fee' that it must be equivalent to the value of the service obtained by each individual benefited thereby. (49) In my view, therefore, the levy of contributions under Section 58 cannot be regarded as imposing of a tax within the meaning of the Constitution, but must be regarded as levy of a fee, which it is within the competence of the State Legislature to impose and collect in respect of all religious and charitable endowments under the provisions of items 28 and 47 of the Third List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In that view of the case I agree with the order proposed. (50) PER CURIAM. Both the petitions dismissed with costs. (51) Petitions dismissed.
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1952 (9) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er on the record to prove that this letter Exhibit P-24 was antedated and that being so, the charge in respect of forgery of this letter also fails. Read as a whole, this letter cannot be said to have been written with the intention of causing any injury to Amarnath or for the purpose of creating a defence in respect of the second charge. The letter read as a whole is an innocuous document and its dominant purpose and intent was to safeguard the interests of accused Patel and to protect him against any underhand or unfair act of his rival contractors. We cannot infer any intent to defraud or any intention to injure Amarnath, though in order to protect himself accused Patel made certain allegations against him. We therefore set aside the conviction of both the appellants under the third charge and acquit them. The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed, the judgments of all the three courts below are set aside and the appellants are acquitted. Appellants acquitted.
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1952 (9) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rous than the corres- ponding provisions under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act. In such cases if steps taken in regard to the sale of movables fail, the fine can even be written off. Therefore, Article 20 does not apply to this case and on this footing the application of Article 265 does not arise. On this conclusion the contentions of the Public Prosecutor are found to be correct and the orders of the lower court as they stand cannot be allowed to stand. The orders of the lower court are modified to the extent that in addition to the fines imposed in all these cases the taxes due by the respective respondent and for which these prosecutions had been launched Will stand added and they are made recoverable as if they were fines. Petitions allowed. Petitions allowed. Crl. R. Cases Nos. 98, 106, 107, 109, 110 and 111 of 1952.-As separate appeals against acquittal have been preferred in these cases by the State and are pending, these petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1952 (9) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 15 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The petitioners have replied by taking out this writ challenging the validity of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and further disputing the correctness of the assessment under Article 286 of the Constitution. Under the Act an appeal is provided against the orders of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and the petitioners have in fact pre- ferred such an appeal. It is open to them to raise all questions as to the extent of their liability under the Act and under Article 286 of the Constitution before the Appellate Officer. We should therefore decline to entertain this petition. We may add that in writ petitions Nos. 21, 41 and 227 of 1952 , we have decided the points raised by the petitioners with reference to the validity of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and the scope and the operation of Article 286. Under the circumstances, the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. RAJAMANNAR, C.J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1952 (9) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o that extent. They cannot claim further that they should be freed altogether from liability even to the extent that they are liable under the Act. As was observed by Holmes, J., in New York Ex. Rel. Hatch v. Edward Reardon(1), with regard to taxes, especially perhaps it might be assumed that the Legislature meant them to be valid to whatever extent they could be sustained. The result of the findings is that the sum of Rs. 1,04,595-4-6, repre- senting the price paid by the petitioners for the hides and skins purchased in Dacca, should be excluded from their assessable turnover and that in respect of the purchases made in Calcutta, Cawnpore and locally amounting to Rs. 7,61,617-3-7 they are liable for sales tax. The learned Advocate-General agrees that the taxing authorities will revise the assessments in accordance with the conclusions expressed herein. There will be no order as to costs. RAJAMANNAR, C.J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly. (1) 204 U.S. 152 51 L.Ed. 415 at p. 422.
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1952 (9) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... so far as the proceedings of the first quarter are concerned, provided that we have no reason, prima facie, to suspect the assessee s bona fides. In the result, therefore, we allow the application in regard to the following items (i) sales of second-hand motor-cars for Rs. 21,400, and (1) 1937 5 I.T.R. 464 A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 721. (2) 1944 12 I.T.R. 441 A.I.R. 1945 Cal. 62. (3) 1947 15 I.T.R. 393 A.I.R. 1947 All. 414. Page No 312 (ii) sales of glass sheets (for an amount unspecified). We reject the application in regard to the following items (i) municipal octroi dues charged to customers, to the extent of Rs. 657-7-6, and (ii) sales of linseed to Iswarmal Bhagwandas for Rs. 2,567-6-6. In regard to the remaining three items, namely, despatches of linseed to the Swaika Oil Mills, Calcutta, the Royal Trading Co., Cal- cutta, and Udairam Laxminarain, Calcutta, we remand the case to the lower court for further enquiry on the lines suggested and decision afresh. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (9) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Power of court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... ificance and produces specific results upon contracts which have been made for the taking of shares, because, since Oakes v. Turquand, the effect of which is very far reaching, decided the vital principle that when winding up has commenced there is no right to avoid a contract to take shares, the avoidance is not possible, unless there has been either proceedings instituted before the commencement of the winding up, or an agreement that the shareholders shall be bound by the result of other proceedings which have been taken for the avoidance of a contract to take shares. In my opinion, therefore, the applicant having come to court for an avoidance of the contract under section 102 after the liquidation of the company and almost six years after the notice of repudiation given by her, she is not entitled to have the register rectified and her name deleted from the list of contributories. The summons will, therefore, be dismissed with costs. Costs to be taxed. Counsel certified.
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1952 (9) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Board’s sanction to be required for certain contracts in which directors are interested ... ... ... ... ..... for a declaration that he had not ceased to be a director of the first defendant company, in favour of the plaintiff, and gave to the plaintiff the declaration that he sought. It is from that decision that the company has come in appeal before us, and although it may be unfortunate that the plaintiff should be disqualified by reason of a very small and petty contract which he entered into, in allowing the appeal we are enforcing the section, although realising that it may cause hardship in this particular case to the plaintiff, in the larger and wider interest which the Legislature had in mind and in order to prevent directors from using their responsible office to their own advantage. If companies are to be properly administered in this country, the board of directors must apply their minds to the specific instances where directors require their consent for entering into contracts with the company. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed with costs. Suit dismissed with costs.
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1952 (9) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF HYDERABAD
Power of court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... with cancelled the transfer. These are matters which require proper evidence and enquiry and we think that it would not be proper to grant the prayer of the petitioner in these summary proceedings. Where the facts requiring consideration are complicated and not simple a separate action alone would be the proper remedy mdash In re Sussex Brick Co. If the petitioner has been wronged he may have his remedy, otherwise than in an application for rectification of the register under section 38 of the Companies Act. There is discretion vested in us either to exercise or not in a particular case the power under section 38 of the Companies Act. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case we are not inclined to exercise our power under this section. The petitioner will be at liberty to take such steps as he may be -advised to do. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. Having regard to the facts of this case we make no order as to costs. Each party will bear his own costs.
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1952 (9) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Application for ... ... ... ... ..... future prospects does not appear to me to justify a winding up order at present, and, therefore, the petition shall be dismissed. It shall, however, be open to the Registrar, and indeed it will be his duty, to watch the progress of this company and to keep an eye on its financial position in order that if circumstances hereafter require his intervention, he may do so. The petition, therefore, will be dismissed. Although costs usually follow the event, as the petitioner in this case is the Registrar of Companies, who is a statutory authority not personally interested in the winding up of any company, and as there was no decision of any court on the validity of sanctions such as the one in this case, and as the respondents had not prior to the hearing of petition offered to write off the two amounts of Rs. 13,474-1-9 and Rs. 9,252, but for which I may possibly have taken a different view, on the petition, the fair order for costs will be that each party will bear its own costs.
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