|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 28 Records
-
1953 (12) TMI 37 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on bail. Under Section 498 the scope for grant of bail is much wider, but ordinarily the principles contained in Section 497 should be considered in such cases. Under Section 497 it is open to a Court to grant bail to a woman even in cases where she is accused of an offence which is punishable with death or transportation for life. Having regard to the extraordinary manner in which the offence is alleged to have been committed and the other circumstances of the case, it appears not unreasonable to allow this petition and to accept heavy bail of the petitioner in order to safeguard her appearance at the trial. 6. This application is allowed and it is ordered that Mt. Chokhi may be released on bail on executing a personal bond for Rs. 5000/- and on furnishing two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge Jhunjhunu for her appearance in the Court. She would remain on bail till such time as the trial Court sees reasons to pass an order to the contrary.
-
1953 (12) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nion that there is no sufficient reason for the detention of the person concerned, the Government is in duty bound to revoke the detention order. What the Government has done in this case is to confirm the detention order and at the same time to revoke it under one of the sub-clauses of section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. This is not what the section contemplates. The Government could either confirm the order of detention made under section 3 or revoke it completely and there is nothing in law which prevents the Government from making a fresh order of detention if it so chooses. As matters stand, we have no other alternative but to hold that the order made on the 5th of January, 1953, under section 3 (1) (a) of the Preventive Detention Act is bad in law and the detention of the petitioner is consequently illegal. The application is allowed and the petitioner is directed to be set at liberty. Petition allowed. Agent for the petitioner Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent C. P. Lal.
-
1953 (12) TMI 35 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ty. If partners are allowed to claim that they should be taxed on the basis of their individual shares of the profits, they should not chafe at the requirement that they should constitute their firm under an instrument of partnership, which writing would undoubtedly be more certain and reliable evidence of the terms and conditions of their partnership than a mere oral agreement. I cannot see what purpose is served by an instrument of partnership brought into existence at about the same time as the application for registration of the firm, which application will contain all the necessary particulars for the purpose of ascertaining the shares of the partners. No decision of any High Court was brought to my notice where this point was directly raised and considered, of the construction of the word "constituted" in the expression "constituted under an instrument of partnership." I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. A. L. Sahgal, Accountant Member.-I agree.
-
1953 (12) TMI 34 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed to have the partnership registered even when they have embodied its terms in a deed. I am accordingly of the opinion that when a deed or instrument of partnership is presented for registration under section 26A, even where the partnership is alleged in the deed to have existed previously on the same terms, this should not be a bar to the registration of the firm, and it should be treated as constituted under the instrument as from the date of the instrument. I would accordingly answer the question framed for our decision in the affirmative. It must be clearly understood that in returning this answer we are not expressing any opinion as to the effect of the answer on the assessment of the firm for the year 1950-51, which will now be decided by the Income-tax authorities, or on the question of the genuineness of the partnership, which the Tribunal has left undecided. In the circumstances I would order that the parties be left to bear their own costs. Bhandari, C.J.-I agree.
-
1953 (12) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... having been held, all persons elected not only in ward No. 2 but other wards, are parties interested and should be given notice of this application. In view, however, of my finding on the first two points it is not necessary to consider this. 13. It is further argued that the publication in the official Gazette is under Section 50 and this is done by the State Government which again is not a party. In view of my findings on the first two points, it is not necessary to consider this either. 14. For the reasons stated above, I do not think that upon this application as framed I can or ought to interfere. 15. The rule is accordingly discharged. The interim order is vacated save and except that the order staying the publication of the results of the election will be further stayed up till 10-1-1954, in order to enable the petitioner to obtain appropriate orders from the Appeal Court in case there is any appeal preferred against this decision. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1953 (12) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nterest at 6 per cent thereon. The plaintiff firm had purchased the shares in the market and they must have dealt with those shares in the stock exchange in course of their business. It is not a case of the plaintiff's money being locked up by reason of the purchase made on the 21st December 1944. The claim for interest should therefore be disallowed. Now deducting at the rate of two annas per share and disallowing the claim for interest, the total claim comes to ₹ 13,362/8/-. 47. There will therefore be a decree for ₹ 13,362/8/- in favour of the plaintiff firm with interest on decree at 6 per cent as against the defendant No. 1 Eilasrai Khemani. The suit is dismissed as against the defendants Nos. 3 and 4. The defendant No. 1 will pay to the plaintiff the costs of the suit on scale No. 2 including reserved costs, if any. Certified for two counsel. The plaintiff will pay to the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 one day's costs of hearing. Certified for two Counsel.
-
1953 (12) TMI 31 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fresh suit. It may, however, be stated that, while I told counsel for the parties that I was inclined to disallow this revision application, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the applicant that he had also put in an application to the effect that the Board of Directors of the company had not, in fact, passed a resolution authorising the Manager, Mr. P.K. Vohra, to institute the suit and that a copy of the resolution forming an enclosure to the application for amendment was a forged document. The applicant should have raised this point before the learned District Judge. It was open to him to apply for the review of the decision of the District Judge on this ground. As this point was not pressed before me during the course of the arguments and as the parties will have to adduce evidence about it the applicant, if so advised, can agitate this point before the learned District Judge. With these remarks the revision application is rejected. Costs shall abide the event.
-
1953 (12) TMI 30 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... less their individual shares are defined and each of them personally signs the application for registration, the requirements of law would not be fulfilled. See Kannappa Naicker & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Chandrika Prasad Ram Swarup v. Commissioner of Income-tax. A similar limited interpretation has been given to the term "person" for purposes of the Companies Act, 1913. See Senaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand. There would be obvious difficulties in the administration of the income-tax law where a fluctuating body like a firm is to be given a legal status. We, therefore, hold that a firm as such is not entitled to enter into partnership with another firm or individuals for purposes of section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. 13. Our answer to the question of law that is referred to us is in the negative. Costs of the proceedings and of the paper-book shall be borne by the assessee. Counsels fee ₹ 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1953 (12) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion for and on behalf of the coparcener in existence at the date of the alienation. It was recognised in that case that if property was- obtained in the suit instituted by the elder son, the property would have enured for the benefit of the entire family; but on the view that the suit was not instituted in a representative capacity in so far as it related to the members of the family who were not in existence at the date of the alienation, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The second proposition set out by Beaumont C. J., in his judgment at pp, 240-241 cannot be accepted without qualifications mentioned earlier. Similarly, the second part of the third proposition that a suit instituted by a coparcener in existence at the date of the alienation is not on behalf of the joint family also cannot be sustained. 36. I agree, therefore, with the answers proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice to the questions which have been referred to us for determination. 37. Answer accordingly.
-
1953 (12) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e which constitutes it a person within the meaning of Article 14. We therefore hold that Section 33(3) of the Income-tax Act does not offend Article 14 of the constitution. It is unnecessary to consider the further question whether even if we hold that the impugned section is ultra vires we should give relief to the petitioner in this case by issuing a direction to the Commissioner; the petition fails on other grounds. We think, however, that this is not a case in which we should award costs to the respondent. No doubt it is somewhat inequitable that for a wrong committed by the Department which had to be corrected by a superior authority a citizen should be called upon to pay a fee. That is no doubt a real grievance of the petitioner but we do not think that on that ground we can give him any relief. The petitioner agitated the question only for the benefit of the public and not to vindicate his private right. The petition is dismissed but without costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1953 (12) TMI 27 - LAHORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e has been an "artificial inflation in the book value of the assets". Although these exact words are not used in the appellate order of the Tribunal by which the case was disposed of, the words "unduly inflated" do appear therein. We assume these words to mean that there was a deliberate inflation. The Tribunal had agreed with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income- tax Officer. The Income-tax Officer had recorded in his order that there had been an attempt to circumvent the law which prohibits issue of shares at discount by transfer of vehicles in lieu of fully paid-up shares of a higher value. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner seems to have agreed with this finding and so did the Appellate Tribunal. It was open to the Tribunal to have come to such a finding and in the face of this conclusion the order of the Tribunal is justified. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1953 (12) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ent or local authority or the Board are not in need of such protection as the tenants of private landlords are and this circumstance is a cogent basis for differentiation. The two classes of tenants are not, by force of circumstances placed on an equal footing and the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Board cannot, therefore, complain of any denial of equality before the law or of equal protection of the law. There is here no real discrimination, for the two classes are not similarly situated. Neither section 4 of the Bombay Rent Act nor section's 3-A of the Bombay Housing Board Act can, therefore, be challenged as unconstitutional on the ground of contravention of article 14 of the Constitution. No other point has been urged before us, We dismiss both the applications. The petitioner must pay one set of costs of the application under article 32. Petition8 dismissed. Agent for the petitioner Rajinder Narain. Agent for the respondents G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
-
1953 (12) TMI 25 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aram Puranchand 1931 5 I.T.C. 459; A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 729, the question whether an assessee was given reasonable opportunity to produce evidence in support of the return and whether the time given was so short as not to be reasonable are questions of law for reference to the High Court. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that the question which the assessee wanted to be referred to this Court was not a question of law. I would ask the Appellate Tribunal to refer the following question to this Court under section 66(2) of the Act, namely - "Was the assessee in the present case afforded a reasonable opportunity to produce his books of account, to produce his evidence in support of the returns and to rebut the case set out by the Income-tax department? If the answer is in the negative are the assessments for the years 1947-48, 1948-49 and 1949-50 liable to be set aside?" FALSHAW, J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
-
1953 (12) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of a step which the statute regards as a condition precedent to the commencement of proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction. The point there was that notice was served under Section 24(2) and the assessment was re-opened without serving any notice under Section 34, and as such the proceedings were held to be not valid. I do not think that it throws any light on the facts of this case where there was no formal re-opening of the assessment under Section 34 at all. What was re-opened was done on an agreed basis on the strength of a disclosure petition. 27. For the reasons above stated, the application cannot be allowed and should be dismissed. The Rule is discharged. The interim orders are vacated. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 28. As the petitioner intends to prefer an appeal against this order, let the interim order staying all further proceedings in the matter before the Collector of Malda continue till a fortnight after the X'mas Holidays, as prayed for.
-
1953 (12) TMI 23 - PRIVY COUNCIL
... ...
... ... ..... ing a beneficial interests and only giving such interests as remain on the one hand, and on the other hand reserving power to take benefit out of, or at the expense of, interests which are given, and for reasons already stated their Lordships are of opinion that the present case is within the latter class. Two other powers reserved by the deceased were also founded on as benefits--power to appropriate and partition the trust property under clause 4(h), and power to purchase it under clause 4(k). It may be that the deceased could legitimately have used those powers to his own advantage, but in fact he made no use of them at all. So at most, there were here potential benefits. As their Lordships have already decided that taking remuneration was a benefit within the scope of the section, they find it unnecessary to deal with these other matters. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal.
-
1953 (12) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the benefits to be derived under it, but the fixing of an anterior date, which might have no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired, may be, many years later, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary. The learned Judges below observe that it is common knowledge that since the end of the war land, particularly around Calcutta, has increased enormously in value and might still further increase very considerably in value when the pace of industrialisation increases. Any principle for determining compensation which denies to the owner this increment in value cannot result in the ascertainment of the true equivalent of the land appropriated. We accordingly hold that the latter part of proviso (b) to section 8 of the impugned Act which fixes the market value on December 31, 1946, as the maximum compensation for lands acquired under it offends against the provisions of article 31 (2) and is unconstitutional and void. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1953 (12) TMI 21 - COURT OF APPEAL
... ...
... ... ..... mes into the trading account or appears in the balance sheet, and bearing in mind that the spare process stock had an arbitrary figure attached to it, the true view is that the Special Commissioners reached that stage and then stopped. They said "There is no doubt at all that the base stock method has been the method in vogue among cotton spinners for very many years--in this particular case for nearly fifty years." For computing profits for the company's purposes there was no fault to be found with it. But as the real question was whether that system was a proper system for ascertaining accurately the full profit in accordance with section 29, I think that the Special Commissioners did not really address their minds to that topic. For this reason I am of opinion that this appeal ought to be dismissed, and I concur quite fully in the judgment which my Lord has just delivered. HODSON L.J.--I agree. Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.
-
1953 (12) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
"police power", i.e., the power of Government to regulate private rights in public interes - the words "acquired" or "taken possession of" should not be taken to have reference to all forms of deprivation of private property by the State.
-
1953 (12) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of the Ordinance for taking over the management and administration of the company, contravene the provisions of article 31 (2) of the Constitution?
Whether the Ordinance as a whole or any of its provisions infringe articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The plaintiff is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance on the basis that it abridges the company's fundamental right under article 31 (2). The plaintiff is thus entitled to succeed in this suit which should have been decreed in the terms in which it was laid.
-
1953 (12) TMI 18 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by the Board is against the rules framed by the Government, The summary rejection of the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay is apparently unwarranted by law. In the last paragraph of his order the President, Board of Revenue, has added that the petition is time-barred. But we are in- formed that an application for condoning the delay had also been filed, and apparently that application has not been considered on its merits. 4.. The orders passed by the Board of Revenue are set aside, and it is directed that the petitioner be heard on the appeal with special reference to his application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. We are not here concerned with the merits of the application or of the appeal, and naturally therefore we have refrained from expressing any opinion on those matters. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50. He is further entitled to a refund of the outstand- ing amount of the security deposited by him. Application allowed.
|
