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Showing 1 to 20 of 25 Records
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1953 (5) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... there has not been a proper exercise of judicial discretion. 42. Now the High Court do not consider these facts at all. They give no reasons and dispose of the matter in one sentence as follows "I would... dismiss the appeals of the other four and accepting the revision petitions change their sentences... from transportation... to death." 43. That, in our opinion, is not a proper way to interfere with a judicial discretion when a question of enhancement is concerned. We are unable to hold that the discretion was improperly exercised by the learned Sessions Judge. Whether we ourselves would have acted differently had we been the trial court is not the proper criterion. We accordingly accept the appeals on the question of sentence and reduce the sentence in each case to that of transportation for life. Except for that, the appeal is dismissed. 44. Sentence reduced. 45. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellants Naunit Lal. Agent for the respondents G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
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1953 (5) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... atangint Dassee v. Chooneymoney Dassee' 22 Cal 903 and like decisions before the introduction of Or. 34 of the Code to replace the corresponding provisions of the Transfer of Property Act need not trouble us as the law has materially changed in the meantime and in the light of that change those older cases have been fully explained in the later judicial decisions Vide 'AIR 1918 Mad 668 (Z 3) 'AIR 1922 Cal 35 (S)' and 'AIR 1919 Bom 56 (V)'. It seems further that those older decisions are not easily reconcilable with the Full Bench case of this Court, viz. 19 Cal 139 cited in the earlier part of this paragraph. 23. It thus appears that the appellant's contentions in the present case are opposed alike to principles, precedents and authority and they cannot, therefore, be accepted. This appeal must, accordingly, fail and it is dismissed but, in the circumstances of this case, we make no order for costs in this Court. Renupada Mukherjee, J. 24. I agree.
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1953 (5) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF ASSAM
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... ... ..... f the plentitude of power which it confers on the High Courts would not justify interference with the exercise of discretion by the Deputy Commissioner when passing an administrative order under executive instructions. He acted admittedly within his jurisdiction and in making the appointment he did not contravene any rule of law or procedure. There Is no infringement of any legal right and therefore even in this case the petition must fail. 26. For reasons given above the petitions are dismissed with costs. Rules are discharged. Hearing fee two gold Mohors in each case. Sarjoo Prasad, C.J. 27. I agree. 28. In spite of the elaborate arguments at the Bar I see no reason to depart from the view which I took sitting with Ramaswami J. in--'Ajit Kumar Mukherji v. Chief Operating Supdt. East Indian Rly. Calcutta' AIR 1953 Pat 92(D) as to the meaning of the expression "termination of service" and the scope and application of Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
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1953 (5) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... Appellate Tribunal have not said whether this contention was justified or not and before us the fact has been denied by learned counsel for the Department. Reliance, was also placed on the fact that the Income Tax Officer had added the value of the rent-free quarters occupied by the assessee as income under the head 'salary'. The Tribunal after going into the facts and circumstances held that though the assessee was called a Managing Agent he was in fact the Chief Manager of the Company. 7. It is not possible for us in this case to say that there were no materials on which the Tribunal could come to the finding that the remuneration received by the assessee was salary. We cannot say that on the facts end circumstances pointed out by the Appellate Tribunal it was not possible for it to hold that the income was not income from business. This is our answer to the question referred to us for decision. 8. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we fix at ₹ 300/-.
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1953 (5) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... e that certain conditions should be satisfied if sanction for opening such courses is to be granted. Thus, an application to open science course might be refused on the ground that there is no laboratory. This clearly is no discrimination. In the same manner in requiring that colleges should provide certain facilities for women before they can be admitted, it cannot be said that there is any discrimination on the ground of sex. 12. Our conclusions are that the University of Madras is not a state as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution and that its regulations are not subject to the prohibition enacted in Article 15(1); that admission to colleges is regulated by Article 29(2) and that the regulations of the University requiring that colleges should provide certain facilities for women before they could be admitted are not discriminatory on the ground of sex. In the result, this appeal must be allowed and W. P. No. 341 of 1951 dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1953 (5) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... they now complain, related to rights which they in fact never sought to exercise and took no steps to assert, while there was still room for doing so, and for the exercise of which the opportunity is now lost. But, argues Mr. Isaacs, the election of the respondents 4 11 and 12 being void, they are no better than usurpers, and the petitioners are entitled to prevent them from functioning as members of the Municipal Board. It may be, as we have already remarked, that the petitioners could claim such relief as ratepayers of the Municipality in appropriately framed proceedings, but there is no question of enforcing petitioners' funda mental right under article 15(1) or article 14 in such claim, There is still less ground for seeking relief on that basis aoainst respondent 3 who is only a nominated member. The petitioners appear to have misconceived their remedy and their application under article 32 must fail. The petition is dismissed with costs, one sot. Petition dismissed.
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1953 (5) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... presence of the small dividend income in the present accounting year. That income is there, but, at the same time, there is nothing to show that the loss which the assessee was trying to set off was loss which he could legally set off under Section 24(2), as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the right to do so would not be established till it was proved that there had, in fact, been some other head of income in the relevant year Besides, on Mr. Chaudhuri's argument, the dividend income might equally be business income. I do not, however, propose to base my decision on this ground, inasmuch as it was hot argued at the bar and the necessary facts are not before us. The reasons I have otherwise given are, in my opinion, sufficient for the disposal of this reference. For the reasons which I have given, the answer to the questions referred must, in my view, be the following - Question (1) No. Question (2) No. Question (3) No. Certified for two Counsel. Lahiri, J.-I agree.
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1953 (5) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sold the cloth to his customers and made himself personally liable for the price of the goods sold and in return was remunerated on a commission basis of Re.1 per cent. So far as the Mills were concerned, they handed over the goods to the assessee and were entitled to get price thereof from him. It was the assessee's risk whether the transactions ended in profit or loss. If some of the persons to whom the goods had been sold did not pay, he would have to recompense the Mills for the price of the goods, which amount might exceed the amount received by him by way of commission. This was clearly, therefore, a venture in the nature of trade which might end in profit or in loss and not work done for an employer where the remuneration being fixed on a commission basis it plight be more or less according to the work done. Having, therefore, considered the matter in all its aspects, we are of the opinion that the answer to the question referred to us must be in the affirmative.
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1953 (5) TMI 26 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been the intention of the Governor-General to place the co-operative society on a higher footing than an ordinary merchant or shopkeeper who would have to pay income-tax on profits gained from sale of sugar etc. The object of giving exemption appears to me to encourage the cooperative business of the co-operative societies and not to differentiate in their favour in regard to income-tax. All these cases go to show that where income is derived by a cooperative society from the business of the society as a co-operative society the profits are within the exemption given by the Government notification, but where profits arise out of some business even though it may be permitted, but not of the nature which follows out of the objects of the co-operative society, then in that case the exemption will not apply. I am therefore of the opinion that the answer to the question which has been referred to us should be in the negative and I would answer it accordingly. Falshaw, J.-I agree.
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1953 (5) TMI 24 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... partner should not be treated as profits made by the partnership. In the case before us the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal treated the case of a partner, who had lent money to the partnership and had also borrowed money from it, as a case of double entry and treated the balance alone as the amount either borrowed by him from or lent by him to the partnership, as the case might be, and after having made this adjustment they disallowed all interest paid by the partnership to such a partner by reason of the provisions of Sections 10(2)(iii) and 10(4)(b) quoted above, while in the case of a partner, who had borrowed more than he had lent, the excess amount paid as interest was treated as profits. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal thus treated the assessee most fairly and, our answer to the second question is in the affirmative. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (5) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... efinite. Historically speaking, article 31 -A which has relation to article 31(2) of the Constitution, has no relevancy whatsoever to the law enacted in section 112 of the Act XLII of 1950. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the law enacted in section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 is not saved either by clause (5) of article 19 or by article 31-A of the Constitution. It manifestly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. That being so, the petitioner is entitled to a direction that possession of his estate be restored to him. We accordingly direct the Court of Wards, Ajmer-Merwara, constituted under the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, I of 1888, to forbear from carrying on superin- tendence of the petitioner's istimrari estate and the other properties taken possession of, and to restore their possession to the petitioner. The petitioner will have the costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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1953 (5) TMI 22 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ds of the section for the purpose of business, profession or vocation. As I have said before the very form of the question shows that it was accepted by the assessee that ₹ 5,000/- were paid by the assessee as fine under the penalty clause of the terms of the lease and such an amount certainly falls under the rule laid down by the English cases that I have quoted as also in the Madras case -- 'AIR 1943 Mad 670 (F)'. 11. I am therefore of the opinion that this ₹ 5,000/- is not an item which was expended for the purpose of enabling the assessee to earn profits in the trade but was imposed as a penalty for the breach of the rules and is not deductable under the statute. I would, therefore, answer the second question in the negative. 12. In the result the answer to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second question in the negative. As the Commissioner of Income-tax succeeds in this petition, he is entitled to costs. Counsel fee ₹ 250/-.
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1953 (5) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... establishment expenses and having regard to the small amount at which it was fixing the deduction it did not consider it necessary to carry out any further operation of computation under the different heads. As I have already stated the amount of deduction was fixed by an estimate. Mr. Meyer did not wish the amount of the deduction to be disturbed and I think in view of all the facts of the case the amount can be maintained on the footing that it is an estimated amount of the expenditure actually incurred for earning and collecting the interest income which was brought under assessment. For the reasons given above the. answer to the question referred Will be "Yes" but only on the basis that the amount was an amount fixed by estimate of the expenditure incurred solely for the purpose of earning the interest income and not on the basis adopted by the Tribunal. As the amount of the deduction is not being disturbed, there will be no order for costs. Lahiri, J.-I Agree.
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1953 (5) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oceedings, that is not by any means conclusive. What is material is the nature. and extent of the publication and whether or not it was likely to have an injurious effect on the minds of the public or of the judiciary itself and therefore to interference with the administration of justice. On the materials before us, it is difficult to say that the circumstances under which the representation was made by the appellants was calculated to have such effect. There might have been some remote possibility but that cannot be taken note of. We are clearly of the opinion that the contempt, if any, was only of a technical character, and that after the affidavits were filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There will be no order for costs either here or in the court below in favour of either party. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (5) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er on those rights. I feel all this is fraught with the gravest danger. We cannot have Star Chambers or their prototypes in this land; not that these tribunals have any resemblance to Star Chambers as yet. But we are opening a dangerous door and paving a doubtful road. If we wish to retain the fundamental liberties which we have so eloquently proclaimed in our Constitution and remain a free and independent people walking in the democratic way of life, we must be swift to scotch at the outset tendencies which may easily widen, as precedent is added to precedent, into that which in the end will be the negation of freedom and equality. To this extent and with the deepest regret I express my respectful dissent. In my view, the convictions cannot be upheld and there should be a retrial in the normal way. Appeals dismissed. Agent for the appellant in C.A. No. 84 Sukumar Ghose. Agent for the appellant in C.A. ’No,. 85 R. R. Biswas. Agent for the respondent G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
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1953 (5) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Maharaja of Patiala was, in fact, the legal representative and the only irregularity was that the notice did not describe him as such, but despite that irregularity the notice was understood in its true character and complied with accordingly. In the present case if the assessee as receiver had been the proper person under the Income-tax Act to be substituted in the assessment proceeding, started in respect of the income received by the executors the fact that he had himself applied for substitution might have been sufficient to regularise the proceedings, although the usual notices might not have been served upon him. The position, however, is entirely a different one and in my view wholly incurable. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred must, in my opinion, be "No." As regards the costs of the reference, the conduct of the assessee has been wholly unmeritorious. He shall have no costs. LAHIRI, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly
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1953 (5) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stribution of rain water through them and if the land is dug and sown with seeds whenever bare patches appear and while all this is done, if elaborate subsidiary arrangements are also maintained for the protection of the trees and the tending of new shoots springing from the stumps of old trees cut down till they themselves grow into new trees, it may well be said that operations in forestry, involving agricultural operations are carried on on the forest land and that the income derived from the land is derived from agriculture. I would therefore hold that the view taken by the Tribunal was erroneous. For the reasons given above, the answers to the questions referred should be as follows Question 1. Yes. Question 2. Yes. As the assessee succeeds on the main question, he will have the costs of this reference, but as the success is divided though unequally, I shall not certify for two counsel, as I would otherwise have done. LAHIRI, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (5) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pted in the present case either, because, for whatever reason it might be, the framers of the Rules have limited the concession to "borrowed money". As it is a special and further benefit, it must be strictly construed. On a true and natural construction of its act, the company, in 1937, was only raising money by sale of its shares and not raising it by a loan or loans. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that both on principle and on authority, as well as on the natural meaning of the language used, it must be held that the amounts in question in the present case did not come under the description "borrowed money" as used in the third proviso to Rule 5A of Schedule I to the Excess Profits Tax Act. The answer to the question referred to must, therefore, be in the negative. The Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Central, Calcutta, will have his costs of the reference. Certified for two counsel. LAHIRI, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (5) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l under the section, still, the form of the question referred is such that it is the action of the assessee which has to be considered. The question does not ask whether the Excess Profits Tax Officer was right in allowing ₹ 6,10,052, but whether the assessee was right in claiming the whole sum of ₹ 10,00,000 as a bad debt allowance for the accounting year. From the point of a question so framed, the manner in which the assessee had himself dealt with the amount of ₹ 3,89,948 in prior years is clearly material. For the reasons, I have given above, it appears to me that both on the question of construction and on the question of the alleged absence of the necessary finding Mr. Mitra's contentions must fail. The answer to the question referred must, therefore, be in the negative. The Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, West Bengal, will have his costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. LAHIRI, J.- I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1953 (5) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
Inadequacy of compensation in regard to these private lands by reason of article 31(4) of the Constitution, as the provision of that article is not attracted to the facts of the present case.
Held that:- The expression "passed by such Legislature" must mean "passed with or without amendments" in accordance with the normal procedure contemplated by article 107 of the Constitution. There can be no doubt that all the requirements of article 31(4) have been complied with in the present case and consequently there is no room for any objection to the legislation on the ground that the compensation provided by it is inadequate.
Section 37 of the Act contains the legislative provision regarding the form and the manner in which the compensation for acquired properties is to be given and as such it comes within the clear language of entry 42 of List III, Schedule VII of the Constitution. It is not a legislation on something which is non-existent or unrelated to facts. It cannot also be seriously contended that what section 37 provides for, is not the giving of compensation but of negativing the right to compensation as the learned counsel seems to suggest. There is no substance in this contention and we have no hesitation in overruling it. The result is that all the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants fail and the appeals are dismissed.
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