|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 30 Records
-
1956 (12) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... unfounded prosecution. Similarly if the charge is unfounded 'to the knowledge of the complainant he cannot escape liability because the prosecution has not technically been conducted by him. In such a case he would be deemed pro hac vice to have represented the Crown or State, 29 MLJ 694 1915 MWN 911 AIR 1916 Mad 666 (N); Venkatappayya v. Ramakrishnamma AIR1932Mad53 . Therefore the Magistrate himself should have discharged this Pichai not under Section 253(I) but under Section 252(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as groundless. Consequently the learned Subordinate judge was right in holding that S.T. Sahib had no reasonable and probable cause in preferring the complaint against this Pichai and that he was actuated by malice in recklessly, pressing his case against this Pichai also. The award of damages is appropriate and the quantum is not disputed before me as excessive. 47. Therefore, A. S. No. 908 of 1853 has got to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed with costs.
-
1956 (12) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
... ...
... ... ..... rd Ex. A-15 clearly shows that this and defendant and his mother were living with the 1st defendant. The Subordinate Judge has discussed this question in paragraphs 25 to 28 and found that the oral partition is not true. There is, also no force in the contention that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and that she had not the money to pay in accordance with the terms of the contract. She issued notices to the 1st defendant and even purchased stamp papers for the document being executed. In the plaint, she clearly set out all these facts and stated that she was willing to deposit the balance, the Subordinate Judge has accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and found these issues in her favour. We therefore agree with the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance as against defendants 1 and 2. 9. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent.
-
1956 (12) TMI 52 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... eight which will include, may include, or probably do include profits or gains in respect of their business of ship owners........." It will thus be seen that the consensus of opinion does not exempt the petitioner from liability of deducting the Indian Income Tax, simply on the ground that the net income of the owner cannot be determined until an account is taken of the entire disbursement. At the moment of payment, the Income Tax must be deducted in terms of Section 18 (3-B) and the relative sections of the Indian Income Tax Act. It is not necessary for me to indicate how this will ultimately be adjusted between the petitioner and the owner. 13. In my opinion, therefore, the Income Tax authorities have rightly taken steps under Section 18 (3-B) of the Indian Income Tax Act, and the petitioner has not been able to satisfy me that any interference is called for. That being so, this application must fail. The rule must be discharged but there will be no order as to costs.
-
1956 (12) TMI 51 - THE COURT OF APPEAL
... ...
... ... ..... that, although it would, I think, perhaps be going too far to say-and it would certainly be going further than the decision of this case requires-that no evidence could possibly be adduced to support the view that an "A" licence is not a capital asset of a haulage contractor's trade, it appears to me that, prima facie, it bears every characteristic and feature of a fixed capital asset. It is an asset which is retained by the company and it is an asset which produces income. 32. It is quite impossible to suggest that it could form part of the company's circulating capital, because these companies do not trade in "A" licences, and, accordingly, as I say, I think that prima facie an "A" licence has a strong complexion of being an item of fixed capital ; but, from that, I do not think it is necessary to proceed to a decided view that the contrary could not possibly be shown. 33. For the rest, I entirely agree with what my brethren have said.
-
1956 (12) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... business of the assessee? These are the tests to be satisfied before it could be said that in paying the gratuity money was laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the company. These tests the assessee did not satisfy in this case. Mr. Subbaraya Ayyar, learned counsel for the assessee, pointed out that the company accepted it as a legitimate payment. But obviously that is not enough to sustain a claim under section 10(2)(xv). As we said, the good faith attendant on the transaction was never in dispute. The action of the company in rewarding a trusted employee after long years of faithful service by making him a substantial payment may be laudable, but the question is, is it a claim that could be allowed under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. That question, in the circumstances of this case, has to be answered in the negative. We answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference.
-
1956 (12) TMI 49 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... accepted practice, deduct the value of that property from its taxable profits for that year, which no individual could do, and which no company could do which suffered a loss of some house or property which formed part of its fixed capital. That consideration does, to some extent at all events, mitigate the undoubted harshness of the result for which the Crown is contending. Finally, although I have every sympathy with the gallant endeavour which the Special Commissioner made to put the matter right from an equitable point of view, there is no justification or warrant for introducing words into a taxing statue which are not there, that being matter for the legislature, and not for this court, which can only take the language as it finds it and put such interpretation as it thinks right upon that. For those reasons I agree that the appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue; R. C. Bartlett & Co.
-
1956 (12) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... itself. It contemplates suits and applications for execution under the Act of 1950. Now I do not find anything in the Act of 1950 which ran be said to authorise a suit or an application for execution. Therefore the suits and applications for execution under the Act cannot be such as are authorised bv the Act. If it were so. the words used in the Act would have been meaningless. It seems to me therefore that when the Explanation talks of suits and application for execution under the Act it must mean these proceedings in which rights given by the Act are concerned. If such is the proper meaning to be given to the words "under the Act" that mean-ing must apply in the case of appeals, review or revision. 74. As the proceedings before us are concerned with the rights given by the Act of 1950 and as they were pending on March 31, 1956. for the reasons earlier stated, I agree with the answers given by my Lord the Chief Justice to the questions referred to the Pull Bench.
-
1956 (12) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f opposite party has filed an affidavit, accepting full responsibility for the statements in the plaint and also Pai's verification of the same, but that, in our opinion, will not, in the circumstances of this case, be sufficient compliance with the rules of verification, laid down in the Code. 7. We, accordingly, make this Rule absolute in part, that is, so far as the verification is concerned and direct that the plaintiff should verify the plaint himself in the presence of the learned Subordinate Judge. For that purpose the learned Subordinate Judge will give him all reasonable facilities and this personal verification by the plaintiff should be made within four weeks from the date of arrival of records in the court below. The defendants' objection to the alleged defective signing of the Vakalatnama and of the plaint, which was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge, would stand dismissed. 8. There will be no order as to costs. Renupada Mukherjee, J. 9. I agree.
-
1956 (12) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er than the defaulter, we would have issued a writ of mandamus to forbid him from continuing the proceedings against the property of the petitioner. But in view of the fact that the Collector has also additional powers, which would enable him to attach the property ostensibly standing in the name of the petitioner, as property belonging to the defaulter, we do not think it necessary to make any such order, especially because Mr. Rama Rao Sahib appearing for the respondents has intimated that the attachment in this case would be treated as an attachment under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the petitioner will be entitled to prefer a claim, if she chooses to, and the claim will be enquired into and disposed of by the Collector. It will also follow that the party aggrieved by decision of the Collector will have right of suit under Order XXI, rule 63, of the Code. The petition is therefore dismissed; but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
-
1956 (12) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed for a good bit of the land around the building for use as a playground should be obvious. In the experimental farm, agricultural or horticultural operations were obviously carried on by the school authorities and not by the assessee. The total extent of 2.54 acres could be hardly enough for the school. It was thus a case of a sale of building with a reasonable extent of land appurtenant thereto. As we said that at one time before the assessee purchased the lands, they were agricultural lands, is not enough to sustain the claim of the assessee that he came within the scope of the exemption in sub-clause (iii) of section 2(4A). He did not hold the land for agricultural purposes. He did not derive any agricultural income therefrom. We answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative, both against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he will pay the costs of this reference; counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (12) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stment and Land Mortgage Company Limited 1986 A.C. 461. But we must also point out that in Indian Turpentine and Rosin Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, United Provinces 1929 3 I.T.R. 219 it was not the scope of section 10(2)(iii) that arose for determination. In Devarajulu Chetty & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1950 18 I.T.R. 357 at page 367, the learned Judges pointed our, "it is the quality of the payment that is the test and not its admeasurement." With that principle we are in entire agreement. Once the true nature of the transaction is realised, there is no scope afforded in section 10(2)(iii) to reduce the quantum paid as interest, to anything considered reasonable by the Taxing Authorities on subjective or objective standards. We answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee company. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
-
1956 (12) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... erson engaged, and that if that was so, the contract was one of employment, whether the work was time- work or piece-work or whether the employee did the whole of the work himself or whether he obtained the assistance of other persons also for the work. Therefore, before it could be held that Ganga Prasad and Viswanath Pande were employed by the first appellant, it must be shown that the contract with them was that they should personally do the work, with or without the assistance of other persons. But such evidence is totally lacking, and the finding, therefore, that they had been employed by the first appellant must be set aside as based on no evidence. Neither of the grounds on which the election of the appellants has been declared void, could be supported. We must accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Tribunal and dismiss the election petition filed by the respondent, with costs of the appellants throughout. Appeal allowed. Election petition dismissed.
-
1956 (12) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ;, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, para 1480 and 1481, pp. 877-878). The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed, against the orders of the High. -Court in applications under Art. 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the, case requires it. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently foundint favour of the respondents both by the De-Duty Commissioner,, Sibsagar, and the High (Court, we should decline to interfere. This being the point of substance which has been decided in favour of the respondents, we are of the opinion that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss them but having regard to the particular circumstances which we have adverted to before, we order that each party will bear and pay its own costs of these appeals. Appeals dismissed.
-
1956 (12) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... consider that this is a fit case for passing such an order. The evidence adduced by the first respondent is very largely, to the effect that the appellant's men did election work in the morning or in the evening, that is, out of office hours. That shows that the work the staff was in addition to their normal duties, and on the, principles stated above, they could not be held to have been employed in connection with the election. As the first respondent does not appear himself to have under-, stood the true position under Rule 118 and has failed to adduce, evidence requisite for a decision of the question, he must fail, the burden being on him to establish that Rule had been infringed. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the, Election Tribunal is set aside and the election petition of the first respondent will stand dismissed. As the parties have each succeeded on one issue and failed on another, they will bear their own costs, throughout. Appeal allowed.
-
1956 (12) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that the actual revenue that will be realised will be more than what has hitherto been available to the State. These are matters which cannot be decided at this stage, and if I decide them one way or the other, the hearing before the Commissioner might be prejudiced. The result is that at this stage of the proceedings I am unable to interfere, and in my opinion I should not interfere, and that the applications are premature. I also make it clear that I do not express any opinion on the question as to whether after the decision of the Commissioner, the petitioner should avail himself of the remedy open to him under the Income-tax Act, or whether he should come up again to this Court. It would not be proper for me to express any opinion on that point at this stage. The result is that these applications fail and the rule must be discharged. All interim orders are vacated. Regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the cases, I make no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
-
1956 (12) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dharmam in his turnover is intelligible but then it must be realised that it will be imposing an impossible burden on the assessing authority if it is obliged to find out in each case and for each year, how much of the collections has been spent for real charities, how much spent for nominal or colourable charities and how much was utilised by the dealer for his personal benefit. In any case, it is not for us to express an opinion on the expediency of the Amending Act, for considerations of policy lie wholly outside our sphere. We have construed the Amending Act as it stands without stretching or cutting down its language for the purpose of avoiding supposed hardship to individuals. Judgment After receipt of the opinion of the Full Bench, the judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, C.J.-Following the opinion given by the Full Bench on the question referred to them these revisions (petitions) are allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petition allowed.
-
1956 (12) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t at that stage. Consequently there is no exemption. It is true that the Bombay Authorities have decided to grant exemption, but that is not a judicial decision and cannot affect my judgment. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have made out no grounds for avoiding the tax which is sought to be levied on them and no grounds have been made for interference of this Court. The application, therefore, fails. The Rule is discharged and all interim orders are vacated. Regard being had to the complicated question of law involved there will be no order as to costs. The petitioner asks for a certificate under Article 132 of the Constitution to enable it to appeal directly to the Supreme Court. The respondents do not object. I certify under Article 132 that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Application dismissed. Attorneys Orr Dignam and Co., for the petitioner. N.C. Mitra, for the respondents.
-
1956 (12) TMI 37 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the present case is liable to pay sales tax for the hessian and the iron hoops used by him in the baling process. 7.. For the foregoing reasons, I would answer all the questions referred to us for decision by saying that the owner of a ginning and pressing factory carrying on the business of baling and pressing cotton supplied by the customers and of delivering the pressed cotton in the form of bales covered with hessain cloth and secured by iron hoops, and making a consolidated charge for pressing as well as packing, was a dealer within the meaning of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act that the hessian and iron hoops used in the baling process were goods and that there was a sale in regard to them when the assessee transferred the property in those goods and that the assessee was, therefore, liable to sales tax on the value of the hessain and iron hoops used by him in the baling process. There will be no order as to costs. SAMVATSAR, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (12) TMI 36 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e tax for the remaining three quarters of the year. The proper time for the assessee to raise the question of rebate for the quarter in question was when the tax was being actually determined by the assessing authority under section 8(1)(b) or in an appeal against that assessment. The assessee having failed to do so, it is not now open to him to claim that he is entitled to any rebate under sub-section (5) of section 8 on the tax assessed on him for the quarter ending on 30th June, 1950. I would, therefore, answer the second question referred to for our decision by saying that in this case as the assessment for the quarter ending on 30th June, 1950, had become final, it could not be modified subsequently under sub-section (5). As to the first question, I express no opinion as the assessment for the first quarter having become final it does not arise for determination. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. SAMVATSAR, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1956 (12) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed have been used distinctively. Therefore, in the context, recording of proceedings is something different from an order. An order would indicate some expression of opinion which is to be carried out or enforced. It is the conclusion of a body (Court, authority or tribunal) upon any motion while the recording of proceeding would mean the incorporating of any matter that had happened. Proceeding has been held to mean in the Oxford Dictionary as a record of the business done. The closing of a case by composition, against a dealer who has rendered himself liable to prosecution for violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act is a proceeding recorded by the prescribed authority within the meaning of section 11 of the Madras Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, and, therefore, an appeal would lie against such recording of proceedings. As no argument was advanced on the merits the revisions must fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
|
