|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 81 Records
-
1960 (11) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f secrecy on the document; nor, in my view, public interest demands such secrecy. In a conflict between the administration of justice and the claim of privilege by the State, I have no hesitation to overrule the claim of privilege. Before closing, I must notice one fact. In this case, the Chief Secretary filed an affidavit. But, in my view, the minister should have done it. The respondent did not object to this either in the district court or in the High Court. In the circumstances, I would not reject the claim of privilege on the basis of this procedural defect. In the result, I would allow the appeal in respect of the minutes of the cabinet and dismiss it in other respects. As the parties have succeeded and failed in part, I direct them to bear their own costs throughout. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y the terms of the statute. The last point that has been urged is that even if s. 20(1) applies, the Scindias are bound to take back the appellants. Suffice it to say that there is no force in this contention either. As soon as the appellants became by force of law the employees of the Corporation, as they did so become on August 1, 1953, in the circumstances of this case, they had no further right against the Scindias and could not; claim to be taken back in their employment on the ground that they were still their employees, in spite of the operation of s. 20(1) of the Act. Nor could they claim any of the alternative benefits specified in the order of reference, as from August 1, 1953, they are by operation of law only the employees of the Corporation and can have no rights whatsoever against the Scindias. We are therefore of opinion that the tribunal's decision is correct. The appeal fails and is thereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 117 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s for which the Income- tax Officer made the addition were at all proper or relevant. These reasons given by the Income-tax Officer, however, have not been expressly approved of by the Tribunal. The Tribunal itself proceeded in an unreasonable manner to make an estimate which as mentioned above was quite unjustified and based on no material. We are unable to hold that the so-called finding given by the Tribunal was a finding of fact at all. It is purely an arbitrary guess based on no material whatsoever. Having heard learned counsel at some length we are of opinion that the answer to the second question must be in the negative. As we have answered to second question in the negative and in favour of the assessee, learned counsel for the assessee does not press that the first question may be answered. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. We fix the fee of the learned counsel for the Department at the same amount. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1960 (11) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the power of the Governor under Art. 310 to terminate the services of a Government servant at pleasure is part of the executive power of the State under Art. 154 of the Constitution?
Held that:- Paragraph 489 only empowers the holding of a departmental trial in regard to a police officer only after a police investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code. When a rule says that a departmental trial can be held only after a police investigation, it is not permissible to hold that it can be held without such investigation. For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that para. 486 is mandatory and that, as the investigation has not been held under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the subsequent inquiry and the order of dismissal are illegal.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that, as the respondent was dismissed without complying with the provisions of para. 486(1), the order of dismissal is illegal and that the High Court is right in setting aside the order of dismissal. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
-
1960 (11) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the levy imposed by the impugned Act amounts to a fee relatable to Entry 23 read with Entry 66 in List II?
Held that:- It is difficult to hold that the field covered by the declaration made by s. 2 of this Act, considered in the light of its several provisions, is the same as the field covered by the impugned Act. That being so, it cannot be said that as a result of Entry 52 read with Act LXV of 1951 the vires of the impugned Act can be successfully challenged.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the impugned Act is relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, and its validity is not impaired or affected by Entries 52 and 54 in List I read with Act LXV of 1951 and Act LIII of 1948 respectively. In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider whether the impugned Act can be justified under Entry 50 in List II, or whether it is relatable to Entry 24 in List III and as such suffexs from the vice of repugnancy with the Central Act XXXII of 1947. The result is the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1960 (11) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ere construing there is similar to the provision before us. This decision supports the view that we are taking. In Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madurai Division, Madurai v. A. Anantharama Nadar and Sons 1970 25 S.T.C. 276., a Division Bench referred the matter to a Full Bench. The Full Bench was asked to consider whether the sale of agricultural produce by an agent of the principal who has grown the said produce will be liable to tax. The Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. It was required to answer the question on the basis of the definition of the word turnover in section 2(r) of the Madras Sales Tax Act. Section 2(r) is similar to section 2(i) (including the proviso) of our Act. This decision also supports our view. In the result, our answer to the two referred questions are in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall get costs which we assess at Rs. 100. There shall be a single set of costs. References answered in the affirmative.
-
1960 (11) TMI 113 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Act as including horticulture observed that it gave an indication that the word agriculture was used in a narrower sense. It is for the reason, it has been held, that the decisions bearing on the definition of that word as contained in the Madras Estates Land Act would afford no assistance in deciding a matter under the Indian Income-tax Act. For these reasons we hold that the expression agricultural produce in rule 5 is confined only to the agricultural produce understood in a narrow sense and excludes horticultural produce. Therefore, the notification now impugned is not obnoxious to rule 5(2)(f) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules. It follows that the notification is valid and cannot be successfully attacked. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. As the same principle applies to T.R.C. Nos. 18 of 1960, 15 of 1960 and 56 of 1960, they are also dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each of them. Petition dismissed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 112 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ice. 7.. In the above view we hold that rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules and the substituted rule 13 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules are invalid since the provisions of section 19(4) of the Sales Tax Act are not complied with. Therefore we allow T.R.C. No. 92 of 1959 in part and set aside the order of the Commercial Tax Officer, Malabar South, Kozhikode, reopening the assessment on the petitioner and assessing him on an escaped turnover of Rs. 6,19,764. To this extent the assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer and the order confirming the same by the Appellate Tribunal are set aside. In T.R.C. No. 93 of 1959 we set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal as well as the Department and remit the case to the assessing officer for assessing the petitioner under the old rule 13, if the said authority so desires. In the circumstances of these cases we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
-
1960 (11) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... or purposes of section 5 of the Act or for the computation of a licence fee under the rules. It seems to us therefore that for the purpose of computation of the licence fee only that part of the turnover of the dealer which comes within the scope of section 5 either eligible to total exemption from tax or to concessional rate of tax at a preferential rate or at a single point that should be turnover for purposes of computation of the licence fee. In the view we have taken we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore that of the Commercial Tax Officer in so far as computation of the turnover for the licence fee is concerned. It is not denied that as a result of the decision in Guruvayya Naidu v. State of Madras 1957 8 S.T.C. 699., the maximum licence fee leviable cannot exceed Rs. 1,000. Subject to this, it will be open to the department to fix the licence fee on the turnover indicated above. The petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 110 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... red at the price fixed. As between the two there is no room for any negotiation. We are not here concerned with contracts arising out of other Control Orders where there might possibly be some room left within the scope of those Orders, to enter into contracts, as in the Andhra case. That question may be left open. As between the petitioner and the Corporation the entire transaction is in the nature of a compulsory transfer of title to the goods from one person to another on payment of the stipulated price. In my opinion, such a transaction will be directly covered by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and would not amount to a sale within the meaning of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. 9.. The question is therefore answered in the negative. We hold that there was no sale of cement to the Corporation and no sales tax was leviable under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1960 (11) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Officer was wrong, because if what was enacted by Act VII of 1956 was the law on the date of the original assessment, the original assessment was illegal. Learned counsel for the respondent-assessee urged that the ambit of section 12(2) was more circumscribed than that for instance of section 12-B of the Act, and that the order of the Commercial Tax Officer should not be characterised either as illegal or improper when it was correct and consistent with the law as it stood on that date. But that contention we must negative in view of what we have stated obove. The principle laid down in Venkatachala v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 1959 S.C.R. 703 34 I.T.R.143. , applies with equal force to cases of revision under section 12(2) of the Act also. The petition is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Deputy Commissioner is restored. The petitioner will be entitled for the costs of this petition. Counsel s fee Rs.100. Petitions allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the sales tax refunded to an assessee under similar circumstances. Neither the Act nor the Amending Act provided a machinery for effecting recovery of the amount refunded without a revision of assessment. Rule 18(1) provided for rectification, but that machinery was not availed of in this case, and it could not have been availed of by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The machinery provided for revision of assessment in rule 17(3) could not have been availed of in this case by the assessing authority to revise not his order of assessment but that of the Tribunal. In our opinion the order passed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and ultimately confirmed by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction and has therefore to be set aside. This petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal confirming the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 7th February, 1957, will stand set aside. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 107 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n it has created. 5.. The learned Government Pleader drew our attention to Union Leather Company v. State of Madras 1960 11 S.T.C. 318. We are unable to see anything in that decision which militates against the conclusion we have reached. 6.. It follows that the assessments impugned in these petitions have to be quashed. We do so. 7.. Various other contentions are raised in these petitions. It is unnecessary to consider them in this judgment and they are left open for future determination. 8.. We make it clear that the quashing of the assessments will not preclude the Department from making fresh assessments according to law. It was agreed that if and when such assessments are made no question of limitation will be raised and we must record that the said agreement has influenced us in interfering at this stage without leaving the petitioner to his normal remedies under the Act by way of appeal and revision. 9.. The petitions are allowed as above. No costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 106 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t obtained by a commission agent he would be exempt from payment of tax in the teeth of section 2(b) and section 8 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Again, he did not have any regard to the fact that the plaintiff had included the disputed turnover in the returns submitted by the firm and paid taxes voluntarily and that there was no cogent evidence in support of the theory that these were done under any mistake. The Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter by remarking that the authorities must be deemed to have collected the tax on sales of groundnut illegally. To say the least, the judgment under appeal is very unsatisfactory and discloses a straining of every circumstance in favour of the plaintiff. We have, therefore, no option but to reverse it and allow the appeal. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the suit dismissed with costs. The memorandum of cross-objections claiming at 12 per cent. per annum is also dismissed with costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he goods themselves are returned to the seller and the unpaid instalments of the purchase money ceased to be payable under the terms of the agreement, the seller is entitled to claim under rule 5(1)(b) the total of the unpaid instalments as an allowance made within the meaning of rule 5(1)(b), provided of course that factually the liability for the unpaid purchase money is terminated and the other requirement, that the transactions should be shown in the accounts, is satisfied. In the case of the assessee he terminated that liability under the terms of the agreement, and the ledger accounts were closed. It was those accounts that disclosed what the unpaid purchase money was. We hold that the assessee was entitled under rule 5(1)(b) to a deduction of Rs. 21,191-1-6 in the assessment year 1955-56. The petition is allowed to that extent and the assessment be reduced accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to the cost of this petition. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 104 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... objection in question was filed by the State. The identical point came up for consideration in Ramachandra Balaram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Since reported at 1960 11 S.T.C. 480., referred to above. The question referred to this Court in that case was Whether the cross-objection filed by the State in the present case is maintainable in law? After discussing the entire position in law, the answer of this Court was given in the affirmative. Accordingly, this question is also concluded by the aforesaid decision of this Court and must also be answered in the affirmative, that is, the Tribunal was right in entertaining the cross-objection. Thus, both the questions referred to this Court for our decision are answered in the affirmative as stated above and the references are disposed of accordingly. Both parties will, however, bear their respective costs. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative. BARMAN, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1960 (11) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ons will not apply to the present case. Under the Motor Vehicles Act the tribunal is vested with statutory authority in performing its quasi-judicial duties, it could rely upon certain administrative directions issued by the appropriate authority. A disregard of its administrative direction by the quasi-judicial authority under the statute was held not to attract the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Here the Commercial Tax Officer is not exercising any independent or statutory jurisdiction of his own. He, as a subordinate of the Government, was directed to do a public duty and if he failed to do that duty on a misapprehension of the scope of the very direction given to him it should be open to this Court to issue an appropriate writ. The rule nisi is therefore made absolute. The result will be that the Commercial Tax Officer will have to dispose of the petitioner s claim for refund afresh. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Ordered accordingly.
-
1960 (11) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e excise duty paid, because the assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of the exemption provided by rule 5(i) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules. We are unable to see any real basis for any charge of discrimination to invalidate either section 5(viii) or the rules. What the assessee had to pay his vendor constituted the purchase turnover on which the assessee had to be taxed. All the elements that went into the price charged by the assessee s vendor would be relevant only for determining the price charged to the assessee, and no charge of discrimination could be based on the price the assessee had to pay to his vendor. As we said, the view taken by the Tribunal on the evidence placed before it, that it was the assessee and not the wholesaler, the assessee s vendor, resident in the State of Madras that was the first purchaser of the tobacco within the State of Madras is correct. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs.100. Petition dismissed.
-
1960 (11) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hority at least of Sidhwani in his favour. It was he who actually started the mischief and the others callously joined him therein. In the result all the 4 accused assaulted all the four officers and bodily lifted them up and put them out of the flat. In our opinion, therefore, accused No. 1 cannot possibly escape a substantive sentence of imprisonment. We would inflict a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days on accused No. 1 and maintain the fine as well as the sentence of imprisonment in default imposed by the learned Magistrate. As regards accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the amount of fine imposed by the learned Magistrate is only Rs. 100. We enhance the sentence of fine to a fine of Rs. 250 each, in default rigorous imprisonment for three weeks. The application by the State is, therefore, allowed and the rule is made absolute. Warrant of arrest to be issued against accused No. 1. We grant him time to surrender till Tuesday, 22nd November, 1960. Ordered accordingly.
-
1960 (11) TMI 100 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he help of smoke. This is done for purposes of preserving the latex and making it fit for marketing. It follows that rubber is still produce from land and not liable to the sales tax. We are fortified in this view by the observation in India Coffee Tea Distributing Co., Ltd. v. State of Madras 1958 9 S.T.C. 769 at p. 772., where the decision of a learned single Judge, holding rubber to be agricultural produce, was not reversed, and indeed conceded by the Government Pleader. The relevant passage in the case reads as follows The learned Judge after considering the several authorities on the subject, held that tea and rubber would be agricultural produce......... The learned Government Pleader conceded that rubber would be an agricultural produce. It follows that rubber is an agricultural produce and this ground for reversing the order sustaining the dealer s objection also fails. Accordingly all the four revision petitions are dismissed, but without costs. Petitions dismissed.
|
