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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 63 Records
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1960 (2) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd Pra 230. The same view has been taken by a single judge of the Madras High Court in Coimbatore Municipality v. Narayanan, AIR 1958 Mad 416. The basis of these decisions of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts is that the Criminal Procedure Code is a general law and that consequently Sub-section (2) of Section 29 does not exclude the application of Section 5 to applications' for special leave under Sub-section (3) of Section 417. But, as we have already pointed out, the provision contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special pro-vision, which applies only to applications made by private parties for leave to appeal from orders of acquittal and is therefore a special law within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 29. With respect, therefore, we are unable to agree with the view token by the Madras and the Andhra High Courts. 8. In our opinion, the question referred to the Full Bench must be answered in the negative. 9. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (2) TMI 82 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e question of credibility have not been taken into account or properly weighed by the trial Judge and such considerations including the question of probability of the story given by the witnesses clearly indicate that the view taken by the trial Judge is wrong, the Appeal Court should have no hesitation in reversing the findings of the trial Judge on such questions. Where the question is not of credibility based entirely on the demeanour of witnesses observed in Court but a question of inference of one fact from proved primary facts the Court of appeal is in as good a position as the trial judge and is free to reverse the findings if it thinks that the inference made by the trial Judge is not justified. The learned appeal court, in coming to a different finding on the passing of consideration, appears to have acted within the aforesaid dictum. 11. In the result, I find no merit in the present appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Gopal Chandra Das, J. 12. I agree.
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1960 (2) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and there is no question of any irregularity being cured because it is almost impossible that no prejudice thereby will be caused to the accused. This irregularity will amount to an illegality vitiating the conviction and sentence because, as I have just stated it is one of the glorious principles of our criminal jurisprudence that we do not try or sentence people in absentia and we do not also convict and sentence people without judgments being pronounced in open Court and signed and dated then and there. It may be different in the continental system of criminal jurisprudence. 5. Therefore, the references by the learned District Magistrate of Salem are accepted and the convictions and sentences in these cases are set aside. I do not order a re-trial in the context of these cases. This atrocious behaviour on the part of the Sub-Magistrate which plainly unfits him for the discharge of his duties will naturally be adequately dealt with on the Administrative Side of this Court.
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1960 (2) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... udge and his discretion is not to be lightly interfered with in appeal. In our opinion, the discretion exercised by the trial court in this behalf cannot be regarded to be unreasonable. 31. However, as regards the amount of ₹ 1,600/- claimed by the plaintiff for loss of reputation, we think the court below was not right in holding that preventive detention does not entail loss of reputation. Ordinarily the people presume that preventive detention is ordered only in connection with illegal activities and the reputation of a person who is so detained does suffer. The amount of ₹ 1,600/- claimed in this behalf by the plaintiff is also reasonable for loss of his reputation. 32. In view of our finding discussed above that the Government is not liable for the act of the Commissioner in ordering wrongful detention of the plaintiff, we allow the appeal and dismiss the suit. In the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
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1960 (2) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... orm of a proviso has done something for which there is absolutely no justification." This view has been accepted as correct and followed in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ramgopal Kaniyalal by Shrivastava and Sharma JJ. of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, and with respect I am of the opinion that it is a correct view and indeed the only possible interpretation of the clear and unambiguous words of the proviso itself. The result is that I would answer the question referred to us by saying that for the purpose of computing the assessees income, profits and gains under section 10 of the Indian Income Tax Act, the loss sustained by him in his jobbing transactions was not adjustable against his profits from the brokerage activities of same period by reason of the terms of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 24 of the Act. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner. Counsels fee ₹ 250. G.L. Chopra, J. I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (2) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... coming up for consideration at a meeting of the Board if the question is one in which he has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest by himself or his partner, or in which he is interested professionally on behalf of a client or as agent for any person Other than the Central Government, a local authority or a railway company. It was said that one Anthony Pillai who was. one of the trustees of the Board was the President of the Port Trust Employees' Union. He was apparently one of the two representatives of Labour chosen by the Central Government under Section 8(1) (h) of the Act. The argument was that, as the President of the Employees' Union, he had pecuniary interest on behalf of the employees of the Port Trust who would be benefited if the Port Trust Board took over the handling of export cargo. The contention was, however, abandoned at a later stage. 16. In view of the above findings, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... return to this country, had allowed him to go to Burma in order that he might not contravene the conditions of his visa. It was further pointed out that the incident took place in June, 1954, some 5 years and eight months ago. Even a substantial fine in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment would be sufficient punishment and a deterrent to the appellant. We have given the matter of sentence our anxious consideration. It seems, prima facie, that a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment and fine of ₹ 1,000 could not be said to be severe for an offence of the kind established against the appellant. The circumstances mentioned above, if correct, in plea of mitigation of sentence may attract attention but so far as a court of law is concerned, judicially, it is impossible to say that the sentence imposed by the High Court is severe in a case where there had been an attempt to corrupt a responsible public servant. 15. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 16. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dicate that the Manager was really anxious to find out the truth of the matter and for that purpose gave every opportunity to Dasappa to cross-examine the witnesses, had the evidence interpreted in Dasappa's own language and asked him after cross-examination of almost each of the witnesses whether he had any reason to believe that that witness bore any ill-will or any grudge against him. It could not be fairly urged therefore that the principles of natural justice were not observed in this case. Nor is there any justification for thinking that the Management had any intention to victimise this man. 15. Our conclusion therefore is that the Tribunal erred in refusing the permission asked for. In view, however, of the undertaking given to us on behalf of the appellant that the proposed order of discharge will not be enforced, it is not necessary for us to make any order granting permission. In view of this, we dismiss both the appeals, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fore the Tribunal giving the particulars of the persons who distributed the leaflets in question. But it is said that the particulars given therein show that the Appellant distributed the leaflets only at Thulavanur, whereas the evidence does not support it. This comment is based upon a misapprehension of the recitals in the annexure. The names of the villages given under the heading "place" are not villages where the leaflets were distributed but are places where the persons mentioned therein reside. That is made clear by the entries against the names of Srinivasa Murthy, Doraiswami, Sundaraiah, Narayana Gowda, Venkatarama Reddy and others. Under the heading "place" sometimes their designations are given and sometimes their addresses are given. The High Court in interfering with the finding of the Election Tribunal did not contravene any rule of practice regulating the disposal of first appeals. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 74 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t in assertion of rights which he correctly believed to be his; not by reason of any encouragement or abstention on the part of the appellant, but by reason of the agreement which he was then entitled to enforce against the appellant." I make bold to say that if the facts in ArifFs case (AIR 1931 PC 79) 58 Ind App 91 were the same as those in the instant case, the decision of the Privy Council would have been different. The contention of Mr. Sinha is thus well founded and supported by authorities and must be accepted as correct. I must hold, therefore, that the defendant-appellant is entitled to invoke the aid of the doctrine of estoppel, and the plaintiff cannot be permitted to prove that the defendant was a mere tenant-at-will contrary to his own representation. 6. In the result, the appeal should be allowed with costs throughout. The decree of the lower appellate Court is accordingly set aside and that of the learned Munsiff is restored. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 7. I agree.
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1960 (2) TMI 73 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble in this situation. If the tax is not paid because of miscalculation, etc., then a lighter penalty of charge of interest is imposed but if it is not paid without reasonable cause, then heavier penalty is imposed. It is always open to the Legislature to impose heavier penalty for a default which has been committed deliberately. It was suggested that it is not possible to compute tax in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (6) when no tax is paid and, therefore, sub-section (8) does not apply to a case of non-payment of tax. There is no substance in this argument. If no advance tax is paid at all, then it necessarily falls short by 80 per cent. and interest is payable on the entire amount of tax in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (6). For these reasons, I would answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. In the circumstances of the case, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. Inder Dev Dua, J.-I agree.
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1960 (2) TMI 72 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the payment of the amount in dispute and treats him as a defaulter, it may then be said that it is a capricious exercise of the discretion. But that is not the position here. Nothing was paid by the assessee in spite of the warning given by the officer concerned in November, 1950, that in the event of its not paying the amount it would be treated as a defaulter within the meaning of section 45 and the Commissioner gave it permission to pay the amount in instalments. It was only in 1955 that the assessee chose to comply with the demand of the Department. In these circumstances, we do not think that there is any scope for the contention that the Income Tax Officer was not justified in treating the assessee as a defaulter or to invoke the doctrine of justice, equity and good conscience. 32. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the judgment under appeal. In the result, these appeals are allowed, but, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1960 (2) TMI 71 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the partnership or otherwise. As regards the other question that clause 4 of the partnership deed envisaged a contingency where the account of the partners shows that they have no capital invested in the partnership but they still remained partners, it is enough to point out that even if the partners may not cease to be partners, if they have overdrawn as against their capital investment, it does not necessarily follow that the partners, when they are getting interest on their capital, are getting it on any other consideration except that they have been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. Reference was then made to the case of Popatlal Bhikamchand v. Commissioner of Income Tax. That case, to my mind, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the result therefore we would answer the question in the affirmative. The Department will be entitled to its costs, which we assess at ₹ 100. C.P. Sinha, C.J. I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (2) TMI 70 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the partnership or otherwise. As regards the other question that clause 4 of the partnership deed envisaged a contingency where the account of the partners shows that they have no capital invested in the partnership but they still remained partners, it is enough to point out that even if the partners may not cease to be partners, if they have overdrawn as against their capital investment, it does not necessarily follow that the partners, when they are getting interest on their capital, are getting it on any other consideration except that they have been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. Reference was then made to the case of Popatlal Bhikamchand v. Commissioner of Income Tax. That case, to my mind, is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the result therefore we would answer the question in the affirmative. The Department will be entitled to its costs, which we assess at ₹ 100. C.P. Sinha, C.J. I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (2) TMI 69 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t has, because what is available for being set off is the resultant profits or loss under section 24(1) and the proviso sets out the mode of arriving at the resultant profits or loss in the computation of profits and gains of a business, profession or vocation." (p. 15) The learned Judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Shrivastava and Sharma JJ., had before them and considered the remarks of the Supreme Court in the case of the Indo-Mercantile Bank Limited ( supra)before they also came to the conclusion that the language of the proviso in section 24(1) could only be interpreted as governing the method of computation of profits and gains of business, profession or vocation under section 10, and they expressed agreement with the view of the Bombay High Court. I am also of the opinion that this view is correct and would accordingly answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner on the reference. Chopra J.-I agree.
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1960 (2) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... idavit or otherwise and after giving an opportunity to the workmen to contest the correctness of such evidence by cross-examination. o p /o p 7. We must therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of the employer-appellant that the balance-sheet that has been filed is sufficient to prove that ₹ 2,27,000 of the depreciation fund was actually used as working capital. There is, as we have already stated, no material on the record from which any conclusion can be reached as regards the utilisation of the whole or any portion of this sum lying in depreciation fund as working capital. o p /o p 8. The appellant's counsel finally asked that the matter may be sent back to the Industrial Tribunal and an opportunity given to him to adduce proper evidence on this point. We do not see any circumstance that will justify us in making an order of remand in a case of this nature. o p /o p 9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. o p /o p 10. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1960 (2) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e authority in dealing with the question were based on the assumption that the amended provision of s. 13(3)(a)(iii) applied to the present proceedings. Otherwise it was irrelevant to enquire whether the property in question had become unsafe or unfit for human habitation as they have done. All the relevant evidence available on record on this point clearly sustains the view taken by the High Court that the case made by the landlord under s. 13(3)(a)(iii) was bona fide. Soon after he purchased the house he decided to reconstruct the building, moved the Municipality with his plan and obtained its sanction. It is difficult to understand how on these facts it would be permissible to hold that the landlord is acting mala fide. That is the view which the High Court took and we see no substance in the argument that in taking the said view the High Court has acted either irregularly or improperly. 11. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 12. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 66 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d 1-7- 1950, that there is a clause that "the party of the First Part shall buy, contract for, sell, ship or con sign for sale to any place all goods manufactured, produced or otherwise belonging to or in the pos session of the partnership, including wastes, by products and all raw products." In other words, the deed of partnership empowers Mr. P. R. Reddy, who has a dealer's licence, to purchase, sell, trans port or consign for sale all the mica produced by the partnership. For the reasons we have already given in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 327 of 1957 we hold that the partnership constituted by the deed of partnership dated 1-7-1950, is legally valid and is entitled to registration under the pro visions of Section 26A of the Indian Income Tax Act. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and as reframed by us in favour of the assessee and against the Income Tax Department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (2) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... High Court rejected that contention in the order made on the application under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. For greater safety it also made an order allowing the amendment sought by the respondent. The High Court's decision not having been questioned by the appellant by an appeal, is binding on him. He must therefore accept the position that the amendment of the petition was proper. I may also state that if the amendment had not been properly allowed that would not have made any difference. The only result would have been that some more particulars.of the corrupt practice alleged would have been wanting. For the reasons earlier stated this would not have entailed a -dismissal of the election petition. The only other point that was argued at the bar was a question of fact, namely, whether the corrupt practice alleged had been proved. On that point I am in perfect agreement with the view expressed by my learned brothers and have nothing to add. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (2) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e already pointed out that there was no break in the continuity of that business from 1920 to 1942. That there was a succession to the business commenced in 1920, in 1927, after Arunachalam's death in no way affected the real question at issue, whether the family was entitled to relief under section 25(4) of the Act on the basis of the succession in 1942. The view taken by the Tribunal that section 25(4) contemplates only one succession and would not apply to cases where there had been an earlier succession before 1939 is erroneous and we did not understand the learned counsel for the Department to support that view. The assessee satisfied all the requirements of section 25(4) and was, therefore, entitled to the relief the assessee claimed under section 25(4) of the Act. We answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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