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Showing 21 to 40 of 58 Records
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1961 (2) TMI 80 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rate. In my view, however, these two businesses are so closely allied that they cannot be treated as separate for the purposes of the income derived from them. I do not consider them as one business, but it seems to me that in the peculiar circumstances of this case the two businesses must be treated together and the expenses incurred on hire charges, repair charges and legal charges are allowable to the assessee under section 10(2)(v) and 10(2)(xv), because there was no intention to discontinue the business when the machinery was stolen and also because the hire charges were being paid by him during the previous years also. There seems to me to have been a continually despite the fact that the actual exhibition of films had been stopped owing to the theft of the machinery. For these reasons, I would answer the question referred to me in the affirmative and allow the assessee his costs which we assess at ₹ 250. FALSHAW J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (2) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ut jurisdiction it held that it should interfere and set aside the order of December 2, 1952, which was also without jurisdiction and restore that, of August 22,1950. -In the view we have taken, the order of the Custodian-General was with jurisdiction and therefore there was in our opinion no-reason for the High Court interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution with the order of December 2, 1952, as this is a case where only a writ of certiorari could issue and that is not justified in view of the decision in Hari Vishnu Kamath's case( 1955 1 S.C.R. 1104) We therefore allow the appeals, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Custodian dated December 2, 1952. This of course will not take away the right if any of the respondents to approach the Custodian-General, for we have not considered the merits of the order, of December 2, 1952. In the circumstances of this case we pass no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1961 (2) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid defect 'in the charge has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. The accused knew from the beginning the case they had to meet. The prosecution adduced evidence to prove that the accused armed themselves with lathies and entered the premises of the decree-holder to recover their cattle and gave lathi blows to the inmates of the house causing thereby serious injuries to them. Accused had- ample opportunity to meet that case. Both the courts below accepted the evidence and convicted the accused under s. 325, read with s. 149, I.P.C. The evidence leaves no room to doubt that the accused had knowledge that grievous hurt was likely to be caused to the inmates of the decree-holder's house in prosecution of their common object, namely, to recover their cattle. We are of the opinion that there is no failure of justice in this case and that no case has been made out for interference. No other point was raised before us. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and respondent 1, and that interest should be paid on all the items of compensation determined by the High Court at 4 per annum. The interest in regard to the compensation payable for Dhirpur lands should be paid to the Sardarani, whereas the interest in regard to the lands in the three other villages should be paid half and half to the appellant and respondent 1. In making the payments of compensation amounts to the respective parties whatever amounts may have been withdrawn by or on their behalf should be taken into account and their claims should be properly adjusted in that behalf. In the circumstances of this case we direct that the appellant should get half his costs from respondent 1 and the other half from respondent 2 in his three appeals. There will be only one set of hearing costs. The costs in the remaining four appeals should be borne by the parties. C. A. Nos. 396 to 398 of 1959 and C. A. No. 152 of 1960 allowed in part. C.A. Nos. 419 to 421 of 1959, dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , 1950, the appellant is described as a " monthly tenant ", but that is not indicative of conduct justifying an inference that a fresh contractual tenancy had come into existence. Within the meaning of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, the appellant was a " tenant " and by calling the appellant a tenant the respondents did not evince an intention to treat him as a contractual tenant. The use of the adjective monthly " also was not indicative of a contractual relation. The tenancy of the appellant was determined by efflux of time an subsequent occupation by him was not in pursuance of any contract express or implied, but was by virtue of the protection given by the successive statutes. This occupation did not confer any rights upon the appellant and was not required to be determined by a notice prescribed by is. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act In that view of the case, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... expected, unless there be either expressed intention or evidence, that they would apply their own law to the case. See N. V. Kwick Who Tang v. James Finlay & Co. 1927 A.C. 604 . The second circumstance is that the arbitration clause indicated an arbitration in India. Of such arbitration clauses in agreements, it has been said on more than one occasion that they lead to an inference that the parties have adopted the law of the country in which arbitration is to be made. See Hamlyn & Co. v. Tallisker Distillery 1894 A.C. 202 , and Spurrier v. La Cloche 1902 A.C. 446 (P.C.) . This inference, it was said in the last case, can be drawn even in a case where the arbitration clause is void according to the law of the country where the contract is made and to be performed. In our opinion, in this case, the circumstances clearly establish that the proper law to be applied is the Indian law. 38. In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. 39. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 74 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sent case, we must uphold the petitioner's case that the notice of demand, which has been issued to him, is not in conformity with the provisions of section 29 of the Indian Income-tax Act and is, therefore, illegal and without jurisdiction. The consequent recovery proceeding must also, therefore, be held to be without jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in the present petition which he has filed. We accordingly order that the notice of demand issued on March 29, 1956, demanding the payment of ₹ 97,223-7-0 and the consequent recovery proceedings in so far as they relate to the recovery of the said amount be quashed and the respondents be restrained from taking any action in pursuance of the said notice of demand and the recovery proceedings instituted on the basis of the said demand. The rule is accordingly made absolute. The petitioner will get his costs from respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Petition allowed. Rule made absolute.
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1961 (2) TMI 73 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... simple kind of cloth was by way of experiment and training, and this opinion is supported by the fact that in the fourth year of production of the new factory sales had risen to ₹ 15,00,000. In my opinion a provision of this kind which is intended to encourage the setting up of new industrial enterprises must be construed liberally and on this view of the matter I consider that the opening of factory at Ghaziabad was a new enterprise encouraged by the successful experiment, and that the fact that what apparently amounts to about 35 of the machinery or plant used in the factory had been used before April 1, 1948, does not preclude the factory at Ghaziabad from enjoying the concession granted under section 15C. I would accordingly answer the question propounded by the Appellate Tribunal in the affirmative and allow the assessee company its costs from the Commissioner of Income-tax. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. KHOSLA C.J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (2) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rnative penalties is flexible ; each penalty is not to exceed a certain limit. The last argument was based on the word " extent appearing in the main part of s. 167 which, it is said, indicated that the third column laid down the extent of the punishment that could be awarded. This argument does not carry the matter further at all for, whichever of the two competing interpretations is accepted, in each case there would be the extent of the punishment specified and that word cannot help in deciding what the correct interpretation is. For these reasons it seems to us that under item 8 in s. 167 a penalty in excess of ₹ 1,000/- can be imposed and so the orders that the Customs authorities had made in these cases are not open to any challenge. It is not in dispute that the penalties imposed did not exceed three times the value of the goods concerned. The petition and the appeal are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order for costs. Petition and appeal dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Corporation and the Standing Committees. It may be that it is in another chapter but the language of the section is wide and applies to all defects or irregularities in any act or proceeding done not affecting the merits of the case. In our opinion the following points should be heard by the Constitution Bench - (1) Whether the imposition in the present case offends Art. 276 or 301 of the Constitution. (2) Whether the failure to notify the final resolution of the imposition of the tax in the Government Gazette is fatal to the tax. If the answer to these questions or any of them is in the affirmative the appeal will have to be allowed. But if the two questions are answered against the appellants the appeals will fail as all other points have been decided by us against the appellants. The costs will follow the event unless the Bench hearing the reference makes other order. Referred to Constitution Bench final disposal. The decision of the Constitution Bench is reported infra.
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1961 (2) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 7 of the First Schedule of the City Civil Courts Act, 1953. In the instant case the question for consideration will be whether the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants as mortgagors and mortgagees rightly ended in the mortgage-decree, and whether that decree had been validly obtained. The question, beyond doubt, ultimately relates to the mortgage. If the decree be set aside the mortgage revives; if not, the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants remains culminated in a mortgage decree under which the plaintiffs remain judgment-debtors o p /o p 9. In the view that we take, we hold that the Court below was right in holding that the case fell within the mischief of Item 7 of the First Schedule of the City Civil Courts Act, 1953 and was also right in returning the plaint. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. The argument on behalf of the respondents was singularly unhelpful. o p /o p We, therefore, make no order for costs in this appeal. o p /o p
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1961 (2) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncome. Several other contentions were raised by the petitioner in the affidavit in these petitions, which really dealt with the correctness of the orders of assessment. We declined to consider these objections, as they could properly constitute points for decision in the statutory proceedings open to the petitioner under the Income-tax Act itself. We should not be considered to have expressed any opinion on the soundness or otherwise of these objections. We confined ourselves to only two questions, (1) the constitutional validity of section 2(6A)(e) and (2) whether what the petitioner obtained as loan from Palkulam Estates (Private) Ltd. constituted agricultural income. On both these points the petitioner failed and that is sufficient to direct the discharge of the rule nisi and the dismissal of the petitions. The petitioner will pay the costs in W.P. No. 372 of 1959. There will be no order as to costs in W.P. No. 373 of 1959. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Petition allowed.
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1961 (2) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... roper course, in our opinion, is to direct that the criminal proceedings pending in the court of the sub-divisional magistrate be disposed of by him or any other magistrate to whom the case may be transferred in accordance with law, after deciding the question whether there was consultation with Mining Boards constituted under s. 10 of the- Mines Act, 1923, before the regulations were framed and, if so, whether such consultation amounted to sufficient compliance with s. 59. If his conclusion is that there has not been compliance with the provisions of s. 59 the regulations must be held to be invalid and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal; if, on the other hand, he holds that there has been sufficient compliance with the provisions of s. 59 he should dispose of the case after coming to a conclusion on the evidence as regards the allegations made against the appellant in the petition of complaint. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1961 (2) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the purchase was not made due to panic or with any other motive, so that the sole and exclusive motive for the purchase was to make a profit. No doubt, the silver bars were kept unsold for about two years and nine months but there is nothing to show that the sale of silver bars at an earlier period would have been more profitable than the sale at the time when they were actually sold. These circumstances thus lead to the conclusion that the transaction of purchases was entered into by the assessee with the sole object of making a profit on resale, that there was no there object of making the purchase and that no other cogent circumstances exist which would displace the strong presumption in these circumstances that the transaction was an adventure in the nature of trade. We, consequently answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The Department will be entitled to the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (2) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for the reasons mentioned above, we think the phrase "any one of the directors" is capable of meaning "every one of the directors", the fact that in other statutes, different words were used to express a similar meaning is not of any significance. We have, on all these considerations come to the conclusion that the words "any one of the directors" has been used in s. 76 to mean "every one of the directors", and that the contrary interpretation given by the High Court is not correct. On the interpretation that "any one of the directors" means "every one of the director, ", no question of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution arises. We, therefore, allow the Appeals Nos. 98 and 99, set aside the orders of the High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 475 and 476 of 1956 and order that these writ petitions be rejected. Appeals Nos. 103 and 104 are dismissed. Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 allowed. Appeals Nos. 100 to 106 dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here the previous order of Khosla, J., affected the interests of persons who were not made parties to the proceeding before him. It was at their instance and for giving them a hearing that Khosla' J. entertained the second petition. In doing so, he merely did what the principles of natural justice required him to do. It is said that the respondents before us had no. right to apply for review because they were not parties to the previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to the previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by the decision of the High Court, that the second application was e entertained by Khosla, J. 9. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1961 (2) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Rambhau Tukaram Nirhali (2). In that case a certificate of sale had been signed but the certificate was not duly stamped which was pointed out when it was sent to the Sub- Registrar for registration. The Sub-Registrar informed the Judge about it and the Judge got back the certificate from the purchaser and thinking that he had power to impound the document and to impose a penalty asked for the opinion of the high Court and it was held that after he had signed it he was functus officio and could not act any further and could not impound it. The same principle was laid down in (1) (1932) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 1171. (2) A.I.R. 1930 Bom. 392. Paiku v. Gaya (1) and in Chunduri Panakala Rao v. Penugonda Kumaraswami (2) and in our opinion as soon as the Collector determined the duty he became functus officio and he, could not impound the instrument under a. 33 and consequential proceedings could not') therefore, be taken. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of law by a Government would amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. We are not aware of any authority in support of that proposition and none has been cited to us. Nor are we able to find any support for it in principle. It is not the respondent's case that other servants of the appellant had been given the benefit of those Rules and such benefit has been designedly denied only to him. It seems to us that the appeal must be allowed on the simple ground that the respondent's petition does not show a violation of any fundamental right. The High Court had no power to act under Art. 32 (2A) at all. We think it right to point out that Arts. 226 and 311(2) of the Constitution of India had not been applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir at any material time. No question of the respondent's application being maintainable in view of these articles, therefore, arises. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (2) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sh India." What was decided in that case was that the house that belonged to the mother of the assessee in that case and which was maintained for his parents was not his dwelling house. The assessee there had no right to the use of the house either as owner or otherwise. We do not understand the passage in Zackariah's case 1952 22 I.T.R. 359 at 362 (Mad.), taken in its content, as it should be, to lay down as a proposition of law that mere ownership of a fractional share in a house with nothing more is enough to constitute it a dwelling house of such an owner within the meaning of section 4A(a)(ii), and it must be remembered that there is a further statutory requirement not only must it be a dwelling house, but it must also be maintained, either by the assessee himself or by some one else for his benefit. Neither of the requirements was satisfied in this case. The petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in one. Counsel's fee ₹ 150. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d they have rejected the appellants' case to the contrary. Respondent 1 claims these items under a deed of surrender executed in his favour by Channamma (Ex. B. 3) on December 5, 1938. This document is accepted as genuine by both the courts and it is not disputed that the surrender effected by it is valid under Hindu law. Indeed this document is wholly inconsistent with the appellants' case that Channamma wanted to convert her separate properties into properties of the joint family of her husband. Therefore, there is no substance in the appellants' argument that they should be given a share in these three items of property. The result is the appeal is partly allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is modified by giving the appellants their half share in the properties described in Schedule C. The rest of the decree passed by the High Court is confirmed. In the circumstances of this case the parties should bear their own costs.' Appeal allowed in part.
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