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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 29 Records
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1961 (5) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of taking cognizance is there, the Court must apply its mind judicially to the facts of the case which can only be properly furnished either in a petition of complaint or in a report in writing of facts constituting the offence made by a police-officer. 79. I would, therefore, answer the questions before the Full Bench as follows (1) The Special Court under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949, does not take cognizance of an offence on the order of distribution made by the State Government under Section 4 (2) of the Act but needs either a petition of complaint Or a report in writing of facts constituting the offence made by a police-officer, for taking cognizance. (2) Accordingly in so far as Criminal Appeals Nos. 377 of 1938 and 393 of 1959 and Criminal Revision Nos. 1545 to 1545 of 1959 took the view that cognizance could not be taken on a report in writing of facts constituting the offence made by a police-officer, they were wrongly decided.
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1961 (5) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n, namely, (a) whether the architect has wrongly withheld the certificate and (b) what amount, if any, is due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. In deciding the above disputes the arbitrator must accept all decisions of the Architect in matters in which the Architect's decisions have become final and binding on the parties under the contract and will not allow any party to raise such disputes to be adjudicated in arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator must keep always in mind the restricted scope and the limited nature of the disputes in the facts of this case and keep the parties within bounds. I appoint Sri Section N. Majumdar, B.E. M.I.E., Retired Chief Engineer (Works and Buildings) West Bengal, now residing at 1 South Dum Dum, Calcutta 28, as arbitrator and direct him to make his award within four months from the date of the service of the order on him. The costs of this application will be costs in the arbitration proceedings; Certified for two counsel.
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1961 (5) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... (though, we do not see any) in holding that the interest on compensation bonds issued to the petitioner is not interest on securities it would yet be taxable as it would be an "income" from some other source. For the reasons mentioned above it appears to us that the sums of interest on the compensation bonds are liable to be charged to Income Tax. 21. A Preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Gopal Behari on behalf of the Income Tax Department which was to the effect that a writ of certiorari can only be issued if the mistake of law is self-evident and no long drawn arguments are required to make it manifest. Reliance was placed upon the case of Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun 1960 1SCR890 . Inasmuch as we have already heard the parties on the merits, it is not necessary to decide the preliminary objection. 22. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that the petition should be dismissed but the parties should bear their own costs, and we order accordingly.
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1961 (5) TMI 68 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Defendant was any question put to find out the total extent of the money-lending transactions of the Plaintiff. The entire litigation was fought out on the main question as to whether the loan was taken by the Defendants' father and whether the hand note was admissible in evidence. Hence I must hold that no prejudice has been caused to the Defendant in this case. I would accordingly agree with the view taken by Rao J. in Raghunath Prusty v. Sauddin Khan 24 C.L.T. 28 and disagree with the technical view taken by Mohapatra J. in Mohendra Mohanty v. Khira Bewa 26 C.L.T. 264 with which jag J. agreed in his decision in Nath v. Achyutandnda 26 C.L.T. 583 Samara Mundo v. Kartick Sahu 26 C.L.T. 623 and Debaraj Misra v. Bata Sahu 26 C.L.T. 644. 14. For these reasons the order of the learned single Judge, under appeal, is upheld and this appeal is dismissed. But there will be no order for costs. Both parties will bear their own costs throughout. Raj Kishore Das, J. 15. I agree.
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1961 (5) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in view of its acceptance of the respondent's preliminary point, did not consider the question whether the inquiry had been made by the Collector in strict compliance with the provisions of the section, and whether the previous sanction of the State Government was obtained before he made the said order. In the affidavit failed in support of the petition in the High Court there is no specific allegation that no such inquiry has been made or that no such sanction has been obtained. Nor did the counsel for the appellant raise the said question in the arguments before the High Court. In the circumstances we do not think that this Court is justified in allowing the respondent to raise the said question for the first time before us. We, therefore, reject this plea. 13. In the result we set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal. But, in the circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs here and in the High Court. 14. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (5) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation of a resolution in a local paper is indeed necessary. The question whether a resolution was published in accordance with those provisions is a question of fact in each case. In the present case it is admitted that the resolution was published in the Aghaz which is a local paper. There is controversy between the parties whether Agbaz is published in Urdu or in Hindi. This controversy has been referred to 'above, and on the material before us it cannot be said that Agha'z does not use the vocabulary of Hindi language, and is, therefore, not published in Hindi. It is true that the script used by the paper is Persian but the language employed by it can be Hindi. The resolution in question was printed in that newspaper in Devanagari character. Thus the; requirements of Section 94(3) of the Act were substantially complied with and the imposition of water tax pursuant to that, resolution cannot be regarded illegal. 25. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
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1961 (5) TMI 65 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramji Keshavji v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 ITR 105 to which we have already made reference. We hold, therefore, that the income from the property which is the subject matter of settlement of the trusts in this case cannot be taxed in the hands of the assessee in the character of the settlor. It should, however, be added that under the third proviso to section 16(1)(c) of the Act the assessee is liable to be taxed so far as the income accruing to her as and when the power of revocation is exercised under the terms of the deed of trust. It is also manifest that the assessee is liable to be taxed in the character of the beneficiary of the income arising to her out of the trust properties. We accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court and as amended by us in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1961 (5) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he period for making the award would be extended by the Court. 23. I also do not consider it necessary to decide in this case as to when arbitrators can be said to enter on the reference or what is meant by 'their being called upon to act' by notice under r. 3 of the First Schedule. I simply not that I agree with the view expressed in Iossifoglu v. Coumantaros (1941) 1 K.B. 396. that arbitrators enter upon a reference as soon as they have accepted their appointment and have communicated with each other about the reference. This is a stage earlier than their starting the proceedings in the presence of the parties or under some peremptory order compelling them to conclude the hearing ex parte. 'Calling upon the arbitrators to act' does include asking the arbitrators to enter on the reference but may also include asking them to do anything in connection with the reference except asking them to do the routine acts connected with the enquiry. 24. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (5) TMI 63 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ration of firms under the Income-tax Act is not a general right but it is a mere privilege given to the partnership in order to enable the individual partners to get the benefit of the lower rates of assessment applicable wherever such rates are lower than the rate applicable to the total income of the firm computed as a whole. If a firm desires to take advantage of this privilege, it must conform strictly to the requirements of section 26A and the rules made under section 59." Applying these tests it is incontestable that these different clauses of the partnership deed do not satisfy them in the present case, as indicated above. For these reasons we decide the question of law by answering it in that negative and by holding that on a true construction of the partnership deed dated 7th April, 1949, registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act cannot be granted to the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Law J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (5) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rnment. There is no provision in the Act empowering the State Government to give any such instructions to the Consolidation Officer; nor does any provision of the Act confer on the State Government any power to make rules or issue notifications to deprive owners of land of any part thereof or to direct the Consolidation Officer as to how he should exercise his statutory duties. Any such rule would be repugnant to the provisions of the Act. That apart, no such statutory rule empowering the State Government to issue such instructions has been placed before us. Both here as well as in the High Court, learned counsel appearing for the State has not been able to sustain the validity of such instructions on any legal basis. The order of the appropriate officers confirming the 'scheme on the basis of the said instructions was obviously illegal and, therefore, was rightly set aside by the High Court. In the result, the, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he Act. I do not think that there would be a danger of such simultaneous exercise of the power to investigate by two officers. The offence will have to be registered at the police station within the limits of the jurisdiction of which the offence has taken place. Thereafter it would be investigated into by the officer at whose instance it was registered. If that officer happens to be a station-house officer the special police officer may take out the investigation from his hands or allow him to continue it. If the offence is registered at the instance of the special police officer, the station-house officer would be bound to know of it from the station-house records and would stay his hands. Upon this view, therefore, I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and of the Magistrate and remit the case to the latter for being dealt with according to law. By COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (5) TMI 60 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t his won instance has been transferred to the Income-tax Officer, Wealth tax Circle, New Delhi. The order transferring the file of this assessee has been placed before us. The assessee has filed a reply stating that it is not clear from the order whether the case arising out of the notice under section 34 has or has not been transferred. The request by the assessee in his letter dated the 7th of April, 1960, is for the transfer of the file of the assessee as a whole and the Commissioner has acceded to his request. We have no reason to brush aside the department's categorical assertion that the Income-tax Officer New, Delhi, "is now seized of the case". In this view of the matter a writ could not be issued to a person outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Therefore we do not propose to discuss the question of the validity of his notice. The result is that all these three petitions must fail and are hereby dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (5) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ions in r. 53 on the ground that they are ultra vires s. 11, there being no maximum fee prescribed by the State Government, and (ii) the provisions in rr. 65, 66 and 67 on the ground that they are ultra vires the provisions in s. 5(a) read with the proviso in s. 4(2) succeeds. As however we have held that the market in this case has not been properly established, the market committee cannot enforce any of the provisions of the Act or the rules or the bye-laws framed by it and cannot issue licences till the market is properly established in law. We therefore allow the petition partly and direct the respondents not to enforce any of the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws against the petitioners with respect to the market till a market is properly established in law for this area under s. 5AA and not to levy any fees under s. 11 till the maximum is prescribed under the Rules. In the circumstances we order parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed in part.
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1961 (5) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion by ’enactments like s. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having consented to have the controversy between the parties resolved by reference to arbitration through Court, the. defendant deprived himself of the right to question the authority of the Court to refer the matter to arbitration or of the arbitrator to render the award. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the suit and to make the reference to the arbitrator. He is equally estopped from challenging the authority of the arbitrator to render the award. In our opinion this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. It, is not, therefore, necessary to determine the other points in controversy, including the question whether The Decrees and Orders Validating Act, 1936 (Act V of 1936) had the effect of validating what otherwise may have been invalid. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (5) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pplications for joint enquiry when each case rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax. He therefore used his discretion and ordered the application to be proceeded with jointly. In view of our opinion on the main point, we do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of the decree challenged. We therefore see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other connected appeals, viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (5) TMI 55 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t case, the State Government had objected to the admission of a document purported to be a declaration under rule 27(2) signed by the purchasing registered dealer on various grounds as aforesaid. The Tribunal, however, overruled the said objection and admitted the document in evidence. In view of the fact, that the tax has already been realised from the purchasing dealer as aforesaid, it is needless to express any opinion on the point. 8.. The result, therefore, is that the answer to question No. 1 is in the negative the answer to first part of question No. 2 is in the affirmative, and the answer to second part of question No. 2 is in the negative as aforesaid with regard to question No. 3, apart from the general observations we have made on the point as above, it is needless to give any answer to the question for reasons as aforesaid. As the opposite party has not appeared, we make no order as to costs of this reference. R.K. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (5) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
Indian Limitation Act for condonation of one day's delay in filing an appeal, the question arose whether the appellant had to explain his con- duct during the whole period prescribed for filing the appeal or he has to explain the delay between the last day for filing the appeal and the date on which the appeal was actually filed. Section 5 of the Limitation Act lays down that an appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation if the appellant shows sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal "within such period". - Held, that it would be irrelevant to invoke general considerations such as diligence of the appellant in construing the words of s.5. The expression "within such period" does not mean during such period and the failure of the appellant to account for his non-diligence during the whole period of limitation does not disqualify him from praying for condonation of delay.
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1961 (5) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
Levy, charge or collect any sales tax on transactions of what the petitioners characterised as hire-purchase agreements
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no doubt that the agreement in question does contain not only a contract of bailment simpliciter but also an element of sale, which element has been seized upon by the legislature for the purpose of subjecting a transaction like that to the sales tax.
To consider the contention under head (3), namely, that though the Parliament may have had the power to tax something which was not strictly speaking a "sale", the law is open to the attack that it discriminates against traders in Delhi inasmuch as, it is further contended, such a law has not been made applicable to the whole of India. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention because no proper foundation was laid in the pleadings for supporting such a contention.
Hire-purchase transactions have been included within the definition of "sale" for the purpose of Central sales tax, and this definition has become applicable throughout India, and it cannot, therefore, be said that the State of Delhi, and now the Union Territory of Delhi, has been selected for hostile discrimination,therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the extended definition of "sale" in the main statute infringes Article 14 of the Constitution.
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1961 (5) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... proceedings. The question whether Smt. Subhadra Devi could be liable as a contributory is another question. Our attention has not laquo been drawn to any list of contributories which might have been drawn up. Therefore, we cannot say whether Smt. Subhadra Devi could be or was on any such list. This decision of ours will, therefore, not affect any right that the official liquidator may have to proceed against Smt. Subhadra Devi and her sons as a contributory, but she and her sons cannot be proceeded against under section 235(1) under which they had been proceeded against and out of which the present appeal has arisen. In the result, we must allow Appeal No. 22 of 1960 and we do so. Smt. Subhadra Devi and her sons will be entitled to their costs of the appeal. Special Appeals Nos. 587 of 1959 and 29 of 1960 will, for the reasons given above, be dismissed and these appeals are hereby dismissed. The official liquidator will have his costs from the appellants of these two appeals.
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1961 (5) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meetings and proceedings – Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served, Oppression and mismanagement, Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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