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Showing 21 to 40 of 64 Records
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1961 (8) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rade of such business. There are no materials on the record to show that the assessee carried on any business in the purchase and sale of properties after 1940. The Tribunal thought that if the property was stock-in-trade in the business of the Hindu undivided family, it would continue in that character in the hands of the assessee even though according to the assessee he had discontinued the business of purchase and sale of properties. We are unable to agree. A stock-in-trade presupposes the existence of a business and if the assessee has no business of buying and selling properties, there can be no stock-in-trade. The properties should, therefore, be regarded as the capital asset of the assessee and the profits derived during the year of account by the sale thereof cannot be brought to tax. We answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee who will be entitled to his costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (8) TMI 50 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In Gajapathi Naidu v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1960 40 I.T.R. 282 the Madras High Court had to consider the implications of an account kept under the mercantile system of accounting. In that case a sum of ₹ 12,447 was received in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1951-52. The amount related to the transactions of 1948-49. It was held that the receipt had properly to go into the year of transactions--the accounting year ending March 31, 1949--that the department had no option in the matter, and that the receipt cannot be included in the assessment for the year 1951-52. In the light of what is state above we have to hold that the sum of ₹ 56,496--the excess received in respect of the season 1953-54--is not liable to taxation under the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income- tax Act, 1955, and that this application has to be allowed. We do so. The respondent will pay the costs of the applicant. Advocate's fee ₹ 150. Application allowed.
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1961 (8) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the application of the assessee. We are of opinion that section 34 of the Agricultural Income Tax Act has fixed the period of one year, only as a period of limitation which applies both to the Commissioner as well as to the assessee. So long as the proceedings have commenced within the period fixed, the power of the Commissioner can be exercised at any time thereafter, and it is not necessary that the power should be exercised within the period fixed. The right of the assessee to obtain relief by applying for revision should not depend on the hazard of the revising authority disposing of the matter within a particular period and cannot be defeated by the failure of the authority to discharge the statutory functions. 8. In the result, this revision petition is allowed. The revision petition before the Commissioner is directed to be restored to his file; he will dispose it of afresh on the merits and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1961 (8) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pleader has argued that the profit of the year was added to the profits of the next year and divided in 1958, with the result that there was no division and crediting in the earlier year. But the application for registration should be decided on facts as they stood on the date the application was made, and not what happens subsequently. Therefore, the later division of the profit would not be fatal to the earlier application, should that be justified by the entries in the account at the time the application be made. In any case, we are convinced that with ascertainment of the partners' shares in the profit, though it be in the reserve fund, the requirement of the profit being divided and credited is met, and, therefore, the answer to the question before us is in the affirmative. We accordingly direct the aforesaid answer to be sent to the Tribunal, and the assessee will be entitled to his costs, advocate's fee being ₹ 100. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (8) TMI 47 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ombay High Court was correct, since the mere facts that the assessee had filed a return of income in pursuance of an invalid notice and had appeared before the Income- tax Officer without raising any objection to the notice could not be construed as amounting to waiver, particularly when there was no finding that the assessee had knowledge of his legal right which he was alleged to have relinquished." (the Law and Practice of Income- tax, 4th edition, page 706). In this case also there was a compliance with the notice by the assessee. But from that fact, and the other facts disclosed by the proceedings, we are unable to hold that the requisites necessary to spell a waiver are available. In this view it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a waiver, in a case like this, is possible or not. In the light of what is stated above the T.R.C. has to be dismissed and we do so. The applicant will pay the costs of the respondent. Advocate's fee ₹ 150. Case dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ters of employment or appointment to any office under the State, contained in Art. 16(1) of the Constitution. So long as the ban subsists., any application made by the petitioner for employment under the State is bound to be treated as wastepaper. The fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is not only to make an application for a post under the Government but the further right to be considered on merits for the post for which an application has been made. Of course, the right does not extend to being actually appointed to the post for which an application may have been made. The "ban' complained of apparently is against his being considered on merits. It is a ban which deprives him of that guaranteed right. The inference is clear that the petitioner has not been fairly treated. The application is, therefore, allowed and a direction issued to the respondents to remove the ban against the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1961 (8) TMI 45 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purview of section 12(2)." It was further held that the assessee, being an investment company, if it borrowed money and utilised the same for its investments on which it earned income, the interest paid by it on the loans would clearly be a permissible deduction under section 12(2) of the Income-tax Act and that whether the loan is taken on an overdraft or is a fixed deposit or on a debenture makes no difference in law. It is thus seen that this decision also does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee. We, therefore, hold that, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the sums of ₹ 45,503, ₹ 13,362 and ₹ 40,465 are not admissible deductions in respect of the assessments for the assessment years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53 respectively. We answer the question referred to the High Court in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (8) TMI 44 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has been discussed in paragraphs 98 and 99 (page 789) of the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment. Their Lordships examined whether the expression "agriculture" can be extended to activities in relation to land or having connection with land such as rearing of livestock, dairy farming, butter and cheese making and then observed ".....there is no warrant at all for extending it to all activities which have relation to the land or are in any way connected with the land. The use of the word agriculture in regard to such activities would certainly be a distortion of the term." In view of these observation it is clear that dairy farming will not be "agriculture" and income from dairy farming will not also be "agricultural income." The learned Member, therefore, took the correct view of the law. The reference is accordingly answered in the affirmative. There will be no order for costs. R.K. Das J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (8) TMI 43 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation in Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax(1), which has been already quoted in our earlier order, that had called for further statement of facts. It was said in that case that there must be a conscious an intentional relinquishment of an existing right and, therefore, such relinquishing of the right must be established. The several acts of the assessee narrated in the fresh statement of facts do not lead to the only conclusion of the assessee having relinquished his objections to the invalid notice. He was undoubtedly anxious to send a return and was asking for time; but that may be to avoid penal consequences. Therefore, waiver of the right, arising from the failure of compliance with the direction of serving notice on the assessee, is not established. It follows that the answer to the question in this reference is that reassessment for 1945-46 made on March 9 is invalid and that be sent. The assessee will get costs, counsel's fee being fixed at ₹ 100.
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1961 (8) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the learned counsel for the department. It was lastly urged by Sri Kondaiah that section 25A is applicable only to assessment years which followed upon the date of partition. It must be mentioned that this point was not raised either in the counteraffidavit or even argued before our learned brother. Even otherwise, we must hold that this contention is unsubstantial as not warranted by the language of the section which refers only to the date when the assessment is made and not to the assessment year. The section itself begins with the words "where, at the time of making an assessment under section 23......." The relevant time is, therefore, the date of the making of the assessment and not the year of assessment in regard to which of the assessment is sought to be made subsequently. For these reasons we negative this argument also. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs in W.A. No. 49 of 1960. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Appeals dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 41 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... otice was completely disregarded; (2) the notice served upon the assessee took effect not from the date upon which it was served upon him but from a date which had already elapsed; and (3) the notice clearly made mention of the fact that it was being issued in pursuance of a mutual agreement arrived at between the parties. These circumstances clearly show that the payment was not being made in accordance with the terms of employment set out in Regulation I but in accordance with the term of an agreement whereby the assessee agreed to give up the objections which he had raised to the issue of the first notice and the University agreed not to enforce the natural consequence of that notice. In this view of the matter, we must answer the question referred to us by saying that the amount of ₹ 7,200 is not revenue receipt but capital receipt. The assessee will recover costs of these proceedings which we assess at ₹ 200. DULAT J.--I agree. Question answered accordingly.
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1961 (8) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... powers mentioned in s.11 are not dissociated from the right to practice mentioned in a. 9, then it is clear enough that s. 1 1 expressly reserves the power of the High Court to make rules declaring what shall be the functions, powers and duties of Mukhtars practicing in the subordinate courts. If this be the correct interpretation of ss. 9 and 11 of the Act, then the principle laid down by the majority in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Pose is if no assistance to the petitioners in the present case. For the reasons given above, we hold that r.2 of the rules made by the High Court under s. 11 of the Act is not in excess of the rule-making power and the petitioners cannot complain of any violation of their fundamental right to practice the profession to which they have been enrolled under the provisions of the Act. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. As there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondents, there will be no order for costs. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. If instead of the word "acquisition" the word "requisition" is read, and instead of the words "the market value of the land" the words "the market value of the interest in the land" of which the owner has been deprived are read, the two subsections of the section can, without any difficulty, be applied to the determination of compensation for acquisition of a land. So too, the other section can be applied. If the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner be accepted, we would be attributing to the Legislature an incongruity, namely, that while it provides principles of compensation in the matter of acquisition, it omits to do so in the matter of requisition, though in both the cases a reference to the Court is provided. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject this contention. No other point is raised. In the result, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 38 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arge or lien for the owelty or the conception, in the words of Stephen J. that the charge for owelty constitute a deduction from the corpus of the property allotted to the sharer who gets the excessive allotment. 18. The foregoing considerations establish that owelty is really part of the properties partitioned, that is, owelty is the substituted property and that it is neither unpaid purchase money, nor any liability in the sense in which a debt is understood to be a liability.' The appeals before me relate to owelties of partition and therefore they do not relate to debts and consequently, the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act has no application to them. In that view, I allow A. S, Nos. 616 of 1958 and 47 of 1959 with costs and dismiss C. M. A. No. 218 of 1958 with costs as welt. 19. BY COURT In the result, A. S. No. 616 of 1958 and A. S. No. 47 of 1959 are allowed with costs, and in view of the majority judgment C. M. A. No. 218 of 1959 is also allowed with costs.
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1961 (8) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arged meaning the same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other fields of human. activity. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the maxim contemporanea expositio could be invoked in construing the word "telegraph line" in the Act. For the said reasons, we hold that the expression "'telegraph line" is sufficiently comprehensive to take in the wires used for the purpose of the apparatus of the Post and Telegraph Wireless Station. In the result, we set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the petition filed by the first respondent. The appeal is allowed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (8) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
banks were excluded from the requirement of disclosing the reserve for bad and doubtful debts under the heading, `capital and Liabilities'. whether the workmen of these establishments were or were not entitled to be placed on a different position from the shareholders
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1961 (8) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat the special Judge now hearing the case would be entitled to proceed on the evidence recorded by S. Narinder Singh in view of the amendment. Whether he would be entitled to do so or not would depend on whether the amended Act would apply to proceedings commenced before the amendment. It has to be noted that the impugned part of the proceedings was concluded before the amendment. On this question, we do not propose to express any opinion. In any event, under s. 350 as it now stands a succeeding magistrate liar, power to resummon and examine a witness further. We cannot speculate what the special Judge who tries the case afresh will think fit to do if s. 350 of the Code is now applicable to the proceedings before him. For all these considerations, we think it fit to send the case back for retrial. We therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed on him. The case will now go back for retrial According to law. Appeal allowed
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1961 (8) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e information amounts to compulsion or not, does not therefor fall to be decided. It may be pointed out that in the other appeals, viz., Criminal Appeal No. 146 of' 1958 and Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1959, also, this question does not arise for consideration in view of our conclusion that in any case the accused does not become a "'witness against himself by giving his Specimen signatures or impressions of his fingers or Palms. It appears to us to be equally unnecessary to decide another question which was mooted in the course of the hearing, viz., whether the prohibition of Art.20(3) operates only after a person has been accused of an offence or even before that stage. Admittedly, in all these cases the person on whose behalf the protection under Art. 20(3) is claimed gave the specimen signatures or impressions of fingers or palms after he had been actually accused of an offence. We think it right therefore not to express any opinion on any of these questions.
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1961 (8) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the said rule, in effect and substance, provides for an additional machinery for collection of income-tax. I would, therefore, hold-that the nonproductive of an income-tax clearance certificate is not germane to the issue of a licence under the said Rules. I would therefore strike out r.6(c) of the Rules on the ground that it constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the right of an applicant to do business as customs, house agent, BY COURT In accordance 'with the opinion, of the majority, the petitions must fail except to the extent that we declare r.10 (c) to be an unreasonable restraint upon the right of the, petitioners to carry on their avocation, and r.11, when it prescribes a renewal fee of ₹ 50, invalid inasmuch as it has provided not for a fee but for a tax. Subject to this, the petitions are dismissed. The petitioners will pay the costs of the other side (one set only), as they have lost substantially. Petitions dismissed except for slight modification
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1961 (8) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reated as a distinct unit of assessment, with the difference that, unlike in the case of a registered firm, the entire income of the unit is added to the personal income of the father or the husband as the case may be. This mode of taxation may be a little hard on a husband or a father in the case of genuine partnership with wife or minor children, but that is offset, to a large extent, by the beneficient results that flow therefrom to the public, namely, the prevention of evasion of income-tax, and also by the fact that, by and large, the additional payment of tax made on the income of the wife or the minor children will ultimately I be borne by them in the final accounting between them. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the provisions of s. 16(3) of the Act impose an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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