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1962 (12) TMI 99
... ... ... ... ..... inciples of natural justice have been applied. In the circumstances of this case, particularly when we find that the appellant had not raised any objection, we cannot say that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating any principles of natural justice. 25. Lastly an attempt was made to persuade us to resurvey the entire material to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Lodge. As we have pointed out earlier, civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given by a private association like a Lodge. Both the courts below have held that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith in the matter of the complaint against the appellant. That is a concurrent finding of fact; and it is the practice of this Court not to interfere ordinarily with concurrent findings of fact. There are no exceptional circumstances for our departing from the said practice. 26. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1962 (12) TMI 98
... ... ... ... ..... and not even desirable that this Court should try to lay down general principles on such matters that require careful consideration of the peculiar circumstances of each case for the exercise of discretion. It is sufficient to say that we find no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's direction in this case that the reliefs given by it would become effective from the date of the reference. 31. We therefore allow both the appeals in part by modifying the Tribunal's award as regards dearness allowance, leave rules and retirement age and also as regards the adjustment of the interim relief as mentioned above. In all other matters in appeal before us the award is confirmed. The modifications made as regards dearness allowance will, as already stated, take effect from April 1, 1959. The modifications as regards leave rules and as regards retirement age will take effect from this date. In both the appeals the parties will bear their own costs. 32. Appeals allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 97
... ... ... ... ..... wife a share equal to that of a son and a quarter share to his unmarried daughter." We do not understand the observation of the learned judge as laying down the proposition that in a partition amongst the members of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Madras School of Mitakshara law the wife and unmarried daughter have any right to be allotted a share. We are clear that the materials on record do not justify or warrant an inference that the assessee impressed his business asset with the character of the joint family property and that in fact and in truth he merely gifted various amounts by purporting to effect a division, crediting them in the hands of his sons, daughters and his wife on December 31, 1955. This is a case in which there is a transfer of assets by the assessees, falling within the mischief of section 16(3) (a) (iv) of the Income-tax Act. The question is answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsels fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (12) TMI 96
... ... ... ... ..... d judge on the question of the valuation of the trees on the plot assigned to the appellant's brother-in-law.We therefore set aside this finding and request the High Court to submit a revised finding on the said question within two months from the receipt of the record. The respondent may file a further statement if I e so chooses to explain or even to correct the valuation list already filed by it. Thereafter an opportunity will be given to the appellant to file his objections. The objections filed by the appellant in this Court may be also considered by the High Court. The High Court will submit the finding on the evidence already on record including the said objections and statements. The parties may file objections to the finding within two weeks from the date the said And is received. The appeal will be posted as early as possible after objections are filed or after the expiry of the time given for filing the objections. Case remitted for submission of fresh finding.
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1962 (12) TMI 95
... ... ... ... ..... alf of the appellants that the several provisions of the Act contravene Article 14 is devoid of any merit." It is well known that there are fundamental differences between the religion and customs of the Mahomedans and those of others, and, therefore the rules of Mahomedan law regarding gift are based on reasonable classification and the provision of Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act exempting Mahomedans from certain provisions of that Act is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. In conclusion, it must be held that the oral gift made by Ismail to his wife, Maniran, was made in accordance with the Mahomedan law and it was a valid gift, inasmuch as no document for the gift was required and the possession of the gifted properties was delivered to the donee who accepted the same. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 15. I agree.
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1962 (12) TMI 94
... ... ... ... ..... 133 under formula D which we have held was the correct formula to apply. The Corporation was entitled to set-off ₹ 6,00,000 representing the assets of the controlled business. Interest on the balance (₹ 18,91,133) will be payable at four per cent per annum simple from February 14, 1957, till October 31, 1957, when ₹ 5,51,464 were withheld and the balance was paid to the Company. Interest on ₹ 5,51,464 at four per cent shall be payable from November 1, 1957, till December 26, 1957. There shall be no interest payable on ₹ 6,00,000 as claimed by the appellant. 34. In the result this appeal fails except for the grant of interest. It is dismissed except for interest granted by us. The Company shall bear its own costs and pay that of the Corporation. The appeal of the Corporation is dismissed with costs. There will be a right to set-off the costs in the two appeals. 35. C.A. No. 551 of 1960 dismissed except for interest. C.A. No. 552 of 1960 dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 93
... ... ... ... ..... which she intended to acquire for her own use and enjoyment. But for the fact that she was compelled to part with the property in favour of her sister-in-law, as a result of trouble caused by the sister-in-law, and the mother-in-law, the assessee offered evidence to show that she would herself have continued to possess and enjoy the property. There was no dominant intention at the time of the purchase of effecting a resale of the property. It was in these circumstances that this Court held that there was no adventure in the nature of trade involved in that transaction. That case did not lay down any proposition that the purchase and sale of a decree would in no case contain the elements of an adventure in the nature of trade. 10. It seems to us that the Tribunal reached the right conclusion that the profit arising from this transaction was assessable. Both the questions are answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (12) TMI 92
... ... ... ... ..... the judgment were the result of some misconception. Counsel relies in support of this submission upon an affidavit sworn by one Surhid Mohan Sanyal constituted attorney of the appellants filed in this Court on the day on which special leave to appeal was granted. Apart from the circumstance that the affidavit is couched in terms which are vague, and the denial is not sworn on matters within the personal knowledge of the deponent, it is a somewhat singular circumstance, that Sanyal who swore the affidavit relied upon, did not when he swore an affidavit in support of the petition for certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution before the High Court, make any such assertion. But on the view expressed by us, we deem it advisable not to express any opinion on the question as to the law applicable to the contract. It will be for the Court trying the suit to deal with that question, and to decide the suit. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 91
... ... ... ... ..... percentage of allowance is to be calculated. The entry (q) is "motor-cars" and the entry (r) covers "motor-taxis". The rate of depreciation for motor-cars is 20 per cent while that for motor-taxis is 25 per cent. The claim of the assessee that the vehicles in question should be regarded as taxis eligible for 25 per cent. depreciation seems to us to be unacceptable. A taxi as ordinarily understood is a vehicle which is available for every hirer. But in a case where vehicles are hired out to a single customer and to no one else, that vehicle cannot be regarded as a taxi. It is also pointed out in the orders of the officers below that these vehicles are not registered as motor-taxis. There is a material distinction between the two items referred to. We are satisfied that the refusal of the larger amount of depreciation allowance is fully justified. The second question is answered against the assessee. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1962 (12) TMI 90
... ... ... ... ..... ion and depends not upon it but upon the time allowed by the Court in the order fixing the amount or security. In this case the appellants applied for the requirements of the proviso being dispensed with and they were dispensed with by the Court; it is wholly irrelevant that they were dispensed with after the expiry of the period of limitation for an application under the rule. After the dispensation there could not arise any question of non-compliance with Clause (b) of the proviso and the application could not be dismissed on that ground. The question whether the application could be dismissed under Clause (a) of the proviso requires reconsideration as pointed out by my learned brother; the Civil Judge will have to go into the question whether the objection raised by the appellants in their application could not have been raised by them earlier. The appeal should, therefore, be remanded. I agree that the appellants should get their costs of this appeal from the respondents.
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1962 (12) TMI 89
... ... ... ... ..... word “agent” in a commercial sense on which the learned Attorney-General relies is wholly inapplicable in the context of Art. 19(6)(ii). Therefore, we must hold that the agreement which has been produced before us is invalid inasmuch as it is wholly inconsistent with the requirements of s. 3(1)(c). 34. The result is, the petitioner succeeds only partially inasmuch as we have held that Rule 7(5) is bad and the agreement is invalid, and that means that the State Government cannot implement the provisions of the Act with the assistance of agents appointed under the said invalid agreement. We accordingly direct that a direction or order to that effect should be issued against the State Government. The main contentions raised by the petitioner against the validity of the Act and its relevant provisions on which specific reliefs were claimed, however, fail. The petition is accordingly partially allowed. There would be no order as to costs. 35. Petition allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 88
... ... ... ... ..... sent disturbed condition, could not come back to Calcutta within a reasonable time. However, there the matter ended. In my opinion, it was not possible for the Tribunal to come to any such conclusion upon the evidence mentioned above, and the answer to the question ought to be in this form "Regard being had to the admissions made on behalf of the department, the facts and circumstances mentioned in paragraph 6 of the statement of case dated 13th March, 1952, do not show that there was any legal flaw in the constitution of the partnership firm as evidenced by the deed of 1st December, 1942. Upon such evidence, it must be concluded that it did come into existence and there is no impediment to its registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act." It is made clear that the question itself postulates the facts and circumstances and, therefore, the conclusion is based upon them. In view of the facts in this case there will be no order as to costs. Datta, J.-I agree.
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1962 (12) TMI 87
... ... ... ... ..... was entered into, the stock-in-trade did not exist. For bringing into existence the stock-in-trade, a great many things would have to be done. The purchaser would have to procure a contract from the railways, the trees would have to be marked by the forest department, the trees would have to be felled and converted into sleepers, and the converted sleepers must be such as would pass the tests. Rejected sleepers would continue to remain the property of the zamindar, as also the parts of the trees other than the completed sleepers constructed according to the necessary specifications, and passed for supply. It, therefore, approximates more to the House of Lords case than the case decided by the Privy Council. The result is that, in our opinion, the expenditure was in the nature of a capital expenditure and not a revenue one, and the question asked must be answered in the negative. The department is entitled to the costs of this application. Certified for two counsel. I agree.
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1962 (12) TMI 86
... ... ... ... ..... ropriate for the Receiver to show in the cause title that it was the firm which was the real plaintiff and that the firm was suing through him- it was merely a case of misdescription and that the plaint could be amended at any time for the purpose of showing the correct description of the plaintiffs We agree with the High Court that where there is a case of misdescription of parties it is open to the court to allow an amendment of the plaint at any time and the question of limitation would not arise in such a case. His Lordship then dealt with the point regarding the rate of interest. x x x x x x x x x Accordingly we set aside the decree of the High Court, allow the appeal in part and pass a decree in favour of the respondent-firm for ₹ 5,639/3/- with -interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the transaction till realization. The respondent-firm will proportionate costs throughout from the appellant-firm, which would bear its own costs. Appeal allowed in part.
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1962 (12) TMI 85
... ... ... ... ..... ion 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, the provisions of the Finance Act, 1955, will apply when considering the income of an assessee in respect of the "previous year in the calendar year 1054" of the assessee. It is not disputed that the Income Tax Act as amended at the date of the relevant Finance Act, applies for the purpose of assessment and any alteration which comes into force on the 1st of April of a finance year must apply to the assessment for that year. The law on the subject is now well settled by the decisions in Maharaja of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Scindia Stem Navigation Co. Ltd. 12. Our answer to the second question is that clause (c) as it stood after its amendment by the Finance Act, 1955, is applicable to the present case in respect of each of the assessees. 13. The assessees will pay to the Commissioner the costs of the reference.
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1962 (12) TMI 84
... ... ... ... ..... the export duty expense which the plaintiff was bound To incur In connection with these goods if they were shipped must be deducted. Both Mr. Daji and Mr. Divekar nave informed us that the amount of export duty in respect of 1,00,000 yards of goods would come to ₹ 17,187-8-0. The plaintiff accordingly would be entitled to damages only in the sum of ₹ 15,625. The damages as awarded by the trial court will be set aside. 24. These were the only contentions made on behalf of the Appellants in this case, 25. The decree passed by the trial court will accordingly be modified. There will be a decree in favour of the respondent-plaintiff against the defendants' Mills in the sum of ₹ 15,625 with future Interest at 4 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till payment. As the defendants have succeeded in getting the amount of damages reduced in this appeal to a very large extent the parties will bear and pay their own costs throughout. 26. Order accordingly.
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1962 (12) TMI 82
... ... ... ... ..... estion whether the assessee had carried on the activity during the year of assessment. He indicated that the assessee, during the assessment year, had gone abroad and that she was not actively carrying on the activity of running a school during that period. This point was at no stage canvassed before the Tribunal and we would not reframe the question with a view to enlarge the scope of the reference. A question of the nature sought to be agitated before us does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. In our view, the question as framed by the Tribunal is sufficient for the purpose of disposing of the matter in controversy between the parties which arises out of the order of the Tribunal. Our answer to the question is that on a true interpretation of section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957, the educational activities of the respondent amount to an occupation within the meaning of the said section. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1962 (12) TMI 81
... ... ... ... ..... emuneration de hors the resolution, whether there was in fact an appointment of Sankaran by the company, are all immaterial and irrelevant. The department does not say, and of course cannot say, that the company is a mere sham and that the managing director and the director were not paid the remuneration. Such being the case we are unable to understand the viewpoint of the Tribunal in disallowing the assessee's claim observing that the whole of the remuneration could have been disallowed. In our opinion the Tribunal failed to take into account the conditions of the statute and its decision cannot therefore be supported. There are no adequate grounds falling within section 10(4A) enabling the department to disallow any part of the remuneration paid to the managing director and the other director. The question is answered in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs to the assessee. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1962 (12) TMI 80
... ... ... ... ..... mbers of the Company may alone be declared invalid. That, in our judgment, should be sufficient to meet any objection which may be raised by the defendants on the score of delay. It was also submitted that the plaintiff has lost his right to the shares since the suit was instituted because the Company had enforced its lien and had sold the shares of the plaintiff in enforcement of the lien. The validity of that action of the Company has been challenged in a separate proceeding, and we need express no opinion on that question. All the Courts have come to the conclusion that the resolutions dated March 3, 1.946 and March 28, 1946 were invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. Therefore, any action taken by the defendants pursuant to those resolutions may prima facie be regarded as ineffective. On that view of the case, this appeal must be allowed and the decree passed by Bishan Narain, J., must be restored with costs in this Court and before the Division Bench. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (12) TMI 79
... ... ... ... ..... h it remains idle, for no fault of its own. Charges for that are levied from the person who required that labour and is responsible for its remaining idle. Of course, if the idle time was due to the default of the labour, no such charges are required to be paid by the ship-owner. We are therefore of opinion that the impugned charges were rightly levied by scale 'E' on the master, owner or agent of the vessels and that the Board could insist on the steamer- agent requisitioning the shore-labour to express an undertaking in the form for requisitioning labour that he will pay the charges laid down in the Board's scale of rates from time to time in respect of labour rendered idle or not properly utilised and also for working more than one hook simultaneously at a vessel's hatch. We therefore allow the appeals with costs here and the Courts below, set aside the order of the Court below and dismiss the writ petitions. There will be one hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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