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Showing 1 to 20 of 51 Records
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1963 (8) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid to be a public servant within the meaning of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code in view of the clear words of s. 43. The difficulty had however now been obviated by the amendment of s. 21 by the addition of the twelfth clause therein. But as s. 21 stood at the relevant time we have to take recourse to s. 43 of the Transport Act and the words of that section make it quite clear that members, officers and servants of corporations can only be public servants when they act or purport to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of the Transport Act or of any other law; and taking of a bribe can never amount to acting of purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of the Transport Act or of any other law. In these circumstances the trial court was right in acquitting Jagatsingh on the ground that he was not a public servant. It follows therefrom that Sheikh Ahmed must be acquitted. 19. We therefore dismiss the appeal, though for different reasons. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... on 31 of this very same Act was challenged In the case In M. P. Menon v. State 1953 HLT 482 AIR 1953 TC 540 and Govinda Pillai, J., held that the Act was valid because in the interests of public order restrictions could be Imposed on the right of freedom of speech and expression. 14. Therefore, we hold that though, the provisions of the impugned statute impose restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech, and expression, those restrictions are in the interests of public order and within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with that fundamental right and Clause (2) of. An. 19 clearly saves the section from the vice of unconstitutionally. On the merits of the case we are bound by the concurrent findings of the Courts below that the report is false and baseless. The publication of such a report therefore clearly amounts to an offence under Section 31(5) . 15. The conviction and sentence are, therefore, confirmed and the revision petition is dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 73 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case falls within the ambit of the principle enunciated by the Privy Council decision in Hariram Serowgee v. Madan Gopal Bagla and by the Madras decision in Mrs. Ida L. Chambers v. Kelland Huxford Chambers. It follows, therefore, that there was no valid gift of the amount of ₹ 3,00,000 made by the assessee to the Bharatiya Gyan Pith in the accounting year 1947-48. If that is the correct legal position, it must be held that there was no sale of the shares in the accounting year 1948-49 by the assessee in discharge of any previous liability to the Bharatiya Gyan Pith. For these reasons we hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case the loss of ₹ 2,12,540 cannot be allowed as a revenue loss arising from the assessees share business. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the assessee and in favour of the income-tax department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250.
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1963 (8) TMI 72 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction to assess him and that in any event the Income Tax Officer was not entitled to assess him unless his objection to the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer was determined by the Commissioner and that this constituted sufficient cause which prevented him from filing the return and complying with the terms of the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer. But according to the finding of fact reached by the Tribunal, the assessee had no such genuine belief in the plea taken by him and he was all along avoiding to file a return by taking a frivolous plea. We must, therefore, hold on the facts and circumstances of the case that it cannot be said that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the return required under section 22(2) read with section 34 as contemplated by section 27. Our answer to second question will, therefore, be in the negative. 13. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner. 14. Questions answered in the negative.
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1963 (8) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommissioner. The only order that is now in force is that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who modified the re-assessment order of the Income Tax Officer dated 28th March, 1959. There cannot be any doubt that the Income Tax Officer could not rectify the order dated 29th March, 1957 which ceased to exist on and from 29th March, 1959 when the Income Tax Officer himself passed the order of re-assessment under Section 34 of the Act. 6. Learned Counsel for the Department is unable to justify the proceedings under Section 35 of the Act in view of the events that happened subsequent to the original order dated 29th March, 1957. On the short ground that there was no order which could form the subject-matter of a proceeding under Section 35 and that therefore the proceedings were wholly misconceived and were without jurisdiction, this writ petition should be allowed. 7. In the result, the petition is allowed and the Rule nisi is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (8) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... able ground for holding that the appellant Noor Khan was prejudiced because he was deprived of the right which the Legislature had ensured him in making his defence, we would have set aside the conviction. We have however considered the evidence of the witnesses carefully and examined it in the light of the criticism offered by counsel for Noor Khan, and after giving due weight to the opinion of the High Court and the Trial Court have come to the conclusion on the facts of this case that no prejudice appears to have been caused. 29. As we have already pointed out, the plea of prejudice caused to the accused does not appear to have been raised in the High Court, and apart from the general plea of illegality of the trial because of the failure to supply the copies of the record of the statement made to Hair Singh no substantial argument in support of the plea of prejudice has been advanced. 30. On the view we have taken, this appeal fails and is dismissed. 31. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 69 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ich is more beneficial to the assessee rather than the way which leads to the imposition of a greater burden on the assessee. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that section 17(1) applies only where a person is not resident in the taxable territories in respect of all sources of income and has no application in a case where a person is resident in the taxable territories in respect of some source or sources of income and is not resident in the taxable territories in respect of others. In the circumstances our answer to the first question is that the word "year" in section 4A(a) in the context refers to the "previous year" as denned in section 2(11) and our answer to the second question is that section 17(1) does not apply when the assessee is a resident in respect of some source or sources of income and is a non-resident only in respect of other sources of income. The Commissioner will pay 2/3rds of the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1963 (8) TMI 68 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s. 1 and 2 as follow "1. Whether for the purposes of computing the capital of the assessee-company under the Business Profits Tax Act, taxation reserve (shown on the credit side of the balance-sheet) should be reduced by the amount of tax paid (shown on the debit side of the balance-sheet ? 2. If the answer is in the affirmative, whether for the purpose of computing the capital of the assessee-company under the Business Profits Tax Act, the amounts of ₹ 2,38,940 and ₹ 5,18,156 being the advance Income Tax paid in respect of profits of calendar years 1947 and 1948, should in any event not be deducted from the taxation reserve fun ?" 13. Our answer to the questions referred to us are as follow Question No. 1. - in the negative. Question No. 2. - in the affirmative. Question No. 3. - not pressed and, therefore, does not require to be answered. 14. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee-company the costs of this reference. 15. No order on the application.
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1963 (8) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a piece of social legislation intended to confer specified benefits on workmen to whom it applies, and so, it would be inappropriate to attempt to construe the relevant provisions in a technical or a narrow sense. This position cannot be disputed. But in dealing with the plea raised by Mr. Dolia that the section should be liberally construed, we cannot overlook the fact that the liberal construction must ultimately flow from the words used in the section. If the words used in the section are capable of two constructions one of which is shown patently to assist the achievement of the object of the Act, courts would be justified in preferring that construction to the other which may not be able to further the object of the Act. But, on the other hand, if the words used in the section are reasonably capable of only one construction and are clearly intractable in regard to the construction for which Mr. Dolia contends, the doctrine of liberal construction can be of no assistance.
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1963 (8) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . 278, Art. 278 operates in its own sphere in spite of Art. 372. The result is that Art. 278 overrides Art. 372; that is to say, notwithstanding the fact that a pre-Constitution taxation law continues in force under Art. 372, the Union and the State Government can enter into an agreement in terms of Art. 278 in respect of Part B States depriving the State law of its efficacy. In one view Art. 277 excludes the operation of Art. 372, and in the other view, an agreement in terms of Art. 278 overrides Art. 372. In either view, the result is the same, namely, that at any rate during the period covered by the agreement the States ceased to have any power to impose the tax in respect of "works contracts". 28. In this view we need not express our opinion on the other contentions raised by Mr. Nambiar. 29. In the result, the said orders of assessment are set aside and the appeals are allowed with costs here and in the High Court. One set of hearing fee. 30. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (8) TMI 65 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... other decisions. We have not thought it necessary to deal with them as each one of them turned on the particular facts of its case. As regards the principle of law concerned, there is not much room for dispute. The real difficulty arises in applying that principle to the facts of a given case. Applying the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gokul Chand v. Hukam Chand Nath Mal AIR 1921 PC 35, the Supreme Court in Kalu Babu Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Piyare Lall Adishwar Lal's case (supra) to the facts of the present case, I have come to the conclusion that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative and in favour of the asses-see. In other words, my answer to that question is that the inclusion of the salary paid by the firm to Shri Gurunath Dhakappa, for services rendered by him as manager, in the total income of the assessee family, is illegal and improper. Revenue to pay the costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1963 (8) TMI 64 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... radesh 52 The court said "The satisfaction of the Registrar as to the due compliance with the provisions of section 58 is not subject to appeal or suit. He is, therefore, the sole authority with regard to that satisfaction. That being so, provided he acts 'bona fide' and follows the prescribed procedure, his satisfaction on the said point is not open to question in a court of law." There is no allegation of mala fides or that the Registrar has not followed the prescribed procedure. It must follow that there was no registration of the firm under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, during the previous year 1957-58 and that the question referred has to be answered in the negative and against the assessee. We do so, but without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1963 (8) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the present case that this happened soon after 1941, because there was in the opinion of the Tribunal no hope of recovery of anything more than about ₹ 2,500 after 1941. This finding, although one of fact, is not supported by any material on the record and in fact the evidence, as it is, points to the other way, for even in March, 1949, the official receiver was of the view, and he wrote in that connection to the assessee, that it was not possible at that stage to say whether any more money would be recoverable from the estate of the insolvent or not. As far as I can see, therefore, the conclusion of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the disputed debt had become irrecoverable long before the beginning of the relevant accounting year, is not justified by any material on the record, and I would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. In all these circumstances, however, I would leave the parties to their own costs of the reference. I agree.
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1963 (8) TMI 62 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... than that imposed on the Hindu undivided families. Hence the petitioner can have no legitimate grievance. He cannot be considered as an aggrieved party. In this case, we are not concerned with the question whether those undivided families which are assessable to tax at a higher rate can assail the validity of the "Act" or not? The aforementioned aspect of the case was evidently not presented to the Bench which decided Mammad Keyi's case 1962 44 I.T.R. 277. Now that we have come to the conclusion that these petitions fail on the ground that the petitioner is not an aggrieved party, it is unnecessary to consider the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the revenue, namely, that the discrimination complained of is of such minor significance and the law ought not to take notice of it. In the result, these petitions fail and the same are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 (one set). AHMED ALI KHAN J.--I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 61 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (1) of Section 83 of the Act for the filing of the affidavit in the prescribed form is directory and not mandatory, I do not feel persuaded to uphold the whole of the order when it says that the defect or the irregularity in the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 "should not however affect the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try the case of corrupt practice raised by the petitioner", as it seems, in its view, the defect does not require any rectification. In exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, I modify the order of the Election Tribunal and direct it to require respondent No. 1 to file within the time to be fixed by it another proper affidavit either in the prescribed form or in the form in which it has already been filed after removing the defects therefrom. The application is accordingly allowed to the extent Indicated above but in the circumstances I would make no order as to cost. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 12. I agree.
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1963 (8) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore us--even the sheet No. 31 mentioned by the Tribunal is not part of the paper-book--to differ from its conclusion even if we have the power and the inclination to do so on this question of fact. What the department has done is to divide the total of the estate or overhead expenses by the number of acres comprising the estate and then multiply the expenses per acre by the number of acres covered by the immature plants in the estate of the assessee. This is an arbitrary approach which cannot be justified. In the light of what is stated above we can only affirm the decision of the Tribunal and answer the reference against the department and in favour of the assessee. We do so, but without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (6) of section 60 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. Reference answered in favour of the assessee.
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1963 (8) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sidered. The eye witnesses in this case are five in number, while in the other case there were only two, but that apart, the earlier judgment can only be relevant if it fulfils the conditions laid down by the Indian Evidence Act in ss. 40-43. The earlier judgment is no doubt admissible to show the parties and the decision but it is not admissible for the purpose of relying upon the appreciation of evidence. Since the bar under s. 403 Criminal Procedure Code did not operate, the earlier judgment is not relevant for the interpretation of evidence in the present case. Mr. Tewatia attempted to argue on the facts of this case but we did not permit him to do so because this Court, in the absence of special circumstances, does not review for the third time, evidence, which has been accepted in the High Court and the Court below. No such circumstance has been pointed out to us to make us depart from the settled practice. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules. We have very carefully considered the evidence led in the present enquiry and borne in mind the plea made by the learned Attorney General, but we are unable to hold that on the record, there is any evidence which can sustain the finding of the appellant that charge No. 3 has been proved against the respondent. It is in this connection and only incidentally that it may be relevant to add that the U.P.S.C. considered the matter twice and came to the firm decision that the main charge against the respondent had not been established. The result is, though the appellant succeeds on the principle point of law raised in the appeal, the appeal fails, because, on the merits, we hold that no case had been made out for punishing the respondent. The appellant to pay the costs of respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (8) TMI 57 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are to be computed, but in section 7 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act the legislature has expressly mentioned how agricultural income is to be computed in cases mentioned in subclauses (2) and (3) of clause (a) of section 2. We are of opinion that the deductions specified in section 7(2) of the Act are exhaustive and it is not open to the assessee to claim any deduction which falls outside the categories of the deductions mentioned in section 7(2). If the view that we have expressed is correct, it follows that the assessee is not entitled to claim deduction of printing and stationery charges from its gross income under section 7 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act in the circumstances of this case. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Board of Revenue against the assessee and in favour of the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (8) TMI 56 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on to rectify the mistake under section 35 is not taken away because of these appeals for the reason that the question whether the business loss of the earlier year could or could not be set off against income from an undisclosed source was not in fact the subject-matter of the appeal preferred before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. So far as this court is concerned, this point is concluded by the decision in Central Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, A-Ward, Indore 1963 47 I.T.R. 895. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the Income-tax Officer acted within his powers and jurisdiction in passing the order of rectification dated 28th March, 1962, and that order is in conformity with sections 24(2) and 35 of the Act. The result is that this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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