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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 60 Records
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1964 (12) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... its from interests ceasing on death has been provided for. Broadly it is sufficient for our purposes to state that if the interest possessed by the deceased extended to the whole income of the property, then the value of the benefit would be the principal value of that property. If the widow had the exclusive right of residence in the property, the sons, even if they also enjoyed the property, could do so only by licence and it necessarily follows that the widow was entitled to the entire income from the property. Her interest did extend to the whole of the income from the property and the valuation could rightly be made under section 40(a) of the Act. That point does not really arise out of the question raised. We refer to it incidentally as the question was argued by learned counsel. In the light of what we have stated, the question is answered in the affirmative. The applicants will pay the costs of the department counsel s fee Rs.250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (12) TMI 35 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... guaranteed by the Constitution. No doubt quasi-judicial authorities have jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly. But no judicial or quasi-judicial authority has the right to decide in an arbitrary manner and if it so decides, I think, this Court is not helpless to safeguard the interests of the victim of such decision by interfering under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further I am of the view that in such cases Article 265 of the Constitution, No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law, is also violated. There is no collection of tax by the authority of law when assessments are made in this arbitrary fashion. 23.. I quash exhibit P6 in so far as it relates to the addition of Rs. 27,60,883.60. The respondent will re-compute the turnover and the tax after deleting this turnover. 24.. This writ application is allowed on the above terms and the respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner including Advocate s fee Rs. 300. Application allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 34 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... edabad Branch, was holding the moneys lying in the said deposit account for or on account of the dealer, the dealer in this case being either the debtor-firm of G. Bhagwandas Ramchand or the Union Radios or the Harsh Radio Corporation. It is also not possible to say that the bank was a person from whom any amount of money was due to any one of the aforesaid firms who were the dealers in respect of the arrears of tax. That being the position, the very first condition necessary for the application of section 39 is totally wanting in this case. The respondent, therefore, was not entitled to invoke the provisions of section 39 and to issue the said notices upon the petitioners bankers. Both the notices, therefore, were contrary to the provisions of section 39 and were without jurisdiction and must, therefore, be set aside. In the result, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. The respondent will pay to the petitioners the costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 33 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ight is not the purchase but the subsequent sale fulfilling the second condition. It is not unknown that even in a prospective statute a part of the requisites for its action may be drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. (Vide R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel Inhabitants 1848 12 Q.B. 120. and Master Ladies Tailors v. Minister of Labour 1950 2 All E.R. 525.). We are, therefore, of the view that, on a true construction, the rule applies only where the subsequent sale complying with the second condition takes place after the coming into force of the rule. This being the position, the assessees obviously cannot claim remission under the rule in respect of purchase tax paid by them, since not only the purchase but also the subsequent sales were made by the assessees prior to the coming into force of the rule. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Reference to the State. Reference answered in the negative.
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1964 (12) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Revenue and since, in our opinion, for reasons which we have stated above, they do not support the claim of the Revenue and there is no other provision of law authorising the State to recover the amount due from the petitioner under the surety bond as if it were an arrear of land revenue, the State cannot proceed to recover that amount by following the coercive machinery of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and must be left to follow the ordinary remedy of an action at law which every creditor who wishes to enforce his debt has against the debtor. We therefore allow the petition and direct that a writ of prohibition be issued prohibiting the respondents from enforcing the notice dated 20th June, 1963, against the petitioner or from taking any steps or proceedings to recover the amount alleged to be due from the petitioner under the surety bond as if it were an arrear of land revenue. The respondents will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 3rd November, 1962, demanding penalty of an amount of Rs. 1,455 and odd under the provisions of section 24, sub-section (3). The contention of the petitioner was accepted by the learned Judge. The conclusion was expressed in these words In my opinion, no authority is really necessary for the clear position that the penalty levied in this case, which the new Act alone contemplates but not the old Act, cannot be imposed retrospectively in respect of an arrear of sales tax which became due before the new Act and that nothing in the transitory provision in section 61 will justify its levy. It is noteworthy that the learned Judge dealt with the matter in the light of section 61 before it was amended by Act X of 1963. In my view, the position has been made even clearer by this amendment. It follows that the levy of penalty is wholly unsupported by the provisions of law. The petition is allowed. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 30 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court in Income-tax Commissioner v. Patel and Co. 1959 37 I.T.R. 412 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 278. , that the decision of the High Court on a reference being in the exercise of its advisory or consultative jurisdiction, the provisions of the Constitution in regard to the certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court do not in terms apply, clearly show that neither under Article 132(1) nor under Article 133 of the Constitution a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court can be granted against a decision of the High Court answering a reference in the exercise of its advisory or consultative jurisdiction. Those observations only support the view expressed by Hidayatullah, J., in the case of Sriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue, M.P.(1). 3.. For these reasons, this application for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision dated 30th July, 1964, in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 71 of 1964 is rejected. There will be no order about costs. Application rejected.
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1964 (12) TMI 29 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... law. I have no doubt that the department has sufficient powers under the law to avoid fraud on the revenue and illegal evasion of legitimate taxes, but resort to illegal notices, however, can scarcely be encouraged by this Court and a writ petition cannot be thrown out merely because the petitioner is doing something unbecoming of an honest citizen and is playing fraud on the revenue. Though the respondent does not urge it, but had there been some explanation necessary from the petitioner, I would merely have directed the firm to appear before the Assessing Authority and explain that these grounds are not goods grounds for canceling the registration certificate, but seeing that the notice is completely outside the provisions of the section, I think it would be a proper exercise of discretion to grant the relief in the present proceedings. For the foregoing reasons, I am constrained to allow this petition which succeeds. The petitioner is entitled to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re to do with the goods. After the goods were delivered, inspected and billed for, it can no longer be said that the title remained in the seller and that the sale was not completed. It must be remembered that under the contract the place of delivery was Calcutta, inspection was to be at Calcutta, payment was to be made at Calcutta and it was an express term of the contract that in no case should payment be claimed from the consignee. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I am of the opinion that the goods were delivered in Calcutta and the sale was completed within the State of West Bengal. As such, the sale is subject to the payment of sales tax and is not within any exemption either under the West Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, or under Article 286 of the Constitution. The result is that the application fails and should be dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 27 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n behalf of the petitioners to Vidarbha Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer III, II Division, Nagpur and Others 1963 14 S.T.C. 430., wherein it has been laid down that rules made under a statute cannot take away any part of the powers or affect any of the provisions of the parent Act under which the rules are made, unless the Act itself permits that to be done. The petitioners, in my opinion, can derive no assistance from the above authority because, as discussed above, the impugned rules in the present case are in consonance with the provisions of the Act and do not in any way detract from those provisions. Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 909 and 1500 of 1964 are consequently dismissed, but in the circumstances I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Civil Writ Petition No. 613 of 1964 may now be sent back to the single Judge for determining the other question which is stated to arise on the facts of that case. FALSHAW, C.J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1964 (12) TMI 26 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ith explanation 1 to section 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. The validity of the latter provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 245 and 246 of 1963 (K.L. Johar and Company v. The Deputy Commercial Tax OfficerSince reported at 1965 16 S.T.C. 213.). The Supreme Court held that the said provision was void as the Legislature had no competence to enact the same. Therefore, we have to hold that explanation 1 to section 2(t) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, is also void and inoperative. From this conclusion it follows that the turnover relating to the hire-purchase transactions, with which we are concerned in this case, could not have been brought to tax. In the result, this petition is allowed and the sales tax imposed on the turnover relating to the hire-purchase transactions is hereby quashed. As this petition is allowed on a ground which was not taken up in the petition, we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... hire-purchase agreements contained book debt of the company, that the hypothecation of the hire-purchase agreements carried a charge on the book debts of the company, and that it was immaterial that the hypothecation bond was intended to secure to the defendants other rights besides the book debts. I find however that in section 95 of the English Companies Act, there is no provision corresponding to section 125(4)(e) of our Act, exempting from registration a pledge of movable property. Consequently, that decision may have to be distinguished, whereas there is no reason for distinguishing the Bench decision of this court which is binding on me. It is hereby declared that section 125 is not applicable to the security created by the company over the fixed deposits and that relief will be granted to the petitioners against any action for alleged default or omission relating thereto. Parties will bear their own costs of this petition. Government Pleader s fee is fixed at Rs. 250.
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1964 (12) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Application for, General ... ... ... ... ..... winding up. And, it should not be forgotten that it is asserted on behalf of the company that the moment the restrictions that have been placed upon it by the order made on the application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator are removed, it will be in a position to satisfy both the Narasimhans and to raise the lock-out. Whether that confidence is well founded or not, of course, remains to be seen, but it is not a matter for consideration) now. Quite apart from that the majority of the creditors and members are opposed to a winding up, that the petitioners are fully paid up shareholders who have alleged that the company is insolvent, and that, to put it at the lowest, their motives are open to suspicion, I do not think that a case has been made out mdash and I am considering, as I must, the cumulative effect of all that has been made out mdash for ordering a winding up. I dismiss the petition. The petitioners will pay the company its costs and also bear their own.
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1964 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there should be a prior adjudication existing before a set-off can be allowed under section 49E?
Whether there is any other condition which is necessary to be fulfilled before the section becomes applicable?
Held that:- There must be a subsisting obligation to make the payment of refund before a person is entitled to claim a set-off under section 49E. In this case, in view of the orders of the Commissioner and the Central Board of Revenue mentioned above, there was no subsisting obligation to pay, and, therefore, the claim of the appellant must fail.
Therefore, agreeing with the High Court, we hold that section 49E of the Act is of no assistance to the appellant and that the petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed
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1964 (12) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957) in so far, as it purports to levy a charge of wealth-tax in respect of the net wealth of a Hindu undivided family at the specified rate, is valid?
Held that:- Entry 86 covers cases of Hindu undivided families, it follows that the impugned provision is valid under the said entry itself. That being so, it is unnecessary to consider whether the validity of the impugned provisions can be sustained under entry 97 or under article 248 of the Constitution. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee is entitled to registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act 1922 ?
Held that:- Unable to appreciate how a defect (even if there be one in the agreement constituting the yarn firm) affects the right of the appellant-firm to be registered. If the statutory conditions which qualify the appellants for registration are fulfilled, an arrangement between some of the partners of the appellants which binds them to distribute the profits under a stipulation which is not a part of the partnership agreement does not affect the right to claim registration of the partnership agreement. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 4 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... untainpens completed under 45(3) and not under item 61(8) as articles plated with gold and silver on the ground that the construction put by the Customs authorities was unreasonable or perverse. Thus if the construction put by the Customs authorities is unreasonable or perverse, or manifestly and obviously erroneous as in this suit, the Court has clear jurisdiction to find that the classification is illegal. P.W. 1 Dr. K. Sanjivi, a leading physician of Madras, has clearly stated that he cannot imagine any doctor prescribing Hostacycline to persons suffering from Vitamin deficiency. Thus the view of the Customs authorities. Hostacycline injections contain other therapeutic ingredients is patently perverse and obviously erroneous. I find on issue 5 that this Court has jurisdiction to review the previous classification made by the Customs authorities and tribunals constituted under the Sea Customs Act. In the result, the plaintiff is entitled a decree as prayed for with costs.
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1964 (12) TMI 3 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Return filed before the commencement of the IT Act of 1961 and proceedings for revision after commencement of the Act - action taken by the respondent-Commissioner(to initiate proceedings under s. 33B of the IT Act, 1922) against the appellant was properly taken and such action cannot be challenged as being without jurisdiction
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1964 (12) TMI 2 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Held that office allowance receivable by the company from the managed companies was income of the company for the year 1954-55 even though it was surrendered by a resolution passed before the end of the accounting period
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1964 (12) TMI 1 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
Income-tax Officer, duly authorised by the Commissioner of Income-tax, made a search of the premises - no any illegality was committed when action was taken in these cases under section 132 - search and seizure are valid
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