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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 57 Records
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1964 (8) TMI 98 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... such a situation the word and may well be construed in a disjunctive sense and be read 39 or . 9. Applying these principles to the, case on hand it is absolutely clear that the word and in Section 2(1)(j) has to. be read as or . A literal interpretation of the word will lead to an absurdity, viz., totally prohibited dyes may be used within prescribed limits. The prohibition, in Section 2(1)(j) of the Act will be attracted If the article of food contains a colouring matter other than the one prescribed under the rules in respect of the article; or where the colouring matter is permitted in respect of that article, if it is not within the prescribed limits' of variability. 10. The outer of acquittal must be set aside, it is set aside and the accused is convicted under Section 7(i) read with Section 16(1)(a) and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- In default of payment of which to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The fine will be paid within a month from this date.
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1964 (8) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion may be relevant in cases which completely exclude the applicability of Sections 8 and 9. 25. We were also referred to the decision in Punyavatamma. v. Satyanarayana I.L.R. 1960 2 A.P. 111; Nagabushanam v. Seetharamaiah I.L.R. 1961 1 A.P. 485 and Chellammal v. Abdul Gaffoor Sahib I.L.R. 1961 Mad. 1061. In the first and the third of these cases the original liability arose after the commencement of the Act but in the second one it arose before the commencement of the Act. We agree with the view taken in the latter case that relief can be given to an agriculturists in such a case under s. 8 or s. 9 as the case may be. 26. Thus it would appear that wherever a transaction was entered into after the commencement of the Act but the original indebtedness arose before the commencement of the Act, the preponderant view is that Sections 8 and 9 would not be inapplicable. That, as already stated, is also our view. In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs. 27. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (8) TMI 96 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can assert the right of ownership by adverse possession. Consequently, when the owner takes legal action against the allotted, the subject-matter of the suit is the tenancy right, and not full rights that any person can have in the building. As held above, where tenancy right in immovable property is the subject-matter of the suit, court fee shall be payable on the annual rent or letting value of the building. This shall be irrespective of whether the suit had been instituted by the owner or by the tenant. The lower courts thus acted illegally by distinguishing the decision in the case of AIR 1949 All 580 (supra). 14. The revision is partly allowed and partly dismissed and it is ordered that court-fee shall be payable as for declaration with a consequential relief and the value of the consequential relief shall be the annual rent or letting value of the building subject to a minimum of Rs. 300/. Costs on parties. The lower Courts are directed to realise court-fee accordingly.
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1964 (8) TMI 95 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not intend to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what it expressly declared either in express terms or by clarification, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matters outside those limits the law remains undisturbed. As I have already stated, there is no provision in the Act which entitles the Management to discontinue or reduce the medical benefits which the workmen have been getting by way of customary concession and as a part of their service condition. It is also not disputed in this case that the Management has not taken recourse to the procedure contemplated by Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act. I, therefore, agree with my learned brother that the award dated the 31st August, 1963, is illegal and ultra vires and must be set aside, and the two points or dispute referred to the Indus trial Tribunal, Bihar, for adjudication must be answered in favour of the petitioners and against respondent No. 2.
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1964 (8) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... four years but within a period of eight years from the end of the relevant year. This condition, which was held by the Supreme Court to be a necessary condition, not having been satisfied in the present case it necessarily follows that the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction whatsoever to issue the notice under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act of 1961. The rulings relied upon by Mr. Gulati have no application as they relate to the question of limitation which is a matter not pertaining to or affecting the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under section 147. The question of limitation, manifestly, is a matter which does not touch the question of jurisdiction and, therefore, those rulings are of little or no assistance to the department in the present case. For the reasons given above, I would direct that a writ of certiorari will issue quashing the notices dated the 2nd March, 1964. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... aim and object of the expenditure. Was it for running the business or was it one concerning the instrument for earning profits? Obviously, the expenditure incurred was not for the continual process of the use of such instrument for earning profits, but was an expenditure concerning the instrument for earning profits. If that distinction is borne in mind, there would be no difficulty in arriving at a proper conclusion as to the nature of the expenditure in question and its aim and object. For the reasons aforesaid, it is not possible to sustain the contention urged on behalf of the assessee firm that the expenditure in question cannot be said to be one for initial outlay or that the expenditure was in the natural of operational or trade expenses. The Tribunal, therefore, was right in disallowing these expenses. (7) Our answer to the question, therefore, will be in the negative. The assessee firm will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference. (8) Reference answered.
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1964 (8) TMI 92 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s either in this court or in the court below. (101) Before concluding, I should notice a submission made by Mr. Krishnaswamy that we should make an elucidation in this judgment that the decree for specific performance made in this appeal shall not affect the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar such as may be exercised by his under section 84C or section 70(mb) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. It is obvious that that jurisdiction remains unaffected by the decree made by us if that jurisdiction can otherwise be exercised. (102) It is also made clear that it should not be understood that we have recorded any finding as to the actual area of Jirayat land in the possession of the plaintiff at any point of time either on the date of the suit or on April 1, 1960, when the plaintiff produced his purshis in answer to the purshis filed by the defendant. That question is left open and this we say as desired by both side. Chandrashekhar, J. (103) I agree. (104) Appeal allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 91 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... de the she realized that it was being valued made contrary to the principles of Art. 31. If 2-7-1962 is the date on which the constitutional objection of the arose from the on which to approach this court, he petition filed in 18th September 1962 can hardly he said to be delayed. In any case, having regard to the importance's of the points raised, and assuming that there was any delay, we would certainly condone the delay. (42) For the reasons given therefore we allow the petition and make the rule absolute, we hold that clause (b) including the word "whichever is less" of sub -section (3) S. 8 Of the Requisitioning and Acquistion of the Immovable property act, 1952 (30 of 1952) is ultra vires of Art 31 of the constitution and is therefore void. The assessment of compensation will there fore have to be made subject to this declaration. (43) The petition will be entitled to his costs from the respondents. We qualify these costs at RS. 500. (44) Petition allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 90 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ether the business is managed by trustees appointed by the directors or whether they are carried on by the directors qua directors is not a material consideration for deciding the applicability of section 4(3)(i). Nor can it be said that a trust deed is essential in order that the provisions of section 4(3)(i) may be relied on by the assessee. The further point made that only a small portion of the income has been spent for scholarship and charity also is not a criterion for deciding whether the assets of the company are held under any legal obligation to apply the income there from for the purposes mentioned in section 4(3)(i). It is not anybody's case that any part of the income has been utilised for any purposes other than those specified in the memorandum and articles of association. In the light of the above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. We direct the parties to bear their costs.
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1964 (8) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nsic unity' and 'to be regarded as one legal proceeding". In that sense, it is the award by the appellate Tribunal, if an appeal is preferred which becomes the final award that governs the parties. The passage form Russell on Arbitration that we set forth earlier, as well as the decision of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1927 Cal 647 make it clear that it is perfectly legal to provide for different stages of arbitration, such as, from a single Arbitrator to a committee of appeal, etc. It is the award which finally emerges from this procedure, which is conclusive as between the parties, and not liable to be set aside, except as provided for in S. 30 of the Arbitration Act 10 of 1940. For these reasons, we must hold that the provision for appeal is not ultra vires the law of Arbitration enacted in Act 10 of 1940. On this ground also the appellants will have to fail. (12) The civil miscellaneous appeal, in result, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (8) TMI 88 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ft is an ordinary incident of the assessee's business. We may, in this connection, refer to Commissioner of Income-tax v. Calcutta Agency Ltd. 1951 19 ITR 191 (SC), where Kania C.J. has held that the burden of proving necessary facts for claiming exemption of an amount under section 10(2)(xv) is on the assessee. We cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Banerjee's contention in the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the fact that there is no material before us to evaluate the terms of the deed of hypothecation, the tenure or the limit or the nature of the overdraft. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and state that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the sum of ₹ 35,800 incurred by the assessee for the purposes of raising or securing overdraft facilities from bank was an expenditure of a capital nature not allowable under section 10(2)(xv). The assessee shall bear and pay the costs of this reference. S.P. Mitra J.-I agree.
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1964 (8) TMI 87 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efer to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision cited, which deals with the Explanation to section 34, and the remarks which they make in that connection are quite apposite in this context. Merely to say that the assessment of the firm and the assessments of the minors as individuals were done by the same Income-tax Officer cannot, in our view, be relied upon to support the theory that the precise information which was required in the present case was made available to the Income-tax Officer by the assessee. It follows that section 34 of the Act was rightly invoked in the present case. Question No. 1 is answered accordingly. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the assessee that the second question has also to be answered against the assessee in view of the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rathinasabhapathy Mudaliar 1964 51 ITR 204 . The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1964 (8) TMI 86 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arned Judge below does not deal with the merits of the other issues and the case does not appear to us to have been tried on the issues of fact and therefore, it is not possible for us to decide this case finally, though we should have liked to do so. We have, therefore, no alternative but allow this appeal and send the case back to the trial Court for further trial and decision de nova according to law. We may make it clear that it will be open to both the parties to lead evidence on the remaining issues and thereafter arguments will be heard and the case disposed of finally. The contesting defendant shall bear the costs of this appeal but the costs hitherto and hereafter shall abide the result. As this Appeal arises out of a 1954 suit, we would direct the court below to give it a high priority and dispose of it as expeditiously as possible. The parties are further directed to appear in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge No. 1, Jodhpur on 21st September, 1964 without fail.
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1964 (8) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e assessee" have acquired, so to say, a clear, well-defined meaning in the manner mentioned above and they are used in the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act in the same context and with the same object. In this connection it may also be mentioned that the view of the Privy Council in the Tribune case 1948 16 I.T.R. 214 (P.C.) which was rendered under the unamended section 33 of the Act has been given statutory effect by the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 33A of the Income-tax Act, which enacts that "an order by the Commissioner declining to interfere shall not be deemed to be an order prejudicial to the assessee." However much this view might cut down the right of revision of the assessee to the High Court, it has to be upheld in view of the clear language of the section. We, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the revision petition as not maintainable under section 54. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (8) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he year which were available with him as on the date of the estimate. Both the Income- tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner have pointed out that the basis upon which the assessee reached his estimate was not made known to them at all. It is true that before the Tribunal a statement giving the data for the estimate was filed. But the Tribunal was not prepared to attach any weight to this statement as furnishing the proper basis for the estimate and expressed its view that the statement is an after-thought. The fact accordingly is undisputed that the assessee was not able to show how the estimate was justified by the state of accounts as they stood on the date of the estimate. It should follow that there were materials before the authorities below upon which the levy of the penalty appears to be fully justified. The question is answered accordingly. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
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1964 (8) TMI 83 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arned Controller and the appellate authority in the opinion expressed by them in their remand reports and reversing the order of the appellate authority dated 19-4-1962 restore the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on 25-1-1961. The parties in the circumstances are directed to bear their own costs. (13) Before finally closing the judgment however I cannot help observing that these premises were required for personal use by the owners and they stared the proceedings as far back as 1959 and till 1964 this cause has not been finally adjudicated. The length of delay in such cases is likely to give rise to a feelings of frustration in the minds of suitors in so far as the administration of justice in our country goes. It is therefore desirable to see that such claims are finally disposed of with greater promptitude. (14) The occupant is given three months for vacating the premises and he should not be evicted before the expiry of three months. (15) Revision allowed.
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1964 (8) TMI 82 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... irect the Special Officer to make an inventory of all the assets of the company as early as possible. Copies of such inventories should be furnished to all the members of the company. 56. There is a prayer for an injunction retraining the respondent No. 6 from taking out any plant, machinery, goods and other assets from the colliery. The charge relating to removal of the said plant and machinery has not been pressed and therefore no. order is made on the prayer for injunction. 57. The respondent No. 6 should furnih an account of all raisings, despatch and sale of coal and coke to the Special Officer. 58. Each party to bear and pay its own costs. The Special Officer will be entitled to retain the costs of this application, as between attorney and client, out of the assets in his hands. All parties are directed to act on a copy of the minutes countersigned by the Court Officer. On default by the parties the Special Officer is directed to have this order drawn up and completed.
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1964 (8) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... tea that they were used in the cultivation of coffee. It is also agreed that if those assets were left idle when they were not being used in the cultivation of tea, then the rebate would have been admissible. What disentitles the rebate, according to the department, is only the use of the assets in the cultivation of coffee or, in other words, the disruption of the exclusive character of the user in the cultivation of tea. In these circumstances-the assets being used in their entirety in the cultivation of tea-we are not prepared to say that the Tribunal was wrong in the conclusion that it reached, and must answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We do so, but without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1964 (8) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... ot figure in the accounts but the inclusion of which is required by the assessee's method of accounting; that is to say, the Income tax Officer may, without deviating from the assessee's method, make such adjustments in the profit and loss account as are necessary for giving full and true effect to that method itself. Having adopted a regular method of accounting, the assessee cannot be allowed to change it or depart from it for a particular year or for part of the year or in respect of particular transactions". (5th Edition, Volume 1, Page 665) In the light of what is stated above the question referred has to be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We do so; but without any order as to costs. ( 5. ) A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of S. 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1964 (8) TMI 79 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sion and that conclusion, in our view, was the only conclusion that it could come to, that the assessee had failed to lead satisfactory evidence to discharge the burden to establish that an integrated activity, as laid down by the Supreme Court, was carried out, which included planting and dibbling in these very areas. Neither of the two contentions raised by Mr. Dwarkadas before us can, therefore, be sustained. Our answer to the first question, therefore, must be in the negative. As regards the second question, it has not, in our opinion, been properly framed. The proper question would be "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the two-thirds of the sale proceeds of the forest trees and the forest produce treated as income by the Tribunal or any part thereof constituted agricultural income." Our answer to that question is in the negative. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference. Questions answered in the negative.
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