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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 87 Records
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1965 (12) TMI 65 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... nd West and Hodge Ltd. falls to the ground. An act of omission, such as is here alleged against these two companies, might perhaps in some circumstances be held to amount to oppressive conduct, but it seems to me that it would be necessary to allege and establish that it was designed to achieve some unfair advantage over those claiming to be oppressed before mere omission could be held to be oppressive. No such allegation is made in this case. Be that as it may, if the omission is, as in the present case, a failure to prevent acts which do not themselves amount to oppressive conduct, such omission without more cannot, in my judgment, constitute oppressive conduct. For these reasons I am of opinion that, assuming that all the allegations contained in the present petition are capable of proof and would be substantiated by evidence, the petition discloses no ground for relief under section 210, and is accordingly demurrable. I will, consequently, dismiss the petition with costs.
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1965 (12) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Fraudulent preference ... ... ... ... ..... he absence of the relative debtors as parties to the record, cause grave prejudice to them, because the decision we give in these proceedings may not bind the relative debtors. We venture to think that the debtors are at least proper parties to these proceedings for making an order of repayment whether in cash or by reversal of entries. In these circumstances, we set aside the direction of the learned judge directing repayment to the liquidators. The liquidator is at liberty to institute appropriate proceedings against the parties concerned for obtaining payments and to collect the amount. The result is that A.S. Nos. 544 and 595 of 1961 are dismissed with costs to the liquidator. A. S. No. 594 of 1961 is allowed but in the circumstances we direct the parties to bear their costs, A. S. No. 620 of 1961 is partly allowed so far as the 13th respondent is concerned with costs payable to him by the liquidator and is dismissed with costs so far as the first respondent is concerned.
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1965 (12) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
... ... ... ... ..... itation is provided for initiating action or instituting proceedings. On behalf of the petitioners it has been pointed out that criminal proceedings are apprehended under sections 282 and 282A of the Act. Sections 282 and 282A provide penalties for making a false return, etc., and for wrongful withholding of property of a company by its officers. As I am satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioners in respect of the amount expended on obtaining clearance from the Pakistan authorities and the other expenses incurred in connection with the satisfaction of the claim of the foreign company, I hereby relieve them from any apprehended liability for which proceedings can be instituted against them in the future under sections 282 and 282A of the Act. No other point has been urged before me by the counsel for the parties. The petition is consequently allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1965 (12) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and on the correct interpretation of the three enclosures to the letter of the assessee dated the 8th day of July, 1954, to the Income-tax Officer concerned, the sum of ₹ 83,157 was allowable as an expenditure of a revenue nature ?
Held that:- It is in the light of persistent efforts made by the company to secure renewal of the agreements for what the High Court called a " sufficiently large period " that the nature of the payment has to be determined. It was only with a view to persuade the State authorities to " grant a new lease for a period of four or five years " that an offer to pay those amounts in addition to the stipulated royalty was made. There was no legal obligation to pay those amounts under the terms of the original agreements, and the company offered " as a special case to pay " those additional amounts " on the understanding that the Government will give approval " for renewal of the agreement. The amounts agreed to be paid did not form part of the price of the company's stock-in-trade, right to collect which was conferred by the agreement dated June 13, 1952. There is no doubt that payment of premium in consideration of the owner of property agreeing to grant a right to take and remove the stock-in-trade of the taxpayer is in the nature of capital expenditure. We, therefore, agree with the High Court on the alternative ground which appealed to them. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the rental income from the house property received by the assessee for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52 is not exempt under section 4(3)(xii) of the Act not withstanding section 10(7) of the Act ?
Held that:- It is equally impossible to apply the provisions of section 4(3)(xii) to an assessment made under section 10(7), read with paragraph 6 of the Schedule. There is no income chargeable under the head " Income from property " as far as a general insurance business is concerned. The effect of section 10(7) is to delete the heads " Interest on securities ", " Income from property " and " Income from other sources " from section 6 of the Act, as far as general insurance businesses are concerned.
Thu agree with the High Court that the answer to the question must be in the affirmative and against the assessee. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the business in Hong Kong was controlled from India during the accounting year for 8 months only and, therefore, proportionate profits attributable to the rest of the year were not exigible to tax?
Whether the loss suffered by the assessee in his business in Hong Kong during the period 1941 to 1945 was ascertained only after the termination of the Second World War in 1946 and, therefore, the loss must be deemed to have been incurred by the assessee only during the accounting year?
Held that:- It will be noticed at once that the question does not relate to the losses incurred in the year 1946, but only those incurred in the year 1941. The question ex facie does not comprehend the losses incurred in 1946 or ascertained during that year. The High Court, therefore, rightly held that the question framed by it was confined to the losses of the year 1941. But on an assumption not warranted by the question, the learned judges of the High Court, in deference to the arguments advanced by the counsel appearing before them, proceeded to consider the argument now raised before us and came to the conclusion that the said losses could not be held to have been sustained in the year 1946. In our view, it was not open to the High Court to answer the question not referred to it by the Tribunal. The Tribunal's order also shows that no such contention was raised before it ; nor did the Tribunal deal with it. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
Agricultural Income, Rubber Estate, Rubber Trees ... ... ... ... ..... the nature described in sub-clause (ii). The definition of agricultural income in section 2 does not include proceeds from the sale of rubber trees in an estate which were utilised for the purpose of deriving income in the shape of latex. There was enough evidence in the record justifying the High Court s conclusion that the rubber trees formed part of the capital assets of the respondent. Admittedly, the respondent did not grow the rubber trees for the purpose of selling them. It was getting income from these rubber frees in the shape of latex. In course of time the rubber trees became old and unyielding. When the trees were no longer productive of latex, the respondent felled them and sold them. The Appellate Tribunal and the High Court were, therefore, right in holding that the sale proceeds of these trees should be treated as capital receipt and not taxable as agricultural income. In this view of the matter, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, the sum of ₹ 21,000 (received by Shri Mathura Prasad as salary from Agarwal Iron Works, Agra) was the income of the assessee family or Shri Mathura Prasad in his personal capacity ?
Held that:- The High Court was right in refusing to direct a case to be stated under section 66(2) of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the war damage receipts of $13,889 and $85,479 constitute income of the assessee for assessment in the years 1954-55 and 1956-57 respectively ?
Held that:- When the assessee put forward the claim for compensation under the scheme framed by the Central Board of Revenue that its entire property had been lost through enemy action and it obtained relief under the special scheme on that basis, the value of the assets must after receipt of compensation be taken to be nil, and the assessee by not writing off the value in his books of account on and after accepting the benefits of the special scheme could not invest those assets for the purpose of assessment to tax with any book value which was liable to be taken into account. Compensation received in replacement of those assets by the assessee from the war damage commission must therefore be treated in its entirety as profit liable to tax. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
Attributable To, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... to the amount of profits which arose on the amounts received by the assessee s bankers. The appellate order of the Appellate Tribunal does not contain any discussion on the point as to the correct manner of apportioning profits between the manufacturing process and the selling process. Apparently, the High Court felt that as they had substituted the accrual basis for the receipt basis, they also must determine the question of apportionment of profits. But there is ample power in the Apppllate Tribunal when the reference goes back to the Tribunal to apportion the profits, if the matter has not been determined before. In the result, we accept the appeals and modify the answer given by the High Court by deleting the following words It and that in determining the tax, the profits should be apportioned as 75 for the manufacturing process and 25 for the selling process. In view of the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed. Answer modified.
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1965 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, section 23A was properly applied?
Held that:- From the judgment of the High Court that the assessee's contention before it was that the expression " profits made " in section 23A refers to profits disclosed by the accounts and further to the profits that were made only during that year, disregarding any profits of the previous year that might have been carried forward as such. The fact that this argument was raised before the High Court further shows that the assessee never urged at any previous stage that in view of previous losses and other facts, it would not be reasonable to require the assessee to distribute a larger dividend.
We agree with the High Court that the answer to the question must be in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
Agricultural Income, Capital Receipt, Tea Estate ... ... ... ... ..... or receiver of rent-in-kind of the produce raised or received by him, in respect of which no process has been performed other than a process of the nature described in sub-clause (ii). The question is whether the sale proceeds of grevelia trees which, had become useless, did not fall within the definition of agricultural income under the Act. There is no controversy about the fact that the owners of tea estates plant grevelia trees not for the purpose of deriving any income therefrom but solely for the purpose of providing shade for the tea plants and that such shade is essential for the proper cultivation of tea. The trees were cut down and sold after they had become useless by efflux of time. The grevelia trees in the tea estate of the respondent constituted therefore capital assets and the proceeds derived therefrom by sale as firewood would not constitute agricultural income under the Act. The appeal has therefore no merits and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
Whether any surcharge can be levied on the agricultural income-tax payable for the assessment year 1957-58 ?
Held that:- The Surcharge Act having come into force on September 1, 1957, and the said Act not being retrospective in operation, it could not be regarded as law in force at the commencement of the year of assessment 1957-58. Since the Surcharge Act was not the law in force on April 1, 1957, no surcharge could be levied under the said Act against the appellant in the assessment year 1957-58. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the source of the amounts was the production or the export of the rubber itself by the owners of the plantations and as the amount was paid back to the producers it was only a trading receipt?
Held that:- The amounts from the fund earmarked for the appellants on the basis of the rubber produced by them were paid against the expenditure incurred by them for maintaining the rubber plantation and producing the rubber. If so, it follows that the receipts by the assessees during the accounting year were revenue receipts and, therefore, liable to be included in their assessable income. We therefore hold, though for different reasons, that the High Court has rightly answered the questions against the assessees. The appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs.
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1965 (12) TMI 33 - SC ORDER
Transport Business ... ... ... ... ..... ads "in respect of depreciation of buildings newly erected, or of machinery or plant being new which has been installed, after the 31st day of March, 1948 ..." Adverting to that clause, this court held in the case cited above that replacement of petrol engines in the buses by diesel engines earned the allowance within the meaning of the said clause. While the former provision gives allowance by development rebate, the latter provision gives it by way of depreciation allowance. But the condition that the machinery or plant should be new is common for both. Following the above judgment we dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal has either decided erroneously or failed to decide any question of law?
Held that:- The accounts of those customers or their statements could have afforded a basis for the best judgment assessment. There must also have been other surrounding circumstances, such as those mentioned in the Privy Council's decision cited supra. But in this case there was no material before the assessing authority relevant to the assessment and the impugned assessments were arbitrarily made by applying a ratio between disclosed and concealed turnover in one shop to another shop of the assessee. It was only a capricious surmise unsupported by any relevant material. The High Court, therefore, rightly set aside the orders of the Tribunal.
Nor can we accede to the request of the learned counsel for the State to remand the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. The sales tax authority had every opportunity to base its judgment on relevant material; but it did not do so. The department persisted all through the hierarchy of tribunals to sustain the impugned assessments. The High Court, having regard to the circumstances of the case, refused to give the department another opportunity. We do not think we are justified to take a different view.
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1965 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and having regard to the provisions of section 25 of the Act, the Board could on the 15th October, 1952, direct a fresh assessment to be made ?
Held that:- It is to be held that the notice issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer was not only unauthorised, but was also quashed by the Board. The Collector must, before proceeding to assess, issue under section 15(3) a notice when no return was filed pursuant to the notice under section 15(1), and a notice under section 15(3) cannot issue after expiry of the year of assessment to which the notice relates. he Collector has, therefore, under the direction given by the Board, to issue a fresh notice before a proceeding for assessment may be started, and the earlier notice issued under section 25 cannot be relied upon by the Collector. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the entire depreciation of the assets was taken into consideration in computing the taxable income and, therefore, the entire amount should have been taken into account by the Income-tax Officer in arriving at the written down value of the assets?
Held that:- The mere fact that in the matter of calculation the total amount of depreciation was first deducted from the world income and thereafter the proportion was struck in terms of rule 33 does not amount to an actual allowance of the entire depreciation in ascertaining the taxable income accrued in India. The Income-tax Officer, as we have pointed out earlier, could have adopted a different method by first ascertaining the gross income accrued in India and then deducting from it the allowance under the Act proportionate to the said income. Whatever method was adopted, only a fraction of the total depreciation was actually allowed in ascertaining the taxable income in India.
Assessee's contention that under the method adopted in terms of rule 33 of the Income-tax Rules, 1922, no depreciation was allowed at all in ascertaining the taxable income on India, for that was only taken into consideration in arriving at the total world income is not acceptable as we may say that the learned counsel did not press this point seriously either. As we have indicated earlier, only a fraction of the amount of depreciation was actually allowed in the assessment of the income accrued in India. We do not propose to express any opinion on the question whether, if the other methods suggested in rule 33 of the Rules were adopted, it could be held that no depreciation was actually allowed in making the assessment. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (12) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the profit on the amounts received by the assessee's bankers in British India as price of goods sold by the assessee on railway receipts in the names of the consignees or as price of goods delivered ex-godown Bhilwara was liable to tax under the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The Appellate Tribunal at the instance of the assessee attached a number of documents to the statement of the case, including the six documents mentioned above, but we find no mention of these documents either in the appellate order of the Appellate Tribunal or in the body of the statement of the case. We feel that it is not consistent with the advisory jurisdiction of a High Court under the Act that the Appellate Tribunal should attach to the statement of the case documents, other than the proceedings of the income-tax authorities, which are not mentioned and discussed either in its own appellate order or in the statement of the case. Suppose a dispute arises as to the interpretation of a document which is annexed in the manner above mentioned. If the High Court decides the dispute it would be deciding questions not decided by the Tribunal, and which the High Court would be incompetent to decide, under the Indian Income-tax Act.
In the result we accept the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court of Rajasthan as far as the assessment year 1943-44 is concerned and remand the case to the High Court.
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1965 (12) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
Whether depreciation is allowable on the original cost of the various components of the plant and machinery and other assets of the company as acquired and used prior to July 1, 1953 ?
Held that:- Assessee's argument that on a proper interpretation of section 10(5)(b) of the Act, the depreciation must be deemed to have been allowed to the assessee in the years in which the income of the assessee-company was exempted is not acceptable as the words "actually allowed in paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949, did not include any notional allowance and we must interpret the, words "actually allowed" occurring in section 10(5)(b) of the Act in the same manner.
The Explanation inserted by the 1962 Order has no bearing on the facts of this case. The exemption granted by the Central Government is granted under paragraph 15 of the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, which was itself issued under section 60A of the Act. The result is that the exemption was granted under the Act and not under any agreement. The case of the assessee must be determined with reference to section 10(5)(b) of the Act, unaffected by the amendment made by the 1962 Order. Appeal dismissed.
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