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Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1965 (8) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... income from and out of which the said property could have been purchased; (ii) the 4th defendant was managing the properties of the tavazhi on behalf of the 1st defendant; (iii) he stood in a fiduciary relationship with the members on whose behalf he was managing the properties; (iv) in every relevant transaction the 1st defendant, the karnavati, was made a party; and (v) the 4th defendant has suppressed both the accounts of the tavazhi and his personal accounts and has failed to prove that he had any personal income from and out of which he could have paid Rs. 14,000 odd towards the purchase of the said property. The facts certainly shift the burden of proving title to the property to the 4th defendant and he has failed to discharge the same. From the aforesaid facts we have no hesitation in agreeing with the finding of the High Court that the said property was the property of the tavazhi. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 12. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 106 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person on which the authority purports to act, should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary (vide Rameshwar Shaw's case AIR 1910 SC 124) (supra)). 14. It is abundantly clear that such activities as have been alleged against the petitioner and on which his detention has been based, are rational to public peace, safety and tranquillity; in the absence of disorder of local significance it cannot, therefore, be said that there is no proximate connection between them and "public order" or, in other words, there is no proximate and reasonable nexus between the activities of the petitioner and "public order". The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Mehar Singh, J. 15. I agree. D.K. Mahajan, J. 16. I agree. H.R. Khanna, J. 17. I agree. S.K. Kapoor, J. 18. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 105 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d when it is so settled, the certificate of the Court would operate as a decree which could be executed in the normal way. There is no provision that the execution of such a decree will also be made by the High Court or come within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. In fact, even though the decree was transferred for execution to the Alipore Court, the judgment-debtor did not take this point to the Court below and himself made as objection under Section 47. This point is a belated one and is an attempt to defeat the execution proceedings which are pending in the Alipore Court. For the reasons aforesaid, we think that there is no substance in this point and that the Alipore Court has ample jurisdiction to deal with the execution proceedings. 9. The result is that no ground has been shown in this application for our interference and the application should be dismissed and the Rule discharged. 10. There will be no order as to costs. Syed Sadat Abdul Masud, J. 11. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at there has been no judicial exercise of discretion in this case. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to a decision of Ramachandra Iyer C.J. in Meenakshiammal v. Ratnasami Hilangiriyar, C.R.P. No. 731 of 1960 (Mad) where the order of the Revenue Court granting time for payment of arrears was revised and eviction ordered. But in that case it is observed The Revenue Court never applied its mind to the question whether the defaulting tenant should be granted time for the payment of rent or he should be evicted forthwith. It found that there was a default in the payment of rent and mechanically as it were allowed the tenant to pay up just as it did in the previous year". In the present case the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer cannot be characterised as mechanical while granting time. Reasons have been given by him for granting time. 9. In the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 10. Revision dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ower under S. 111 3 3 . The Central Government reversed the decision appealed from without giving any reasons; nor did the record disclose any apparent ground for the reversal. In this context, Shah, J. made the observations quoted above, and held that there was no proper trial of the appeals and the appellate order should be quashed. Hidayatullah, J. at p. 370 of the Report pointed out that there was DO reason for the reversal and the omission to give reasons led to the only inference that there was none to give. There is a vital difference between the order of reversal by the appellate authority in that case for no reason whatsoever and the order of affirmance by the revising authority in the present case. Having stated that there was no valid ground for interference, the revising authority was not bound to give fuller reasons. It is impossible to say that the impugned order was arbitrary, or that there was no proper trial of the revision application. 22. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 102 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be quashed, the notice also must be quashed along with them. As the respondent No. 3 has no jurisdiction to commence proceedings in exercise of the inherent powers of the Civil Court, the notice dated March 27, 1963, which is the foundation of these proceedings and which clearly specified that it was a proceeding under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code must be held to be bad. 28. Before I conclude I should note that reference was made to several decisions It is not necessary for us to deal with these decisions having regard to our conclusions in this appeal. 29. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial Court dated December 23, 1964. are set aside, and the rule is made absolute. Let a writ of certiorari issue quashing the proceedings in respect of case No. 124 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure including the notice dated March 27, 1963. Each party to pay its own posts throughout. Bose, C.J. 30. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he matter. Therefore as held in parappa Ningappa v. Mallappa Kaliappa AIR1956Bom332 we are not bound by that decision. o p /o p (21) In this case there are no daughters and no disqualified heris. On a partition during the lifetime of Lalji Patil the plaintiff would have been entitled to one - third shares and no succession to a further one - sixth share. Her share, therefore, in the property will be one - half share. o p /o p (22) We therefore, modify the decree the of the courts below the by decreeding to the plaintiff one - half share instead of one -sixth shares. A preliminary decree will accordingly be drawn up and remitted to the trial court for the effecting partition in accordance's with the preliminary decree in two months from the record reaching the trial court. o p /o p (23) As the question involved is some what difficult is seems it would be proper is to order parties to bear their own costs throughout. o p /o p (24) EJ/D.H.Z. o p /o p (25) Order Accordingly.
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1965 (8) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... son or persons, the assessment may be made on his legal representative either solely or jointly with that other person or persons, as the case may be." Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act applies section 24B of the Income-tax Act to assessments against legal representatives. Under the power of modification conferred by section 21, rules have been framed which direct that section 22 in sub-section (3) of section 24B is to be read as section 13 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. We are of opinion that these provisions amply cover the procedure to be followed in the circumstances of this case. But on our view as to the scope and application of subsection (3) of section 24B, it must be held that the assessment orders under the Excess Profits Tax Act are also vitiated because of the same defects in not fully applying the procedure prescribed by that sub-section. The questions referred to us are all answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue with costs.
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1965 (8) TMI 99 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder. No question, even if of law, not arising out of the Tribunal's order can be answered by a High Court under section 66. Harla v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 469 is irrelevant; all that it decides is the effect of the non-publication of a resolution of a Council of Ministers. I may at the same time point out that in the case of Radhey Shiyam A.I.R. 1929 ALL 210 it was pointed out that the Excise Rules are made in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 40 and 41 of the Excise Act and have the force of law. In the result the question should be answered in the negative. A copy of this judgment should be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench 'A', as required by section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax should get his costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee may be assessed at ₹ 200. MANCHANDA J.--I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 98 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a High Court on reference. Of course when the Tribunal receives the High Court's advice on reference in one year it would be bound when the same question arises in a subsequent year but it would be on the ground of stare decision and not of res judicata. 14. For the above reasons as matter of pure law also I would hold that the decision in the earlier reference did not operate as a res judicata As regards its effect as stare decision I think that it stands overruled by the decision in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. 1960 38ITR675(SC) (Supra) 15. 1 answer both the questions in the affirmative. 16. A copy of this judgment should be sent under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the Court to the Tribunal as required under Section 65(5) of the Income Tax Act. 17. The Commissioner of Income Tax should get his costs of this reference which is assessed at ₹ 400/-. Counsel's fee it assessed at ₹ 400/-. S.C. Manchanda, J. 18. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is open to the appellants to raise this contention. It has been fairly conceded by Mr. Dutt that no such plea had been raised in the writ petition filed by the appellants. Besides, it is plain that neither the Union of India, nor the State of West Bengal which are impleaded to the present proceedings make such a claim. It would indeed be surprising that even though the Union of India and the State of West Bengal expressly say that this area belongs to Pakistan under the Radcliffe Award and has to be delivered over to Pakistan, the petitioners should intervene and contend that Pakistan's title to this property has been lost because West Bengal had been adversely in possession of it It is, therefore, unnecessary to examine the point whether a plea of-this kind can be made under International Law and if yes, whether it is sustained by any evidence on the record. 31. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. 32. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 96 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st. In any event, such an application can not be transformed into a suit for title, adjudicating the title of a third party, claiming adversely to the company. The result is that this appeal ought to succeed. The order of the court below is set aside and the application dismissed. The administrator should make over possession to the party from whom he received possession. This order will be without prejudice to any further application being made for, either the winding up of the company, or an order under sec. 397 or 398 of the Companies Act, on proper materials, and in the presence of the proper parties. The appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal and to the costs of the hearing in the court below. Certified for two Counsel. The administrator will retain the costs, charges and expenses, including the costs of the appeal and of the hearing below and the reserved costs from out of the assets in his hands, taxed as between attorney and client. G.K. Mitter, J. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 95 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... business of the sale, wholesale or by auction, of fruits and vegetables to just four shops in Sabzi Mandi of Malerkotla is, to use their Lordships' expression, more than a reasonable restriction on the right of the respondents in this case. 6. The respondent was denied a licence for the sale of fruits and vegetables whether wholesale or retail or by auction within the municipal limits of Malerkotla on the sole ground that he was not one of the four persons who had successfully bid for one of the four shops for that purpose in Sabzi Mandi of Malerkotla. This, the learned Judge rightly considered, was not a valid and a legal ground in view of the ultra vires nature of the impugned bye-laws and the restriction imposed by the same on the right of the respondent to carry on that particular business, which restriction has been found to be far from reasonable. 7. In this view, the appeal of the appellant Municipality fails and is dismissed with costs. D. Falshaw, C. J. I agree.
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1965 (8) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ndment should be ordered or not, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. The case of the plaintiff for amendment in the present case stands on a stronger footing because there is no question of limitation involved and we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in permitting the amendment to be made and remanding the suit to the trial Court for a fresh hearing in accordance with law. 5. It should be added that Mr. Purshotam Trikumdas submitted that he is not challenging the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench in Apaji's case, ILR (1892) Bom 29 though before the High Court the correctness of that decision was questioned. We should like to make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion with regard to the correctness of that decision or its applicability to this case. 6. For the reasons already expressed we hold there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1965 (8) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rati as the owner of one-third share are wrong and that the decree of the trial Court is right. The question of limitation may be briefly disposed of. There is no good evidence on record to establish that the respondent, prior to 1950, asserted that she had any right adverse to the plaintiffs over the property in suit or that she acted any manner which would amount to an ouster of the plaintiffs. Admittedly the dispute between the parties arose sometime in 1944. Prior to that there could. be no reason for her acting adversely to the interests of the plaintiffs. It was really in about 1950 that she leased certain properties and transferred certain plots and soon after the plaintiffs instituted the suit. The suit is clearly not barred by limitation. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and restore the decree of the trial Court. We further direct the respondent to pay the costs of the appellants in the High Court and this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (8) TMI 92 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on (1), completely accords with this legislative intent. Some reference was made to section 14(2)(aa) in the course of the arguments but that section does not throw any light on the construction of section 15C, sub-section (1). That section was necessitated because of the amendment of section 23(5)(a) and was introduced in order to give partial relief to the partners of a registered firm which became necessary by reason of the registered firm being directly made liable to pay tax under section 23(5)(a)(i) and it has nothing to do with section 15C, sub- section (1). We are, therefore, of the view that the assessee in the present case was entitled to exemption from tax in respect of ₹ 81,855 being the amount of exempted profits under section 15C in the determination of the tax payable by the assessee under section 23(5)(a)(i). Our answer to the question referred to us is accordingly in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1965 (8) TMI 91 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ered by the owner of the plot in procuring the required finance to enable the assessee to complete on the said plot of land a modern cinema theatre could not be said to be connected with the acquisition of the depreciable assets. No reason has been offered for this conclusion. But even from this conclusion it does not follow that interest paid on money borrowed for the purpose of construction is not in any way connected with acquisition of depreciable assets. Therefore, the case is of no assistance to the revenue. We, therefore, agree with the Tribunal that the interest paid on the debentures issued forms part of the actual cost incurred by the assessee in acquiring the capital asset and that such interest must be taken into consideration for the purpose of depreciation and development rebate. The question, therefore, must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and the assessee will get their costs from the revenue. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1965 (8) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... call the words of this Court which were put in the forefront by Mr. Chari that it is not permissible for the prosecution to drop a serious charge and select one which does not require the procedure under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the offence was under s. 196, Indian Penal Code, a complaint in writing by the court concerned was required. Before a complaint is made the court has to consider whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to order a prosecution. In the lesser offence no such complaint by the court is necessary and it is obvious that the lesser offence was L7Sup.165-4 chosen to bypass the Sessions Judge who had earlier decided that Dr. Dutt should not be prosecuted for perjury. Such a device is not to be commended. In our opinion, the offence in the present case did not fall within ss. 465/471, I.P.C. and the prosecution launched against Dr. Dutt cannot be allowed to go on. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Appeal allowed,.
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1965 (8) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ess provision. There is a simple answer to this contention. The answer is that once it is held that no party has a vested right to have his appeal to be heard by more than one judge of the High Court, no right to prefer an appeal under Art. 133 can be said to vest in him, the right under which being unavailable in case heard And disposed of by a single judge of the High Court. The argument of learned counsel thus fails. One more point was sought to be urged by learned counsel for the appellant. The point is based upon the fact that one of the contesting respondents had raised a question as the maintainability of the suit. According to learned counsel that person being in pari delicto with the plaintiff, ought not to have been permitted to raise that question. Since the point was not raised by the appellant in either of the two courts below we declined to permit it to be raised for the first time before us. For these reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (8) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... me when the objection is taken in the appellate or revisional Court. The 'point is clearly brought out in the judgment of Venkatarama Aiyar, J. in Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others(1955 1 S.C.R. 117,122.) thus .lm15 "The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in a failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits." The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court set aside, and the orders of the trial Court and the District Court are restored. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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