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Showing 1 to 20 of 61 Records
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1967 (11) TMI 118 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ection can never be attracted in the present case. Section 5 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code which provides that offences under other laws shall be investigated under the Code, is subject to the qualification "subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offence". In our view, the Act of 1962 is such an enactment which has provided its own procedure for investigating into offences committed under it and the provisions of Chapter 14, Cr. P.C., therefore, would not apply to such investigations. Apart from this, the offences under the Act of 1962 are non-cognizable. In any event, Section 162, Cr. P. C. would not apply to such cases as Customs officers are not Police officers. 26. In the result, the rule is discharged in all the applications and the interim stay granted by this Court is vacated. Writ to be sent to the trial Court immediately. 27. Rule discharged.
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1967 (11) TMI 117 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the finding of the lower appellate Courts was to the effect that the execution of the promissory note was not proved. That finding is a finding on a pure question of fact which is not open to discussion in second appeal. 4. Further, that finding of the lower appellate Court stands reinforced by a very important feature which it observed of the signature appearing on the receipt stamp in Ex. P-1. What was noticed by it was that one part of the Kannada letter 'Ya' was missing on Ex. P-1 and that part is the segment or the are which is at the end of the Kannada letter 'Ya'. The missing segment, according to the lower appellate Court established the removal of the receipt stamp which contained the defendant's signature from Ex. P-3 and its transplantation on Ex. P-1. 5. This finding of the lower appellate Court which is a finding on a pure question of fact cannot be called in question in Second Appeal. So, I dismiss this appeal with costs. 6. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 116 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as to do under such circumstances is to move the court or the authority, as the case may be, for handing over possession of the said property to the officer. And if the court or authority does not require to have possession of the property for any lawful purpose it is its duty to hand over the property to the officer, for being dealt with according to law. In the instant case, the currency notes were seized by the police, as they appeared to be involved in the commission of offences under the Act; and the police handed over the matter to the Enforcement Directorate, as the case was not cognisable by the police; and as it had to be investigated by the respondent. These notes were not, therefore, required for any purpose in the court, but the respondent was entitled to have them for the investigation. In these circumstances, the order passed by the First Class Magistrate handing over the currency notes to the respondent is correct. We, therefore, dismiss this revision petition.
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1967 (11) TMI 115 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ual relationships between the parties. We would, therefore, prefer to follow the two above said decisions and with respect find ourselves unable to accept the proposition laid down in the Madras case. 35. We are clear in our view that Article 85 applies to the account in question as it is mutual, open and current. 36. Article 85 of the Limitation Act having been held applicable, the limitation would be three years to be reckoned from the close of the year in which the last item admitted or proved is entered in the account. Such year of course has to be computed as in the account. It is already held that the last entry under Exhibit P-2 appears on 9-9-1947. There is no dispute that the Bank Accounts run from 1st January to 31st December each year. Reckoned from that point of view, the suit would obviously be within time. 37. For the reasons we have attempted to give, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal is consequently dismissed with costs. 38. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... I L R (1890) 15 Bom. 238 it was observed by Sargent C J., as follows The Indian Legislature has, however, provided for the summary removal of any one who dispossesses another, whether peaceably or otherwise than by due course of law; but subject to such provision there is no reason for holding that the rightful owner so dispossessing the other is a trespasser, and may not rely for the support of his possession on the title vested in him, as he clearly may do by English law. This would also appear to be the view taken by West J., in Lillu v. Annaji (supra). 15. In. our opinion, the law on this point has been correctly stated by the Privy Council, by Chagla C.J., and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the cases cited above. 16. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the High Court erred in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs, judgment of the High Court set aside and the order of the Board of Revenue restored.
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1967 (11) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of which we say nothing, does not concern us here, because the words used in s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act are different." We may mention that Hidayatullah, J., observed at p. 764 in Ballavdas Agarwala's case 1960 2 S.C R. 739 "An officer of the municipality must himself perform hi-, duties created by statute or bye-law. He cannot delegate them to others, unless expressly authorised in this behalf. The Act does not so empower the officers to delegate their functions in their turn, and thus an officer to whom the power is delegated by the Chairman must perform them himself." We agree with the above observations of Hidayatullah, J. On this point there does not seem to have been any difference of opinion between him and the majority; he differed only on the question whether on the facts in that case there was in fact a delegation or not. For the aforesaid reasons we dismiss the appeal and maintain the order passed by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
Where there is a bargain for a certain quantity extra greater quantity, and there is h power of selection in the vendor to deliver which he thinks fit, then the right to them does not pass to the vendee until the vendor has made his selection, and trover is not maintain able before that is done
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1967 (11) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to which they were transferred. The learned Attorney-General told 'us that the government has no objection to those officers continuing in those posts for the present. We are sure if any change is required the same will be effected by mutual understanding between the High Court and the government. In the result these appeals are partly allowed and the order of the High Court holding that Shri B.K. Patro, Shri K.K. Bose and Shri P.C. Dey had no authority to hold the posts they were holding on or after October 10, 1966 is set aside. Though we hold that the orders of the High Court posting Shri B.K. Panda as law secretary, Shri T. Misra as superintendent and legal remembrancer and Shri P.K. Mohanti as deputy law secretary were excess of its powers, we do not set aside the mandamus issued by it for the reasons mentioned earlier. In other respects the judgment appealed against is upheld. The parties will bear their own costs in these appeals. R.K.P.S. Appeals allowed in part.
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1967 (11) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ings Bench Division in The King v. Grubb( 1915 2 K. B. 683.) relied on by Mr. Dhebar learned counsel for the appellant does not bear on the question under consideration. Therein, the factum of entrustment was not in dispute. The only question of law that arose for decision in that case was whether when a property is entrusted to a company, and the person directing and controlling the company, by whose instructions the property had passed into the possession of the company, had converted the same fraudulently, that person can be said to have committed an offence under s. 1 of the Larceny Act 1901. The court answered that question in the affirmative. ln view of our conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the entrustment pleaded, it is unnecessary to consider whether on the material on record it can be concluded that the respondent had misappropriated 40 bags of cement referred to earlier. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iscarding cards. We cannot, therefore, say that the game of Rummy is a game of entire chance. It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill. The chance in Rummy is of the same character as the chance in a deal at a game of bridge. In fact in all games in which cards are shuffled and dealt out, there is an element of chance, because the distribution of the I cards is not according to any set pattern but is dependent upon how the cards find their place in the shuffled pack. From this alone it cannot be said that Rummy is a game of chance and there is, no skill involved in it. Of course, if there is evidence of gambling in some other way or that the owner of the house or the club is making a profit or gain from the game of Rummy or any other game played for stakes, the offence may be brought home. In this case, these elements are missing and therefore we think that the High Court was right in accepting the reference it did. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
Whether order passed by the Textile Commissioner and confirmed by the Central Government imposing cut in the import entitlement by the respondents should be set aside and quashed?
Held that:- Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to, carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise, solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances. in which the obligation has arisen. We agree with the High Court that the impugned order passed by the Textile Commissioner and confirmed by the Central Government imposing cut in the import entitlement by the respondents should be set aside and quashed and that the Textile Commissioner and the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports be directed to issue to the respondents import certificates for the total amount equal to 100% of the f.o.b. value of the goods exported by them, unless there is some decision which fails within cl. 10 of the Scheme in question.
It is common ground that the report of the Committee was not made available to them and the Textile Commissioner, before he passed the orders, did not call for their explanations. It must therefore be held that enquiry in a manner consonant with the rules of justice was not made in the case of those four exporters also. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
Whether preparation of provisional gradation lists by the State of Madhya Pradesh under the relevant provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was unwarranted in law and the final list published on April 6, 1962 prepared by the State Government under instructions from the Central Government with regard to the integration of officers of the Engineering Department was illegal and ultra vires and must be quashed by the grant of a writ?
Held that:- Appeal allowed in part. In view of the special circumstances of the present case we think that the respondents were entitled to an opportunity to make a representation with regard to the two points urged by Mr. Asoke Sen before the final gradation list was published. As no such opportunity was furnished to the respondents with regard to these two matters we hold that the combined final’ gradation list dated April 6, 1962, so far as category 6 is concerned, is ultra vires and illegal and that part of the notification alone must be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari. The rest of the notification of the State Government dated April 6, 1962 with regard to other categories will stand unaffected. So far as category No. 6 is concerned, the Central Government is directed to give an opportunity to the respondents to make a representation in regard to the two points mentioned in this paragraph and thereafter take steps to finalise and publish the list in accordance with law.
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1967 (11) TMI 106 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e. Section 41(1) empowers the officer concerned to require a dealer to produce before him the accounts, documents etc. Under clause (3) of the same section, if any officer empowered has reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of any tax, he may seize the documents, accounts etc. of the dealer. As already noted, section 57(1) of the Act applies only to the documents produced under section 41(1) and not to the documents seized under section 41(3). The documents mentioned in item (3) of the application are the documents said to have been seized by the officers. I am, therefore, of the view that section 57(1) will not apply to these documents. The learned counsel further contended that they are privileged documents under section 124 of the Evidence Act. It is not open to the petitioners who are private parties to claim privilege. The privilege can be claimed only by the public servant concerned. The revision petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... because the publication of a draft rule is not equivalent to the notice expressing any intention to levy a rate. In our opinion, therefore, rule 17 is not invalid for want of proper publication. Learned counsel for the assessee then suggested that the assessing authority having formed the opinion that the transactions subjected to tax amounted to works contracts, it was not open to him in exercise of the revisional power to reopen the assessment and bring to tax the escaped turnover by a change of his opinion. But rule 17 which applies clearly says that the power thereunder can be exercised if for any reason the whole or any part of a turnover has escaped assessment. The expression for any reason covers a wide area and certainly includes a change of opinion. The petitioner, in the result, succeeds only in respect of the enhancement of the rate by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner s order dated 18th October, 1963, but fails in other respects. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1967 (11) TMI 104 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ons for not resorting to appeal in this case are weighty. Against the face of the instructions, presenting of appeals was futile, but in the case before the Supreme Court, the assessee did not file appeal because he was required to deposit the sales tax first. The considerations in the two cases are not in pari materia. In my view, the second preliminary objection also fails. As already stated, the merits of the petition are not being assailed on behalf of the State. In view of what has been stated above, the writ petition is allowed. Consequently, I quash the orders passed by the Excise and Taxation Officer, Patiaia, respondent No. 3, dated 9th October, 1958, (annexure B), dated 11th February, 1960 (annexure C), dated 4th October, 1962 (annexure D) and dated 25th June, 1964 (annexure E). The sales tax realised for these years were in contravention of law and I direct that they be refunded to the petitioners. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs. Petition allowed.
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1967 (11) TMI 103 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sions were unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner carrying on his business. We are not convinced that the maintenance of registers of the transactions by the miller-petitioner imposes any restrictions on his carrying on the business. We are inclined to the view that that would only set his business on regular lines. We are not therefore persuaded that these provisions are violative of the right of the petitioner to carry on business or to hold property. Even otherwise, we would say that these are reasonable restrictions having regard to the view taken by the Supreme Court that the provisions as to search and seizure are reasonable restrictions. Vide Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver(1) and confiscation is a reasonable restriction as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Papanna v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Guntakal(2). The petition therefore fails and is dismissed with costs, Government Pleader s fee of Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1967 (11) TMI 102 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the meaning of section 2(c) of the 1947 Act and section 2(d) of the 1958 Act in respect of its activity of generation, distribution, sale and supply of electrical energy. The second question is answered by saying that the turnover representing the sale of coal-ash is liable to sales tax. The answer to the third and fourth questions is that the assessee-Board is not liable to be taxed on the turnover representing the supply of steam to the Nepa Mills and on the turnover of the sales of specification and tender forms. In view of our answer to the first question, the fifth question must be answered by saying that the assessee-Board cannot be made liable for purchase tax. 14.. As the first and the main question was referred at the instance of both the assessee and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, and the other questions were referred at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of these references. References answered accordingly.
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1967 (11) TMI 101 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on 3-D of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the other questions mentioned above having been raised, the writ petitions were admitted. The orders have the effect of imposing financial liabilities. The petitioners have a fundamental right to carry on business without any illegal restrictions or impediments. Inasmuch as the assessment orders have, on the face of these orders, been made upon a complete misconception of the law and a large number of cases are affected, we have decided to interfere notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. Consequently, we allow these writ petitions and quash the order of the Sales Tax Officer in each case. The result is that the assessment proceedings will now be deemed to be pending in each case before the Sales Tax Officer who will go into the evidence from a legally correct angle and pass fresh assessment orders containing the necessary findings. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1967 (11) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
Best judgment assessments under sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of section 11 of Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 challenged - Held that:- Appeal allowed. There is considerable force in the second point urged on behalf of the respondent, viz., that the assessment of the respondent was made by the assessing authority without giving him an adequate opportunity of being heard. The first notice of 8th March, 1961, was held by the assessing authority himself not to have been properly served, and the second notice of 23rd March, 1961, was also obviously not properly served. The service which was accepted by the assessing authority was affixation at a shop which used to be visited by the respondent. The shop was not his own and his place of residence was known. No attempt was made to serve the notice on him at his residence. In these circumstances, the proceedings taken ex parte against the respondent were not justified.
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1967 (11) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Sales Tax Authority is not competent to issue a notice under sub- section (2) of section 8 after expiry of three years prescribed by section 10?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The notice under section 11(2) is only a step in the proceeding for assessment and does not disturb the continuity of the proceeding. Therefore, when the Sales Tax Officer issued a notice against the respondent under section 8(2) of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950, a fresh proceeding to assess turnover which has escaped assessment was not commenced, and section 10 of the Act was not attracted thereto.
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