|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 111 Records
-
1968 (8) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
Proceedings for assessment to sales tax initiated by the respondent for the year 1955-56 quashed - Held that:- Appeal allowed. As in the present case the proceedings for assessment to sales tax taken against the respondent for the year 1955-56 by the assessing authorities are legally valid and the respondent has made out no case for grant of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing those proceedings or for quashing the notice issued on March 16, 1963, or the order of the appellant dated July 18, 1963. Thus the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated March 31, 1964, should be set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent, i.e., Miscellaneous Petition No. 37 of 1963 should be dismissed. This appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.
-
1968 (8) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the turnover of inter-State sales of rubber is taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The only facts found are that the assessee was a public limited company which was engaged in the business of planting and growing rubber trees and converting the latex obtained from the trees into rubber sheets and regularly selling the rubber sheets thus produced by it. It was argued for the appellant that the company was registered as a "dealer" as defined under section 2(b) of the Act. But this fact in itself is not decisive on the question as to whether the turnover of inter-State sales of rubber is taxable under the Act.
-
1968 (8) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the disputed sales of manganese amounting to Rs. 2,77,976.45 were sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce or were intrastate sales?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The movement of manganese ore from the State of Madhya Pradesh to Vishakhapatnam outside the State was a direct result of the covenant of these contracts. It follows that these two sales also were inter-State sales under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and were not liable to be taxed under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act.
-
1968 (8) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the second press note issued by the Orissa Government on November 2, 1955, must be deemed to be an order of the State Government exempting non-resident dealers from liability to tax on inter-State trans- actions for the period from April 1, 1951, to September 6, 1955?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The argument put forward on behalf of the appellant is not warranted. In the first place, it is obvious that after the decision of this court in the Bengal Immunity case [1955 (9) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] the Orissa Government could not have lawfully levied any sales tax on the "explanation sales" and, therefore, the issue of the press note dated November 2, 1955, suspending the levy of sales tax on such sales with effect from that date could not be reasonably construed as an order of exemption contemplated by section 7 of the Act since no such exemption was necessary in view of the law declared by this court in the Bengal Immunity case. The second press note must therefore be treated to be merely an administrative direction and it was not intended to be an order of exemption made under the provisions of section 7 of the Act.
-
1968 (8) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
Whether 'dhoop' or 'dhoop-batti' does not come under the category of 'perfume' and is not liable to tax under item No. 37 of the Notification No. 905/X dated March 31, 1956, under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The question referred to the High Court must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has taken the view that agarbattis fall within the dictionary meaning of "perfume" as it was a kind of incense which gave out agreeable odour when burned and therefore fell within item No. 37 of the Government notification. This decision supports the opinion that we have expressed that dhoop and dhoop-battis fall within the category of "perfume" and are liable to tax under item No. 37 of the Government notification.
-
1968 (8) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
Liability of the appellant to payment of additional sales tax under section 3(2) of the General Sales Tax Act as amended in 1951 in respect of sales of tobacco made by the appellant in the erstwhile State or Travancore-Cochin out of purchases from dealers outside that State for the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The appellant has failed to show that the non-resident dealers or sellers from whom he had purchased tobacco could fall within the meaning of the following critical words of rule 6: "by the person who in the State is the first dealer in such goods". No contention has been raised before us by the counsel for the appellant that rule 6 was not applicable. It has therefore only to be seen as to who would be a person who in the State would be the first dealer in such goods. It appears to us that the person to be the first dealer has to be in the State and not outside the State.
-
1968 (8) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
As we are bound to follow the majority judgment we find no escape from the conclusion, after applying the ratio therein, that the general sales tax law of the State which would include the rules framed thereunder governed the levy and assessment of the tax in the matter of inter-State sales - Appeal dismissed.
-
1968 (8) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the circumstances and on the facts of the case, the assessee came within the meaning of the term 'dealer' under section 2(c) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Under the contract under which the parcel vans were to be supplied to the Union Government, the respondents supplied 64 more vans in the year 1953-54 and received an amount of Rs. 6,88,000. For the reasons given by us in disposing of the case in respect of the turnover for the year 1952-53, this appeal must also fail and is dismissed with costs.
-
1968 (8) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
Section 22 of the General Clauses Act (corresponding to section 37 of the English Act) is a section dealing not merely with construction but with interpretation and it follows that the provisions of that section are applicable for the interpretation of the Act in view of the requirement of section 29 thereof
-
1968 (8) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the preparation of medicines on prescriptions of the applicant amounted to a manufacture of 'medicines and pharmaceutical preparations' within the meaning of Notification No. ST-3504/X dated 10th May, 1956, and whether the applicant was assessable to tax on the turnover of the medicines so dispensed?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Acceptance of the contention by the revenue would imply that a medical practitioner supplying to his patients medicines and pharmaceutical preparations separately is not liable to tax: when under his direction they are mixed by his employees for the special use of a patient under his treatment and to achieve a specific purpose, the turnover from the resultant mixture is taxable. In the absence of clearer phraseology, the Court would not in a taxing provision be willing to give that interpretation.
-
1968 (8) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
Applicability of Article 286 of the Constitution of India read with Article 264 before the amendments made by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, to the erstwhile State of Vindhya Pradesh during the relevant assessment period for the purpose of imposition of sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Whatever way the matter is looked at, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the context of Article 286 required that the word "State" as used therein should include Part C States.
-
1968 (8) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the supply of coal by the petitioner to the State amounted to a sale?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. A writ of mandamus will issue directing the State of Rajasthan not to realize sales tax except with regard to the transactions of sale between the period April 1, 1955, and September 6, 1955, both days inclusive. The Sales Tax Officer who is also one of the appellants in this case will make appropriate modifications in the order of assessment in the light of the judgment of this Court.
-
1968 (8) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent-company was liable to pay sales tax on an amount of Rs. 4,20,000 being the sale price of two arc furnaces which had been purchased in 1952 and sold in 1958?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the sale proceeds of the furnaces could not be included in the turnover of the assessee for the purpose of determining the liability of the assessee to sales tax.
-
1968 (8) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Payments of certain debts out of assets subject to floating charge in priority to claims under the charge, Directors - Power of, Winding up – Exercise and control of liquidator’s powers
-
1968 (8) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of TO, Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served
-
1968 (8) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Custody of company’s property, Winding up - Power to apply to court to have questions determined or powers exercised and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc.
-
1968 (8) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... in any sense. But in view of the provision in section 537 of the present Companies Act, 1956, the decree cannot he executed as against the effects or properties of the company in liquidation, without the leave of the court, which of course, means the winding-up court. Such a case is, therefore, covered by the comment of Solomon Judah on the Act and quoted with approval by the Lahore High Court in Nazir Ahmad v. Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. 1943 13 Comp. Cas. 1 AIR 1942 Lah. 289 (FB) to the effect that if a suit is continued without leave obtained under the said section, the decree is not binding on the liquidator. Hence the decree under execution in the instant case is not binding on the liquidator and hence proceedings in execution cannot continue. The matter has, therefore, to be taken to the winding up court for further order. Any observation made by the executing court regarding the nature of the decree or its executability must be ruled out as being of no effect.
-
1968 (8) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Recovery of sums due to Government ... ... ... ... ..... ds belonging to such person. That has not however been put as a condition precedent. The certificate can, in my opinion be issued even without first trying to deduct or attach and sell the excisable goods. In this case, there are no sums in the hands of the officer concerned which could have been deducted. It is not clear whether there are any excisable goods belonging to the petitioner which would have been attached and sold. Assuming that they are there, even then, as stated by me earlier, it was not incumbent upon the officer to follow that procedure as a condition precedent before he could have issued the certificate. The section is plain and does not warrant any such interpretation. 5.Since no other contention was raised, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. MEMO OF COSTS Respondents Costs Rs. Ps Stamp for vakalatnama. . . . Nil Advocate s fee as fixed by the Court . . . 100.00 to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent 100.00
-
1968 (8) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
Whether computation of bonus in respect of the accounting year ending 31st March, 1965, payable to the employees is in accordance with the Payment of Bonus Ordinance ?
If not, what should be the quantum of bonus for the employees ?
Held that:- The error which the Tribunal fell into was in mixing up the development rebate reserve to which the company had to appropriate ₹ 7 lakhs in P. & L. account and the development rebate of ₹ 8.87 lakhs allowable to it under section 6 of the Act. Mr. Chari for the unions fairly conceded that he could not challenge this position. There was, therefore, no justification for the Tribunal to allow ₹ 7 lakhs only instead of ₹ 8.87 lakhs as development rebate.
An estimated liability under gratuity schemes such as the ones before us, even if it amounts to a contingent liability and is not a, debt under the Wealth-tax Act, if properly ascertainable and its present value is fairly discounted is deductible from the gross receipts while preparing the P. & L. account. It is recognised in trading circles and we find no rule or direcion in the Bonus Act which prohibits such a practice.
If Parliament intended to make a departure from the rule laid down by courts and tribunals that the bonus amount should be calculated after provision for tax was made and not before, we would have expected an express provision to that effect either in the Act or in the Schedules. In our view the contention urged by the company that the tax liability is to be worked out by first working out the gross profits and deducting therefrom the prior charges under section 6 but not the bonus payable to the employees is right.
In the result, the appellant company succeeds on the questions of development rebate and the provision for gratuity amount. Its appeal on those question is, therefore, allowed and to that extent the award is set aside. As regards the question of depreciation amount, the Tribunal will ascertain the amount afresh after giving the parties opportunity to lead such evidence as they desire and taking that amount and the amounts of development
-
1968 (8) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the expression " information " in the context of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, must mean instruction or knowledge derived from extraneous sources concerning facts or particulars or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment?
Held that:- When the expression " information " is understood in the sense of instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment, it is difficult to see how determination of valuation for the purpose of assessment of estate duty would not squarely fall within the meaning of the expression " information " in the context in which it occurs in section 59 of the Act. It has not been disputed, and can indeed not be disputed, that the provisions of section 59 are in pari materia with section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The opinion expressed by the Board of Revenue, in the present case, as to valuation, was clearly " information " in the sense in which that expres. sion has been held to have been used in these enactments. The view of the High Court on this point cannot be sustained for the aforesaid reasons.
The Division Bench did not decide the first point which related to the applicability of section 59 to assessments completed before the amendment Act came into force. This matter will have to go back for decision of that question. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside.
|
