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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 89 Records
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1968 (9) TMI 125 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... their relations without interest and if so what was the provision made for the recovery of the loans. Mr. Saha would file such an affidavit within a week from date and the application would come up for final orders on the 9th September, 1968. 21. As per my directions in the aforesaid order, Mr. Girindra Mohan Saha, the senior partner of Messrs. Ray & Ray, Chartered Accountants and the Auditors of Hotels (1938) Private Ltd., and the East India Hotels has filed a further affidavit and on a perusal of the same I am satisfied that Mr. Saha had taken into consideration all the factors that the learned Counsel for the Central Government pointed out and which have been noted in my aforesaid order and that the exchange ratio as suggested by the said Auditors is reasonable and should be accepted. Therefore, there will be an order in terms of prayers (a) to (j) of the petition. The petitioner would pay the costs of the Central Government such costs being assessed at ₹ 1,200.
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1968 (9) TMI 124 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... esides at the point of time when the determination has to be made, irrespective of the period of default. We were intimated by both sides that the notification by which there was delegation, has since been rescinded and that the power which was so delegated has been recalled by the State Government. So, it is clear that although it was possible for Government notwithstanding the delegation to exercise power which it had so delegated, that power exclusively vests in Government after the delegated power was recalled. That being so and with respect to the defaults with which we are concerned in these writ petitions, the power created by the Section 14-B to decide whether any damages should be recovered and to decide their quantum now resides in Government which is the repository of that power. We make this elucidation so that there should be no further controversy in respect of this question. 18. In the circumstances we make no direction in regard to costs. 19. Petition allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 123 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... hich the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, "but within three months of the date". In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at page 1964 it is stated that 'of' is sometimes the equivalent of after, e.g., the word "21 days of the execution' means '21 days after the execution'. 8. We therefore, find that the term 'within three months of the date' in Section 106 of the Factories Act means 'within three calendar months after the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector". This interpretation based on common law as well as on the provisions of the Limitation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act results in the exclusion of the day of the knowledge, i.e., the date of inspection and the "three months" being calculated as three calendar months. In this view all the prosecutions are within time. 9. These revisions are therefore, dismissed. 10. Revisions dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 122 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... force in view of the observation of their Lordships in the Supreme Court authority just cited namely AIR 1961 SC 1480. The toll is charged for use of the road in the State and this Tolls Act has no extra territorial application. Now the same reasoning disposes of the other argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner pertaining to the charging of Re. 1/- for every maund of load carried by the vehicle. Heavier the load, greater will be the stress and strain caused to the road. Therefore the toll is less when the laden weight of a vehicle is comparatively smaller, it increases with the load carried by any vehicle. Lesser the laden weight, of the vehicle, lesser the tax, greater the laden weight, more the tax. This levy has no bearing on inter-State trade and commerce and is not violative of Article 301 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, no consent of the President was necessary. 18. The result is that there is no merit in this writ petition, which is dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... .M. and A.T.M. will be modified in the following respects In clause 1 (a) for the expression "one fourth month's wages", the expression "15 days' wages" will be substituted; In clause 1 (b) for the expression "one third month's wages", the expression "21 days' wages" will be substituted; In the proviso for the expression "12 months' wages", the expression "20 months' wages" will be substituted; In clause 2 for the words "15 years' service", the expression "10 years' service" will be substituted; In clause 3 in the proviso for the expression "12 months' wages", the expression "20 months' wages" will be substituted and it will be followed by the Explanation of "misconduct" as in Annexure 'A'. In clause 4 the words "plus the dearness allowance" will be omitted. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals.
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1968 (9) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s agreed upon had not been taken and that he had not been fully supplied with water and asking for an action of the damages to be taken. The lessor moved to have the action stayed. It was held that the disputed matters arose partly under the agreement and were outside the arbitration clause in the lease and that even if all the matters for which damages were claimed could be brought within the arbitration clause it would not be proper to refer them to an arbitration who would not have the authority to construe the agreement to determine its effect upon the lease. It is manifest that the decision has no bearing upon the question presented for determination in the present case. 10. For the reasons already expressed, we hold that the claim of the respondent firm was within the scope of the arbitration clause and the application made by the appellant in Suit No. 128 of 1963 was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1968 (9) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or future any right, title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property. If it does, it is compulsorily registerable. In the aforementioned Full Bench decisions sufficient attention has not been given to s. 17 of the Registration Act. The focus was entirely on the provisions of the Arbitration Act and there again on the enforcement of the award and not in the making of the award. A document may validly create rights but those rights may not be enforceable for various reasons. Section 17 does not concern itself with the enforcement of rights. That Section is attracted as soon as its requirements are satisfied. There is no gainsaying the fact that the award with which we are concerned in this case, at any rate, purported to create rights in immovable property of the value of rupees more than one hundred. Hence it is compulsorily registerable. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was decided under r. 117. The two sums were considered separately. The contention was that under section 123 (7) and r. 117 the candidate was nominated only on November 16, 1951 and the first sum was paid on September 12, 1951. The question then arose when the candidate became a candidate for the application of the Rule and section 123(7). It was held that the candidate became a candidate when he unequivocally expressed his intention by making the payment. The question of commencement of the candidature is now obviated by prescribing the two terminii between which the expense is to be counted. In so far as the case goes it supports our view. It is risky to quote the decision because the terms of the law on which it was declared were entirely different. We can only say that there is nothing in it which militates against the view taken by us here. On the whole, therefore, the judgment under appeal is correct. The appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arose whether the Deputy Commissioner for the purposes of an election petition under the Punjab Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads. Act 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder was a persona designate and it was held that it was the Deputy Commissioner alone who could perform the functions which the statute and the rules conferred on him even though the Governor had made an order declaring the ex-cadre posts of Additional Deputy Commissioners to be equivalent in status to the cadre posts of Deputy Commissioners. This decision may be open to some criticism owing to the observations made in Central Talkies' case ( 1961 3 S.C,R. 495). However, in the present case we are not basing .our decision by taking into consideration the line of argument of persona designata. For the reasons which have already been stated the appeal is allowed with costs, with the result that the writ petition filed in the High Court succeeds and the impugned order shall stand quashed. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 7 had it been supplied to her by the copying department. We are inclined to accept the statement that she was under the bona fide impression that the certified copy was not ready, and that is why it was not supplied to her by the copying department. It is not a case where it is possible to impute to the appellant want of bona fides or such inaction or negligence as would deprive her of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We are therefore inclined to allow her application under Section 5 and to condone the delay in re-filing the appeal with a certified copy of the order. 11. In the result, we allow the appeal. The application filed by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and the order of the High Court dismissing Execution First Appeal No. 86 of 1967 is set aside. The appeal is remanded to the High Court so that it may deal with and dispose of the appeal on the merits. There will be no order as to the costs of the appeal in this Court.
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1968 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Standing orders submitted for certification conformed to the Model Standing orders or not?
Held that:- Items 5 and 6 are both modifications in Standing Order 11 (vii). In each of these cases, the order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner now impugned shows that he did not rely on any fresh facts, material or circumstances which were not available at the earlier stage when the Standing Orders were first certified or first modified. In effect, therefore, the present order amounts to passing orders, different from earlier orders passed by the Appellate Authority, on a reconsideration of the same material which was available to both the Authorities. In fact, the modification at item No. 1 in Standing Order 9(a) had been specifically disallowed in appeal by the Chief Labour Commissioner in his order dated 12th February, 1963, when he first heard the appeal under s. 6 and confirmed the certification of the original Standing Orders. Thus, in respect of item No. 1, what the present Chief Labour Commissioner has done is to permit the modification because he considered it reasonable and fair, even though, on the same material, his predecessor had disallowed this very modification on the basis that, in his opinion, the original. draft Standing Order was fair and reasonable. On the principle enunciated above, it is clear that the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner, allowing all these four modifications, which is not based on any fresh facts, material or circumstances, is liable to be set aside. As a result, I would partly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), permitting modifications mentioned by him in his Order at item Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 relating to Standing Orders 9(a), 12(A) and Il(vii)
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1968 (9) TMI 114 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the purview of Article 301 and sales tax not being a law which directly impinges upon the movement of goods from place to place, falls outside the purview of Article 301 of the Constitution see Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 232. (2) A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1406.and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan(2). Even otherwise, we are not satisfied that the mere imposition of additional tax under section 5-A imposes any restriction on the freedom of trade or commerce. In this view, the challenge to the provisions of section 5-A that it constitutes a fetter on the freedom of trade and commerce and is violative of the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution, cannot be sustained. For the reasons which we have given above, all the contentions raised by the learned counsel having failed, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 50 in each writ petition. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Court Martial had jurisdiction to try and convict the petitioner of the offences under ss. 304 and 149, Indian Penal Code?
Held that:- There is no express obligation imposed in the present case either by s. 164 or by s. 165 of the Indian Army Act on the confirming authority or on the Central Government to give reasons for its decision. We have also not been shown any other section of the Army. Act or any other statutory rule from which the necessary implication can be drawn that such a duty is cast upon the Central Government or upon the confirming authority. We, therefore, reject the argument of the petitioner that the order of the Chief of the Army Staff, dated May 26, 1967 confirming the finding of the Court Martial under s. 164 of the Army Act or the order of the Central Government dismissing the appeal under s. 165 of the Army Act are in any way defective in law. For the reasons expressed we hold that the petitioner has made out no case for the grant of a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The application accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
Whether case fell within the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 and the appellant was entitled to ,exemption from payment of excise duty on the cotton fabrics?
Held that:- The case of the appellant is covered by the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 and the appellant is entitled to exemption from excise duty for the cotton fabrics produced for the period between October 1, 1959 to April 30, 1960 and from May 1, 1960 to January 3, 1961. It follows therefore that the appellant is entitled to the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise of Baroda, dated November 26, 1962 and the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise, dated November 12, 1963. For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, dated July 31, 1964 should be set aside, that Special Civil Application No. 1054 of 1963 should be allowed and that a writ in the nature of certiorari should be granted to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Excise and Customs dated November 26, 1962 and the order of the Collector of Excise dated November 12, 1963. This appeal is accordingly allowed
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1968 (9) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r of fact, there are provisions in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which require every dealer to get himself registered and to maintain correct and proper accounts of dealings. If the petitioners have complied with these provisions, as they should have, they would be able to show that their sales are subsequent sales of furnace oil not liable to charge. Learned Government Pleader defends the Amending Act by pointing out that it is not a new retrospective levy but the legislation is curative in character. Even if it created such a new liability which in a sense is not the case, we do not think that it is confiscatory in character or so oppressive or burdensome as to hold that it is unreasonable or unconstitutional. Jawaharmal v. State of RajasthanA.I.R. 1966 S.C. 764. upheld the validity of extra rates retrospectively imposed by legislation. In our opinion the attack on the validity of the Amending Act fails. The petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (9) TMI 110 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... object sought to be achieved by sub-section (6) of section 21. That subsection is therefore discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and as such, has to be struck down to the extent that it places a fetter on an appeal against the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under section 20(2) of the Act. The result will be that appeals against the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (2) of section 20 will have to be entertained and disposed of by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal without the precondition of proof of payment of tax prescribed under section 21(6) of the Act. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary for us to consider the further contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the letter imposed under section 21(6) of the Act is so onerous as to virtually taking away the right of appeal by making it illusory. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... him. It is by reason of this distinctive principle that the ratio in the above decision proceeded to say that the tax is levied upon the last taxable purchaser who deals with the commodity in its raw state. Even this is absent in the instant case. It is not provided anywhere that the last purchaser who is not exempt from tax otherwise is the purchaser who is liable to pay sales tax on the incidence of purchase. Even on this ground the contention of the revenue should fail. Suffice it, however, in this case, to say that as the mills are not dealers and as they have not purchased the sugar-cane setts in a manner known to law and as is popularly understood, the transactions involving the sale of sugar-cane setts by the farm grower are not exigible to tax as proposed by the respondent. In the result W.Ps. Nos. 588, 589, 1043, 1044 and 1802 to 1804 of 1968 and T.C. No. 2 of 1968 are allowed with one set of costs in W.P. No. 1802 of 1968. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 108 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rds the existence of an implied contract of sale of gunny bags either at the assessment or at the appellate stage shows that the department had in its possession no such material. In these circumstances we cannot but hold that the impugned assessment order is arbitrary and without any material. In State of Kerala v. C. Velukutty 1966 17 S.T.C. 465 60 I.T.R. 239., the assessment order under the Sales Tax Act was found to be arbitrary and without any material. The High Court of Kerala set aside the assessment order. The Supreme Court confirmed the order of the High Court and also refused the request of the State to remand the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. For all these reasons, we allow this writ petition with costs. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the assessment order dated 31st May, 1966, passed by the Sales Tax Officer II, Kanpur, and the order dated 21st March, 1967, passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax, Kanpur. Petition allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 107 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner had not preferred an appeal from the order of assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer which was subjected to rectification in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The relief which is made available to a dealer in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 21 is not a favour shown to him. That revisional jurisdiction has to be exercised for a higher purpose and that purpose is the displacement of a wrong order by a right one and in that view of the matter, an objection to the imperfect exercise of revisional jurisdiction could be made the subject-matter of an appeal under section 22. So, we allow this revision petition and we direct the Commercial Tax Officer to so modify his order of assessment that the petitioner stands exempted from the payment of tax in respect of all the sales of cotton yarn during the period between 1st April, 1958, and 31st March, 1959. In the circumstances, no costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (9) TMI 106 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aims a concession must be filed before the assessing authority. In the absence of any such provision, the certificates or documents may in proper cases be admitted in appeal or revision. Indeed, Chopra s case(1) was distinguished on this ground by this Court in National Traders (India), Indore v. Additional Commissioner of Sales TaxM.P. No. 195 of 1966 decided on the 8th April, 1968 1968 22 S.T.C. 86. , where it was held that certificates of sales of medicines to Government departments required by rule 24(ii) could be admitted in revision. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the dealer could not be denied the benefit of concessional rate of tax under the Government notification of 8th August, 1962. 9.. For the reasons stated above, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the negative and question No. 2 in the affirmative. 10.. Having regard to the circumstances of this case the parties will bear their costs of these references. References answered accordingly.
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