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1969 (5) TMI 62 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e L.P. As by the State of Punjab. 85. The points canvassed before us in these appeals are also the same which have been discussed above in the first bunch of 13 appeals. The reasons given in the foregoing part of this judgment will, therefore, apply mutatis mutandis to the cases of these respondents, also, in these appeals. In these cases also, the impugned orders terminating the services of Sushil Kumar Khullar and Bhagwan Singh Chawla were passed on October 28, 1966, but were communicated to them on or after 1st November, 1966. Though we have reversed the finding of the learned Single Judge with regard to the applicability of the 1942 Rules to the cases of the respondents, yet on the ground, that the impugned orders not having been communicated before 1st November, 1966 remained ineffective and stillborn, we maintain the annulment of the impugned orders in these two cases, also, and in the result, dismiss the appeals with no order as to costs. Mehar Singh, C.J. 86. I agree.
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1969 (5) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ways more than one indicated by what follows aforesaid observation in the passage reproduced above. In my view the decision in the Allahabad case does not in any way support the proposition that a new statute of limitation is invariably to be given retrospective effect regardless of the fact whether or not it prejudicially affects vested rights of action. In the circumstances I regret my inability to follow the decision in the Punjab case. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, my conclusion is that a Tribunal constituted under Section 110(1) of the Act has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim arising out of an accident which occurred prior to its constitution. In that view of the matter the present petition must succeed. 13. In the end the petition is allowed and the impugned order annexure 4 is quashed with the direction that opposite Party No. 4 shall not proceed with the claim of opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.
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1969 (5) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which corresponds to Section 151. The said Regulation provided that nothing in these Regulations shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the power of the Court to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice. That residuary provision would not. In our opinion, be sufficient to invoke such a special power, which may be available under Order 41, Rule 33, for being resorted to even in the Mills' appeal. Therefore, once the order of the Industrial Court is set aside, the only relief that would be granted to the employee would be to restore the order of the Labour Court in toto. 11. As the first two points of Mr. Patel are accepted , it is not necessary to go into the fourth and fifth contentions of Mr. Patel. 12. In the result, this petition is allowed and the order of the Industrial Court is set aside and is quashed by a certiorari and the order of the Labour Court is restored in toto. 13. Rule accordingly made absolute with costs 14. Rule made absolute.
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1969 (5) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al Corporation to file the complaint. It must, therefore, be deemed in the contemplation of law that the Delhi Municipal Corporation was the complainant in the case. The maxim qui per alium facit per seipsum facere videtur (he who does an act through another is Jeemed in law to do it himself) illustrates the general doctrine on which the law relating to the rights and liabilities of principal and agent depends. We are, therefore, of opinion that Shri Mathur was only acting in a representative capacity and that the Delhi Municipal Corporation was the complainant within the meaning of S. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the petition for special leave and the appeal petition were properly instituted by the Delhi Municipal Corporation. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated April 9, 1965 and direct that the appeal should be remanded to the High Court for being heard afresh and disposed of according to law. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (5) TMI 58 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ded. In truth, the Harrison case was totally different from the facts here. True, the purchaser there bought in order to strip, but there is nothing to suggest that the vendor knew of this intention or stood to derive any benefit from the strip. So far as he was concerned, there was nothing to show that this was not a normal deal in shares. Here the whole transaction was geared to the strip and the tax claim from which both parties stood to profit equally. The only reason for this deal was fiscal advantage as opposed to normal trade. In my view it is highly improbable that either party would have entered into this transaction on any other basis. In my judgment the case is covered by the decision in Finsbury Securities Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners and especially in relation to the Mantern transaction - one of those considered in that case, details of which are to be found in 43 T.C. 591. I would dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal granted.
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1969 (5) TMI 57 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d at only by deducting the necessary items of expenditure belong to the post-manufacturing stage from the retail price. 22. At one stage I was inclined to take the figures given by the Chartered Accountant concerning the railway freight, distribution, advertisement and insurance, and straightway quash the duty on that basis, but Shri Brij Ban Kishore indicated at the later stage of the argument, that these might be worked out in the event of my these holding that these items had to be deducted by the revenue authorities themselves. In this view the order of assessment of the Assistant Collector, Central Excise confirmed in revision is quashed and with the direction that the Assistant Collector of Customs, who dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the demanded tax was not paid, shall decide afresh in the light of the legal principles mentioned in this judgment. 23. The writ petition is accordingly accepted but there will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (5) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is on the appropriate Government the obligation to consider the representation made by a detenue?
Whether it makes any difference where such a representation is made after the detenue's case is referred to the Advisory Board?
Held that:- The petitioners had a constitutional right and there was on the State Government a corresponding constitutional obligation to consider their representations irrespective of whether they were made before or after their cases were referred to the Advisory Board and that not having been done the order of detention against them cannot be sustained. In this view it is not necessary for us to examine the other objections raised against these orders. The petition is therefore allowed, the orders of detention against petitioners 15 and 36 are set aside and we direct that they should be set at liberty forthwith.
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1969 (5) TMI 55 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e knowledge that the fish would be exported by the assessee to Calcutta, but there is no integral link between the sale and the export. The export of fish by the assessee, if any, to Calcutta is therefore not in the course of interState trade. The purchase from the fishermen was for the purpose of export of fish outside the State, but not in the course of inter-State trade. It is not necessary to refer to the plethora of authorities cited on either side. The aforesaid three Supreme Court decisions clearly bring out the distinction between a sale for export to an outside State and a sale in the course of inter-State trade. 10.. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we would answer the question in the affirmative by saying that the State of Orissa is competent to impose purchase tax on fish sold by the fishermen to the assessee. The assessing authorities had taken the correct view. There will be no order as to costs. PATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (5) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndertaking of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that no further amounts of tax assessed for the three years will be realized from the petitioner until its appeals are disposed of by the Assistant Commissioner. The parties will bear their own costs. By the Court For the reasons set out in our respective judgments we allow the writ petitions in part and quash the orders of the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) I, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur, dated 21st February, 1966, dismissing the appeals of the petitioner and direct him to hear them again and dispose them of in accordance with law. We also accept the undertaking given by the learned Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents that during the pendency of the aforesaid appeals the petitioner shall not be treated as being in default in respect of the balance of the sales tax assessed against it for the assessment years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1969 (5) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are (i) That admittedly no appeal lies against the cancellation of an exemption certificate under rule 25, with the result that the validity of that order could not have been tested in the appeal filed against the assessment order made under section 21 of the Act. (ii) The writ petition was admitted by this court on 8th November, 1962, and was pending decision till this day. Even if an appeal has been filed before the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) that cannot provide an alternative adequate remedy to the petitioner. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order passed under section 21 of the Act suffers from a mistake of law apparent on the face of the record. The result is that we quash that order. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Inasmuch as Mr. Swami Dayal has made a statement before us that he will not press his appeal before the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), the stay order dated 8th October, 1964, is vacated. Order quashed.
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1969 (5) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has paid it, the turnover so assessed in his hinds falls completely outside the scope of section 3 when that provision is applied to the principal. In coming to this conclusion we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in M/s. Lakshmi Narain Ram NarainWrit Petition No. 2154 of 1960 decided by B.L. Gupta, J., on September 18, 1961. A special appeal against that decision was dismissedSpecial Appeal No. 632 of 1961 decided by V. Bhargava and S.D. Khare, JJ., on April 16,1965. It is not disputed in the instant case that the commission agents were assessed and have paid the tax in respect of the turnover of Rs. 32,756-6-6. Upon the considerations to which we have adverted, that turnover cannot be considered for the purpose of computing the gross turnover of the assessee. The question is answered in the negative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. The fee of learned counsel is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered in the negative.
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1969 (5) TMI 51 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 11 and not from anything outside it. The proceeding for assessment under the Sales Tax Act is, therefore, completed as soon as a final order of assessment is made. An observation to this effect was also made by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas s case A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 766 (para. 11) 14 S.T.C. 976. But, in all the cases before me, the petitioners will succeed on my finding that a consolidated assessment order in respect of several return-periods is ultra vires, and, accordingly, all subsequent proceedings for demand and recovery, founded on such ultra vires assessment order, are also invalid. The impugned orders are accordingly quashed and the rules made absolute accordingly. I make no order as to costs, however. Respondents shall have the liberty to proceed afresh, in accordance with law, if not otherwise barred. On the prayer of the learned Advocate for the respondents, the operation of this order will remain stayed for a period of six weeks from this date. Orders quashed.
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1969 (5) TMI 50 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... im, to call for the record of any proceedings, and in the proviso the time-limit for an application is 180 days of the date of taking the proceedings or the passing of an order. For action taken of his own motion, the Commissioner is not circumscribed by any limitation whatsoever. I am, therefore, in complete agreement with the view so elaborately propounded by Tuli, J., that the validity and integrity of the Division Bench authorities of this Court in Narain Singh Mohinder Singh v. The State of Punjab 1963 14 S.T.C. 610. and National Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. The Additional Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab 1964 15 S.T.C. 746., is not affected in any manner by the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Orissa v. Debaki Debi and Others 1964 15 S.T.C. 153. Reference should, therefore, be answered as proposed. NARULA, J.-I also agree with the answer proposed to be given by my Lord Tuli, J., to the question referred to us. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (5) TMI 49 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... because of the deductions that had been held by the revising authority to have been wrongly allowed. It was open to the Commissioner to redetermine the quantum of turnover liable to tax while exercising the revisional powers but once he decided to direct the assessing authority to make a reassessment in accordance with law, the proceedings for reassessment were fresh proceedings which were governed by the period of limitation prescribed in section 11-A of the Act. The learned Advocate-General has put forth an argument that since the original assessment order was passed on best judgment the nature of the proceedings after remand remained the same. Even if that be so, the same period of limitation is provided in subsections (4), (5) and (6) of section 11 which govern the orders of assessment based on best judgment. For the reasons given above there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. SHAMSHER BAHADUR, J.-I agree. NARULA, J.-I also agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (5) TMI 48 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ad High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Pritam Singhs. What was considered in that case was the question whether the body mounted on the chassis of a motor vehicle was an integral part of the motor vehicle and could, therefore, be considered to be component parts of motor vehicles within the meaning of item No. 24 of the notification issued under that Act. That has clearly no application to the present case because the expression component is different from the expression spare parts with which we are alone now concerned. The interpretation placed upon the expression spare parts in the impugned order is erroneous and hence the impugned order has to be quashed. The writ petition is, therefore, accepted and the impugned order, levying an additional demand of sales tax on the motor bodies built by the petitioner for the aforesaid period in question, is quashed. The Petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this application. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
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1969 (5) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the turnover, which was the subject of consideration by the High Court, was liable for sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The expression "customs frontiers of India" in section 5 of the Central Act, in our opinion, must be construed in accordance with the notification issued by the Central Government under section 3-A of the Act, on August 6, 1955, read with the Proclamation of the President of India dated March 22, 1956. So applying the definition of "customs frontiers" it is clear that, in the instant case, the sales were effected by transfer of documents of title long after the goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India. We have already stated that the ships carrying the goods in question were all in the respective harbours within the State of Madras when the sales were effected by the assessees by transfer of documents of title to the buyers. If so, it follows that the claim made by the assessees that the sales in question were sales in the course of import has been rightly rejected by the assessing authority. Unfortunately, though various aspects seem to have been pressed before the High Court by the State of Madras, this notification of August 6, 1955, issued by the Government of India, defining the "customs frontiers" of India, was not brought to the notice of the High Court.
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1969 (5) TMI 38 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... itor thereof feels aggrieved by the company having been struck off the register. In obedience to Parliament, I must assume that the artificial and impersonal entity that we know as a limited company, has been endowed with the capacity not merely of having feelings but also of feeling aggrieved even though it has ceased to exist. On the facts of this case, however, I have been quite unable to see what the grievance of this company is nor can I perceive what grievance the contributory has. If there were real prospects of a surplus to be snatched from the fate of bona vacantia, it would be different but here there is not only no hope of a surplus, but also merely the most cautious of assertions in the petition that if it is granted some of the assets may be available for the benefit of creditors. In my judgment there are no grounds whatever which would suffice for the exercise of the court s powers of restoration and resurrection under the subsection, and I dismiss the petition.
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1969 (5) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Directors – Power of, Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... order the respondent-company to be wound up. I appoint the official liquidator as the liquidator of the company. The Registrar shall forthwith send to the official liquidator of the court notice as required by rule 109 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. It will be the duty of such of the officers as are liable to make out or concur in making out the company s statement of affairs under section 454 to attend on the official liquidator at such time and place as he may appoint and to give him all information he may require. The order for winding up shall be drawn up by the Registrar and two certified copies thereof shall be sent to the official liquidator as required by rule 111. Any notice required to be served on the petitioner company of further proceedings in liquidation shall be served on its counsel. The order shall, within 14 days, be advertised by the petitioner company in one issue each of The Indian Express and Vir Arjun Delhi. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1969 (5) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Seizure - Show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... d on behalf of the petitioner. 8.We may also note a submission made on behalf of the petitioner in reply to the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents that this Court might quash the entire proceedings including those relating to the gold and restrain the respondents from proceeding further in the matter. In this respect, we find that the perusal of different paragraphs of the petition makes it clear that it relates to the car only and the redress sought by the petitioner is against the unauthorised retention of the car by the respondents. We consequently are not prepared to grant any relief to the petitioner except that in respect of the car. 9.As a result of the above, we accept the petition to the extent of issuing a direction to the respondents to return car No. DLJ 2916 to the petitioner. Looking to all the facts, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. 10.At the request of Mr. Brij Bans Kishore the respondents are granted ten days to implement this order.
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1969 (5) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Review of order on the basis of subsequent Supreme Court decision ... ... ... ... ..... rmally inclined to consider this submission of Shri Brij Bans Kishore on the question of costs, if that was the ground which had been stated in the Government s reply (Annexure F to the petition). The reply reads as follows - I am directed to refer to your representation dated 27-11-1968 addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India on the above subject and to say that the Government of India had carefully considered your case while passing the revisional orders communicated to you, which may please be treated as final . 4. It may be noticed that tile above said reply was given in spite of the specific reliance by the petitioner in his application for review on the above said decision of the Supreme Court. 5. In the circumstances the order of the appellate authority and the revisional authority is quashed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner is directed to be heard without insisting on the payment of the excise duty. 6. I make no order as to costs in this writ.
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