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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 66 Records
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1969 (7) TMI 123 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hand v. Shankar Datta 1965 RLW 33 was not referred to. Nor was Section 2(3) of the Stamp Act adverted to. The observations made in that case with regard to a bill of exchange are erroneous. The Stamp Act contains an extended definition of a bill of exchange payable on demand. This definition was not considered. The question as to whether or not a bill of expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand can be a bill of exchange payable on demand under the Stamp Act did not arise for decision in that case. Having reconsidered the observations made in Hanuman's case with regard to a bill of exchange in the light of the decision in Mool Chand's case 1965 RLW 33 I find that those observations are erroneous. These erroneous observations were followed by the learned Additional District Judge. 15. I accordingly allow the revision application with costs, set aside the order of the trial court and hold that the Hundi in suit is admissible in evidence as it is exempt from duty.
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1969 (7) TMI 122 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... ction 2(1)(b )is not applicable see Gartside (supra). (2) Arnholz (supra) does not involve the proposition that in those circumstances it is not possible to find a passing on death. (3) Scott (supra) and Burrll (supra) were in terms decisions under section 1 simpliciter, and (since Gartside (supra)) Kirkwood (supra) must be so regarded. We do not consider that since Gartside 's case (supra)those decisions must be regarded as unsound in law, having regard to our view of Arnholz 's case (supra). (4) The cases of Scott's case (supra), Burrell's case (supra) and Kirkwood 's case (supra) do not, however, lead us to the conclusion that there was a passing under section 1 simpliciter in this case. (5) This appeal should be allowed. Leave to appeal granted conditionally upon the Crown ( a) not seeking disturbance of order in Court of Appeal as to costs, and ( b) not asking the House of Lords to award costs. Solicitors Currey & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1969 (7) TMI 121 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he deceased holder held on 26-1-1962 and would have held on the date of the declaration had he been alive on that date. 20. We are thus unable to agree with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the State and the view taken by the Revenue Authorities. 21. The orders of the Deputy Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (in Special Civil Application No. 1026/66) and or the Assistant Collector (in Special Civil Application No. 170/68) are quashed and set aside. The respective cases are sent to the Deputy Collector and the Assistant Collector who will deal with these cases in accordance with law and proceed on the basis that the heirs or the legatees are the persons in respect of whom the ceiling area is to be determined and the surplus land declared. The returns which can be called from the heirs and legatees will be their individual returns and not joint returns. 22. In the result, both the petitions succeed and are allowed with costs. 23. Petitions allowed.
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1969 (7) TMI 120 - THE HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... reasons why taxpayers never insisted on a right to a hearing before this board, or to see the revenue's statement, in connection with the surtax assessments to which the board's jurisdiction related-in fact, for reasons into which I need not enter, the whole procedure of recourse to the board was little used. I cannot find in the fact that Parliament has taken over for use in quite a different context the procedure and language used in setting up the board any warrant for supposing that Parliament has given its endorsement or approval to any pre-existing practice. The manner in which, in a contested matter, the section is to be applied is entirely open in the courts. I should add that the particular procedure by which this case reached the High Court and ultimately this House has not been the subject of argument, both sides having been content that the substantive question, as to the scope of section 28, should be decided. I would dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 119 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... 868 . Accepting that this principle may be invoked in a proper case, I think that in any event it is not available to the taxpayer here. I cannot do better than adopt the passage in which Cross J. dealt with the argument 1969 1 Ch. 78, 87 ; 73 I.T.R. 480 " There are not, as I see it, two finds of profit here, the accounts profits, only part of which are taxed, and the assessed profits, all of which bear tax. What are taxed are, I think, the company's profits for the year, whatever they may be ; but they are taxed according to a yardstick which may compute them at less or more than they appear in the company's accounts. " I should add that I have much doubt whether, whatever the factual position might be, this procedure is open to a taxpayer in this context in view of the specific provisions of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph 9. I would dismiss the appeals. Appeals dismissed with costs. Solicitors Allen & Overy ; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1969 (7) TMI 117 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his is enough to justify the conclusion that by affixing of the notice on a conspicuous part of the property, there has been due service of the notice. 11. Quite apart from what I have stated with regard to the service of registered notice or affixation of the notice on a conspicuous part of the premises, it is enough to hold that in this case, there has been due service of notice by virtue of the fact that the notice has been sent by post under "certificate of posting" and the presumption arises under Section 114(f) of the Indian Evidence Act that the letter has been duly delivered to the addressee as the letter has been addressed to the residential address of the respondent tenant. 12. For these reasons, I find no substance in the contention of the respondent and allow this revision petition with costs. 13. The respondent-tenant is directed to vacate and deliver possession of the premises to the petitioner within three months from this date. 14. Petition allowed.
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1969 (7) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... acts of this case come within the rule laid down by this Court in Faguna Kanta Nath v. The State of Assam 1959 2 Supp. S.C.R.1 The case of Gallu Sah v. The State of Bihar 1958CriLJ1352 relied by the High Court is distinguishable. Therein Gallu Sah was a member of an unlawful assembly. He was said to have abetted Budi to set fire to a house. One of the members of the unlawful assembly had set fire to the house in question though it was not proved that Budi had set fire to the house. Under those circumstances this Court held that the offence with which Gallu Sah was charged was made out. As observed by Calcutta High Court in Umadasi Dasi v. Emperor I.L.R.Cal. 112 that as a general rule, a charge of abetment fails when the substantive offence is not established against the principal but there may be exceptions. Gallu's case was one such exception. 15. For the reasons mentioned above we allow the appeal and acquit the appellant. He is on bail. His bail bonds stand cancelled.
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1969 (7) TMI 115 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hers in that case it was held that if a partner has books of accounts in his possession and would not produce them, an account may nevertheless be arrived at by presuming everything against him. Those observations were made in the context of a defendant withholding the material account books. In the present case, however, it is the plaintiff who is withholding the material account books. It is also significant that the defendants in the present case do not want that the accounts be gone into in spite of the non-production of the material account books by the plaintiff. As the only party, who expressed keenness for rendition of the accounts of the partnership, was the plaintiff and as he withheld material account books, the Courts below, in my opinion, rightly held that the accounts could not be gone into because of the default of the plaintiff-appellant.(15) The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1969 (7) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he data on the basis of which the analyst came to his conclusion. The relevant data is given in the report. A report somewhat similar to the one before us was held by this Court to contain sufficient data in Mangaldas's ( 1965 2 S.C.R. 894) case referred to earlier. The correct view of the law on the subject is as stated in the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nagar Mahapalika of Kanpur v. Sri Ram ( 1963 All. L.J. 765) wherein it is observed "that the report of the public analyst under s. 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 need not contain the mode or particulars of analysis nor the test applied but should contain the result of analysis namely, data from which it can be inferred whether the article of food was or was not adulterated as defined in s. 2 (1) of the Act." In the result the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The appellant is on bail. He should surrender to his bail and serve the sentence imposed on him. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the goods purchased by him or to pay the same whenever he pleases. The contention that in view of s. 11 of the Act, no cognizance could have been taken of the offence alleged is premature. This question does not arise in this ease. No court has yet taken cognizance of the case. That stage has Still to come. There is no substance in the contention that the complaint made before the police does not disclose a Cognizable offence and as such the police could not have taken up the investigation of that complaint. The offence complained of is punishable with three years’ imprisonment and as such it falls within the 2nd Sch. of the Cr. P.C. and consequently the same is a cognizable offence as defined in s. 4(1)(f) of the Cr. P.C. Hence it was open to the police to investigate the same. For the reasons mentioned above we are unable to accept any of the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was an intention to create a charge, the Kottayam Bank not being a party to the deed could enforce the charge only if it was a beneficiary under the terms of the contract, and it is not claimed that the Bank was a beneficiary under the deed Ex. D-1. The suit against M.C. Chacko must therefore be dismised. The decree passed by the High Court is modified and it is declared that M.C. Chacko is not personally liable for the debt due under the letter of guarantee executed by K.C. Chacko, nor are the properties in schedule A allotted to M.C. Chacko under the deed dated June 21, 1951 liable to satisfy the debt due to the Kottayam Bank under the letter of guarantee. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and specially that a concession that persons not parties to a contract may enforce the benefit reserved to them under the contract was made before the High Court, we direct that the parties to this appeal will bear their respective costs throughout. Y.P'Decree modified.
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1969 (7) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the assumption made by the High Court that the entry of goods into the city may be only for the four purposes mentioned by the High Court; nor do we hold that the proviso exempts from taxation timber brought into the city in the course of transit even when it is not directly removed out of the city by rail, road or water. The proviso, in our judgment, has a limited operation. It merely provides that the municipality shall not be entitled to levy a tax on timber brought into the city in the course of transit to any place outside the city and directly removed out of the city by rail, road or water. But on that account we are unable to hold that the proviso is enacted with the object of bringing to tax all entry, of timber which is not brought into the city in the course of transit to any place outside .the city and directly removed out of the city by rail, road or water. The appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
The argument that all taxes should be governed by Art. 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts,cannot be upheld.
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1969 (7) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
Whether s. 23(1)(b) of the Act is ultra rites Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it provides for a punishment heavier and severer than the punishment or penalty provided for the same acts under s. 23(1)(a) of the Act?
Even if s. 23 ( 1 ) (b) is not void, the complaint in respect of the offences punishable under that section has not been filed properly in accordance with the proviso to s. 23-D (1 ) of the Act, so that proceedings cannot be competently taken on the basis of that complaint?
Charge of violation of R. 132-A(2) of the D.I. Rs. punishable under R. 132-A(4) of those Rules and is to the effect that R. 132-A of the D.I. Rs. was omitted by a notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 30th March, 1965 and, consequently, a prosecution in respect of an offence punishable under that Rule could not be instituted on 17th March, 1968 when that Rule had ceased to exist
Held that:- In the case before us, it is s. 23(1)(b) which is challenged and on a slightly different ground that it provides for a higher punishment than that provided by S. 23 (1) (a).
The record before us, therefore, does not show that any material at all was available to the respondent in the course of the enquiry under s. 23D( 1 ) on the basis of which he could have formed an opinion that it was a fit case for making a complaint on the ground that he would not be able to impose adequate penalty. The complaint has, therefore, to be held to have been filed without satisfying the requirements and conditions of the proviso to. s. 23D(1) of the Act and is in violation of the safeguard provided by the Legislature for such contingencies. The complaint, insofar as it related to the contravention by the accused of provisions of ss. 4 ( 1 ), 5 ( 1 ) ( e ) and 9 of the Act punishable under s. 23(1)(13) is concerned, is invalid and proceedings being taken in pursuance of it must be quashed.
We are inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Sen that the language contained in’ el. 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1965 can only afford protection to action already taken while the rule was in force, but cannot justify initiation of a new proceeding which will not be a thing done or omitted to be done under the rule but a new act of initiating a proceeding after the rule had ceased to exist. On this interpretation, the complaint made for the offence under R. 132A(4) of the D.I. Rs., after 1st April, 1965 when the rule was omitted, has to be held invalid.
It, however, appears that when s. 4(1) of the Act was amended, the Legislature did not make any provision that an offence previously committed under R. 132A of the D.I.Rs. would continue to remain punishable as an offence of contravention of s. 4 ( 1 ) of the Act, nor was any provision made ’ permitting operation of R. 132A itself so as to permit institution of prosecutions in respect of such offences. The consequence is that the present complaint is incompetent even in respect of the offence under R. 132A(4). This is the reason why we hold that this was an appropriate case where the High Court should have allowed the applications under s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and should have quashed the proceedings on this complaint. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (7) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not make a return, in the absence of the books, he could have taken time for making the return, or alternatively, while making the return, he could have stated he could not vouch for the correctness of the same. Neither course he took. The return submitted having been found to be incorrect, necessarily the Tribunal s decision is correct. The tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 107 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for levy and collection of tax shall be deemed to have been validly made under the provisions of the Act as amended by Act 9 of 1964. Without revising the orders, the authorities under the Act could not have demanded the tax refunded on the ground that the refund was made under any mistake. As stated earlier, the object of the amendment was not to exempt from tax sales of cloth held in stock on 14th December, 1957, but to realise the tax on such sales. It could not be the intention of the Legislature to collect the tax from some dealers and exempt others. That object is clear from the fact that subsection (5-A) of section 5 has been amended with retrospective effect and assessments made prior to the amendment on the basis that sale of cloth held in stock on 14th December, 1957, was chargeable to tax, have been validated. Therefore the second ground also fails. In the result, these revision petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, no costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (7) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sales tax authorities. The dealer after furnishing the declaration in Form III-A from the purchasing dealer cannot be asked to lead any further evidence as to the correctness of the declaration contained in Form III-A. In the instant case, the declaration furnished in Form Ill-A by the assessee has been ignored merely because the purchasing dealer happens to be an oil mill which normally consumes oil-seeds. That circumstance by itself was not enough to entitle the sales tax authorities to reject the III-A Form or to place any further burden on the assessee to prove that the sale of oil-seeds was not a sale to the consumer. This in my opinion is the correct legal position. By the Court We answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the dealer-assessee and against the Commissioner, Sales Tax. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall pay costs of these proceedings to the dealerassessee at the rate of Rs. 50 in each reference. References answered in the negative.
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1969 (7) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The fact that the assessee charged commission from the selling dealers does indicate that he might have acted as a commission agent on behalf of the selling dealers and that the supplies made by him to his principals might have been in his capacity as the selling agent of the selling dealers. If he was found to have acted as a commission agent on behalf of the sellers, he could not claim exemption as a purchasing agent. In that event he could be taxed as a dealer. It cannot, therefore, be said that this was an altogether new question. In our opinion, it was merely another face of the question which the Judge (Revisions) was called upon to examine. In the circumstances, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, the costs of these references which we assess at Rs. 100. There shall be one set of costs only. References answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (7) TMI 104 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... indow leaves and when the window leaves had become a part of the building that the property in the goods passed under the terms of the contract. 8.. Thus there is no escape from the conclusion that the agreement involves a works contract and there is no agreement for sale of materials. The assessing authorities took a wrong view in assessing 75 per cent. of the billed amount. 9.. We would answer the questions referred thus (1) In the facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal was wrong in its view that the contracts in question are divisible contracts. (2) In the facts and circumstances of this case the property in the goods supplied in the execution of the contracts in question passed by accession to immovable property and not by sale as movable goods. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Reference fee deposited under section 24(1 be refunded to the assessee. PATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (7) TMI 103 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the so-called purchasing dealers are fictitious persons and the declarations in question cannot be genuine. 5.. Section 24 of the Act provides for reference to the High Court of a question of law arising out of the order passed by the Tribunal. The question posed in these references appears to us not to be a question of law but one relating to the quantum of evidence necessary to prove a fact in issue. We have stated that the burden to prove the genuineness of the declaration is always on the assessee and it is for him to establish by cogent evidence that the declaration is genuine and not fictitious. If a declaration appears to be fictitious the assessing authority is entitled to reject the same unless the assessee establishes that notwithstanding such appearance, the declaration is in fact genuine. 6.. The references are accordingly answered. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. MISRA, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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