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Showing 1 to 20 of 119 Records
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1970 (2) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... med to be void as against the claims enforceable under the attachment of the property by Pillai. 6. But Mr Chagla appearing on behalf of Pillai raised an alternative contention. He said that at the time of sale there was another outstanding attachment and the sale in favour of Padmavathi being contrary to such attachment was, in any event, void. It appears that on January 17, 1956, Pillai had in execution of a decree obtained in Suit 55 of 1953, attached the property, but that attachment was removed on March 23, 1957, on satisfaction of the decree. By Section 64, Code of Civil Procedure, the attachment is only void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment, and it is not void generally. Since the attachment effected on January 17, 1956 was removed, any private alienation contrary to such attachment cannot be regarded as void for there are no claims enforceable under the attachment, dated January 17, 1956. 7. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (2) TMI 149 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce to divert the income before it accrues or arises to him. Effectiveness of the device depends not upon considerations of morality, but on the operation of the Income Tax Act. Legislative injunction in taxing statutes may not, except on peril of penalty, be violated, but it may lawfully be circumvented . The aforesaid passage throws no light directly on the question in issue, but the juristic principle underlying this dictum would be a guide to come to a conclusion whether accrual of low profits, by itself, would enable the taxing authorities to declare the books of account as not being properly maintained. 5. In our opinion, the learned Tribunal took the wrong view in rejecting the books of account merely on the ground that the rate of profits as shown therein was low. 6. We accordingly answer the question in the negative. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. The reference fee deposited be refunded to the petitioner. Sachidananda Acharya, J. 7. I agree.
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1970 (2) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rest upon any just and reasonable basis. The difference emphasised on behalf of the petitioners is too tenuous to form the basis of a serious argument. Their challenge, therefore, fails. The decision in Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of Customs, Bombay ( 1963 3 S.C.R. 600) on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners dealt with a different problem though the principle of law laid down there seems to go against the petitioners' submission. It was expressly observed that there is no inherent vice in the principle of fixing seniority by rotation in a case when a service is composed in fixed proportion of direct recruits and promotees. The distinction between direct recruits and promotees as two sources of recruitment being a recognised difference, nor obnoxious to the equality clauses,' the provisions which concern us cannot be struck down on the ratio of this decision. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 147 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fact that the case is brought on to the Magistrate's file only indicates that the papers, on which the order for the remand of the accused is made, would become a part of the Court file so that they can be put up for hearing on the next date. Our attention has also been invited to Paragraph 25.56 of the Punjab Police Rules, Volume Iii, Reprint Edition, according to which an incomplete charge-sheet can be put in Court. The above paragraph contains instructions for the police and would not affect the procedure to be followed by a Criminal Court for which purpose we have necessarily to look to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 18. The two accused were, on consideration of the facts of the present case, released on interim bail by the Division Bench before the reference of this case to the Full Bench. Keeping in view all the facts we confirm the interim order and direct that the petitioners may remain on bail during the pendency of the case against them. 19. Order accordingly.
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1970 (2) TMI 146 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e compensation in abolition or Zamindary estates instructions regarding." While these circulars under Section 13 of the Wealth Tax Act bind all officers and other persons employed in the execution of the Wealth Tax Act, they do not bind this court nor have they any legal validity unless tested. In that circular, the indication is there that any right to compensation is an asset under all circumstances a proposition to which we cannot give an unqualified assent in view of our findings and determination stated elsewhere in this judgment. 54. For these reasons, we answer the question raised in the statement of the case in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and we also answer the question, as refrained by us, in the negative holding that what has been attempted to be taxed in this case is not an asset within the meaning of Section 2(c) of Wealth Tax Act and also make this finding in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. T.K. Basu, J. 55. I agree.
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1970 (2) TMI 145 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation of contiguous lands must also be decided in their favour, as found by the two courts below. 16. Lastly, we come to the question of compensation. On this point, the two courts below have differed but, in our opinion, the lower appellate court has made the correct approach, so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. The petitioner made the improvements, if any, at his own risk. His purchase was subject to the opposite parties' right of pre-emption. If he (petitioner) made any improvements in the meantime, he did so at his own risk and, when the relevant statute does not provide for any compensation, although, in other respects, it has dealt with the rights of the parties in detail, and when, further on equitable consideration alone, the matter would not stand differently here, it is not open to the petitioner to claim any compensation in the instant case. 17. In the premises, this Rule will fail and it will be discharged. 18. There will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (2) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It, therefore cannot be said that the issue of private defence was tried on a former occasion precluding the reception of evidence in the present case which would disturb or upset finding in the other cases. And when the rule in question having been designed to preclude the reception of advance it is inappropriate to rely on it on special leave appeal in this Court. According to the decision in Kharkan's case(6) he judgments in the other cases produced in this Court are also not relevant as they do not fulfil the conditions laid in Section 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act. The plea of private defence in the two cases cannot be said to give rise to or necessarily involve the same issue which require the same evidence for the purpose of proof. As already indicated, no attempt was made on behalf of the appellant to show that his conviction is otherwise legally unsustainable or that he was otherwise prejudiced in his defence. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ade by letter dated October 29, 1960. The request was repeated in the subsequent letter dated August 30, 1961. The first demand cannot on account of the second request be wiped out. No objection was raised at the time when Dutta was appointed arbitrator by the order of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner that the claim was barred by the law of limitation, not was the contention raised before the High Court or this Court in appeal from the order of the High Court confirming the appointment of Dutta. Even before the arbitrator no contention appears to have been raised that the claim was barred by the law of limitation. The question of limitation was not a pure question of law. Whether the claim was barred by the law of limitation depended upon proof of facts. From the date of the settlement of the claim three years had not elapsed before a notice asking for a reference was made. Prima Facie , the claim was not barred by the law of limitation. The appeal is allowed with costs.
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1970 (2) TMI 142 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es to act on this void direction. After all, the act of Court should not harm parties. So I hold that the filing of the appeal within the time permitted by the District Court was not so unjustifiably delayed as not to deserve condonation by this Court. 12. However, the affidavit of the State Government for excusing the delay was hardly complete or concrete. Indeed, the petitioners prayed for exclusion of time, not excusing of delay. Section 14 allows exclusion absolutely, while Section 5 permits excuse as a matter of discretion. There was some confusion in the mind of the petitioner in this matter and further details were furnished only in a supplementary affidavit after the matter came to a contest in Court. In these circumstances, the State must, like ordinary parties, pay the penalty for the marginal negligence in the conduct of its proceeding. I therefore, direct the petitioner to pay the respondent costs ₹ 50/- and allow the petition for condonation, of the delay.
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1970 (2) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he Australian Constitution does not alter the true character of the guarantee and it cannot be inferred that the Constitution imposed restrictions upon legislative, power, but denied to the individuals affected by unauthorised assumption of executive power the right to challenge the exercise of that power. A vital constitutional provision cannot be so con- strued as to make a mockery of the declared guarantee and the constitutional restrictions on the power of the legislature. If the power of the State Legislature is restricted in the manner provided by Art. 301, but within limits provided by Arts. 303 to 305, it would be impossible to hold that the State by executive order can do something which it is incompetent to do by legislation. In any view of the case, these -appeals must fail and are dismissed. Only one respondent has appeared in this case, but even he has not filed a statement of the case. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... change the location. The appellants had been carrying on business in milling rice for more than 30 years and the mill was by reason of the proposal to submerge the site in the Sharawathi Hydro- Electric Project had to be shifted from its location. The State allotted another piece of land to the appellants and did not acquire their machinery and permitted erection of their rice mill building on the new location. This was done with a view to cause minimum hardship to the appellants arising in consequence of the proposed construction of the dam resulting in submergence of their land. The State also granted permission to the appellants to change the location under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. The permission cannot be said to be granted without consideration of the relevant circumstances. The appeal is allowed, -and the petition filed by the respondent N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. is ordered to be dismissed with costs throughout in favour of the appellants.
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1970 (2) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata,for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. In the present case the decision of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for determination of standard rent, is, in view of the judgment of this Court, plainly erroneous see Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy v. Khemchand Gorumal & Others( 1962 3 S.C.R. 928.) If the decision in the previous proceeding be. regarded as conclusive it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction 'of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature. The appeals are allowed, and the orders passed by the High Court and the Court of Small Causes are set aside and the proceedings are remanded to the Court of First Instance to deal with and dispose them of in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1970 (2) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e and in a harmonious manner, it is clear that what the appellant admitted was that the acquisition in question, was made by his father on his behalf and the consideration for the same was paid by his father from out of the appellant's private funds that were in the hands of his father. Hence we are unable to agree with the High Court that the appellant had admitted that the properties covered by Ex B-6 were the acquisitions of his father. 9. There is no basis whatsoever for distinguishing the acquisitions under Exs. B-2 to B-5 and B-7 and B-6. They all stand on the same footing. The respondents have not challenged the finding of the trial Court and the High Court as regards the acquisitions under Exs. B-2 to B-5 and B-7. 10. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court to the extent appealed against is set aside and that of the trial Court restored, but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs in this Court.
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1970 (2) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Similar view has been expressed in "Principles of Administrative Law" by Griffith and Street. That is also the view taken by Sir Ivor Jennings in his "Cabinet Government". For the reasons mentioned above, we are of opinion that the functions under the Motor Vehicles Act had been allocated by the Governor to the Transport Minister under "the Rules" and the Secretary of that ministry had been validly authorised under rule 23-A to take action under S. 68 (C) of the Act. The validity of some of the provisions of Madras Act 18 of 1968 which amended the Act was canvassed before us,. It is not necessary to go into those questions for deciding the validity of the impugned scheme. Those questions can be more appropriately gone into and decided if 'and when action is taken on the strength of those provisions. Hence we leave open those questions. In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs-hearing fee one set. Appeals dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... etermined on the facts of each case. We are unable to agree with Mr. Nariman that in interpreting a deed of partnership, business whereof it is stipulated shall be continued by the surviving partners after the death of a partner, the Court will not award to the legal representatives of the deceased partner a share in the goodwill in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary. The goodwill of a firm is an asset. In interpreting the deed of partnership,- the Court will insist upon some indication that the right to a share in the assets is, by virtue of the agreement that the surviving partners are entitled to carry on the business on-the death of the partner, to be extinguished. In the absence of a provision expressly made-or clearly implied, the normal rule. that the share of a partner in the assets devolves upon his legal representatives will apply to the goodwill as well as to other assets. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... en, but it is not open to the Legislature to say that, a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffecive and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court. This Court in The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd.'s( 1963 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 172.) case held that the cess was not validly imposed and levied because the sanction of the State Government was not obtained at the time of enhancing the rate of levy of tax. That judgment was binding between the parties and also by virtue of Art. 141 binding on all Courts in the territory of India. The Legislature could not say that that declaration of law was either erroneous, invalid or ineffective either as a precedent or between the parties. It is unnecessary then to consider whether the repealed Act may be amended without reenactment. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing. fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court with a direction that it be readmitted to the file and be dealt with and disposed of according to law. The High Court will issue rule to the Municipality and the State and dispose of the petition. We recommend that the case may be taken up for early hearing. We had during the pendency of the appeal in this Court made an order restraining the levy of octroi duty. We extend the operation of the order for a fortnight from this date to enable the Company to move the High Court for an appropriate interim order pending hearing and disposal of the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. Costs in the High Court will be costs in the cause. Since we have granted special, leave against the order dismissing the petition, we do not deem it necessary to consider whether the order rejecting the application for certificate was erroneous. Civil Appeal No. 2131 of 1969 is therefore dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rt to certify cases to be fit for appeal to this Court. The word “certify” is a strong word; it postulates exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court and the certificate should ordinarily show on-the face of it that the discretion was invoked and properly exercised. This Court should be in a position to know that the High Court has not acted mechanically but has applied its mind. A certificate under this clause is impermissible on questions of fact and when a case does not disclose a substantial question of law or principle then the certificate granted by the High Court is liable to be revoked by this Court, though such prima facie nondisclosure would not by itself automatically invalidate the certificate. In the case in hand no substantial question of law or principle was made out at the bar and the certificate was clearly misconceived though it vaguely states that several questions of law are involved. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er its power is exhausted. Section 6 then steps in wherein the Parliament has declared that as soon as such an order comes into being that will have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act. Parliament being supreme, it certainly could make a law abrogating or repealing by implication provisions of any pre-existing law and no exception could be taken on the ground of excessive delegation to the Act of the Parliament itself. There is no delegation involved in the provisions of section 6 at all and that section could not be held to be unconstitutional on that ground, The result therefore is that in our opinion the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, are constitutional and. the impugned order is also constitutional. Accordingly' this appeal is dismissed, and the trial Court is directed to proceed expeditiously with the case in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (2) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 is invalid and the action taken or deemed to be, taken in exercise of the powers under the Act is declared unauthorised.
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