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Showing 21 to 40 of 90 Records
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1973 (11) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant be tried by another learned judge of the High Court who may be assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice of that Court. It seems indeed desirable that election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be. entrusted for trial to a permanent judge of the High Court, even though we find that additional or acting judges or those requested under article 224A of the Constitution to,, sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters. 'We, therefore, set aside the order dated August 10, 1973. The election petition filed by the appellant shall now be heard by a permanent judge who may be assigned for the purpose by the learned Chief Justice. The case may, therefore, J be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders. The appeal is accepted accordingly. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs of this Court and in the High Court. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e governed by mere departmental resolutions and executive instructions. These cannot take the place of statutory rules which alone can impart stability and security and ensure observance of the rule of law. Legal rules must govern the recruitment and conditions of public servants so that there is no arbitrariness or inequality in State action in regard to them and the rule of law is not eroded. And such rules should preferably be framed without avoidable delay and after consultation with groups which apprehend discriminatory treatment as that would go a long way to produce a sense of contentment and satisfaction. We make these observations not with a view to casting any reflection on the administration but to highlight a problem which has come to our notice quite often, in the hope that it will help the social dimensions of the problem and the damage to public interest which may be likely to result if the problem is not promptly and satisfactorily resolved. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... umed or oil extracted. Therefore, unless the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act as prescribed by Rule 5 contains those particulars, the petitioner will not be in a position to challenge the correctness of the same, if he is so advised, by filing an appeal. In the present case, admittedly no notice in the form prescribed by Rule 5 has been issued to the petitioner herein and the only notice which has been sent to the petitioner is one containing the total amount referable to the different periods by way of cess said to be payable by the petitioner-mills. Consequently, the notice actually issued to the petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 5 and therefore cannot be sustained. On this short ground, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned demand notice issued by the first respondent is quashed. However, the allowing of this writ petition will not prevent the first respondent from proceeding afresh in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Contraction of a contract - why the Legislature can and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some res- pects similar to that of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act?
Held that:- The argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that rights of a statutory tenant created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely preventing the eviction so long as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of s. 43 do not preserve, subsequent to repeal, any right to rebuff the plaintiff's claim for, eviction and (d) that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act does not justify anything longer or for any time longer than s. 2 of the Act confers or lasts.
It-is appropriate for a Court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes. A court of justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U. P Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. This statute 'which provides for summary eviction of unauthorised occupants cannot obstruct the suit for eviction of a tenant. The far-fetched submission has hardly any substance and we reject it.
In the result, C.A. 1727 of 1968 is dismissed and C.A. No. 1728 of 1968 is allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 81 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ief against defendant No. 3; and he has invoked the power of this court under the provision of Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion, the power of the court under this provision of law is discretionary. An amendment under this rule should normally be refused where it would introduce a totally different, new and inconsistent case or its affect would be to substitute one distinct cause of action for another or change the character of the suit. In my opinion, the amendment, as prayed for by Mr. Senapati, would certainly change the entire character of the suit by modifying the cause of action as well. In my opinion, therefore, this prayer at this stage has no merit. 12. In the result, I find that this appeal must succeed, since the plaintiff has not been able to satisfy me that he has any enforceable claim against defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the court below are set aside. I make no order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioner was appointed to the substantive post of Chief Secretary to the state ate of Tamil Nadu?
Held that:- In the present case, it appears that the petitioner gave advice in course of duty. The Government practically in all cases accepted the advice of the petitioner. There does not appear any instance of acrimony or disagreement between the Government and the petitioner. There are no records to suggest that the petitioner advised one way and the Government acted in an opposite manner. The events alleged at the time of the elections are in aid of the petitioner's contention that his dealing of the law and order situation was so firm that the Chief Minister and other members of his party became alienated. The petitioner suggested that the Chief Minister and the members of his party were responsible for introducing violence and intimidation. The further suggestion of the petitioner is that the petitioner exposed the activities of the D.M.K. Party. Complaints against the D.M.K. Party were like complaints against other political parties. The affidavit evidence, indicates that the law and order situation was kept under normal'control. All the officers of the State including the police service discharged, their duty in the best interest of administration 'as also 'in public interest. The petitioner did not achieve anything extraordinary. As the Chief Secretary it was the duty of the petitioner to see that situation nowhere went out of control. The Chief Minister and the members of his party cannot be said on the affidavit evidence to have committed acts of violence or intimidation. The entire affidavit evidence establishes beyond any measure of doubt that the petitioner's allegations imputing malafides against the Chief Minister are baseless. The petitioner's allegations were in aid of suggesting vindictiveness and vengeance on part of the Chief 'Minister Facts' and circumstances repel any such insinuation and innuendo.
For these reasons the contentions of the petitioner fail. The petition is dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 79 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ners apply for grant of interim stay before the appellate authority, the said prayer may be considered, taking note of the fact that this court, during the pendency of many of these writ petitions, granted interim orders of stay in their favour, which continued to be in force till today. 12.. In Writ Petitions Nos. 2238 to 2241, 2440, 1182 and 2463 of 1972, the petitioners have challenged the proposition notices issued to them. It is submitted by the learned counsel on both the sides that no order of assessment in pursuance of the proposition notices have been passed in these cases. Hence, these writ petitions are dismissed, reserving liberty to the assessing authority to take further action in pursuance of the proposition notices issued to the petitioners in accordance with law and in the light of the enunciation of law made in this judgment. 13.. Having regard to the circumstances of these cases, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1973 (11) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were formed. It must therefore necessarily follow that since the tax was levied and collected on watery coconuts, the persons who paid that tax alone are entitled to refund. The mention of any specific dealer to whom the tax should be refunded, in our view, was not necessary because the express language used makes it unnecessary. We therefore find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the proviso entitled only those who were taxed on watery coconuts out of which the dry coconuts were formed. Since the petitioners are dealers in dry coconuts, even though they paid the tax on their transactions, they are not the persons who have been declared by the proviso to be entitled to ask for refund of the tax levied and collected in respect of such watery coconuts from the dealers concerned. It is not, therefore, possible to allow the writ petition and issue the necessary writ. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 77 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a fact is in dispute the assessing officer is entitled to enquire into it and would be required to give an opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his stand. In our view, the stand of the learned standing counsel is absolutely fair. We would, accordingly, while sustaining the assessments and rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for their annulment, quash the order of the assessing officer refusing the application for refund (annexure 3) and call upon him to redispose of the application for refund on the basis of the law contained in the amending Act of 1969. He will certainly give reasonable opportunity to the assessee to establish its contentions on questions of fact before a decision on the refund application is finally taken. 8.. This writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above by quashing annexure 3 and requiring the assessing officer to redispose of the application for refund. We make no order as to costs. PANDA, J.-I agree. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 76 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xemption from sales tax under article 286(1) (b) of the Constitution and the view taken by the Commissioner is right. The alternative contention advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee that the sales were not sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce but intra-State sales does not merit serious consideration. Under the terms of the contract, the ore had to be loaded into railway wagons at Papinaikanahalli in Mysore State for transmission to the M.M.T.C. at Cuddalore in Tamil Nadu State and it further provided that the charges for weighment, sampling and analysis at Cuddalore shall be shared equally by the parties. The contract envisaged movement of the goods from Papinaikanahalli in Mysore State to Cuddalore in Tamil Nadu State. Therefore, the sale was an inter-State sale so as to attract tax under the Act. As both the contentions urged on behalf of the assessee fall, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng which the proceedings remained stayed under the orders of the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, dated 16th December, 1960, therefore, cannot be taken into consideration in computing the period of limitation for making the assessment. Accordingly, the assessment made after 3rd February, 1962, was barred by time. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the further question whether in computing the period of limitation for making the assessment, the entire period between 16th December, 1960, and 7th May, 1961, when the Sales Tax Officer came to know about the order dated 23rd January, 1961, or that the period between 23rd January, 1961, and 7th May, 1961, alone can be taken into consideration. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee who will be entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Pronounced under Chapter VII, rule 1, of the Rules of Court. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (11) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purchasing dealer by misapplication of the goods after he purchased them, or for any fraudulent misrepresentation by him, penalty may be visited upon the selling dealer. I think what was said in connection with section 8(1) and (3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, applies with equal force to the situation before me. In that view, a selling dealer cannot be penalised for non-use of the goods purchased from him, after furnishing him with declaration forms. He cannot be held responsible if the goods have not been actually used in the manufacture for sale of goods specified in the First Schedule. He will not be, on that account, liable to pay tax more than at the concessional rate. The result is that there is no justification to reopen the assessment by exhibit P1 notice. Exhibit P3 order is bad and is liable to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed. The original petition is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to suffer costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 73 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bans Lal, the learned counsel for the department, drew our attention to a single Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Shaw Bros. and Co. v. State of West Bengal 1963 14 S.T.C. 878., wherein it has been held that chopping of timber into firewood is a manufacturing process and, therefore, firewood is a manufactured article. With great respect we are unable to agree with this view for the reasons recorded in the earlier part of the judgment. In the light of the discussion above we hold that the business of firewood carried on by the assessee-firm could not be called a manufacturing business nor could the assessee-firm be called a manufacturer and the liability of the assessee-firm to pay the tax arose at Rs. 50,000. Consequently, the answer to the question referred to us is returned in the negative, i.e., against the department. The assesseefirm shall have its costs in both the references separately which are assessed at Rs. 150 each. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pose of the case in conformity with the opinion of this court because of technical difficulties pointed out above. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the assessment orders cannot be interfered with in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. Whether or not a petition should be entertained against an assessment order would depend on the facts of each case. The facts of the present case are such that there is no other way of giving relief to the petitioner to which he has been found entitled. We, accordingly, allow this petition and direct that a writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue quashing the assessment orders dated 31st May, 1969, relating to the assessment years 1966-67 and 1967-68, copies whereof are annexures A and B to the writ petition. It will, however, be open to the Sales Tax Officer to pass fresh assessment orders in accordance with the law and the observations made herein. The petitioner is entitled to the costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 71 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s found by the Assessing Authority that the goods subject to the levy of purchase tax have been disposed of in one of the three methods stated in section 5(2)(a)(vi) within 6 months from the date of purchase, the deduction of the purchase value of those goods has to be allowed out of the gross turnover in order to determine the taxable turnover. It follows that the view taken by the Assessing Authority, while passing the impugned assessment order, with regard to the deduction in respect of the sale of cotton in the course of export out of the territory of India within six months from the date of purchase is wrong in law. Accordingly, I accept all these writ petitions and quash the impugned assessment orders passed by the Assessing Authorities and direct them to pass fresh assessment orders in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs since the matter was not free from difficulty. Petitions allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid for the motor cycles, and hence is not liable to sales tax has only to be stated to be rejected. The expression turnover is defined under the Act as the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold or supplied or distributed by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his own account or on account of others, whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration. It is not disputed that in the aggregate amount recovered from the customer, the freight charges incurred by the petitioner in transporting the goods from the place of manufacture to Bangalore have been included and unless they are permitted to be deducted under any rule framed under the Act or by any other provision of law, the petitioner cannot claim that such freight charges do not form part of the assessable turnover. We, therefore, reject the above contention also. In the result, this petition fails and it is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 69 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... question. In view of the abovementioned facts, the question whether the pulleys were hardware does not arise in the present case. We, therefore, reframe the question as under Whether, under the circumstances of the case, the pulleys manufactured by the assessee were liable to be taxed as machine parts at the rate of 6 per cent under Notification No. ST-7098/X-1012-1965, dated 1st October, 1965? The Judge (Revisions) found that, admittedly, the pulleys manufactured by the assessee were ordinary pulleys which connect shafts for transmission of power, etc., with electrical motors or oil engines. They cannot be treated as machine parts. On this factual view, it cannot be held that these pulleys were machine parts and liable to be taxed at 6 per cent. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since nobody appears for the assessee there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 68 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ery . In the dictionaries the term cutlery has been stated to mean the various types of knives and cutting instruments used for domestic and manufacturing purposes and includes butchers and cooks knives as well as carving forks and steel used for sharpening knives. In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume VI, page 927, it has been further said that table forks and spoons form another trade although many manufacturers produce the whole range. It is thus clear that the spoons are not recognised in the commercial world to be included in the trade of cutlery. They form another trade. In our opinion, the departmental authorities took a correct view of law that the spoon was not included in cutlery. Our answer to the question referred to us is that the spoon is not included in cutlery and is not covered by entry No. 5 of Notification No. ST-3391/X-1012/1962, dated 1st July, 1962. As no one has appeared for the assessee there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (11) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t all. So if a person bona fide and with due diligence prosecutes the first proceedings and on being unsuccessful therein, files an appeal on merits, it can be said that he had sufficient cause for not filing an appeal during the period in which he was prosecuting his application under section 30. So there was good cause for condonation of delay. Having heard the learned standing counsel we are not satisfied that the revising authority committed any error of law in taking the view that the assessee was bona fide and with due diligence prosecuting the first proceedings under section 30 and on being unsuccessful therein filed an appeal on merits, which is a finding of fact. On the basis of the said finding the delay could reasonably and validly be condoned. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (11) TMI 66 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 958. For the words the tax so levied , the words and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of the sale of such goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax levied under such law were substituted. For the words shall be refunded to such person , the words shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of interState trade or commerce were substituted. The effect of this amendment is that the refund can only be claimed by the person, who effected the inter-State sale and by no other person. Admittedly, the petitioners did not effect the inter-State sale of the goods. Thus, according to this amendment, the contention of the counsel for the petitioners is without any force and is rejected. The petitioners are liable to pay the sales tax and the impugned notices were validly issued to them. There is no substance in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. D.K. MAHAJAN, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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