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Showing 41 to 60 of 90 Records
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1973 (11) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that this assertion in the writ petition has not as such been denied in the counter-affidavit, leads us to believe the case of the petitioner that de-oiled rice bran is used, inter alia, as cattle feed. The word fodder has been defined in the Chambers s 20th Century Dictionary as food supplied to cattle feed . Thus, it seems to us, that there is no material difference between cattle fodder and cattle feed . Anything, which is used as cattle feed, could as well be called cattle fodder within the meaning of the aforesaid notification. In our opinion, the de-oiled rice bran was covered by the expression cattle fodder in the aforesaid notification and was, as such, exempt from sales tax. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to modify the assessment order dated 26th March, 1973, excluding therefrom the turnover of the petitioner in respect of the de-oiled rice bran. The petitioner would be entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 64 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wording. In Punjab also the department seizes the goods and releases them only on payment of penalty. So this distinction is without any effect. The learned single judge made certain further observations that in the present case the goods were being transported from one of its offices in West Bengal to its sub-depot in Jullundur and were not being carried as a result of sale . In view of the fact, that the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 14-B of the Act had been struck down because of the decision of the Supreme Court, it was hardly necessary, as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, to make any further observations. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss the same. However, any observations made with regard to the nature of the transaction under which the goods were being transported, would not be taken into consideration in any further proceedings that may arise. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ision of law has been brought to our notice which rules out this possibility. The last contention urged by Mr. Ved Vyas is that if there is any doubt as to the interpretation of section 8(2A) of the Central Act, its benefit should go to the assessee. In the first place, we have no doubt on the matter and we have already expressed our opinion. In the second place, the assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The rule is firmly settled that if the assessee claims exemption, the burden of proof that he is entitled to it is on him and, therefore, there is no question of his getting the benefit of the doubt. See in this connection M/s. Sharma Sales Centre v. State of Haryana1973 R.L.R. 276. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the questions referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessees. In the circumstances of the cases, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. References answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court ... ... ... ... ..... nding and to formally adjourn them for hearing on every date. These applications are only effective if any one of the contingencies mentioned in rule 101 occur. There is, therefore, no necessity to have replies at this stage, and there is no necessity to keep these applications pending till such time as the original petition fails or is likely to fail in the manner mentioned in rule 101. These applications are accordingly disposed of, but this order will remain on the file and as soon as the list in Form No. 10 has been filed by the petitioner s counsel, as separately directed, the applicants will be before the court (all 81 of them), to ask the court to be substituted as petitioners, as and when the contingencies provided for in rule 101 occur. This will, in effect, allow the applicants to get the relief they seek now, as and when the time for the grant of the same arises. This application and the 80 other applications of a similar type are disposed of. No order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up – Application of insolvency rules, Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... cannot be allowed to be levied by the Board. It is obvious that the delayed payment charges aggregating to Rs. 1,999 are for the period July 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968, that is, after the company was ordered to be wound up by this court. In view of rule 156 of the Companies (Court) Rules, interest on the outstanding amount of the claim cannot be allowed as a debt provable in winding-up and under these circumstances the only debt which can be admitted to claim is the amount of the minimum charges aggregating to Rs. 38,295 for the period July 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. The amount of Rs. 1,999 for delayed payment charges must, therefore, be disallowed. Under these circumstances, we allow the appeal and make the judge s summons absolute as regards the amount of Rs. 38,295 only and we disallow the claim of Rs. 1,999 for delayed payment charges. The official liquidator will pay the costs all throughout, that is, of the Company Application No. 76 of 1972 as well as of this appeal.
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1973 (11) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Dyes - Synthetic organic dyestuffs ... ... ... ... ..... to be on the assessee. It is, however, clear from the provisions of the said sub-clause (iii) of Section 4A(a) that the fact to be established by an assessee is by way of an exception and is one which could only be within the knowledge of the assessee himself. In our view, therefore, it was incumbent on the respondents to establish in the present case that the four varieties were manufactured after the midnight of 28th Feb., 1961 and they have failed to do so. 23. emsp In the result, the petitioners succeed and we allow the petition and set aside the order dated 22nd August, 1955 so far as the lot of 31958 kgs. is concerned, the earlier two orders dated 21st April 1962 and 4th September, 1961 having merged therein and direct the respondents to refund to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 90,803.78 wrongly collected by them from the petitioners. 24. emsp The respondents to pay to the petitioners the costs of this petition and the Civil Appeal No. 1218 of 1967 to the Supreme Court.
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1973 (11) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Confiscation - Customs ... ... ... ... ..... account. We are unable to appreciate this line of reasoning. When the Government Order mentions that coins of less than 40 silver content will be released, the normal connotation will be that coins with less than 40 silver content by weight would be covered because the weight of a coin is a fixed thing while its value may fluctuate from day to day according to the market rates. The omission of confining the benefit of the Government Order to coins of less than 40 silver content by value would not exclude exemption in favour of silver coins with less than 40 silver content by weight. In the present case the seized coins were admittedly less than 40 silver content by weight. In our opinion, they were clearly covered by the aforesaid Government Orders and so could not validly be confiscated. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. The respondents are directed to return the seized silver bars and the coins to the petitioner forthwith.
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1973 (11) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Brand Name - Ready to wear apparel ... ... ... ... ..... er is entitled to clear the goods manufactured and which are not marked under a brand name that is a name or other trade mark registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. We may make it clear that the stand taken by the respondents that so long as the article falling under Item Nos. 1, 2 and 3, notification Annexure A are sold irrespective of the facts whether they are affixed with label MEBRO or are not, are liable to pay duty since the petitioner has not got trade mark de-registered cannot be accepted. It is not necessary for the petitioner that he should get the trade mark de-registered in order to claim exemption in respect of the goods which it manufactures and which it markets not under a brand name. Mr. Daru stated that he has obtained licence and, therefore, he is not pressing that relief claimed in the petition. 8.For the aforesaid reasons rule issued on the petition is made absolute. Respondent No. 2 to pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner.
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1973 (11) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants have no locus standi to ask for release of the goods?
Held that:- There cannot be any question of violation of principles of natural justice or any lack of opportunity to the appellants to show cause in regard to the order dated 20 September, 1963 extending the time for giving the notice under Section 124 of the Act contemplated in Section 110 of the Act. The appellants themselves asked for release of the goods on depositing moneys and executing bonds representing the value of the goods released. The agreements in the present appeals establish that the parties on consideration of all the facts and circumstances waived notice for extending the time within six months of the seizure of the goods.
The Excise Authorities are also right in their contention that the appellants have no locus standi to ask for release of the goods because the Bank was in possession of the goods as the pledgee and the Excise Authorities seized the goods from the possession of the Bank.
The moneys deposited and the bonds executed by the appellants are really the substituted goods for the purpose of adjudication as to whether there can be any confiscation of goods or imposition of penalty. The parties agreed that the Excise Authorities would retain the securities for the purpose of adjudication proceedings in the event of failure of the appellants in the writ petitions filed by them. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation And Development Rebate, Expenditure Incurred ... ... ... ... ..... rs during these four months period. Even this figure is more than the amount allowed by the Tribunal under this head. I see no reason not to accept the Tribunal s finding that this amount of Rs. 36,406 out of the aggregate amount of Rs. 78,897.60 claimed by the assessee ought to be properly allowed to the assessee as part of the actual cost incurred by the assessee-company in acquiring and installing the depreciable assets. The same conclusions will hold good for both the assessment years in question, as it is the admitted position that the facts are identical for both these years. VIMADALAL J.--I agree and have nothing more to add. BY THE COURT The question referred to in para. 7 of the statement of the case is answered in the affirmative, but the figure is reduced from Rs. 84,181 to Rs. 81,922.73. The answer to the question referred to us in para. 8 of the statement of the case will be in the same terms. The Commissioner must pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1973 (11) TMI 40 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... material which would enable us to determine the question satisfactorily. In view of the provisions of section 27, sub-section (5) of the Wealth-tax Act, which is in the following terms If the High Court or the Supreme Court is not satisfied that the case as stated is sufficient to enable it to determine the question of law raised thereby, it may require the Appellate Tribunal to make such modifications therein as it may direct , we direct the Tribunal that it should furnish us with a better statement of the case so that we are able to determine the question of law raised satisfactorily. For that purpose, the Tribunal can ascertain the material facts and then remit the statement of the case to us indicating whether the Board while permitting the purchase or sale of gold placed any restrictions on its price, i.e., whether gold could be purchased or sold only at a particular price or at the price quoted in the newspapers on any relevant date. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 39 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... te under article 133 of the Constitution. The different petitioners herein have through their respective advocates undertaken to apply for urgent certified copies of the judgment herein in the course of tomorrow and they have applied for stay of the operations of the different proceedings pending before the authorities concerned regarding their liability to pay tax on capital gains arising under the circumstances set out hereinabove. In order to enable the parties concerned to appeal to the Supreme Court and to obtain stay from the Supreme Court, the proceedings before the different authorities in connection with the liabilities of these different assessees to capital gains tax are hereby stayed for a period of four weeks from the date on which certified copies of the judgment are ready for delivery to the applicants for such certified copies. The office to supply such certified copies even though the formal orders in connection with these different matters are not drawn up.
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1973 (11) TMI 38 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... ct brings the amount of Rs. 42,000 to the charge of estate duty. Mr. Awasthy then referred to K. C. Manavedan v. Deputy Controller of Estate Ditty. His contention is that it is not necessary that the deceased should have interest in praesenti or controlling power on property during his lifetime. This may or may not be so. The fact of the matter is that in Manavedan s case, the property which was sought to be subjected to estate duty was in existence. Whereas in the case with which we are dealing, the property was not in existence as to pass on death, while in the case referred to by Mr. Awasthy, it was in existence and passed on the death of the deceased. Therefore, this decision does not help the contention of the learned counsel. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will get his costs which are assessed at Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 37 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Closing Stock, Finding Of Fact, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... August 1, 1961, both written by the foreign party to the assessee. The Tribunal after going through the correspondence found that the assessee had not satisfactorily explained the credit note for pouond 607 12s. 6d. dated November 15, 1960, and the failure to account for it in the account books. It also observed that if that credit note had wrongly been issued by the foreign party, it would not have borne a specific serial number, which it actually bore (No. 55966). The Tribunal thus came to its conclusions after assessing the evidence before it. It was competent to determine the sufficiency of the evidence before it. The inference drawn by the Tribunal from the evidence on record was a finding of fact, and its refusal to make a reference to us, as desired by the assessee, calls for no interference from us. Under these circumstances, we do not find any merit in this petition, which, accordingly, is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Adequate Consideration ... ... ... ... ..... al income of the assessee. For the assessment year 1961-62, the relevant provision applicable is section 16(3)(a)(iv). For the assessment year 1962-63, the relevant provision is section 64(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. But the provisions are in pari materia and there is no difference in substance. Though the provisions applicable for these two assessment years are different, the question referred specifies only section 16(3)(a)(iv). But we see from the order of the Income-tax Officer that for the assessment year 1962-63, he has invoked the provisions of section 64(iii). Since the law in respect of both the provisions is the same, there is no need for discussing section 64(iii) separately. Our opinion expressed above covers the question both in regard to section 16(3)(a)(iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and section 64(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We, accordingly answer the reference in the affirmative and against the assessee with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1973 (11) TMI 35 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Trust Whether Charitable ... ... ... ... ..... ombay High Court in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Yusufally, that the apparently wide discretion has to be exercised within the four corners of the wakf and for Dawat purposes. What are Dawat purposes, have been described by Marten J., at page 1102, in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Yusufally and, in our opinion, it is only within the four corners of Dawat purposes as recognised by the Dawoodi Bohra community that the Mullaji Saheb can use the corpus or the income of this fund. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 11(1)(a) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the trusts are entitled to exemption under section 11(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We, accordingly, answer the question in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1973 (11) TMI 34 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Higher Rate, Income Returned ... ... ... ... ..... there was any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee in filing the return. The Tribunal arrived at this finding on a careful consideration of the materials of the particular case. In the circumstances, we find that the Tribunal was justified in its opinion that the penalty in the instant case, in view of the particular facts and circumstances of the case, was not justified. The facts of this case appear to be similar to the facts of the case in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sankarsons and Company, a case decided by the Kerala High Court. We respectfully agree with the observations made by the Kerala High Court regarding the question of law raised in that case, which are equally applicable to the facts of the present case. In the result, we answer the question referred in the negative and against the department. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. D. PATHAK J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... my view, the Income-tax Tribunal was correct in the view that it took following the decision in Income-tax Reference No. 2 of 1950, and the revenue must accordingly fail in this reference. It may be mentioned here that Mr. Hajarnavis had, in passing, submitted certain other possible objections to the registration of this firm. However, we did not permit him to raise them, since the Commissioner had not cancelled the registration of the firm on the basis of those contentions advanced by Mr. Hajarnavis. The same would also not arise from the order of the Tribunal. VIMADALAL J.--I agree and have nothing to add. By the court Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the firm could be registered under section 26A for the assessment year 1959-60, and the Commissioner of Income-tax was not right in law in cancelling the registration thereof. The commissioner to pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1973 (11) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Adventure In The Nature Of Trade, Income From Business ... ... ... ... ..... was liable to be included in the income of the assessee-company under section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. VIMADALAL J.--I agree with the judgment just delivered by my brother, Desai J., and would like to add only a few words. There is no material at all on record which would show that the two claims in question were purchased for any purpose other than to undertake an adventure in the nature of trade. In fact, the material on record pointed out by my brother, Desai J., in his judgment points only one way and that is that at a time when the company was not bound to purchase the said two claims, it purchased them with the sole object of trading in them for profit. On the authorities cited by my brother, Desai J., the fact that this was not the main business of the company makes no difference. BY THE COURT The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Commissioner. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner.
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1973 (11) TMI 31 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Retrospective Operation, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... nue in advancing its case. Under these circumstances, both the contentions urged on behalf of the revenue fail and both the aspects of the second contention must also fail. We, therefore, hold that section 59 after its amendment by the Act of 1958 is not retrospective in its operation and is not a variant of the provisions of the old section 62 and hence reliance cannot be placed on section 59 for reopening the assessment which was once completed-prior to July 1, 1960, since reopening of the assessment would take away the right of the accountable person not to have the assessment reopened. Under these circumstances, we answer the question in each of the three references against the revenue and in favour of the accountable person. We answer the first part of the question in the negative and it must be held that the reopening of the assessment under section 59 of the Act was bad in law. The Controller will pay the cost of the accountable person in each of the three references.
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