|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 54 Records
-
1973 (6) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... mstances ,the only reasonable construction of the statutory provisions is that the moment a coparcener dies, his interest in the coparcenary property gets crystallised and separated from the rest of the property and the property so separated devolves on his heirs by succession under the provisions of the Act, as tenants in common and that excludes any right of the kartha of the coparcenary to deal with that property. Therefore, on the death of Gnanasekhara, his interest in the casuarina trees vested in the plaintiffs herein, namely, his widow and daughter, and since the appellant herein sold the casuarina trees after such death, he is accountable to the plaintiffs for the sale proceeds of the said casuarina trees and consequently the plaintiffs are entitled to an one-third share of the said sale proceeds, namely, Rs. 10,000/-. 20. Under these circumstances, we hold that there is no substance whatever in the appeal and dismiss the same with costs of the plaintiffs-respondents.
-
1973 (6) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ny should be deemed to be enable to pay its debt. In support of this proposition reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Japan Cotton Trading Co. v. Jajodia Mills.. In the affidavit in opposition, however, it had been stated that a reply was sent to the statutory notice, However, in view of the contention raised even though the statutory presumption might have been there in view of the defence indicated in the affidavit in opposition it cannot be held at this stage that the dispute was either not reasonable or not bona fide. 4. In the premises. I am of the opinion that the petitioner cannot enforce the claim in this winding up petition and should take recourse to have its remedy if any, by other proceedings. In the premises, this application fails and is accordingly dismissed. 5. There will be no order as to costs. This however, will not prejudice any proceedings to be taken by the petitioner by instituting a suit to enforce its claim.
-
1973 (6) TMI 69 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the inherent powers of the Court. But even so, no grounds have been made out for invocation of the inherent powers of review. The judgment sought to be reviewed, rendered on 1-1-1969, noticed that no counter affidavit bad been filed by the Government and there was no appearance for the Government at the hearing, Writ appeal No. 5070 of 1965 and the batch of cases heard along with it, or at least some of them, were then pending in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and remanded the matter back to this Court on 30th July 1969. In pursuance of the remand, a Division Bench of this Court sustained the legislation by its judgment given on 18-10-1970. No steps were taken for an appeal against the Judgment dated 1-1-1969. The application for review was filed only on 18-8-1971. In the circumstances, we see no ground to exercise our inherent power of review. We dismiss this application but in the circumstances without costs.
-
1973 (6) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... kashi is to the effect that the goods were wrapped in covers. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were sitting on the rear seat where no packages or goods of any kind were found. Even if, therefore, possession of the goods by the accused had been proved and also that the goods were smuggled, no knowledge on their part could be said to have been proved of the goods being smuggled. 28. The prosecution had thus failed to prove that the accused were found in possession of the goods, that the goods were smuggled and that the accused had knowledge that they were smuggled. In the result, the charges could not be held to have been established against any of the accused and they were entitled to an acquittal. They were, therefore, rightly acquitted by the trial Court and this appeal by the State must fail. 29. The appeal filed by the State accordingly fails and is dismissed. The order of acquittal passed in favour of all the three accused by the learned Presidency Magistrate is confirmed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 67 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in section 2(4) is property of every description except immovable property. The learned counsel could not show anything repugnant in the subject or context in the Act to prevent calling in aid of the definition in the General Clauses Act. It is clear that an animal is also movable property and by no stretch of imagination can it be brought under immovable property . That being the position, goods , which means all kinds of movable property, will include animals. Sale of animals is therefore sale of goods under the Act. The second submission of the learned counsel also fails. 6.. We have already held in disposing of the second submission that goods under section 2(4) of the Act includes animals . The third submission of the learned counsel is also, therefore, of no avail. 7.. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. We will, however, make no order as to costs. The rule is discharged. The stay order stands vacated. R.S. BINDRA, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 66 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... appellate order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal found paucity of material for coming to a conclusion and, therefore, directed a further enquiry by remanding the matter. We are of the view that the remand was justified and we are, therefore, not in a position to answer on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, whether the articles in question were exigible to tax at the rate prescribed under serial No. 1 or under serial No. 32 of the schedule of taxable goods. We accordingly decline to answer the question referred to us at this stage. After investigation is made in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal, it shall be open to the parties to raise appropriate contentions in case there would still be existing dispute between the assessee and the department in regard to the rate of tax to be applied to the case in question. The references are accordingly discharged. There would be no order as to costs of the proceedings. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. References discharged.
-
1973 (6) TMI 65 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he Supreme Court in the case of Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore 1972 29 S.T.C. 246 (S.C.). A larger Bench of seven learned judges had already held that the two decisions referred to in the later case were not good law. Yet, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Cement Distributors P. Ltd. 1973 31 S.T.C. 309 (S.C.)., reliance was placed on those decisions which were no more good law. In view of this feature in the case, it would follow that the principle indicated in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Cement Distributors P. Ltd. 1973 31 S.T.C. 309 (S.C.). may not be available to support Mr. Mohanty s contention. 12.. The question as referred to this court can have only one answer in view of what has been stated above and that answer shall be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be construed that there was a sale of gunny bags liable to payment of sales tax. We make no order as to costs of the references. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1973 (6) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y strongly relies on the said decision in support of his contention that the sales tax collected under section 21-A cannot form part of the turnover for the purpose of the General Sales Tax Act. But, the learned counsel for the revenue submits that the decision in Spencer and Co., Madras v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Division No. III, Madras 1969 24 S.T.C. 161., so far as it deals with this point requires reconsideration. But we are not convinced that the principle laid down In the said decision on this point is in any way erroneous. Following the above decision we hold that the sales tax collected and paid over to the State by the petitioners under section 21-A of the Madras Prohibition Act has to be excluded from the taxable turnover while the gallonage fee had rightly been included. In other respects the orders of the Tribunal are upheld. The tax case is therefore partly allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the definition of business in 1964, transactions which were incidental or ancillary to the assessee s main trade or business were not liable to tax where there was no profit-motive, transactions of sale effected after the said amendment will be liable to tax, if they were incidental or ancillary to, or connected with, the main business. As a matter of fact, in that case, the sale of certain articles of scrap such as unserviceable oil drums, rubber hoses, jerry cans, rims, unserviceable pipe fittings and old furniture sold by the assessee, which was a company dealing in petroleum products, was held to be taxable under the Madras General Sales Tax Act for the reason that the scraps were connected with the business of the assessee. Following the principle laid down in the above case, we hold that the transactions in this case are liable to tax. In this view, the order of the Tribunal is set aside, and the tax case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 62 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the negative. The third question does not survive for our consideration and it is not necessary to answer the same. Therefore, we answer the questions referred to us as follows (1) On the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales of saris of art silk fabrics to which zalars, that is, borders are attached by stitching them to saris after the process of manufacture are not covered by entry 41 of Schedule A arid, therefore, are not exempted from tax under subsection (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, saris of art silk fabrics to which zalars, that is, borders are attached by stitching them to saris, are not art silk fabrics within the meaning of sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. (3) The question does not arise for our consideration as the second question is decided in the negative. There shall be no order as to costs of this proceeding. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1973 (6) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ccasioned by the order placed by the local buyer and that, therefore, the sale by the assessee to the local buyer is a sale in the course of import as per section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act. This view of the Tribunal is challenged by the revenue. We are of the view that on the facts found by the Tribunal that the import of the chemicals in question has been occasioned by the order placed by the local buyer, the conclusion is inescapable that the sale by the assessee to the local buyer of the same consignment of chemicals Is a sale in the course of import. The learned Government Pleader seeks to question the finding of the Tribunal that the order placed by the local buyer on the assessee preceded the import. But after going through the correspondence and other materials found from the records, we are satisfied that the finding rendered by the Tribunal cannot be taken exception to. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 60 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s made when the suppression found was to the tune of Rs. 37.05, it was on the footing that there were similar other suppressions in the purchase account which could reasonably be estimated at Rs. 2,000. The actual suppression found at the reassessment stage being to the tune of Rs. 232.05 it is quite possible that this could have been accommodated in the estimate made in the first occasion. In accepting the assessee s contention, the Tribunal does not seem to have made any error. The second question referred to us, therefore, turns out to be one of pure fact. The Tribunal was competent to make an estimate according to his best of judgment and in the facts of the case, no question of law arises out of that order. We accordingly decline to answer the second question. 14.. The first question is, therefore, answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The department shall have hearing fee of rupees one hundred. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1973 (6) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sale of goods by one party to the other for a money consideration. Applying the above test to the facts of this case, it is clear that in the agreement there is no independent term for the sale of gunny bags as such by the assessees to the Food Corporation for a money consideration. As already stated, there is no reference to the supply of gunny bags, either old or new, apart from the contract to grind the wheat and supply wheat products in a packed condition. The assessees have used old and new gunny bags for packing the wheat products and this is only in the course of discharging their obligation of grinding wheat and supplying wheat products in a packed condition. The obligation to pack the wheat products in standard packings cannot be construed as an obligation to supply gunny bags for a price. We are, therefore, of the view, that, in this case, the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion. The tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 58 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... are concerned here and which is, as stated, more or less a residuary entry as far as the case of machinery and other spare parts and accessories are concerned. The Tribunal was also right when it considered the development of this entry for purposes of appreciating the legislative intent. By subsequent amendment, the State Legislature by way of a greater caution clarified by inserting sub-entry (2) under entry No. 15 and making the original entry No. 15 as sub-entry (1) and covered also the oil engines and electrical motors other than those adapted for use in motor vehicles. In this state of affairs, therefore, we answer the question raised as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, oil engines prior to 14th March, 1960, and spare parts thereof prior to 27th September, 1960, fall under entry 15 of Schedule C to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, for purposes of levy of tax. There should be no order as to costs in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1973 (6) TMI 57 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... erials found. It should also be noted that in the case of rejected materials neither the contractors nor the sub-contractors had any right or interest therein. They were at liberty to dispose of these materials with the consent of the company, provided they were in a position to find out the purchasers who might be prepared to pay the royalty for those materials. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal has not properly considered the relevant terms and conditions nor addressed itself rightly to the real question which was at issue between the parties. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the contract entered into between the applicant and M/s. Palanji Shapoorji and Company was a contract for work and labour in respect of quarrying limestone chips from Ranavav quarry and was not a contract for sale of the same. The State shall pay the costs of the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1973 (6) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd levying the penalty. On the facts of the case, the Tribunal s observation that there is no proof of suppression with a view to evade payment of tax and, therefore, the penalty is not justified, cannot be sustained. Admittedly, the return submitted by the assessee had been found to be incorrect and a best judgment assessment has been made in the case. This straightaway attracts the provision of section 12(3). We are not inclined to agree with the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee that a finding that the suppression was wilful is necessary for the purpose of invoking section 12(3), even though the said provision does not, in terms, require such a finding. In this view of the matter, we have to set aside the order of the Tribunal in so far as it relates to the levy of penalty and the order of the assessing authority levying a penalty of Rs. 100 is restored. The tax case is allowed in part. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 55 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... iew, such a contention has no substance. It is well-settled that there is no estoppel against a statute. If the statute provides that such a pending proceeding can be continued or enforced only against the State of West Bengal, I do not see any reason why mere participation in the assessment proceeding by the petitioner can disentitle it to the protection afforded by the statute. For the reasons stated above this rule succeeds. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the notice dated 10th February, 1967, issued under section 11 of the Act and the Certificate No. 8151 (BH) of 1967-68 filed in the office of the Certificate Officer, 24-Parganas, and the Certificate Case No. 81 ST(BH) of 1967-68. There will also be a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the said notice under section 11 of the Act. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.
-
1973 (6) TMI 54 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... pondent No. 1 has also considered the merits of the case and found that there was hardly any reason for him to hold that a suo motu revision was necessary. The reasoning of respondent No. 1 on this point does not seem to be very clear. While he treats this application as one made under rule 80(2) of the Rules and rejects the same as time-barred, he also proceeded on the basis that it was a suo motu revision. It is not clear as to whether this application was treated by him as one for suo motu revision or as an application for revision at the instance of the petitioner. In these circumstances, the order of respondent No. 1 is quashed and set aside by a writ of certiorari. There will be a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving any effect to the said order. Respondent No. 1 is, however, at liberty to proceed according to law. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.
-
1973 (6) TMI 53 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed under section 13(2) of the Act is not paid, the authorities constituted under the Act have to take recovery proceedings in the manner provided under the Act. When such proceedings are initiated against the alleged defaulting assessee, it is open to him to contend that he is not a defaulter or that the amount of penalty sought to be recovered is excessive. If the assessee contends that he is not a defaulter or that the amount claimed is excessive, then the court of the Recovery Officer has to decide whether penalty has been incurred or that the amount claimed is correct. In that view, all the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners fail. Consequently, these writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. One set. Sri Chandrakantharaj Urs, the learned High Court Government Advocate, who appeared for the respondent is permitted to file his memo of appearance in W.P. Nos. 23 and 24 of 1973 within two weeks from today. Petitions dismissed.
-
1973 (6) TMI 52 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on 6th October, 1971, he had only one purpose in view and, that is to seize the private account books which were normally kept hidden or intentionally put out of the way. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the respondent, in our opinion, amounts to a search of the petitioner s premises for the purpose of securing hold of the concealed account books. Admittedly, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure required to be followed were not complied with by the respondent. Therefore, the search being illegal, the seizure of the account books also becomes illegal. The search and seizure being illegal, the petitioner is entitled to the return of the account books and other papers seized from his premises. We, accordingly, issue a direction to the respondent to return to the petitioner the account books and other documents seized on 6th October, 1971, as per annexure A together with copies of notes, if any, made therefrom. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
|
