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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 88 Records
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1975 (10) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lection-petitioner were in the nature of his supplemental pleading. They could not be treated as something extraneous to his pleading. They could be legitimately looked into for construing Paragraph 11(iv) of the petition. These particulars supplied by the petitioner were substantially the same as given in Para 10 of the petition. These particulars amply confirmed the identity of Shiv Pratap Singh mentioned in Para 11(iv) as the same person who was one of the candidates. 47. In sum, Para 11(iv) of the petition contained allegations of a complete charge of corrupt practice against a candidate, Shri Shiv Pratap Singh and consequently in view of Section 82(b) it was obligatory for the petitioner to implead him, also, as a respondent. Failure to do so, would inexorably lead to the dismissal of his petition under Section 86. 48. Accordingly on this short ground, and for all the reasons aforesaid, we uphold the dismissal of the election petition and disallow this appeal with costs.
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1975 (10) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ced by an extraneous finding with regard to the lay off. Since it is a jurisdictional fact and the Tribunal's correct finding about victimisation would entitle it to interfere with the order of the management a wrong decision regarding victimisation resulted in an error of jurisdiction on the part or the Tribunal in not allowing the applications under section 33. The High Court was, therefore, not correct in dismissing the writ application in limine. In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court as well as the orders of the Tribunal are set aside. The Tribunal committed an error of jurisdiction in not allowing the applications. The Tribunal is, therefore, directed to record appropriate orders allowing the applications under section 33. The appellant will however, pay the costs of the Respondent as already ordered. CMP No. 5579 of 1975 of the appellant praying for condonation of delay in filing additional documents is rejected. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (10) TMI 117 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t would be more proper remedy for the determination of such disputed question of facts than a writ petition. I have not thought it fit to dispose of the writ petition only on the basis of the preliminary objections as I found that the question involved in the case is likely to arise time and again and therefore, I have dealt with the merits of the case. I have, therefore, refrained from giving any findings on the preliminary objections except to the extent they were covered in the discussions of the merits of the case. In view of the above discussion I would hold that the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel has no application to the State when the State is acting in its public, governmental or sovereign capacity except when it is necessary to apply the doctrine to prevent fraud or manifest injustice and would, therefore, dismiss the writ petition. In the peculiar circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. 19. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... because of the provision of law contained in section 37(3) of the Act But in this case on a careful consideration of the matter we have come to the definite conclusion that the difference which arose between the parties on the company's repudiation of the claim made by respondent no. 1 was not one to which the arbitration clause applied and hence the arbitration agreement could not be filed and 3 no arbitrator could be appointed under section 20 of the Act. Respondent no. 1 was ill-advised to commence an action under section 20 instead of instituting a suit within three months of the date of repudiation to establish the company's liability. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and orders of the courts below and dismiss respondent , no. 1's application filed under section 20 of the Act. Since he fails on technical grounds, in the circumstances of the case, we shall direct the parties to pay and bear their own costs throughout.
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1975 (10) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ents that even during those periods they were working as S.D.Os. or had gone on leave while continuing in such posts. In the circumstances justice requires that the Government should not claim any refund of any part of the salary paid to the respondents up till today. Partly in view of their undertaking and partly because of the requirement of justice, we direct the Government not to do so. 20. The final result of the appeals is as follows Civil Appeal No. 521/1970 is dismissed as abated on account of the death of the respondent. The respondent of Civil Appeal No. 519. it is admitted on all hands, is no longer in service. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed as infructuous. The remaining 11 appeals are allowed, the judgments and orders of the High Court both of the single Judge and the Division Bench are set aside. But this is subject to the directions given above in regard to the salary paid to the respondents so far. There will be no order as to costs in any of the appeals.
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1975 (10) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trisected by it). For the practice of law with expanding activist horizons, professional ethics cannot be contained in a Bar Council rule nor in traditional cant in the books but in new canons of conscience which will command the members of the calling of justice to obey rules of morality and utility, clear in the crystallized case-law and concrete when tested on the qualms of high norms-simple enough in given situations, though involved when expressed in a single sentence. We but touch upon this call to the calling of law as more is not necessary in the facts of these cases. 26. The law has thus been set right, the delinquents identified and dealt with, based on individualised deserts and the appeals are disposed of in the trust that standards and sanctions befitting the national Bar will be maintained in such dignified and deterrent a manner that public confidence in this arm of the justice-system is neither shaken nor shocked. 27. Parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1975 (10) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the order which had died at birth'. 32. I need not labour the point further. It has been lucidly brought out by my learned brother, Chandrachud J. in his judgment. Moreover, in the view I take, that the phrase "being under a sentence of imprisonment for life" takes in only that sentence of life imprisonment which, under the law, being the ultimate end product of the entire gamut of litigation fought in the hierarchy of courts, has become final, conclusive and indefeasible and as such is not liable to be impugned, annulled or voided by further judicial action further pursuit, of this line of argument will be unnecessary, if not academic. 33. For the foregoing reasons, the death sentence awarded to Rohitsingh with the aid of Section 303, Penal Code, must be set aside. His conviction under Section 302/34, Penal Code for the murder of Arun shall stand and on that count he shall undergo imprisonment for life. Excepting this modification, his appeal is dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in force in 1959 when the dispute arose and was decided by the Managing officer. A full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pt. Dev Raj v. Union of India & ors.( A. I. R. 1974 Pun. 65) considering the same question which arises for determination in this appeal, held that "a displaced person has a right to the determination of his claim for compensation and its satisfaction in the prescribed manner and this is a substantive right", that so far as rule 30 is concerned "the right which a displaced person claims under this rule .. cannot be adversely affected or taken away unless it is expressly stated in the amending provision, or the language of the Act This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the law. Neither by express words nor by implication the amendment of the Rules in 1963 deleting rule 30 has been made retrospective in operation. For these reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 111 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alance of his debt after accounting for the proceeds of the sale of articles pledged is governed by Article 57 of the Second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 viz., three years from the date of the loan and the suit brought beyond that period was barred by limitation. But these cases were cases of pledges of moveables and not cases of mortgages. 37. Further it does not appear that in any of those cases the debtor or pledgor was given the option to pay the amount at any time within three years of the pledge. These two decisions in our view do not apply to the facts of the present case, firstly because the suit transaction is one of mortgage and secondly because under the express terms of the agreement the money lent could be paid by the debtor any time within three years from the date of the agreement. The suit is therefore held to be within time. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 39. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t fit to summon the appellant and to enquire from him because, as appearing from the recovery memo Ex, P-5, he believed that the bribe was taken by Ram Narain, not for the appellant, but "in the name of the record clerk." The entire conduct of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the member of the raiding party was inconsistent with their having seen the appellant participation in the incident and taking the bribe or having anything to do with it. 7. We are, therefore, of the view that the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution is wholly insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant made a demand for bribe through Ram Narain or accepted any bribe from Dhan Lal for giving early certified copy of the entries in the Land Record. We must, consequently, set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit him of the offence charged against him. The bail bonds executed by the appellant will stand cancelled.
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1975 (10) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch as daily allowance and other allowances which are available to the regular employees. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the apprentice is an employee within the meaning of section 2(9) of the Act. Incidentally we may note that section 18 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, provides that- "save as otherwise provided in this Act, every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in an establishment shall be a trainee and not a worker...." The concept of apprenticeship is, therefore, fairly known and has now been clearly recognised in the Apprentices Act. Apart from that, as we have noticed earlier, the terms and conditions under which these apprentices are engaged or not give any scope for holding that they are employed in the work of the company or in connection with its work for wages within the meaning of section 2(9) of the Act. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 108 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sions of Sub-s. (4) of s. 215 empowering the Income Tax Officer to reduce or waive the interest in respect of those cases and under those circumstances as may be prescribed have been made applicable to interest payable under this Section also. r. 40 therefore is the relevant rule governing the grant of the benefit of waiver or reduction of interest payable under this section also. It has already been found that the petitioner's case does not fall within any of the categories mentioned in clauses (1) to (5) of r. 40. Hence there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the Commissioner ought to have interfered with the assessment order Ext. P3 passed by the Income Tax Officer for the year 1971-72 in so far as he levied interest from the petitioner under s. 217 of the Act. All the contentions raised by the petitioner have been found to be untenable. This writ petition has only to be dismissed and I do so, but, in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.
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1975 (10) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t, a probationer or temporary, will be discharged or reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reason. If the reason is to be fathomed in all cases of discharge or reversion, it will be difficult to distinguish as to which action is discharge or reversion simpliciter and which is by way of punishment. The whole position in law is rather confusing. We think it is time that the whole question was considered de novo and it would be better for all concerned and avoid a lot of avoidable litigation if it should be held that the reversion of a probationer from a higher to a lower post, or the discharge of a probationer, or the discharge from service of a temporary servant cannot be questioned except on the basis of mala fides in the making of the order. This Court will not be burdened with a lot of work of a kind about which the feeling of almost all the Judges has been that it is better that they do not come to this Court. The appeal is dismissed without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lly argued. The question in that event may not have been within the content of clause 23 of the agreement. But all questions of law, one of which may be interpretation of the agreement, need not necessarily be withdrawn from the domestic forum because the court has discretion under section 34 of the Arbitration Act or under article 226 of the Constitution and that the court is better posted to decide such questions. The arbitration clause 23 is a clause of wide amplitude taking in its sweep even interpretation of the agreement and necessarily, therefore, of clause 13 therein. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the submission that we should exercise our discretion to withhold the matter from arbitration and deal with it ourselves. We, therefore, find no justification in interfering with the conclusion of the High Court in dismising the writ application. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. We will, however, make no order as to costs. P.B.R. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be produced. We further feel that the Court should, if it thinks it necessitous, exercise its discretion and grant further time for formal compliance with the rule if the copies fall short of the requisite Number. In this view and to the extent indicated, we over-rule the decision in Bikram Dass's(supra) case. The State has yet another hurdle in its way. In the present case, an application for condonation of delay in filing the three copies re queried by r. 3 was made and the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, held that such condonation should not be granted. Discretionary exercise of power by a Court cannot be lightly interfered with by a Court of appeal, and we are loathe, therefore, to upset the order of the High Court declining to condone the delay, there being nothing perverse or irrational in the exercise. In this view also, the appellant has to lose. For these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... overnment has not been made. No rule of double jeopardy bars but absence of power under a rule inhibits a second inquiry by the Disciplinary authority after the delinquent had once been absolved. The appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. We may however make it clear that no government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. It can be; but once a disciplinary case has closed and the official re-instated, presumably on full exoneration. a chagrined Government cannot re-start the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by rules ill some authority. The basics of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier enquiry. For the present, this is theoretical because no such deadly defect is apparent on the record. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oring or disregarding the statutory rules which are binding on it. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to a refund of ₹ 1,21,930.71 which is due to the appellant out of the illegally realised premium of ₹ 1,55,000 allowing the sum of ₹ 33,069.29 already received by the appellant from the Government on account of compensation. The appellant's counsel made a statement in court that since the appellant had already vacated the area it will not of its own make any further claim for compensation or under any other heads but reserves its right to raise all possible defences against any action that may be instituted by the State against the appellant in the matter of the grant of mining for mica in the area. Subject to the reservation of the above right, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent that the State Government is directed to refund ₹ 1,21,930.71 as mentioned above. The appellant is entitled to its costs in this Court. Appeal allowed in part.
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1975 (10) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-s. (4) of s. 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. The High Court, in the present case, did not, therefore, act without jurisdiction in holding that the application preferred by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was not barred by the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-s. (4) of s. 417 since the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within such time limit. The order granting special leave was in the circumstances not an order outside the power of the High Court. We do not, therefore, see any reason to grant special leave to Mangu Ram and the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal to appeal against the order of the High Court and we accordingly dismiss the petitions for special leave filed by them. P.B.R. Special Leave Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t case for the making of the application or the delay made after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in subsection (3) from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal can be condoned under the proviso to that sub-section. In any view of the matter, in our opinion, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal is constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal is the only remedy available to the claimant. On the facts of this case, we hold that the remedy available to the respondents was to go before the Claims Tribunal and since the law was not very clear on the point, the time of about four months taken in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution can be held to be either a reasonable time or the delay of less than 2 months could well be condoned under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110A. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss this appeal with costs to respondents 1, 2 and 3. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 100 - COLLECTOR, OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... case neither the duty has been assessed nor it is a question of non-levy of duty. In the instant case the goods i.e. lids have escaped assessment absolutely. It is not the case of short levy through inadvertence, error, mis-statement about the quantity, description or value of the goods on the part of the owner. It is a case where the goods have just not been assessed to duty, which in due to the Govt. and if Rule 10 does not apply, invocation of Rule 10A is justified. It must also be noted in this connection that the appellants not seem to have informed the Deptt. at any stage that they were supplying the said quantity of the lids to the same parties to whom they had supplied the metal containers earlier without lids. Therefore, taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, the Assistant Collector was justified in confirming the demand of ₹ 1890.13 raised by the Supdt. of Central Excise. In view of the above conclusions the appeal is rejected.
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