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Showing 61 to 80 of 125 Records
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1976 (7) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Blowers without electric device - Duty Liability ... ... ... ... ..... said contention of Mr. Sarkar. The pronoun those undoubtedly refers to electrical fans. Therefore, unless the articles mentioned in sub-item (2) are electric fans or are operated by electrical device, they cannot, in my opinion, come within the purview of that sub-item so as to make them chargeable to excise duty. 4. In these circumstances, if any excise duty have been realised from the petitioner in respect of blowers manufactured by him, which are without any electrical device, the respondents shall refund such duty to the petitioner as claimed by him. It is made clear that the petitioner shall not be entitled to claim refund of duty realised by the respondents on blowers with electrical device or electrically operated. The respondents shall not also charge any excise duty on blowers without any electrical device or which are not electrically operated. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus issue in the above terms. 5. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above.
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1976 (7) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHEMDABAD
Fan - Twin Lobe Compressors - Eo Nomine Rotors ... ... ... ... ..... ation to avoid controversy. 10. As stated by us at the outset, the meaning given to electric fans all sorts in sub-item (2) of item No. 33 is so vague that it is difficult for any reasonable person to apply any standard or identifiable test and it is unreasonable to come to the conclusion that the goods in question come within the meaning of electric fans, all sorts . If it were the intention of the Legislature that the goods of the type with which we are now concerned should also be exigible to duty, the Legislature would have named these goods Eo nomine of defined electric fans in such a way so as to bring in the goods with which we are now concerned within the ambit of Item No. 33(2). 11. For all these reasons, we quash the impugned order of the first respondent and hold that the goods in question are not liable to excise duty under Item No. 33(2) or any other sub-item of Item No. 33. This Special Civil Application is, therefore, allowed. Rule is made absolute with costs.
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1976 (7) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Belting Dack - - Scope - Show cause notice - Criteria for issue - Clandestine removal - Connotation of - Cotton Fabrics - Freight and handling charges - Non-inclusion of in contract price - Admissibility
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1976 (7) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Brassieres - Item 22D. - Use of power - Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... (f) of the Act includes all processes that are incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product the only question to be considered by us, in the present case, is whether the process of ironing applied to the stiched brassieres can be regarded as incidental or ancillary to their completion. In our opinion, the process of ironing that was applied to the stiched brassieres prior to their packing was a process incidental to the completion of the brassieres as a manufactured product since the said process was obvious intended to give a finishing touch in order to render them marketable as ready-to-wear undergarments. Inasmuch as the said process was admittedly being carried out with the aid of power, liability for payment of duty under Item 22D gets attracted. The contention to the contrary put forward by the petitioner cannot therefore be accepted. 6. The original petition therefore fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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1976 (7) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the dispositive fact of giving up by a coparcener of a good part of what is due to him at the time of division to his own detriment and to the benefit of another coparcener, can be called "disposition" in law?
Held that:- Section 9, dealing with gifts, takes in property under a disposition made by a deceased, throwing up the question "what is a gift" ? Section 27 supplies the answer: "any disposition made by the deceased in favour of a relative of his shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as a gift ", unless, of course, it is made for full consideration. There is no limitation, environmental or by the society of words, warranting the whittling down of the unusually wide range of Explanation 2 to section 2(15).
What the provision declares is that if the disposition made by the deceased is more than two years before death, the property covered thereby shall not pass on the death unless it shall not have been bona fide. That is to say, even if the transaction were more than two years before the death, if it were entered into in bad faith, estate duty may still attach to that property. So far as dispositions made within two years of the death of the deceased are concerned, there is no question of mala fides or bona fides. All such transactions are caught within the coils of section 5 read with sections 9 and 27. The requirement of "bona fides" has nothing to do with dispositions within 2 years and has much to do with those beyond 2 years. The marginal obscurity in section 9 is due perhaps to compressed draftsmanship.
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1976 (7) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Gift Tax Act, Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... the Tribunal will, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court in New Jahangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax be restricted to the evidence on the record and may not be entitled to take additional evidence. That may result in injustice. In the circumstances we think it proper to decline to answer the question on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to consider and decide the question whether the conveyance under consideration was by way of usual provision for the marriage of the daughter and thus incidental to the marriage in this particular family or in this particular community. It will be open to the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal under section 26(6) of the Gift-tax Act in the light of the observations made in this judgment, after determining the question which ought to have been decided. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (7) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Capital Asset, Fair Market Value, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... on occurring in the third proviso to sub-section (2) should not be construed similarly. Having regard to the language that has been employed in the third proviso to section 12B(2) and having regard to the provisions which are to be found in sub-section (3) of section 12B it seems to us clear that on its proper interpretation the expression became the property of the assessee occurring in the third proviso to section 12B(2) would include a case of acquisition of capital asset for which no actual cost in terms of money has been paid by the assessee. In this view of the matter, it is quite clear to us that the assessee and his 7 partners were entitled to substitute the fair market value of the goodwill as on January 1, 1954, under the third proviso to section 12B(2) of the Act. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (7) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Cash Credits, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... nd has miserably failed to establish that case, it was not thereafter open to him to rely upon the decision in S. Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1964 51 ITR 757 (Mad) and merely advance the contention that the Income-tax Officer should have treated these credits as having come out of the addition of Rs. 53,000 made in the year 1960-61. On these two vital matters, the reported decision differs basically from the facts of this case, and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in not applying that decision to the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the conclusion of the Tribunal is one on a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case, and no question of law can be said to arise out of the said decision of the Tribunal. Accordingly, these petitions are dismissed. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to the costs of these petitions (one set). Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 250.
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1976 (7) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Diversion By Overriding Title, In Part, In The Nature, Partnership Deed, Provision For Payment
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1976 (7) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ject-matter of the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In this case, as already pointed out, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that there was no error at all, because no income escaped assessment. In those circumstances that order having become final and having been accepted by the department, it is not now open to the Income-tax Officer, on whom the said order is binding, to go behind that order and initiate proceedings under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as if there had been escapement of income to assesment. In view of these circumstances, we answer the third question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Since, by virtue of our answer to the third question, the controversy between the parties can be completely disposed of, it is unnecessary to answer the first two questions, and, therefore, we do not answer these two questions. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (7) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
1961 Act, Actual Cost, Local Authority ... ... ... ... ..... s has been met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority. His contention was having regard to such a provision which is to be found in the new Act, the provisions which are to be found in the old Act should also be construed in a similar manner. It is not possible to accept this contention of Mr. Joshi for the simple reason that section 43 which contains the definitions of several expressions including the expression actual cost gives those definitions for the purposes of sections 28 to 41 and section 33 is one of the sections included in these sections which deals with development rebate. The position under the new Act is, therefore, entirely different since we are concerned with the provisions of the old Act in the instant case, reliance on the new provisions could not be of assistance to Mr. Joshi. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Department will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1976 (7) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Income, Expenditure In The Nature Of Entertainment Expenditure, Income From Business, Income Tax Act, Total Income
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1976 (7) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Income, Capital Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... obligation to pay the subsidy. Actually, notwithstanding the demand and the statutory notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the institution of the suit, the amount as claimed was not paid. On the contrary, the whole of the amount claimed has not been accepted and a deduction therein has been arrived at by an amicable settlement between the Government and the assessee-company. Such an amicable settlement was arrived at for the first time in or about August, 1954, and it was, thereafter, that the amount of Rs. 2.03.903 was paid. Thus, so far as the facts of the case before us are concerned, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the amount of Rs. 2,03,903 accrued for the first time after the amicable settlement was arrived at between the Government and the assessee-company and has been rightly subjected to tax in the assessment year 1955-56. In the result, our answer to question No. 3 is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the reference.
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1976 (7) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, Income Tax Act, One Partner ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax Officer is enjoined to intimate only the defect in the declaration. If the intention of the legislature were to give an assessee an opportunity of remedying all disorderly declarations, whatever be the nature of the lacuna it would not have cut down the amplitude of the opportunity to remedying only defects in the declaration. There is another aspect of the matter. It is settled that fraud vitiates all proceedings and, if this is so, a fraudulent declaration of the type which we have in hand, would be no declaration in the eye of law, and in such an eventuality the Income-tax Officer would have no occasion to intimate the assessee under section 185(3) for, in law, the declaration furnished would be non est. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (7) TMI 51 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, One Partner ... ... ... ... ..... ment ....... We, on behalf of........................ declare that-- (name of firm) (1) our firm was granted registration for the assessment year 19 ...... 19...... vide order dated...... 19...... passed by the Income-tax Officer ......... and ........ This form of declaration would be inapposite in the case of erstwhile partners. The above reasoning points inescapably and irresistably to the conclusion that the persons concerned referred to in rule 24 are the partners of the firm as constituted at the date of making the declaration under the second proviso to subsection (7) of section 184 of the Act. The conclusion as to the validity of the declaration made in the present case reached by the Tribunal, therefore, becomes supportable, though, however, on a different reasoning. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (7) TMI 50 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax Act, Voluntary Disclosure ... ... ... ... ..... r the income from agricultural property for the earlier assessment years, it is clearly outside the scope of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the direction given by him in this behalf should be ignored by the Income-tax Officer. We answer question No. 1 in the following manner While the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was legally competent to set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment with regard to income from the sources which had been considered by the Income-tax Officer, he was not legally competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to make assessment in respect of sources which were not considered by the Income-tax Officer nor on the basis of material which had not been considered by the Income-tax Officer. Our answer to question No. 3 is covered by our answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2. We do not propose to give a separate answer to question No. 3. We make no order as to costs. MIAN JALALUDDIN J.--I agree.
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1976 (7) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... ssion was given on the date of the execution, the dispositive clause which controls and governs the first sentence, leads to the only conclusion, namely, that the transaction embodied in exhibit A-4 was only a will and not a settlement. We are of the opinion that the above extract represents the correct legal position and applying the above principles to the document we are considering, we have no hesitation in holding that the document in the present case does not constitute a settlement or gift because there is no provision in the document transferring any interest in the immovable property in praesenti in favour of any of the settlees. Under those circumstances, we agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal on the nature of the disposition contained in the document, and, accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs of this reference, and the counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1976 (7) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital, Dividend Reserve, General Reserve ... ... ... ... ..... ead of transferring the amount to the dividend reserve, the amount of Rs. 25,00,000 was transferred to the general reserve and the sum of Rs. 18,35,715 was directed to be paid as dividend for the same year from the amount standing to the credit of the general reserve. It is clear that the nomenclature given to an account is not conclusive. The sum of Rs. 18,35,715 was the proposed dividend in relation to the year ending June 30, 1964, and it is not includible in the computation of capital of the assessee-company. Thus, our answer to question No. 2 is that the general reserve to the extent of Rs. 18,35,715 as on July 1, 1964, was not includible in the computation of capital of the assessee-company but the sum of Rs. 6,64,285 as on July 1, 1964, was includible in the computation of capital of the assessee-company under rule 1 of the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, for the assessment year 1966-67. Each party will bear its own costs of the reference.
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1976 (7) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ility for tax was of Rs. 1,42,320 and the claim for deduction was made in respect of this amount of tax payable on the income so voluntarily disclosed. The Tribunal, following the decision of this High Court in Standard Mills case 1953 50 ITR 267 (Bom), has allowed the deduction and it is against this order that the present question is raised. So far as question No. 7 is concerned, no substantial submission has been made by Mr. Joshi. It is well settled position in law that liability in respect of tax payable is a debt and such amount of debt is to be deducted in computing the net wealth of an assessee that can be subjected to tax under the Wealth-tax Act. Thus, the Tribunal was right in permitting the deduction in respect of Rs. 1,42,320 being the amount of tax payable on the additional income voluntarily disclosed by the assessee. Accordingly, our answer to question No. 7 is in the affirmative. As nobody appears on behalf of the assessee there will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (7) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Cash Credits, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... transfer, assign or encumber his interest in the trust estate. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. The effect of the operative part of the deed of release executed by Shantilal is that thereby his entire interest under the trust deed in the trust estate is relinquished and even the powers of appointment which were conferred upon him are given up or surrendered. Such a thing cannot be treated or regarded as an attempt to transfer, assign or encumber his interest in the trust property. That being the position, the argument of Mr. Joshi that the provisions of paragraph (C) of clause 4(c) of the trust deed have come into operation cannot be accepted. So far as the interest of the sons of Shantilal is concerned, their shares have been determined and there is no question of applying the provisions of section 41 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1992. In the result, our answer to the question referred is in the negative. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assesses.
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