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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 173 Records
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1978 (3) TMI 197 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tribunal. The conclusion as it has now been reached cannot be justified. We find that opportunity has not been granted to the revision petitioner to meet the case based on the statement of Sri Bharathan. There was also no proper opportunity given to the assessee to rebut the presumption that the slips related to the business of the assessee. In these circumstances, we think, the proper course would be to set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal as well as the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Sales Tax Officer to enable the assessee to present his case in the light of what we have said here, adducing such evidence as he deems necessary. The department will also be free to adduce evidence, if so adduced. In the view we have taken on the first of the two questions posed by us, it is not necessary to consider the question whether there is a pattern of suppression for the whole year. That is left open. Disposed of as above. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 196 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... section 34(1)(b) cannot, therefore, succeed. The provisions of section 19(1) of the Act provide that if for any reason the sale or purchase of goods chargeable to tax under the Act has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the assessing officer can at any time within five calendar years from the date of the order of assessment reopen the assessment. In view of the clear language employed in section 19(1) of the Act, the view of the Tribunal that the assessing authority was debarred from reopening the assessment under section 19(1) of the Act on the ground that the assessing authority must be presumed to have scrutinized the C forms submitted by the assessee at the time of assessment, cannot be upheld. 6.. For all these reasons, our answers to the questions referred to us for opinion are in the negative parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (3) TMI 195 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lway, Jodhpur v. Assistant Commercial Taxation Officer 1976 37 S.T.C. 423 (S.C.)., where the Supreme Court held that introduction of the definition of the word business in section 2 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, by the Rajasthan Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1965, retrospectively was proper and the legislature was competent to give such retrospective effect by the amending Act. In our opinion, so far as the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, is concerned the matter is concluded by the judgments of this court and the said Act must be read and construed in the light of those judgments. In the facts and circumstances, it appears to us that question No. (2) must be answered in favour of the assessee. Our answer is that the sale of unserviceable goods, reject scraps, discarded and surplus materials were not exigible to tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 194 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he year of assessment. Out of this, according to the assessee, there is no intimation to the customer that an amount of Rs. 12,35,531.41 is payable and this amount is only a provision for anticipated price variation and its anticipated variation receipt and does not represent actual receipt since the assessee had not drawn or issued any price variation bills for this amount. The Tribunal, in our opinion, rightly pointed out that although the bills might not have been issued, the assessee had included the amount in the balance sheet and, therefore, that will form part of the sale price, and the fact that bills had not been issued to the customers is immaterial for the purpose of assessment. The Tribunal observed that what was material was not actual collection of the sale price but the receivability of the amount. We are in agreement with this reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal. We dismiss these revision cases but in the circumstances without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 193 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is purpose, the Tribunal directed a remand to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 2.. Counsel for the assessee has strongly attacked the order of remand made by the Tribunal. We think the counsel s attack against the order is justified. The Tribunal has a duty to consider the several aspects on which reliance had been placed by the Sales Tax Officer and by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, for coming to the conclusion on the question whether the assessee could or could not be regarded as a dealer in rubber. Without having specifically considered these aspects and entered a finding on the question, the Tribunal s remand, we are constrained to observe, amounts to a non-application of its judicial mind. We are unable to sustain the same. We set aside the order of the Tribunal and send the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Cases remanded.
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1978 (3) TMI 192 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Madras High Court that the assessee in that case had extracted limestones and transported the same to the buyer s place of business in pursuance of the agreement of sale entered into by it which specifically provided for the price of the limestones at the place of extraction and also for the supply and delivery charges payable to the buyer. In such circumstances, the Madras High Court upheld the claim for deduction in relation to the supply and delivery charges. We think the decision is appropriate and must govern the facts of this case. 6.. We are of the opinion, that in T.R.C. Nos. 65 and 66 of 1976, the assessee s claim to deduction in respect of transport charges must be upheld. We do so and for determining the main question in regard to the nature and the subject-matter of the agreement, along with T.R.C. No. 64 of 1976, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and send the cases back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. We make no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 191 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t introduced this forbidden system directly, it has done so in a colourable indirect manner. Once again we cannot accept this submission. If the excise duty has been paid as per the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and is included in the consideration for the sale, the dealer gets the benefit by paying reduced duty. Therefore, there is no colourable exercise of the power. For these reasons, we see no force in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. W.P.M.P. No. 1321 of 1978 Since the writ petition itself is dismissed there cannot be any question of granting stay. The stay petition is accordingly dismissed. Sri P.R. Ramachandra Rao makes an oral request for granting a certificate to enable his client to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are clear in our mind that there is no substance in the writ petition and we are therefore unable to certify that this is a case which deserves consideration by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the request is rejected. Writ petition dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 190 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at no reasons are given for refusing the refund of the institution fee. We feel that there is no valid reason for the Tribunal to deny the refund of the institution fee which it was authorised to refund under rule 30(3) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules. We direct the Appellate Tribunal to refund to the petitioner-assessee the institution fee paid in the appeals before it. Subject to the above modification, the common order of the Tribunal challenged in these revision petitions shall stand. We make it also clear that we should not be taken as having expressed any opinion on the view of law taken by the Tribunal on the interpretation of section 25-A of the principal Act as the need for expressing our opinion in the said regard did not arise. These revision petitions are accordingly dismissed subject to our direction regarding the refund of the institution fee by the Appellate Tribunal in respect of the appeals before it. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 189 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the appeals thereby impliedly refusing to rectify the mistake apparent on the record. In fact, there is no question of rehearing the appeals. The only question is of rectification of the mistake of law which is apparent on the record. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to exercise the jurisdicdiction vested in it under section 21-A of the Act and rectify the mistake of law apparent on the face of the record in accordance with law. For the reasons recorded above, Civil Writ Petition No. 228 of 1975 is allowed to the extent indicated above with no order as to costs. The above relief having been given to the petitioner in the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioners says that Sales Tax Cases Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 1973 and Sales Tax References Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of 1973 be dismissed as withdrawn. The learned counsel for the State has no objection to this being done. We order accordingly with no order as to costs. TIWANA, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 188 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... printed cloth and the observations there can, by no stretch of imagination, have any application to this case. We are of the view that the words such cloth or yarn would mean the cloth or yarn manufactured in U.P. and sold. It has nothing to do with the transformation by printing and designs on the cloth. The cloth exported is the same as the cloth sold with this variation or difference that the colour has changed by printing and processing. In the view which we take that the cloth exported is the same as the cloth sold by the petitioners, there can be no question about the exemption clause not applying to it and if the exemption applies, then the tax has been levied without jurisdiction. Both on the construction of the provisions of the taxing statute as well as on the principle of the judicial decisions noticed above, the view taken by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is correct. We dismiss these tax revision cases, in the circumstances, without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 187 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ready been answered in a series of cases. For the reasons indicated in the decision reported in Bavchand and Co v. State of Orissa 1976 38 S.T.C. 42., we would hold that for the period in question, the taxable turnover in dispute was liable to be assessed at the rate of 7 per cent. 4.. Our answers to the two questions, therefore, are (1) The Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, in the facts of the case, was not justified in deleting the sale proceeds of silver bullion amounting to Rs. 12,934.20, by admitting the sale patties issued by the commission agents of the assessee at the second appellate stage, from the taxable turnover. (2) The Additional Sales Tax Tribunal was wrong in holding that the turnover in dispute was liable to assessment at 5 per cent and under the relevant entry it was liable to be taxed at 7 per cent. As there is no appearance of the assessee in spite of service of notice, we make no order for costs. MOHANTI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 186 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid as part of the consideration for the sugarcane supplied to it by the grower. The point of time at which such payment was made or the purpose for which the amount has been used by the seller would be immaterial, as long as the amount is paid in lieu of the sugarcane supplied by the seller to the petitioner. We are of the view that the amount paid by way of khodki charges during the several assessment years, in fact, forms part of the price paid by the petitioner to the suppliers and it has been rightly included in the taxable turnover under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. The above view receives support from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Pandavapura Sahakara Sakkare Kharkhane (P.) Ltd. v. State of Mysore 1973 32 S.T.C. 104., though the amounts included in that case in the taxable turnover were not khodki charges but transport and harvesting charges. In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 185 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal was satisfied that the goods moved in pursuance of the contract of sale of the goods placed by the customers with the Here italicised. (1) 1969 23 S.T.C. 32. Kerala branch of the petitioner s factory. This was sufficient in the opinion of the Tribunal to hold that the movement of the goods had been occasioned by the contract of sale and, therefore, the transaction in question was an inter-State sale assessable under the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act. We do not think that any error of law has been disclosed in the decision of the Tribunal which calls for interference in these revision petitions. T.R.C. No. 21 of 1975 relates to the assessment year 1966-67 T.R.C. No. 23 of 1975 relates to the assessment year 1967-68 and T.R.C. No. 20 of 1975 relates to the assessment year 1969-70. Subject to this difference, the question arising is the same. We therefore dismiss all these revision cases, but make no order as to costs in any of these cases. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 184 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to buy at concessional rate wooden drums as packing material. Though the shape or the nature of the drum could not be material, yet the entry in the other dealer s certificate of registration is certainly available to be used as a further illustration of what the department expects the packing material to be. 4.. On the aforesaid analysis, we must hold that the Tribunal has taken the right view and the contentions advanced by the State have no basis. We would, accordingly, answer the first question thus In the facts and circumstances of the case, cable drums can be treated as packing materials for aluminium cables and the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, was justified in allowing the benefit of the concessional rate in respect of the sales effected by the assessee to M/s. Aluminium Industries Limited. In view of the aforesaid answer, the second question, as framed, does not arise for consideration. We make no order as to costs. MOHANTI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 183 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unsel that there has been a violation of article 301 of the Constitution as a result of the amendments complained of. 7.. The challenge based on article 14 cut no ice. The only ground urged was that tapioca having been originally shepherded into the inclusive part of the term vegetables in entry 10 of the Third Schedule, the omission of it alone, from that part, and its transference to the First Schedule as item 72, was discriminatory. We are quite unable to agree. The power of exemption from tax in respect of commodities, and the withdrawal of the exemption, are alike powers to be exercised by the Government with due regard to revenue raising purposes. We are unable to hold that the withdrawal of exemption for tapioca and its subjection to tax under the First Schedule, violates article 14 of the Constitution. We dismiss these writ appeals and these writ petitions with no orders as to costs. The petitions for stay and direction are dismissed. Appeals and petitions dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is conclusively proved that the signatures of the Manager of the Borpukhurie Tea Estate on the aforesiad cheque No. 5 3 were forged ?
What became of the report which appears to have been made by the appellant to the police in- respect of the said cheque and what is the impact of the result of that report on the truth or otherwise of the alleged forgery ?
Whether a prima facie case for dismissal of the respondent is made out by the appellant ?
Whether the appellant’s decision to dismiss the respondent was bona fide or was it an outcome of any unfair labour practice or victimisation ?
Whether the respondent was entitled to any payment in the interregrium between the conclusion of the enquiry and the final order of the Tribunal ?
Held that:- Allow the appeal - remit the case to the former with the direction to treat the appellant’s aforesaid application dated November 10, 1966 as one under section 33 (3) (b) of the Act and to dispose of the same with utmost despatch not exceeding six months of receipt of the order, after going into the point get out above. The parties shall be allowed to- adduce such evidence as they may like in respect of the aforesaid points. The costs of this appeal shall be paid by the appellant to the 2nd Respondent Workman which is ,quantified at Rs. 1500/-.
S.R.
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1978 (3) TMI 181 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... d be trifled with, and I am convinced that firm action should be taken against those who have the temerity to do so. The basis upon which the court granted permission must first and foremost be restored if not restored the permission must stand revoked. I direct the official liquidator forthwith to issue a notice to the respondent specifying the breaches I have referred to above and to call upon the respondent to remedy the same within a fortnight of the date of the receipt by her of such notice. In the event of the breaches not being remedied within that time, the official liquidator is directed to act forthwith under the terms of clause (9) of the agreements. The judge s summons qua prayers (b), (c), (d ) and (e) stands adjourned for four weeks. I make it clear that my decision and the directions that I have given are regarding prayer (a) of the judge s summons as also, as company judge, de hors the judge s summons, on the basis of information received in the company court.
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1978 (3) TMI 172 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Restrictions on establishment of place of business in India ... ... ... ... ..... 1976, of the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, was passed without any reason in support of his order and no opportunity was given to either of the contracting parties to present their cases before such authority. In the affidavit-in-opposition also no reasons for disapproval have been disclosed. Accordingly, this rule is made absolute. The impugned order of the Central Government dated 23rd of November, 1977, is quashed. Consequently, the agreement dated 8th June, 1976, subsists subject to the approval of the Central Government. This order, however, shall not prevent the respondent No. 3 from entering into a fresh agreement with a third party at its own risk and peril. Let a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 not to give effect to the said impugned order. There will be no order for costs. Let the operation of the order be stayed for a period of a fortnight from date, as prayed for.
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1978 (3) TMI 171 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... of the character of wages, we do not find it possible to accept this contention. We hold that leave allowances and notice pay will come within the scope of the expression wages used in clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 230. But, the right of priority in respect of such amounts will, as already indicated, have to be limited to the period mentioned in those clauses, viz., the period of two months next before the date of winding-up of the company. The lower court will, therefore, investigate afresh the question as to which of the amounts claimed by the workmen will fall within the scope of clause (b), (c ) and (e) of sub section (1) of section 230 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and pass appropriate orders in the matter. The appeal is allowed, the order of the court below is set aside to the limited extent indicated above and the matter is remanded to the lower court for fresh disposal in the light of the observations and directions contained in this judgment.
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1978 (3) TMI 170 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet ... ... ... ... ..... 191.3, the language of which is almost similar to the provisions of section 210 of the Act/the Supreme Court further held that it is no defence to the charge for breach of section 131 to say that a meeting was not called. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court it must, therefore, be held that the provisions of section 210(5) of the Act are attracted eves in a case where no general meeting was held. In view of my above finding it is not necessary for me to consider as to whether the Explanation to section 159 of the Act was applicable to the facts of the instant case as was contended by the learned lawyer for the appellant in the trial court. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Magistrate dated July 28, 1976, is hereby set aside and the learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case from the stage it reached prior to the passing of the impugned order, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore.
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