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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 173 Records
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1978 (3) TMI 114 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Evidence, Circumstantial Evidence - Appellate Court ... ... ... ... ..... P.C. 227(2) afforded a correct guide for the appellate Court s approach to a case disposing of such an appeal. (3) The different phraseology used in the judgments of this court such as (A) Substantial and compelling reasons , (B) good and sufficiently cogent reasons , (C) strong reasons are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the question of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal but should express the reasons in its judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. 10.Bearing these principles in mind, I have analysed the evidence and find that this is not a case in which this Court should interfere with the order of the learned Magistrate, acquitting the accused. Therefore these two appeals are dismissed.
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1978 (3) TMI 113 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Medicinal preparations ... ... ... ... ..... ntion was not drawn to this question of manufacturing profit. We are of the opinion that excise duty can be levied on Physicians samples except that the manufacturing profit as established by the appellant is to be excluded in computing the value on which such duty would be levied. 29.We, therefore, allow the appeal in part. We direct the issue of a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to impose excise duty on Physicians samples of the appellant s products which are distributed free by the appellant by excluding from wholesale price thereof the manufacturing profit which the appellant would have earned if those samples had been sold in the wholesale market. We also direct the respondents to consider all the claims of the appellant for refund, if any, including the refund due on Physicians samples and dispose of such claims within three months from date in accordance with law. 30.There will be no order as to costs. 31. Order per S.K. Dutta, J. . - I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 112 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Seized articles ... ... ... ... ..... ree declaring the plaintiff the owner of the articles seized. Subject to the result of the pending confiscation proceedings, the defendants are directed to return the goods to the plaintiff who will be also entitled to the costs of this suit including costs reserved from the contesting defendants in equal shares. The Joint Receivers appointed are directed to collect the seized articles from the Registrar Original Side of this Court and to return the same to the custody of the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 from whose possession it was taken by them, so that the confiscation proceedings may be completed expeditiously. The Joint Receivers will also hand back the key of the box in which the seized articles are kept to the person from whom they took possession of the same. The Joint Receivers to be paid a further fee of 12 GMs. each and also all costs, charges and expenses, to be paid by the plaintiff in the first instance, and they shall thereafter stand discharged. Order accordingly.
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1978 (3) TMI 111 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ANDHRA PRADESH
Exemption notification based on annual turn over - Time limit for filing refund ... ... ... ... ..... am inclined to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Whether the production during a financial year would exceed 40 metric tonnes or not would be known only at the end of the financial year. It is only at the end of the financial year that the petitioner company could properly claim refund on the basis of the notification. In the present case, the Central Excise Officials did collect duty from the petitioner-company even on the first 20 metric tonnes contrary to the view which they are now putting forward. I am also unable to see any moral justification for the attitude of the Department. The petitioner-company is clearly entitled to the exemption under the notification. No purpose seems to be served by unnecessarily denying the benefit to which the petitioner s company is entitled. 4. Both the Writ Petitions are allowed. In each case, a direction will be issued to the respondents to grant the refund claimed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 110 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Penalty cannot be imposed if compounding fee has been accepted ... ... ... ... ..... piece of fragment. Dross and ash cannot be taken as scrap these are distinguishable. The benefit of the Notification No. 134/65, dated 20-8-1965 is thus not available to the petitioner s product i.e., zinc (unwrought). 3. It is seen from the case records that in this case compounding fee of Rs. 50/- has been accepted by the Deptt. and again a penalty of Rs. 50/- under Rule 173Q of Central Excise Rules, 1944 has been imposed. Govt. of India accordingly set aside the order of the imposition of penalty of Rs. 50/- under Rule 173Q, ibid. 4. Subject to the modification or order-in-appeal as at para 3 above, the Revision Application is otherwise rejected.
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1978 (3) TMI 109 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERAB
Short levy due to error - Inadvertence or error - Short levy - Show cause notice - Quoting of wrong rule - Effect
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1978 (3) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Greases - Blended or compounded lubricating oil - Alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... there is no question or any occasion for paying duty more than once and in fact the concerned manufacturer would be getting facilities of proforma credit in respect of duty paid on blended or compounded lubricating oils and Greases used in the manufacture of finished, blended or compunded lubricating oils and Greases and that too at the concessional rate of l3 ad valorem. The cases as cited by Mr. Dutta, in any view are distinguishable on facts and in terms of the decision in the case of Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. - 1977 - E.L.T. (J 199), the duty as levied was authorised, as duty is on the manufacture of goods and not on sale and the more so when in fact the said Company produce Greases which is also sold in the market as such. 20. In view of the above arguments of Mr. Dutta, excepting on those relating to other remedy fail, so also the Rule. The same is as such discharged and all interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Valuation - Discount based on quantity purchased during the year - Quantity discount whether trade discount - Revision of own order - Legality
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1978 (3) TMI 106 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Pillow Blocks - Classification - Item 72(3) - `Detachable' - Connotation of. ... ... ... ... ..... between Mc. Gill precision bearing pillow blocks and Fafnir, the former being detachable by means of screws while the latter forming one integral block. (ii) Detachability not by some means or other nor by use of force but detachable ordinarily. (iii) Once detached, both the components are rendered functionally useless. (iv) The availability of replacement is not a point to be put against the petitioner. (v) How in the commercial world the commodity is understood and sold ? 15. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the findings of the respondents, that the housing block is to be assessed under item 72(3) while the ball bearings which is housed inside the pillow blocks would be assessed under item 72(35) of the Tariff. 16. Hence, the impugned orders are hereby quashed and the writ petitions will stand allowed. I make it clear that the pillow blocks are assessable under item 72(3) as an integral part and not as the individual units. However. there will be no orders as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 105 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Thailams - (Bath oil) are not Perfumed Hair Oils - Fiscal enactment - Interpretation ... ... ... ... ..... ducts are liable to central excise duty under Tariff Item No. 14F of Central Excise Tariff. 8. This reasoning again is improper and is unacceptable to me. Taken in conjunction with item hair lotions creams and pomades , certainly perfumed hair oil is meant as hair oil for grooming the hair and not for a hair oil applied to the hair before bath and then washed off. Certainly, no person in commercial field will ever consider these thailams as hair oil and that is the proper perspective in which the classification should be made. In common parlance, these are understood as thailams. In fact, in a way it is also admitted by the respondents. Looked at from any point of view, I am unable to agree that the impugned orders could ever be sustained and the levy of excise duty on these thailams in perfumed hair oils attracting Item 14F (ii) of Schedule I of the Act will have to be necessarily quashed. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 104 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Equalised freight - whether includible in the assessable value ... ... ... ... ..... ncluded as part of the price structure at the factory gate which alone is the relevant basis for the levy of the excise duty, the imposition is valid. 5. It is well settled in law that excise is on the incidence of the manufacture. It is admitted in this case that petitioner does incur expenditure by sending the consignment and therefore, he is entitled to charge the freight. Merely because he charges a uniform rate of freight, it does not follow that should also be included as the cost price of manufacturer. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, it is a post-manufacturing operation. In my view, there is no warrant for holding that freight should be construed as one actually incurred. Merely because freight comes to be charged when the goods leave the factory, it cannot be contended that it should go in the cost price. Therefore, the impugned order is hereby set aside and this writ petition will stand allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Prosecution - Minor partner ... ... ... ... ..... he accounts of the firm. Sub-sec. (3) states that such minor s share is liable for the acts of the firm, but the minor is not personally liable for any such act. Therefore, merely on the ground that petitioner is a partner of the first accused firm, he cannot be prosecuted for the aforesaid offences. If, however, he has personally done anything in contravention of the Excise Rules and thereby committed any offence under the Excises and Salt Act, no doubt, he can be proceeded against. But in this case, there is absolutely no evidence to show that he had personally contravened any of the provisions of the Excises and Salt Act. In these circumstances, so far as the petitioner is concerned, I am of the view that the prosecution is misconceived. Therefore the charges framed against the petitioner are quashed and the proceedings against him in the aforesaid case are also quashed. In view of the above order in the main petition, no orders are necessary in Crl. M.P. No. 905 of 1978.
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1978 (3) TMI 102 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Collusion - Meaning - Rule 10. - Mis-statement - Scope of - Alternative remedy - Existence of - Constitution
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1978 (3) TMI 101 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Exemption Of Residential House, Let Out, Life Interest In Property ... ... ... ... ..... a life-tenant was entited to exemption under section 33(1)(n). The High Court quoted the observations of the Supreme Court as follows ( 1975 99 ITR 370, 373 (AP)) Though the word belonging no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, it is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word. Learned counsel for the revenue was not able to distinguish the aforesaid decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court nor was he able to persuade us to differ from the same. On consideration of the relevant statutory provisions and keeping in mind the meaning of the word belonging as explained by the Supreme Court we see no reason to differ from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and, with respect, we follow the same. The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 100 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessing Officer, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... rritorial jurisdiction the aforesaid limited number of Benches were located, having the jurisdiction to deal with all the references under section 66 to the exclusion of the various other High Courts, which obviously is to be avoided. The basis pointed out by us above would avoid such a situation. In the view taken by us, it would follow that in the present case, since the Income-tax Appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of 1963-64 had arisen out of the assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer at Meerut which is in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it is the High Court of Allahabad to which the reference should have been made and not the Delhi High Court. As the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the reference, we decline to answer the reference and return the statement of case to the Delhi Bench for taking such appropriate action as it thinks fit in the light of this judgment. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this reference.
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1978 (3) TMI 99 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... assessment year, i.e., assessment year 1960-61, it cannot be said that rectification proceedings could be properly initiated and rectification could be validly made. In the subsequent assessment years if section 155 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not applicable, section 154 could never be applied. For the reasons given above, it appears to us that there is no merit in the case of the revenue and the question referred must be answered in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. We take note of the fact that the assessee is now a public undertaking being run by the Government of India. Both public money and judicial time could have been saved if the matter could have been settled departmentally on the basis of the decision in Income-tax Reference No. 29 of 1970 Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 1978 111 ITR 843 (Cal) . C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 98 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Loss, Dealer In Shares, Enduring Nature, Loss On Sale, Revenue Loss ... ... ... ... ..... ducted when you are estimating the annual profits or gains for a particular year. In this case it appears to me that the Commissioners certainly have ample evidence before them upon which they could find that these losses were losses upon capital. The assessee before us is not a dealer in shares. Those shares were purchased and held by the assessee as not its stock-in-trade but as investment in the nature of a capital. Therefore, the loss incurred in selling those shares must be a capital loss. That apart, the assessee by the acquisition of controlling interest in that company acquired a source of supply and this source must be held to be a benefit of an enduring nature and hence a capital asset. Therefore, this loss cannot be a revenue loss and it must be a capital loss. In the premises, our answer to the question is that the loss of Rs. 42,327 was not a revenue but a capital loss and it is in favour of the revenue. Each party to pay and bear its own costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 97 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Private Trust, Public Charitable Trust, Tax Deducted At Source ... ... ... ... ..... that the petitioners had been given excessive relief on income chargeable to tax. This position seems to be fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. S. Subramanyan v. Simplex Nills Ltd. 1963 48 ITR 182. It appears that a similar view was also taken by the Kerala High Court in the decision of the case of Moidu v. Income-tax Officer 1965 2 ITJ 336. In that view of the matter, the notice under section 148 cannot be sustained and must be held to be without jurisdiction. This order, however, will not prevent the revenue authorities, if they are entitled in law, to proceed against the private trust or against the trustees of the said private trust or to rectify the order of refund in favour of the petitioners in accordance with law, if they are otherwise entitled to. Subject to the observations as aforesaid, the rule is made absolute and the notice is quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Stay asked for is granted for a period of four weeks.
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1978 (3) TMI 96 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gross Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... 80A. Such gross total income means, the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deductions under Chapter VIA or deductions in respect of annuity deposit paid under section 280-O. In the instant case such gross total income is found to be a net loss in the year concerned, because of the losses suffered during the year. Therefore, there is no question of any further deduction of 60 of the dividend earned under section 80M. The said dividend is to be adjusted against the business loss and the net income of the assessee computed at a negative figure. Accordingly, we answer question No. 2 also in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. It is, however, made clear that in answering the question, we have neither considered nor decided the question of carrying over of losses and/or depreciation and/or development rebate from previous years. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 95 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Deduction Of Interest, Interest On Securities, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... stituted borrowed money within the meaning of section 19(ii) of the Act. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rowntree and Co. Ltd. 1948 1 All ER 482 (CA), it was held that the words borrowed money require the existence of a borrower and a lender and that there must be a real borrowing in the legal sense of the word. It was also observed that borrowing as well as discounting a bill are distinct legal transactions although they produce the same result. Borrowing is a familiar word and borrowing money is a familiar phrase. In our opinion, the phrase money borrowed used in section 19(ii) has been used in its ordinary sense known to the commercial world. There is, in our opinion, no justification for expanding its meaning to include transactions which are not intrinsically of that nature. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner would be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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