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Showing 81 to 100 of 173 Records
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1978 (3) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... t is not there to sustain the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax. What we find is only the conclusion arrived by the Commissioner. There is a difference between reasons and conclusion. As observed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M. L. Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 at page 98 thus Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. We, accordingly, allow the writ petition and quash the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax. He is directed to reconsider the application filed by the petitioner on merits. The petitioner will be entitled to get costs of this petition from the respondents.
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1978 (3) TMI 93 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Application For Extension, Assessment Order, Concessional Rate, Derived From Export, Import Entitlements, Industrial Company, Late Filing, Original Assessment, Total Income
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1978 (3) TMI 92 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Cottage Industry ... ... ... ... ..... within the Factories Act, we are of opinion that it is an irrelevant fact for the application of section 81 of the Income-tax Act. If the activity engaged in by the society is a cottage industry, it does not cease to be so simply because the premises in which it is carried on is a factory as defined by the Factories Act. The learned counsel places reliance on Dist. Co-operative Development Federation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1973 88 ITR 330 (All) and District Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1973 87 ITR 639 (All). The societies concerned in these cases were engaged in manufacture of bricks by engaging a large number of workmen who were not members of the societies. These cases are, therefore, distinguishable on facts. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the society and against the department. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 150 in each case.
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1978 (3) TMI 91 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... tter of confirmation at the initial stage and produced his books of account much later. We would like to observe that the law on this point is now well settled. It is necessary for the assessee to prove prima facie the transaction which results in a cash credit in his books of account. Such proof includes proof of the identity of his creditor, the capacity of such creditor to advance the money and, lastly, the genuineness of the transaction. These things must be proved prima facie by the assessee and only after the assessee has adduced evidence to establish prima facie the aforesaid, the onus shifts on the department. In the instant case, it seems that the assessee established only the identity of the creditor and nothing more. For the reasons as stated above and in view of the question as framed the contentions of the revenue must succeed. We answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs, BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 90 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Adventure In The Nature Of Trade, Dealing In Land ... ... ... ... ..... as forthcoming could not, without other circumstances, justify an inference that the assessee intended by purchasing the property to start a venture in the nature of trade. The Tribunal has found that apart from the intention at the time of purchase of the property that the assessee had a profit motive in mind, no circumstance has been brought to conclude that the transaction was an adventure in the nature of trade. The assessee does not deal in land. The firm of which he is a partner carries on a very different kind of business. The land was purchased in 1960. A small portion was sold several years later. On these facts, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was justified in drawing the inference that the transaction did not represent an adventure in the nature of trade. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... assessee did not take care to find out the fate of its adjournment application. In the next place, it found that since the assessee had not produced the account books, it was not understandable how the accountant s presence was material for the hearing of the appeal and one of the partners or even their counsel could have appeared and argued the appeal. On these grounds, the application was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee has come to this court under article 226 of the Constitution. We find no substance in this petition. Both the grounds given by the Tribunal for refusing to restore the case are relevant and cogent. Moreover, the petitioner invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That admittedly is a discretionary jurisdiction. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that the order refusing to restore the case suffers from any manifest error of law so as to entitle this court to interfere. The petition has no substance and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 88 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Profits Chargeable To Tax ... ... ... ... ..... erred to the profit and loss account. The observation that a unilateral act on the part of the debtor in making transfer entry would not bring about remission or cessation of liability has to be understood in the context of the facts. The Tribunal was justified in placing reliance on the decision of this court in Pioneer Consolidated Company of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1972 85 ITR 410 (All). In that case also, the assessee transferred the amount in question to the profit and loss account. It was held that such an entry in the accounts of the company is prima facie evidence of income. The position in the present case is similar. In our view, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amounts in question were liable to be assessed under section 41(1) of the Act. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (3) TMI 87 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Approved Gratuity Fund ... ... ... ... ..... ed by section 36(1)(v) which permits deduction out of the gross profits of any contribution made by an employer towards gratuity fund created under a trust. In the present case the amount is deductible in the computation of the gross profit itself. In other words, the amount was already deductible under section 28 while computing the gross profits, even if it may not be a permissible deduction under section 36(1)(v) of the Act. The same view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. D. V. Bapat, Income-tax Officer 1975 101 ITR 292, in which reference has been made to an earlier decision of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1974 95 ITR 151. We have heard learned counsel, but we are not disposed to take a different view. In this view, the questions referred to us are answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1978 (3) TMI 86 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Penalty For Concealment ... ... ... ... ..... ssessee, it was contended that the said Explanation was not attracted and, in the next place, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had not, in fact, invoked the Explanation. It was not hence open to raise that plea at this stage. The Tribunal had not given a finding on this point apparently because it agreed with the contentions of the assessee. Moreover, the facts are not before us, namely, we do not know what was the income returned and what was the assessed income. There is nothing on record before us to show how much expenses were disallowed. Hence, the very factual foundation for the application of the Explanation is missing. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the imposition of penalty could not be held to be unjustified in law. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 (Rupees two hundred only).
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1978 (3) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Income, House Property, Income From Business, Let Out ... ... ... ... ..... taxable under section 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as business income. It was not disputed before us that the furniture was let by the assessee to its employees for furnishing of the residential quarters allotted to them. That equally applies to the various Government departments which agreed to locate a branch of the State Bank of India, post office, police station, Central excise office, etc., provided accommodation was made available to them. The assessee not only made available such accommodation but also provided the furniture required by the Government for use of such accommodation. From this, the conclusion will be irresistible that the letting of furniture was subservient to the letting of the accommodation, i.e., it was for more beneficial enjoyment of the accommodation let. The application for reference under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are accordingly rejected. The assessee shall have its costs in both the cases. Hearing fee Rs.150 in each case.
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1978 (3) TMI 84 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Income, Central Excise, Income From Business, Income From Letting Out, Let Out ... ... ... ... ..... therefore, of the opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the letting out of the accommodation to the Government for locating a branch of the State, Bank of India, post office, police station, Central excise office, railway staff quarters, etc., was incidental to the assessee s business and, therefore, rightly taxable under section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or section 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as business income. The result, therefore, is that the references are answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. In our view, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that rent received from letting out of the accommodation to the Government departments, being incidental to the assessee s business, is taxable as income from business and not as income from property. The assessee shall have the costs of these references. Hearing fee Rs. 150 in each case.
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1978 (3) TMI 83 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Annuity Deposit, Expenditure Incurred, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... he same income. In other words, when the assessee receives back the instalment of the annuity deposit he does not earn the amount but the amount received is subject to income-tax in that year. In our opinion, an annuity deposit, in any case, cannot be compared with or put in the same category as other items of income included under the head Other sources . Once the assessee exercises his option he is bound to continue to make the deposits in subsequent years. Failure to do so will make him liable to penalties by way of additional tax and also further penalty under section 280R if so provided in the scheme. The benefit available to the assessee in giving the annuity deposit scheme is, primarily, payment of a lesser amount of tax in the year of the deposit and not earning of the interest included in the instalments. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 82 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Firm Registration, Individual Partner ... ... ... ... ..... nd, therefore, their Lordships held that registration could not be granted. Here, the instrument of partnership was very much in existence in the accounting year. In Mandyala Govindu and Co. s case 1976 102 ITR 1 (SC) their Lordships were dealing with a partnership, where the shares of the partners were unequal and a minor was admitted to the benefits of the partnership. It was necessary to specify in the deed how the amount of loss in the minor s share would be borne by the partners and, therefore, they said that there could be no presumption that the losses were to be shared equally. We, accordingly, answer the reference against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. It must accordingly be held that the Tribunal was justified in directing the Income-tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee-firm under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment year 1958-59. Since the assessee did not enter appearance, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1978 (3) TMI 81 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Previous Year, Retrospective Effect, Road Transport Vehicle ... ... ... ... ..... from 1st April, 1960. The proviso applies uniformly to all assessees for the assessment years commencing from 1st April, 1960. Parliament has thus not discriminated between the assessees. Even assuming that on this construction some assessees will get the benefit of rebate and others will not in respect of vehicles purchased on the same date because of different previous years adopted by them, a matter on which we do not express any opinion, that would be an accident of the mode of accounting adopted by the assessees and Parliament cannot be blamed for any discrimination. We may also point out that the validity of the proviso was upheld by the Supreme Court in Southern Roadways v. Union of India 1962 44 ITR 708. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us as follows The Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim of the assessee for development rebate for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1978 (3) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Cash System, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... the old method, namely, the mercantile system of accounting, because it cannot be said that the assessee had followed it regularly in view of its aforesaid altered method of accounting, and, in such circumstances, as stated in section 145(2) of the Act, the Income-tax Officer may make an assessment in the manner as provided in section 144 of the Act. Since the relevant facts as indicated in the foregoing paragraph have not been ascertained by the Tribunal, we are unable to answer the question in this reference. In these circumstances, as submitted on behalf of both the parties, the Tribunal, after giving a reasonable opportunity to them of being heard, shall ascertain the material facts as indicated above and determine afresh whether the aforesaid amount was liable to be included in the assessment for the assessment year 1970-71. This reference is accordingly disposed of without answering the question and without making any order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 79 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Annuity Deposit, Registered Firm, Total Income, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ord have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Venkatachalam, Income-tax Officer v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1958 34 ITR 143 (SC), which was a case arising under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court has again followed the said observations in Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Teja Singh 1959 35 ITR 408 (SC) and in Daya Singh v. Dhan Kaur, AIR 1974 SC 665. We, therefore, hold that the Commissioner of Income-tax was in error in not taking into consideration the deduction under section 280-O of the Act while determining penalty payable by the assessee. The Tribunal rightly reversed the decision of the Commissioner in this regard. Our conclusion is in conformity with the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gujarat Automobiles 1976 105 ITR 588. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the department The assessee is entitled to costs. Advocate s fee is Rs. 250.
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1978 (3) TMI 78 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... opinion, is in consonance with the views indicated by the High Court in the case of Chooharmal Wadhuram v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1971 80 ITR 360. Counsel for the assessee drew our attention to the observations in the case of Shaikh Abdul Kadar v. Income-tax Officer 1958 34 ITR 451 (MP), Commissioner of lncome-tax v. Amarchand N. Shroff 1963 48 ITR 59 (SC) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. M.A. Mandagi 1967 63 ITR 173 (Mys). In the view we have taken and in view of the ratio of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Raman Chettiar 1965 55 ITR 630, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to discuss the aforesaid decisions in any detail. In the premises, question No.1 referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue and question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 77 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... rcised its discretion of remand in a judicial mariner. If this is the position, then we must hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was not justified in sending the matter back to the Income-tax Officer again for consideration. Counsel for the revenue drew our attention to the decision in the case of Smt. Bhagirathi Devi Jalan v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1978 112 ITR 534 (Cal). There the court was concerned with the question when an authority exercises power pursuant to an order of remand by a Tribunal whether the period of limitation for passing this order would apply. This question is entirely different from the question posed before us. In the premises, we do not think that the observations made in that case are of any help in deciding the question referred in this instant reference. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1978 (3) TMI 76 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty Proceedings, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... of the Act, as amended by s. 50 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, arose in the case. Learned counsel for the department, however, conceded that the only question of law which arose in this case and which should be referred by the Tribunal is as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the order imposing penalty on the assessee-firm was illegal on the ground that it was barred by limitation, having regard to the provisions of s. 275 of the I.T. Act, 1961, as amended by s. 50 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 ? Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was not right in holding that no question of law arose out of the order of the Tribunal. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal, Indore Bench, Indore, to state the case and to refer it on the aforesaid question of law. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this application.
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1978 (3) TMI 75 - KERALA HIGH COURT
High Court, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ctorially to the fruit of a tree or the crop of a field, for it was said by Panchapakesa Ayyar J. in V. P. Rao s case 1950 18 ITR 825 (Mad), that there are some trees which yield only once like the plantain tree but all the same, there was neither any design nor any plan behind the money that the assessee obtained from the two foreign parties. There was no doubt a sort of agreement between the assessee and those two foreign parties but the receipt in itself was entirely, fortuitous and exceptional. The petitioner may go abroad once again and yet he may not be lucky enough to get hold of a foreigner who should give him money and also look after his house during his absence for a short period. We are of the opinion that the receipt in question involved in these cases was clearly the assessee s income from his occupation. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar, will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, as required by law.
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