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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 137 Records
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1979 (12) TMI 165 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ding that point. After remand, K.P. Chowdhry's petition (M.P. No. 153 of 1961) was decided by a Division Bench on 22nd July 1969. A perusal of that judgment will go to show that section 82 as substituted by the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 9 of 1965 was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges and reference was made to section 82 in the shape as it stood before the Amending Act, may be, because the recovery proceedings challenged in that case were started before the enactment of the Amending Act. The learned Judges of the Division Bench had, therefore, no occasion in that case to consider whether the recovery could be supported under the new section 82. Similarly, in Ramdhan Agarwal v. State of M.P. and others M.P. No. 499/74, decided 17th January 1976 the attention of the Division Bench deciding that case was not drawn to the new section 82. The petition fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioner.
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1979 (12) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... plicable to the Supreme Court which contention was not accepted by the Court. 6. Neither in the application for adducing additional grounds or in the order of the Court directing the matter to be placed before the Constitution Bench, there was any reference to the validity of Section 384 of the CrPC. Neither was it pleaded during the arguments that Section 384 of the CrPC is ultra vires of the Constitution. As the question of validity of Section 384 the Code, of Criminal Procedure was neither raised nor argued, a discussion by the Court after "pondering over the issue in depth" would not be a precedent binding on the Courts. The decision is an authority for the proposition that Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules should be read down as indicated in the decision. 7. We are satisfied for the reasons stated above that the decision is no authority regarding the scope of Section 384 of the CrPC. The order of dismissal of the appeal summarily will stand.
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1979 (12) TMI 163 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , but is a question of fact and in the circumstances of the case, it would not arise, if the answer to the first question is returned in the negative. However, if the answer to the first question is returned in the affirmative then, as an inevitable consequence, the assessee would succeed as the finding on the second question which is one of the fact is in his favour. 6. Accordingly, we allow these applications in part and direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the following question to this Court. "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the ITAT was right in holding that the order passed by the WTO on November 1, 1973, was an order u/s 18(1)(c) of the WT Act. 1957 and not an order giving effect to the order of the CWT passed u/s 18(2A) of the WT Act, 1957, and therefore, an appeal would lie before the AAC and the Tribunal." 7. The reference may be submitted within six months of the order. There will be no order as to costs of these applications.
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1979 (12) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... timately countersigned by the Vice-Chairman. Therefore, the price of ₹ 75,000 as the disposal price is approved by the Vice-Chairman. Even if it includes surcharge it cannot be said with confidence that the Vice-Chairman has not approved the surcharge as a component of disposal price. 21. The last contention is that the Authority has made a huge profit by levy of surcharge. In this connection statistical table was annexed to the petition and there was serious controversy about the facts and figures set out therein, by the other side. Having gone through the detailed affidavit in reply it transpires that the contention is without merits. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the Authority has made a huge profit. On the contrary it appears that the overall working of the Authority is deficit ridden. 22. These were all the contentions in these petitions and as there is no merit in any of them the petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.
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1979 (12) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed to a Court which is beyond the frontiers of the State and to a remedy which lifts been provided not by the State Legislature but by the Constitution itself. 40. For these reasons, therefore, we reject the argument of the appellant that Clause (c) of Section 13A of the Act would apply to the present appeal and that the appellant is. therefore, entitled to the benefit of this provision on the basis of the Civil Miscellaneous Petition filed by him. We are clearly of the opinion, on an interpretation of the various clauses of Section 13A of the Act and the explanation thereto that the benefit under Section 13A has been intended by the Legislature to be conferred only on the appellate and revisional courts and even execution proceedings have been excluded from the ambit of the protection granted. 41. For these reasons I agree with the judgment proposed by my brother Goswami, J., and dismiss the appeal but in the peculiar circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 160 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the relief of setting aside the sale. 13. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of Ramanujam, J., is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, namely, W.P. No. 2956 of 1972 will stand allowed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. 14. As soon as we pronounced the judgment, Mr. Peter Francis, the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent herein orally requested us to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court of India -under Article 133 of the Constitution. Having regard to our conclusion on the admitted facts with reference to Section 36 as well as Section 44 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, though we have considered a substantial question of law of general importance, we are not satisfied that, having regard to the facts admitted to which we have applied Sections 36 and 44 of the Act, this is a case which in our opinion needs to be decided by the Supreme Court and we accordingly reject the request.
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1979 (12) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the procedure. However it must not be forgotten that the Special Court would always be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 and Art. 136 permits a challenge to any order interlocutory or final of any court or tribunal in the territory of India with the special leave of this court. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that in narrowly interpreting the expression 'interlocutory order' in Sec. 11(1), door may not be thrown open for introduction of a procedure possibly lacking in fairness and likely to result in deprivation of personal liberty. In view of the conclusion that the order framing a charge is an interlocutory order within the meaning of s. 11(1), the appeal against such an order is incompetent in view of the provision contained in s. 11(2), and therefore the preliminary objection must be upheld and the appeal is dismissed. O R D E R In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (12) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the defendant should be directed to pay mesne profits at the rate of ₹ 50/- per month till today and that an enquiry should be made by the trial court under Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine the mesne profits payable by the defendant hereafter till the date of delivery of possession. In the result, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and a decree is passed directing the defendant to deliver possession of the suit house to plaintiff No. 2 and to pay mesne profits to him at the rate of ₹ 50/- per month from September 20, 1956 till today and also to pay future mesne profits as per decree to be passed by the trial court under Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the foregoing reasons, Civil Appeal No. 626 of 1971 is accordingly allowed with costs throughout. Civil Appeal No. 629 of 1971 is dismissed but without costs. C.A. 626/71 allowed. C.A. 629/71 dismissed.
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1979 (12) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot;....consider, on the one hand, the number of readers they believe would tend to be depraved and corrupted by the book, the strength of the tendency to deprave and corrupt, and the nature of the depravity or corruption; on the other hand, they should assess the strength of the literary, sociological and ethical merit which they consider the book to possess. They should then weigh up all these factors and decide whether on balance the publication is proved to be justified as being for the public good." Going to the basics, freedom of expression is fundamental. The censor is not the moral tailor setting his own fashions but a statutory gendarme policing films under Art. 19(2) from the angle of public order, decency or morality. These concepts are themselves dynamic and cannot be whittled down to stifle expression nor licentiously enlarged to promote a riot of sensual display. Anyway, the appeal must succeed and we extinguish the prosecution by the order. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (12) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cepted by the Court. Neither in the application for adducing additional grounds or in the order of the Court directing the matter to be placed before the Constitution Bench, there was any reference to The validity of S. 384 - of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither was it pleaded during the arguments that S. 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is ultra vires of the Constitution. As the question of validity of S. 384 the Code of Criminal Procedure was neither- raised nor argued, a discussion by the Court after "pondering over the issue in depth’ would not be a precedent binding on the Courts. The decision is an authority for the proposition that Rule 5(1)(c) of O.XXI of the Supreme Court Rules should be read down as indicated in the decision. We are satisfied for the reasons stated above that the decision is no authority regarding the scope of S. 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order cf dismissal of the appeal summarily will stand, Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (12) TMI 155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cial Deputy Collector as the proper valuation, he must be deemed to have adopted that valuation as his own estimated value of the lands which he wanted to enhance by relying upon the valuation made by another authority, namely, the City Civil Court. To such a case s. 59 is clearly attracted but, obviously, with a view to avoid the bar of s. 73A, he purported to issue the impugned notice under s. 61 and, therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. The aforesaid decision seems to lend support to the second ground urged by counsel for the appellant for quashing the impugned notice but we would like to, base our decision on the first ground discussed above. In this case also, we are told that the rectification proceedings have been completed pursuant to the impugned notice, which also must be quashed. In the result, the notice under s. 61 of the Act and the rectification order passed in pursuance thereof or quashed. The revenue will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellant.
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1979 (12) TMI 154 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t been denied. We do not think that the appellants were justified in issuing the show cause notice. 5. It may be mentioned here that the point that the respondent had committed an offence by keeping in his custody primary gold does not seem to have been argued before the learned Judge. On the other hand, it was argued that the total quantity of gold found to be in the possession of the respondent, exceeded the permissible limit and so he had committed an offence by not making a declaration of the same before the competent authority. That point was over-ruled by the learned Judge relying on the above Bench decision of this Court. Be that as it may, in our opinion, as the appellants had not dealt with the said fact, which we consider to be very much relevant, the appellants had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. 6. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal fails and it is dismissed, but there will be no order for costs. 7. All interim orders are vacated.
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1979 (12) TMI 153 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... istrate convicted the respondent without there being any evidence in that behalf and it appears that it was this obsession that the learned Magistrate dealt with the respondent very leniently by awarding a sentence of fine only but having gone through the evidence as discussed above it could not be doubted that there is no evidence at all for maintaining the conviction of the respondent. 6. In view of this, therefore, there is no question of consideration of the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of enhancement of sentence. As conviction of the respondent itself could not be maintained, there is no question of sentence at all. The appeal filed by the appellant is therefore, without substance. But it is found that the conviction of the respondent could not be maintained, the conviction and sentence passed against him are set aside and it is directed that if the amount of fine has been paid, it shall be refunded to the respondent.
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1979 (12) TMI 152 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... uld have a different meaning at different places in the said Act the different places being the Explanation and column 2 of the Tariff Schedule. I am afraid I do not accept that Item 68 is a hotch-potch either. Whoseover is familiar with the intricaties of drafting any Tariff Schedule whatsoever whether it is a Railways Rates Tariff or a Sales Tax Tariff or an Excise Tariff is fully familiar with the need to insert somewhere or even as sub-section of the different section of N.O.S. or N.E.S. class. That is nothing but typically legal jargon the need for which is recognised in every single learned treatise on interpretation of statutes. To say that such a wording is either too vague or that it does not answer to the terminology “class or description of articles” is to deny that the drafting of a tariff Schedule is an important and difficult task. 7. The levy of c.v. duty corresponding to CET 68 in all the 3 appeals was proper. The appeals are hereby rejected.
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1979 (12) TMI 151 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS BOMBAY)
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... ... ..... s much as polyamides (nylon 6), which constitute the raw material in the manufacture of the impugned goods, figure under Item 15A(l)(i) of the Central Excise Tariff. Similarly, Garstrap’ which is made from Polyethelene is also an article or plastic falling under Item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff. 29. In view of the fact that the appellants pay additional duty of Customs (C.V.D.) under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, under Item 15A(1) of the Central Excise Tariff the appellants are entitled to exemption under Notification No. 68/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971, as amended from time to time. 30. In the light of the above, the impugned goods are correctly classifiable under Item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff and not under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. Further, the appellants are entitled to the exemption under Notification No. 61/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971, as amended from time to time. The 14 appeals are accordingly allowed, with consequential relief.
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1979 (12) TMI 150 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... foregoing I would have thought that Section XVI Note 2 (b) rather than note 2 (a) had better application here. I therefore reject this appeal. 7. The only reason why the Government has refrained from extending statutory recognition to the Explanatory notes, I guess, is that its cost is too prohibitive, and in our poor country. The Democratic Government should not recognise as statutory’s something which Government cannot make available to tax payer at reasonable cost. Copyright regulation prevent the Government from printing copies of the Explanatory notes, for sale to tax payer at reasonable cost. It is really for the Customs Cooperation Council to consider whether they cannot find ways and means for their expenses elsewhere, and remove this big hindrance in the way of third world countries from adopting the CCCN or explanatory notes. Really, the present prohibitive cost of the Explanatory Notes cuts down the utility and scope for wider adoption of CCCN considerably.
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1979 (12) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the imposition of vend fee on denatured spirit for grant of license for wholesale vend of denatured spirit is within the competence of State ?
Held that:- The provisions in the Act which provided for a levy on retail vend of foreign liquor was held to be valid. The power to legislate under List II Entry 8 relating to intoxicating Liquor comprises of liquor which contains alcohol whether it is potable or not. The power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of the intoxicating liquor and its exclusive right regarding intoxicating liquor cannot be questioned.
The purpose of introduction of Act 5 of 1976 was to make it clear that U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act, 1972 shall be deemed to and always to have been valid. In view of our findings that U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act, 1972 was valid, the effect of U.P. Act 5 of 1976 is to remove all doubts and to give retrospective effect.
Unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that specially denatured spirit for industrial purpose is different from the ordinary denatured spirit. The definition of alcohol under rule 12 includes both ordinary as well as specially denatured spirit. It is true that the stand taken by the Government in the earlier proceedings was different but that would not make any difference so long as the Government had a right to impose the levy. It has been found that after the addition of S. 24A by Act 30 of 1972, the Commissioner was entitled to accept payment for conferring the privilege which the State owned exclusively.
The conditions relating to grant of a licence for issue of denatured spirit for industrial purpose are laid down in rule 4. Special conditions regarding licence in form F.L. 39, 40 and 41 are prescribed in rule 5. The appellants/petitioners having applied for and obtained licences in form F.L. 39 are bound to comply with the conditions. Act 5 of 1976 has been given retrospective effect as the levy imposed under Act 30 of 1972 was found to be illegal and unsustainable by the Allahabad High Court which was reversed by this Court by giving retrospective effect, the State has only restored the status quo enabling the collection of the levy validly made by Act 30 of 1972. On the facts of the case there could be no complaint because what is sought to be collected is levy which was legally made.
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1979 (12) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent is not liable to pay the damage even though no contract in writing had been executed in accordance with Article A 299 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The respondent by his own conduct in not depositing the 1/6th of the bids offered by him made it impassible, for the excise authorities to conclude the contract.
As the respondent did not comply with the demand, the excise authority concerned decided to conduct a resale of the excise privileges on March 21, 1951, and also to prosecute the respondent for an offence punishable under section 185 of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter the respondent gave a representation (Exh. 7) on March 30, 1951 stating that I any action other than prosecuting him may be taken. He stated in that representation that his sole object in offering the bids was to help the Government and to help himself but when he calculated whether he would make any profit he felt that he would not do so. According to the said representation, that was the reason for not depositing 1/6th of the bid amount at the fall of the hammer. He, however, did not question the authority of the excise authorities to put up the excise privileges for resale and to claim the loss occasioned by such resale from him. In these circumstances I am of the view that it is not possible to hold that the respondent was not in law liable for the claim made by the State Government even though no contracts were formally entered into between the respondent and the State Government. The liability of the respondent in the instant case arises under the statute and it also arises as the result of a civil wrong or a tort committed by him, in offering the highest bid with open eyes and in not fulfilling the obligations arising therefrom. Thus the respondent should be made liable for the sum claimed in the suit and the decree made by the trial court should be restored.
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1979 (12) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
Whether inside prison or outside, a person shall not be deprived of his guaranteed freedom save by methods 'right, just and fair'?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Allow the petition and direct a writ to issue, including the six mandates and further order that a copy of it be sent for suitable action to the Ministry of Home Affairs and to all the State Governments since Prison Justice has pervasive relevance
The prisoner who is the victim has been repeatedly questioned under different surroundings and divergent statements are recorded. We do not wish to state what we consider to be the obvious inference, but we are taken aback when the Assistant Public Prosecutor has given an opinion which, if we make presumption in his favour, shows in differences and, if we make contrary inferences, makes us suspect. When offences are alleged to have taken place within the prison, there should be no tinge or trace of departmental collusion or league between the police and the prison staff. We make these minimal observations so that the State may be alerted for appropriate action. Surely, The conduct of the prosecution cannot be entrusted to one who has condemned it in advance.
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1979 (12) TMI 146 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... out the distinction between the word file on the one hand and the words admit and entertain on the other. If the stage of admitting or entertaining an appeal comes later to the stage of filing the memorandum of appeal as was held in the above case, it is difficult to accept the view of the Tribunal that the tax must be paid before or at the time of filing of appeal or within the period of limitation for filing of the appeal when section 38 does not expressly so provide and when the only prohibition is that the appeal shall not be admitted or entertained unless the whole of the amount of tax or such lesser amount not below one-third, as the appellate authority may direct, is paid. 6.. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions as follows (1) The Tribunal was not right in holding that the appeal was time-barred. (2) The dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not proper. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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