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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 146 Records
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1979 (3) TMI 178 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ee charged the price of the gunny bags from its ex-U.P. principals in pursuance of an agreement with its ex-U.P. principals. Thus, all the ingredients of a sale were present. So far as the movement of gunny bags from one State to another is concerned, it will be seen that the foodgrains purchased by the assessee were packed in them and then the bags containing the foodgrains were despatched to places outside U.P. The movement of gunny bags outside U.P. was directly linked up to their sale or at least incidental to it, inasmuch as right from the start the parties contemplated that they should be sent outside U.P., after the foodgrains were packed in them. The question is answered by saying that the turnover of gunny bags was liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act for the assessment years in question. As the question has been answered in favour of the department, the department is entitled to its cost, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (3) TMI 177 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purified and put in the shape of sulphur rolls. There has been no essential change in the quality and the character of sulphur as found in the sulphur rocks and in sulphur rolls. Sulphur rolls are really nothing else but a purified form of rock sulphur. In such a situation, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Officer 1960 11 S.T.C. 827 (S.C.). is applicable. In that case, the question was whether hydrogenated groundnut oil was different from groundnut oil. It was held that inasmuch as the process of hydrogenation did not alter the essential character of groundnut oil, both the commodities were the same. In view of these considerations, it must be held that sulphur rolls sold by the assessee are taxable as minerals as mentioned in Notification No. ST-II4949/X-10(2)-74 dated 30th May, 1975, and not as an unclassified item. The appeal is accordingly allowed with Rs. 200 as costs to the assessee. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sales made by respondent 1 were made at Faridabad in the course of inter-State trade as contended by the State of Haryana or whether they were intra-State sales effected within the Union Territory of Delhi as contended by the appellant?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the sales in question are inter-State sales and that the turnover of sales is assessable to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, at the instance of the sales tax authorities at Faridabad. The amount of tax which the respondent has wrongly paid to the sales tax authorities at Delhi on such inter-State sales from April 1, 1961, to September 30, 1965, shall have to be transferred by the sales tax authorities at Delhi to the sales tax authorities at Faridabad, as directed by the High Court.
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1979 (3) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the alleged sales were not sales in the eye of law as the respondent had no volition in the distribution of liquor, which was received from the manufacturing concern at Jammu?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Even assuming in favour of the respondent-company that it did not carry on the trade thinking that it would be liable to pay sales tax, the area of consensuality still left in the field for the purpose of agreeing to the final terms of the transactions between the company and its retail dealers was quite sufficient for the application of the ratio of Vishnu Agencies [1977 (12) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. Having considered all that was submitted on behalf of the respondent-company, we find that there is no escape from the conclusion in this case that the transactions in question were sales exigible to sales tax.
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1979 (3) TMI 158 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... n at this stage is not an abuse of the process of the court and, on the other hand, the dispute sought to be raised by the company is not at all bona fide or raised in good faith. Therefore, I am making the following order The interim stay hereby granted will stand vacated and the application is dismissed with costs and the advertisement of the winding-up petition directed by the order dated 9th January, 1979, will be published and the matter will appear in the list on the 15th May, 1979. Let it be recorded that the balance-sheet for the year ending 31st March, 1978, is kept in the file of these proceedings and the debenture register and two copies of the applications for the debenture alleged to be made by the petitioning creditor dated 15th May, 1976, are kept in the custody of this court and the Registrar, origin U side, of this court will keep the same in a soiled cover until further order of this court. The Registrar, original side, to act on a signed copy of the minute.
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1979 (3) TMI 150 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... 231 of the Companies Act, 1948, and accordingly cannot be made without the leave of the companies court being first obtained. I, therefore, hold that interpleader suit against the company (defendant No. 1) is a suit or proceeding aginst the company within section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, and cannot be filed or continued without the leave of the company court. Admittedly, the present suit was filed on 6th May, 1976, i.e. , after the passing of the winding-up order against the company, defendant No. 1. The present suit, therefore, cannot continue unless leave of the Bombay High Court, which passed the winding-up order, is obtained by the plaintiff. I, therefore, stay the present suit directing the plaintiff to obtain the necessary leave from the High Court of Bombay under section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. There will be no order as to costs. Leave is granted to the plaintiff to apply for revival of the suit as and when it obtains leave from the Bombay High Court.
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1979 (3) TMI 142 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Validity of acts of directors ... ... ... ... ..... ate that the duty of the Government nominees is limited only to look after the interest of the Government investment. The Government investment is not safe unless the overall performance of the company is on a sound footing. He who looks at the narrow view and without a foresight on the company s performance cannot safeguard the Government s investment. Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, learned senior advocate, who intervened in these petitions, urged one more contention. According to him, a director in any event who is not ordinarily residing inside the State is not liable to pay the profession tax. According to him, his residence must be more than transient or casual. In the view that we have already taken, we do not think that it is necessary to decide this question in these petitions, In the result, the rule is made absolute we hold that Entry 6 in the Schedule under section 3 of the Act is beyond the legislative competence and also beyond the scope of section 3 and, therefore, void.
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1979 (3) TMI 141 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Amalgamation, Principles for interpretation of statutes ... ... ... ... ..... any which is being wound up , the second relates only to an order for dissolution of a transferor-company without winding up. It is no doubt true that a single scheme of amalgamation or reconstruction in a given case may involve both types of companies, namely, those under winding up and those which are not, one or more of the latter category coming in for dissolution. In such a situation both the provisos come into operation. On the other hand, there may be cases where, as in the instant case, no company which is under winding up may be involved. In such an event, the first proviso does not come into play at all and only the second proviso will be operative. This is not the same as saying that the second of the provisos would come into operation only when the first proviso operates, as contended for the respondent-companies. To sum up, dissolution of a transferor-company cannot be ordered without first obtaining a report from the official liquidator under the second proviso.
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1979 (3) TMI 140 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order, Effect of supervision order ... ... ... ... ..... order is effectively answered by section 526. Since this section states in clear terms that the order bringing the winding up under supervision of court shall be deemed to be a winding up order for all purposes of the Act, the date of the winding up order in the present case for purposes of section 458A has to be taken as November 12, 1975. It, therefore, follows that in computing the period of limitation for the application under section 446, even if we take the starting point to be April 27, 1973, the period between April 27, 1973, and November 12, 1975, and indeed a period of one year thereafter has to be excluded. If this is done clearly the present application is very much within time. For the reasons above discussed, I am of opinion that the contention of the respondent that the application is barred by limitation is not correct and cannot be upheld. This contention is, therefore, rejected and the application will now be listed for hearing on, merits on 9th April, 1979.
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1979 (3) TMI 118 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... of this income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars and that the burden is on Department to establish that the receipt of the amount in dispute constitutes the income of the assessee. 13. In the present case, the assessee has succeeded in showing that Shri Satpal Agarwalla is an Income-tax assessee from the asst. yr. 1968-69 and so the genuineness of the creditor has been established. Even the means of the creditor is established for the purpose of penalty proceedings. Moreover, the ITO imposed the penalty only on the ground that the cash credit was not satisfactorily explained. This cannot be a ground for holding that the assessee had concealed the income. On the whole, we find that the Department has failed to prove that the assessee is guilty of concealment of income of Rs. 15,000. We therefore, hold that the AAC, therefore was justified in cancelling the penalty under. We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 117 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... ners originally is not a ground for refusing registration of a firm. 11. It has been held in the case of Himalaya Engineering Company vs. CIT Bihar and Orissa(4), that the fact no share capital was contributed by some of the partners or the fact that the reconstitution was not disclosed to bankers were not grounds for refusing registration to the firm and that the firm was entitled to registration. 12. From the aforesaid rulings it is evident that even if it is held that Shri Omprakash Agrawal had not contributed any capital, the registration to the assessee firm cannot be refused. The ITO has not stated that Shri Omprakash Agrawal is not getting shares as mentioned in the partnership deed and he is not an acting partner. Under such circumstances we hold that the ITO was not justified in refusing registration to the assessee firm. We, therefore, hold that the assessee firm is entitled to registration for the Asst. yr. 1973-74. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed in full.
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1979 (3) TMI 113 - ITAT PATNA
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... ... ..... ot file one return and then subsequently rectify it on the basis of audited accounts. We, therefore, hold that the assessee had reasonable cause for waiting for the receipt of the audited accounts. 8. Now the AAC has taken a view that the assessee could have filed the return within five days when the assessee received the audited accounts from the Auditors on 25th April, 1974. The time of one month taken by the assessee for filing the return after the receipt of the audited report is a quite reasonable time. We, therefore, hold that there was reasonable cause for the delayed filing of the return by the assessee on 31st May, 74 and the AAC was not justified in holding that there was no reasonable cause for filing the return on 31st May, 1974. Under the circumstances, the entire penalty order of the ITO is liable to be cancelled. We, therefore, cancel the penalty order of the ITO. 9. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is allowed in full.
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1979 (3) TMI 111 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... uilding according to the above notification worked out to Rs. 17.2 per sq. ft. The assessee himself has accounted for the cost of construction at the rate of Rs. 20 per sq. ft. for ground floor, Rs. 18 per sq. ft for the first floor, Rs. 19 per sq. ft. For the second floor and Rs. 20 per sq. ft for the third floor. The cost of construction as per the accounts maintained by the assessee is also supported by the approved valuer s report, the PWD rates and also the Govt. Notification mentioned supra. In the absence of any material to discredit the accounts maintained by the assessee for the cost of construction, which is admittedly supported by vouchers, we see no reason why an estimate at all should be made of the cost of construction. We have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting the cost of the construction as admitted by the assessee. We direct that the amount added towards deficiency in the cost of construction as sustained by the AAC, be deleted. 6. The appeal is allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 109 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... or the above sum under s. 35 of the Act. Before the AAC. The assessee had made an alternative contention that the claim was admissible under s. 37, Before us, the learned counsel for the assessee urged that the claim is admissible under s. 37. He submitted that the assessee did not get the technical know-how though the payment was made. This aspect of the matter has not been gone into by the lower authorities. Further, if the assessee bases its claim under s. 37, it has to be seen whether the loss was incurred during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year under appeal. In these circumstances, in the interest of justice, we restore the matter to the file of the AAC to examine the claim of the assessee afresh on the basis of the provisions of s. 37 and on the basis of the materials, which the assessee may, produce before him in support of its stand and dispose of the claim in accordance with law. 9. For statistical purposes, the appeal is treated as partly allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 108 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... ion which was actually let out. If so, all the other expenses authorised to be deducted under s. 24 have also to be limited accordingly. It is in pursuance of this legal position that the assessee itself had apportioned the Municipal taxes. The insurance also has to be apportioned accordingly. It has been so apportioned by the ITO. However, we find that the assessee while appealing to the AAC took a ground that if it is disallowed under the head property it has to be allowed under the head other sources . Since the AAC had allowed the entire deduction in computing the property income, he has not considered this plea. The order of the ITO does not show whether it has been considered under any other head. We, therefore, hold that on this point, namely whether the disallowed portion under the head property should be allowed under other heads to be determined by the AAC. 13. In the result, the appeal for the year 1976-77 is dismissed and for the year 1977-78 it is partly allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 107 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... income from his father s estate. The assessee had contended before the AAC that there was no income at all and the estimate was high and excessive. The learned counsel for the assessee stated before us that for the financial year 1970-71, the income from the father s estate was only Rs. 343 and that too from a fixed deposit. It was further claimed that this amount belonged to the HUF and, therefore, not taxable in the assessee s hands. Since this matter has not been considered by the lower authorities, we direct the ITO to examine this claim of the assessee and modify the assessment in accordance with law and on merits. 9. The other grounds urged in paragraphs 13 to 15 for the asst. yr. 1971-72 are not pressed by the learned counsel for the assessee. They are, therefore, not considered by us. 10. For the asst. yr. 1972-73 no other ground is pressed. 11. In the result, the appeal for the asst. yr. 1972-73 is allowed and the appeal for the asst. yr. 1971-72 is allowed in part.
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1979 (3) TMI 101 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ve been treated by the Department as advance tax and given credit. In this connection we may refer to the decision of the Madras High Court in Rasiklal Kamdar vs. CIT(1). It is interesting to refer to the observations at page 58 of the report, which is reproduced below We are of opinion that even the expression lsquo advance tax rsquo as understood by the common man, men rsquo s only the tax paid prior to the assessment and can never mean a tax paid pursuant to an assessment, whether it is a provisional assessment or final assessment. Consequently, the expression lsquo advance tax whether understood as defined in s. 207(2) of the Act or as could be understood by the common man, will mean only one thing, viz., the tax plaid before the assessment as required by the Act. In the light of the above we find that the AAC had rightly directed the ITO to give credit for the advance tax paid before levying interest under s. 139(8). 6. In the result the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 100 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... Before us, the learned departmental representative relied on the gujarat High Court decision in 93 ITR 288 (Ahmed Ibrahim Sahigara) in which the High Court had held that the tax liability on account of concealed income disclosed by the assessee which rises for the first time under s. 68 of the Finance Act, 1965, cannot be deducted as a debt owed by him on the last day of the relevant accounting year in which such concealed income the assessee rsquo s net wealth. 4. We have considered the rival submissions. The AAC rsquo s order in favour of assessee is supported by a catena of judicial decisions, namely, 99 ITR 79, 110 ITR 902, cited supra, 111 ITR 92 (Shree Kumar Gupta) and 112 ITR 341 (C.K. Babu Naidu). The latest decision to the same effect is reported in 116 ITR 347 (Sri Bhagwandas Jain) (MP). Respectfully following the majority decisions, cited above, we would concur with the AAC rsquo s finding for all the years. In the result the Revenue rsquo s appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 99 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... reading of the trust deed it is clear that during the previous years relevant to the assessment years under appeal the assessee had clearly parted with his assets in favour of designated beneficiaries. It is also clear that during these previous years none of the contingencies leading to the reversion of the assets to the author of the trust ever happened. This being so, the ITO has not done correctly in including the income from a property already alienated by the assessee in his total income. The assessee s appeals for all the years are allowed. 7. In our view on the same parity of the reasoning, it is not open to the Department to invoke the provisions of s. 164 of the Act to levy tax at the maximum rate of 65 per cent on the ground that the shares of the beneficiaries under the trust deed were unknown or uncertain or indeterminate. We therefore, respectfully follow the said decision and confirm the orders of the AAC as correct. 8. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 98 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... he Commissioner has correctly exercised his jurisdiction in the matter. The learned counsel for the assessee has pointed out that the Commissioner has directed the ITO to charge interest under s. 139(8) and this order of his virtually amounted to depriving the ITO even if he has not exercised his power of waiving the interest under Rule 117A. There is merit in this contention of the assessee. The Commissioner acting under s. 263 could at best have asked the ITO to look into the question of levying interest under s. 139(8), but not direct him to charge interest, thus appearing as it were to over-ride the powers of the ITO to waive such interest under r. 117A. We, therefore modify the order of the Commissioner by altering the direction to charge interest under s. 139(8) by directing the ITO to consider the question of levy of interest under s. 139(8) on merits in the light of Rule 117A. The order under s. 263 is modified as above. For statistical purposes the appeal is allowed.
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