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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 157 Records
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1979 (9) TMI 213 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Excise Rules which apparently dealt with residuary powers for recovery of sums due to Government and did not expressly provide any procedure for assessment. Similarly, in Roopchand v. K. U. M. Samiti, Raipur (supra) a quasi-judicial procedure for assessment was inferred from section 20 of the Madhya Paadesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 and rule 56 made there under although none of these provisions expressly provided for assessment of the fee imposed. These decisions support our conclusion that sections 173 and 174 impliedly provide for assessment in a quasi judicial manner in cases where there are no separate bye-laws for assessment of a tax. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument that the tax was inoperative till 18th August 1978 for want of any machinery for its assessment or collection. 6. The petitions fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs in both the petitions. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners in both the petitions.
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1979 (9) TMI 212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the matter rests and it cannot be said that any of the ingredients of the charge have been made out. Apart from the findings and evidence referred to earlier in this paragraph, no material has been brought to our notice on behalf of the State such as would indicate that the bills or the summaries in question were false in any material particular. 16. Although it does appear that quite a few of the documents admittedly prepared by or at the instance of the Appellants in connection with the execution of the work came into existence not while the work was in progress but only later when a demand for them was made by the Accounts Department, the charge cannot be sustained in relation to any of its heads, there being no proof of the falsity of any of the entries made in those documents. In the result, therefore, we accept both the appeals, set aside the conviction recorded against and the sentences imposed upon each of the Appellants and acquit them of the charge in its entirety.
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1979 (9) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ho have been promoted in the interval of some months. The sense of injustice rankles and should be obliterated so that every servant in strategic position gives of his or her best to the country. We have had the advantage of the presence of the learned Solicitor-General, appearing for the Union of India. With characteristic fairness he has persuaded his client to agree to what we regard as a just gesture, viz., that the Respondent-Union of India will shortly review the seniority of the petitioner, her merit having been discovered and her seniority to Grade II being recognised. We direct accordingly. 9. Subject to what we have said above, we do not think it necessary to examine the averments of mala fides made in the petitions What we do wish to impress upon Government is the need to overhaul all Service Rules to remove the stain of sex discrimination, without waiting for ad hoc inspiration from writ petitions or gender charity. 10. We dismiss the petition but not the problem.
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1979 (9) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re the building tax has not been assessed so far, the assessing authority may give the assessees an opportunity to produce evidence on which they may want to rely in support of their returns. In cases where the assessments have been made, but the assessees could not or did not file their appeals within the period specified therefor, we direct that they may be permitted to do so within a period of 30 days from the date of this judgment and the appellate authority may admit those appeals as the prosecution of these cases was sufficient cause for not presenting them earlier. It is clarified that if any matter is pending before the Government of Kerala under Section 3(2) of the Act, it will be permissible for that Government to dispose it of according to the law. So also, in cases where the High Court has given an option or opportunity to any assessee to file fresh objections before the authority concerned, under the provisions of the Act, it will be permissible for him to do so.
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1979 (9) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at by Sub-section (1) of Section 1 the Act was brought into force with effect from January 30, 1976, i.e., the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated. The Act substitutes a 'new' proviso in Sub-section (3) of Section 19 in place of the old proviso to Sub-clause (3) to Clause 20 of the Ordinance, altering the whole basis of absorption. The new proviso is given a retrospective effect, and it now holds the field from the notified date i.e., January 30, 1976. The proviso in Sub-clause (3) to Clause 20 laying down a particular ratio of absorption, is pro tanto avoided by an express enactment of a 'new' proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 19 which is entirely inconsistent with it When an Ordinance is replaced by an Act which is made retrospective in operation, anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance stand wholly effected. 22. In the result, the appeal as well as the writ petitions must fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1979 (9) TMI 208 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the concept of belonging for more beneficial enjoyment of the parent property. Viewed in this light it would be apparent that the land in question being just in front of the plaintiff's house though across a narrow lane could still be land appurtenant to the plaintiff's house if it was shown that it was being used for the mere beneficial enjoyment of the plaintiff's house as I have already held earlier that the findings of the Lower Appellate Court on the point of user are based on surmises and conjectures and also mis-reading of evidence the said findings have to be interfered with and I hold that the land in suit appurtenant to the plaintiff's house was in plaintiff's possession. 9. In the circumstances, there is force in the appeal and the same is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court is restored, The suit of the plaintiff shall, therefore, stand decreed with costs throughout.
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1979 (9) TMI 207 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that his cases have been dealt with by the ITO who has jurisdiction in the matter. We may note that District VI(13) was created on 16th Dec., 1977 by a notification while Manchanda relies on notification 14th Nov., 1977 and it is quite possible that after December, 1977 there is a further notification by which the petitioner's cases has been transferred to Circle District VI(13). In any case, in view of the specific allegation of the petitioner himself that his case was being looked after by the ITO District VI(13) and also the petitioner had been so told specifically as far back as 1978, that it does not lie with the petitioner now to say that the jurisdiction of his case does not lie in District VI(13). No foundation has been laid for this argument which is contrary to the pleading. At this stage we are not prepared to let Manchanda urge this point. We, therefore, overrule the point. 12. As a result we find no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed with costs.
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1979 (9) TMI 206 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... s. 206(1). However, the assessee has paid the full amount of tax before 31st March, 1977 i.e. within the time allowed by law. Secondly, there is a valid explanation for the delay in filing the return, inasmuch as, the accountant concerned with the work was ill at the relevant time. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, we hold that the imposition of a penalty was not justified. We direct that it is cancelled. 3. The appeal is allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 205 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was above ₹ 12,000//- even prior to the date of acquisition and further that it had risen sharply by nearly ₹ 4,000/- within two years thereof. Nevertheless without giving the least reason in the following paragraph he slashed this evaluation to a sum of ₹ 9,000/- and further maintaining the 'B' block to a rate of ₹ 6,000/- only. We are unable to sustain this finding and indeed the learned Advocate General; Haryana, could also advance no cogent argument to explain the patent disparity. 15. For the aforesaid reasons all the cross-objections are hereby allowed. Compensation to the landowner-claimants is awarded at the uniform rate of ₹ 12,000/- per acre. They will also be entitled to solatium at the statutory rate of 15 per cent and interest on the enhanced amount at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of taking possession including the solatium thereof. The landowner-claimants would also be entitled to their costs. 16. Order accordingly.
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1979 (9) TMI 204 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... entioned in the plaintiff's letter dated 24th August, 1976 (Annexure-L) excluding the disputes already pending before the arbitrator as detailed in (Annexure-N) shall be referred by the Chief Engineer defendant No. 4 to an arbitrator. The plaintiff's counsel states that Kumari K.P. Sarojini arbitrator is not acting at present as such and, therefore, a new arbitrator is to be appointed. The Chief Engineer defendant No. 4 is, therefore, directed to appoint an arbitrator within two months from the date of this order referring all the disputes detailed in the plaintiff's letter dated 24th August, 1976 (Annexure-L) to the petition but excluding the disputes which have already been referred by him as per his reference letter dated 29th October, 1977 (Annexure-N to the petition). Parties are left to bear their own costs. A copy of this order with copies of Annexure 'L' including 'X' and Annexure 'N' be sent to the Chief Engineer, defendant No. 4.
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1979 (9) TMI 203 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... land and the superstructure constructed thereon belong in the eye of law to the society, in the matter of transfer of shares relating to them, compulsory registration is not necessary on account of exemption enacted by the State Legislature in clause (a) of Section 42. We are therefore of the opinion that the transfer of the property in question from Girish to plaintiff was a valid transfer. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative if the land and the super-structure belong in the eye of law to the co-operative housing society and is in the negative if they or any one of them belongs to the member personally. It appears to us that there are several other contentions which have been raised in this civil revision application. It is necessary, therefore, to send the matter back to the learned single Judge for finally deciding this civil revision application in light of the answer which we have given to the question referred to us. 8. Answered accordingly.
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1979 (9) TMI 202 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt, within the wide inclusive definition under Section 5(11)(b) of the Rent Act, and prohibitive provision of Section 15(1) is out of the way. Precisely this very contention was raised in Anand Nivas case and was accepted by Sarkar, J., but rejected by Shah, J., speaking for the majority, on the ground that Section 12, under which possession of the statutory tenant is protected itself prohibits such transfer. Transferee being a tenant under the definition is outweighed by the prohibition against transfers traced judicially in Section 12(1) of the Rent Act. This contention also is thus liable to be rejected. 24. We thus find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion of Kanade, J., and not with that of Mrs. Sujata Manohar, J. 25. The assignment in dispute not being thus valid and effective, the plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed and the landlord's petition is liable to be allowed. 26. Rule accordingly made absolute with costs throughout. 27. Order accordingly.
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1979 (9) TMI 201 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ontained at page 235 Vol. III wherein he has categorically denied all the allegations made against him by Reddy. The assertions made in the affidavit are fully supported by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of Reddy himself. For these reasons, therefore, the second contention regarding the impugned order being mala fide is also rejected. The result is that all the contentions raised by counsel for Reddy fail. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed a clear error of law in quashing the impugned order which was fully justified by rule 16(3), and did not suffer from any legal infirmity and was also in consonance with the law laid down by this Court starting from Shyamlal's case upto Sinha's and Nigam's case (supra) discussed above. We, therefore, allow the appeals, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the impugned order retiring Reddy. In the peculiar circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch I have specifically adverted. In the present case if the High Court refused to examine the official records, I presume that the reason was that the respondent Government servant had failed to make out any case whatever that the order was by way of punishment, and there being no doubt in the mind of the High Court on the point it was justified in declining to look into the official records. That the respondent Government servant has been unable to make out any case at all that the impugned order is by way of punishment is clearly evident from the material before us. No occasion arises in such a case for scrutinising the official records. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent is dismissed. In view of the order already made by this Court that the respondent will be entitled to his costs from the appellant in any event, the respondent will be paid his costs accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 199 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tured on powerlooms, excluding durries, carpets, hosiery goods and readymade garments but including the goods specified in the annexure hereunder. (a) Cotton fabrics of all varieties. 9. A bare perusal of this notification clearly indicates that before exemption can be claimed in respect of the textiles it must be manufactured on power-looms. In the present case it may be conceded that the raw material utilised for making the fused collar is manufactured on power looms, although there is no clear indication in this respect. But the exemption is not being claimed in respect of the convenient of the fused collar but for the fused collar itself. The method of manufacturing the fused collar has already been indicated earlier and it clearly shows that fused collars are not manufactured on powerlooms. This being so the assessee could not claim exemption in respect of fused collar manufactured by it. 10. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs which is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1979 (9) TMI 198 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction 5 of the Limitation Act. The word sufficient cause has been interpreted to mean cause which is bona fide and that which is done in good faith is bona fide. There being no dispute that the assessee was suffering from low blood pressure and was advised not to move, he was obviously prevented from sufficient cause as he was acting under medical advice. His immobility during 4-9-1969 to 22-9-1969 was based on Expert opinion and if acting on medical opinion the assessee did not move he was obviously acting in good faith. It cannot therefore be said that there was no sufficient cause as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 2. In these circumstances these revisions succeed and are allowed. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided by saying that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The assessee is entitled to its cost which is assessed at ₹ 200/-. The fee of the Standing Counsel is assessed at ₹ 100/-.
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1979 (9) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isclose an offence of which the magistrate could take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b). Ultimately when a magistrate looks at police report also styled as charge-sheet under Section 190(1)(b) he takes cognizance upon a police report and prima facie he does so of the offence or offences set out in the report (vide Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra ((1972) 1 SCR 571, 574)). And the report under discussion does disclose an offence under Section 7 of the Act. 13. It thus appears that the police report submitted under Section 173(3) after the information received from Mahesh Kant Jha by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was forwarded to police officer-in-charge of the police station for investigation disclosed sufficient information for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the accused and to proceed further with the trial, and no case is made out to interfere with the same. 14. Accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1979 (9) TMI 196 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y sub-s. (1) of s. 1 the Act was brought into force with effect from January 30, 1976, i.e., the date on which the ordinance was promulgated. The Act substitutes a ’new’ proviso in sub-s. (3) of s. 1 in place of the old proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the ordinance, altering the whole basis of absorption. The new proviso is given a retrospective effect, and it now holds the field from the notified date i.e., January a 30, 1976. The proviso in sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 laying down a particular ratio of absorption, is pro tanto avoided by an express enactment of a ’new’ proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 which is entirely inconsistent with it. When an ordinance is replaced by an Act which is made retrospective in operation, anything done or any action taken under the ordinance stand wholly effected. In the result, the appeal as well as the writ petitions must fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. N.V.K. Appeal and Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (9) TMI 195 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w which, in the view of the High Court, falls to be determined by the Supreme Court, and following the decision in India Machinery Stores P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar and Orissa,(2) the appeal was liable to be dismissed in view of the defective certificate. However, in both the cases after observing that the certificate was defective the appeals were disposed of on merits. In this case a very substantial question of law of general public importance is raised and it would be a travesty of justice if we now dismiss the appeal on the sole ground that the certificate is defective. It would have been open to us to grant special leave on the question raised before us. Therefore, the preliminary objection must be overruled. This appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court as well as of the first appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (9) TMI 194 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e position being as disclosed above, it would be in the interest of justice to remand the case to the Revising Authority to reconsider the question of the acceptance or rejection of the books afresh because the only ground which remains unexplained is the discrepancy in the turnover of sales shown during the assessment in a chart and the turnover disclosed from the books. 6. After hearing counsel for the parties I am inclined to accept this contention, since it will furnish an opportunity to the Revising Authority to examine this question afresh in the proper perspective and in the light of the decided cases which have been noted above. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go into other questions raised in this revision. 7. I, therefore, allow the revision and set aside the order of the learned Additional Revising Authority and refer the matter back to him for decision afresh according to law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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