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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 217 Records
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1980 (2) TMI 288 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... if the goods are intended for sale.... 11. Mr. Mehta finally urged that the products entered the stream of trade as the products of the petitioner company and hence the petitioner-Company must be deemed to be the manufacturer. This contention is fallacious. The products manufactured by the seller, namely, Cibatul Ltd., did not change when they entered the stream of trade merely because the foreign Company's trade marks were affixed on them. The products remained the same. They did not become new or different products merely by the affixation of the trade mark. Hence this contention of Mr. Mehta must also be repelled. 12. In the result, the ground of challenge of the petitioner-company that it is not the manufacturer but merely the buyer of the goods manufactured by the seller, namely, Cibatul Ltd., is valid and must be accepted. 13. The petition is, therefore, allowed in terms of prayer (a)(i) and (ii) There will be no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
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1980 (2) TMI 287 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and it was held that the words might maintain mean has the power , or is entitled, to maintain and that under S. 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, a suit or appeal which the receiver is required to continue is one relating to the property of the insolvent and therefore an appeal which relates to a money decree passed against file insolvent does not amount to a legal proceeding relating to the property of the insolvent and if the receiver declines to continue the appeal, the insolvent appellant is entitled to continue the same. Having regard to these principles which are applicable to the instant case, the claim in the suit cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed to relate to the property of the insolvent and therefore, the presence of the Official Assignee is unnecessary. The conclusion of the court below to the contrary is, therefore, untenable and consequently, that order is set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. 4. Petition allowed.
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1980 (2) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... riti Ranjan Ghosh and Ors. v. The State 77 C.W.N. 865 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Dharamvir Singh v. State 1975 Crl. L. J. 884 (Pb. & Haryana), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Brij Bhushan Raghunandan Prasad v. The State AIR1957MP106 , the Orissa High Court in Srikant Rout v. State of Orissa 1972 (2) Cutt. W.R.1332 and the Allahabad High Court in the judgment under appeal. A contrary view was taken by the Patha High Court in Gulzar Khan and Ors. v. State AIR1962Pat255 and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in B. Rami Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 1971 Crl. L.J.1591 (A.P.). We do not agree with the latter view. We accordingly dismiss the appeal and while doing so we would suggest the suitable legislation may be made on the analogy of Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, to provide for the investiture of Magistrates with the power to issue directions to any person, including an accused person, to give specimen signatures and writings.
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1980 (2) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rt to hold that the accused received the gratification from P.W.3. In Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Administration) (supra) also it was said mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it was paid was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in the case was not reliable to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can be no quarrel with that proposition but where the recovery of the money coupled with other circumstances leads to the conclusion that the accused received gratification from some person the Court would certainly be entitled to draw the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In our view both the decisions are of no avail to the appellant and as already observed by us conclusions of fact must be drawn on the facts of each case and not on the facts of other cases. In other words there can be no precedents on questions of facts. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1980 (2) TMI 284 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the railway Administration. The mere fact that he was paid a stipend during the training period as an Apprentice, did not make a him an employee of the Railway Administration. Indeed Clause 17 of the agreement (Ext. 69) stated in clear terms that the Railway Administration did not bind itself to employ him on the completion of the training. In its narrow sense, the act of the accused-respondent did not amount to engaging in 'trade'. Even if the wider interpretation were to be put on the word 'trade' in Section 168, Penal Code, the engagement of the appellant as an Apprentice-trainee would not bring him within the purview of the expression 'trade'. The fact remains that during the period of his apprentice-ship, the appellant was not carrying on any 'tade' as a means of livelihood within the meaning of Section 168, Indian Penal Code. 6. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the judgment of the High Court and in dismissing this appeal.
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1980 (2) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... legal illiteracy and pecuniary indigence may have forbidden their moving this Court or the High Court by way of habeas corpus petition. It is a bad state of affairs when we see the Bihar State being oblivious or callous to the prisoners whom it is warehousing. For what purpose, one knows not. It may be an act of penitence on the part of the authorities of the state and also of cleansing of conscience if only a special officer with judicial experience or other law officer familiar with criminal justice were appointed to make an extensive survey and study all the cases of prisoners to find out whether illegal custody has become a large scale phenomenon. After all, the State is also the guardian of the people's freedom and must, activist fashion set in motion measures to enlarge those prisoners who are held in custody without the warrant of fair procedure. 11. With these directions we direct the release of the petitioners oh their own bonds in a sum of ₹ 1,000/- each.
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1980 (2) TMI 282 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... them any proposition of law, as advanced by the learned counsel, was laid down. It is a basic principle of natural justice that if a party at the appellate stage is allowed to lead additional evidence, the opposite party has to be afforded an opportunity to lead evidence, in rebuttal, if it so desires. Moreover, the Tribunal during the course of the arguments asked the assessee certain questions regarding both the matters, namely, the production of the additional evidence and the death of Hira Lal, one of the partners, but the assessee showed his inability to give any information. There was, therefore, no option with the Tribunal but to remind the case for fresh decision after making further enquiries on the issues framed. No fault therefore, can be found with the order of the Tribunal and the question referred to us is accordingly answered in the affirmative. The Revenue shall also be entitled to costs which are assessed at ₹ 250/-. Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, J. I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ce of Pws 1, 2, 3, and 6 clearly proved that the house was purchase by the plaintiff. The trial Court believed the evidence of these witnesses which was supported by the document including Exhibits P2 and P4 as also a revenue receipt The High Court made on serious attempt to examine the intrinsic merits of the testimony of these witnesses. Even if the evidence of these witnesses is excluded from consideration, the registered sale deed duly executed was sufficient to prove the title of plaintiff in respect of the house in absence of any plea of benami or evidence by the state to show that Defendant No. 5 was the real purchaser. For these reasons we find ourselves unable to agree with the decision of the High Court and hold that in dismissing the plaintiff's case, it has committed an error of Jaw. The Appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the plaintiff's suit stands decreed. The appellant will be entitled to her costs throughout.
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1980 (2) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that the Bank established by a State had distinctive features which differentiated it from other Banks and formed a category in itself and the Act in setting up separate authorities for determination of disputes and in prescribing a special procedure to be followed by them for the recovery of the dues by summary process could not be considered to be discriminatory. 9. We are, therefore, of the view that Section 3 of the Act which enables the State Government to recover the sums advanced under the circumstances mentioned therein as if they were arrears of land revenue cannot be held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition. Since the High Court disposed of the case on the basis of the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. and Anr. (supra) which has since been overruled, we make no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 279 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f 1980 save and except that the appellant is different and for the same reasons as are given by us in our Judgment disposing of Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1980, we allow the present appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court as also the Order of Conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and remand the case to the learned Magistrate so that he may proceed with the case from the stage at which the appellant confessed to a plea of guilty. The learned trial Magistrate will ignore the plea of guilty entered by the appellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to lead such additional evidence as it thinks fit and then allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence and lead such evidence in defence as he thinks proper and then dispose of the case in accordance with law. The appellant will continue on the same bail on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979.
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1980 (2) TMI 278 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ear 1961 long after the partition, alleged and proved by the defendants 1st party and this being the position it cannot be made liable for partition and it is unnecessary to consider whether the joint family as it existed prior to partition, possessed sufficient nucleus which might have contributed to the acquisition of these properties or whether in fact defendant No. 8 had purchased the same out of her own khas fund. In addition to the relief for partition, the plaintiffs also claimed decree for mesne profits in respect of the lands of Schedules 3 and 4. It would suffice to say that, in view of the finding recorded above, the plaintiffs cannot be entitled to any decree for mesne profits. 23. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the suit instituted by the plaintiffs is dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs and the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 24. I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 277 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d Janaki about succession to the estate of Kallyani. Both had applied to the exclusion of each other for being substituted as legal representatives of the deceased. For purposes of this appeal both were substituted for the deceased appellant. It is not necessary to decide this question in this appeal because whoever of the two establishes her right to inherit the property of Kallyani would be entitled to the same but the dispute would be between Yashoda and Janaki and the other defendants have no right to be heard in that matter. 33. Accordingly this appeal succeeds and it is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court and the High Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit in regard to A schedule property are set aside. Plaintiff's suit is decreed and it is declared that she has 1/4 share in properties set out in schedule A annexed to the plaint. A preliminary decree to that effect shall be drawn. Defendant 1 shall pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout.
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1980 (2) TMI 276 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent of India also a very vague and evasive stand appears to have been taken. It is not said that any orders were passed on the representation or that it was considered but it is said that it was to abide by any stand taken by the State Government. Section 11(1) of the COFEPUSA Act clearly enjoins that the Central Government may revoke or modify an order passed by the State Government. Mr. Abdul Khadar fairly conceded that the Central Government had a discretion under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act to revoke the order of detention. Thus when once a representation is made to the Central Government, it is duty bound to consider the same in order to exercise its discretion either in rejecting or accepting it. If there is inordinate delay in considering the representation that would clearly amount to violation of the provisions of Article 22(5) as to render the detention unconstitutional and void. We, therefore, allow the petition and direct that the detenu be released forthwith.
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1980 (2) TMI 275 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... resentation of appeal is that they should be carefully scrutinised at the initial stage soon after they are filed and the appellant required to remedy the defects". The principle laid down in the above decision should govern all defective proceedings filed in Court". It was this observation that I had in view in the above judgment. I observed that in rare cases application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal could be filed after the appeal was presented, though I had my own misgivings about the principle of law enunciated in that judgment. At that time, I overlooked the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 3A (1). I would not have made the above observation if this rule, which made it mandatory for the condonation petition to accompany the appeal, was brought to my notice. This petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground also. In the result, I dismiss the petition. The parties are directed to bear their costs. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1980 (2) TMI 274 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en made amply clear by the words "and if he persists in such failure or refusal with further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for every day, after the first, during which the offence continues." 12. The express language of the above section goes to indicate that failure or refusal to comply with the term of the said section creates an offence and continues to be an offence so long as such failure or refusal persists. In other words, so long as the requirement of the said section is not complied with the offence continues. But for the above quoted words in Section 58B(2), Sri Sarkar, relying on the above judgment, might have successfully argued that. the offence was not a continuing one, but then, as, unlike the provision of Section 69 of the Mines Act, Section 58B(2) expressly makes a provision rendering the offence in question a continuing one, Mr. Sarkar's contention must fail. 13. In the result, the applications fail and the Rules are discharged.
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1980 (2) TMI 273 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t;objects" qualifies both the objects as well as purposes and it would not be correct to read charitable with objects and not with purposes. In fact, here the words. " objects " and " purposes " mean the same thing. This contention raised on behalf of the revenue is also without force. Thus, having regard to the terms of the trust deed and to the correct interpretation of the term " charitable purpose " in s. 2(15) of the Act (as interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association 1980 121 ITR 1 ), we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in both the references, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of our decision of the question referred to us in the two references, the Income-tax cases under s. 256(2) of the Act have become infructuous and are hereby dismissed as such. The parties are left to bear their own costs in all the cases.
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1980 (2) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ep in mind that what follows from the grant of special leave is an appeal, and the jurisdiction must, therefore, be invoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi recognised in law. 26. In regard to the question whether the procedure followed by this Court in disposing of a petition for special leave under Article 136 is consistent with the procedure contemplated by Article 21, we have no hesitation in holding that the principle is inbuilt within the terms of Article 136 itself that the Court in exercising its jurisdiction will do so as a court of law following the well-known norms of procedure which have been recognised for long as governing and informing the proceedings of all courts. We have no hesitation in holding that Article 21 is not violated. 27. The petitioner has failed to establish that there is a case for interfering with the judgment of this Court allowing the appeal. 28. The writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 270 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al appeal was presented by Mr. M.L. Shrimal, who had no authority from the appellants to act on their behalf. 13. So far as this factual position is concerned, it appears to us unassailable and Mr. Raj Narain Munshi was unable to controvert it. It is well established that presentation of an appeal amounts to acting on behalf of the party, which requires an authority in writing. It is not the case of the appellants that Mr. Shrimal had any authority whatever from the appellants to present this appeal. The record is silent and no explanation has been submitted before us even at this stage as to in what circumstances and with whose authority the appeal came to be presented by Mr. Shrimal. In these circumstances, we have no alternative but to hold that the presentation of the appeal was not proper and was consequently incompetent. This preliminary objection also prevails. 14. The result is that we allow both the preliminary objections and reject the appeal. No order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nstitute and the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development. If the contention of the respondents is right, the order of the High Court would also be bad. But we do not think that the contention of the respondents is well founded. The three respondents to the application for eviction, in our opinion, sufficiently represented the Union of India and. therefore, there was no justification for the High Court to set aside the order of eviction. It is a little regrettable that the High Court should have interfered with a fair and just order by relying on a hyper-technicality while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. which is a jurisdiction calculated to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. 2. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order of eviction passed in favour of the appellant. 3. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellant.
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1980 (2) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n obligation on the transferee to report to the registering authority concerned regarding the transfer of the vehicle along with a certificate of registration and then get the registration transferred in his name. It was therefore the duty of the plaintiff to have applied to the registering authority under Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act and got the registration transferred in his name. It has been found by the Courts below that all the registration papers as also the memo of sale were handed over to the plaintiff. In these circumstances therefore if the plaintiff did not choose to move the registering authority, he cannot be heard to say that he is entitled for refund of the purchase money or claim damages. The decisions of the Courts below are therefore correct and do not warrant any interference by this Court. 3. We do not find any merit in this appeal. We accordingly dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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