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Showing 81 to 100 of 103 Records
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1980 (5) TMI 23 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Borrowed Capital, Capital Employed, New Industrial Undertaking, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... al employed exclude all borrowed moneys or ignore the reality of the funds used during the entire year except its first day. Parliament could not have possibly intended to favour the affluent assessees who are able to employ their own capital and to discriminate against the indigent who have to borrow funds to finance their undertaking. The learned counsel for the respondents made reference to CIT v. Warner Hindustan Ltd. 1979 117 ITR 68 (AP) and Karimtharuvi Tea Estates Ltd. v. State of Kerala 1963 48 ITR 83 (SC). Suffice it to say that both the cases are distinguishable and the learned counsel cannot derive any benefit therefrom. No other argument has been raised in the other case. For the aforesaid reasons, I accept the writ petitions, declare r. 19A(3) ultra vires under s. 80J of the I.T. Act, quash the impugned orders of the Commissioner and direct him to allow the deductions to the petitioners taking into consideration the observations made above. No order as to costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 22 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Expenditure Not Accounted For, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... amounts in connection with the marriage himself. But he has stated that he did not go for honeymoon and there is no indication I that he spent any monies himself over and above the expenditure met by the family. No enquiry has been directed on that aspect either. It is on this narrow ground that we think that the present assessee is entitled to the benefit of doubt. It is more probable that the family met the entire expenditure on the marriage though it had accounted only for Rs. 10,000 rather than that, in addition to the amount spent by the family, the assessee had incurred expenditure to the extent of Rs. 10,000. For the above reasons, we are of opinion that the questions referred to us should be answered by saying that the addition of Rs. 10,000 as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources was not justified in law. The questions referred to us are answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e for roofing repairs under the heading Reserves and surplus . That amount again admittedly had been debited to the profit and loss account. But in terms of Sch. VI to the Companies Act, 1956, all these amounts were to be shown under the head Current liabilities and provisions . Moreover, undisputedly at the initial stage the amount represented amounts set apart for meeting the liabilities of the company. Thus, taking the matter as a whole we are of opinion that the persons in authority had no intention to treat the impugned amount as reserves . On the discussions made above and under the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in holding the amount in question as reserve and in reversing the decision of the Commissioner. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, each party to pay and bear its own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1980 (5) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Asset ... ... ... ... ..... ried on. We have noticed what are the tests laid down by the Supreme Court to judge as to what would constitute agricultural operation. Undoubtedly, in the instant case, the land in question was used for agricultural purposes because there were agricultural operations, there was cultivation of the land and sowing of seeds. The purpose of this cultivation does not, in view of the definition of capital asset under the 1961 Act, in any way affect the question whether the land in question is agricultural land or not. The user or the potentiality of use is a relevant factor but the purpose for which such nature of activity is carried on is of no relevance. If that is the position, then, in view of the facts found by the Tribunal, in our opinion, the Tribunal came to a correct conclusion and the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (5) TMI 19 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... al method open to the employer in this regard than the insertion of a provision in the trust deed or the execution of separate agreement with the trustees or the issue of some directions or instructions to the auditors, trustees or bankers to ensure such deduction. If some such formal as well as informal arrangement could be treated as an effective arrangement for purposes of s. 10(4)(c), there is no reason why the correspondence in the present case, read in the context of the constitution of the board of trustees, cannot itself be taken to amount to provision of the effective arrangements envisaged in s. 10(4)(c). For the reasons mentioned above, we are of opinion that the Tribunal was correct in answering both the issues in favour of the assessee. We therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee on both the issues. As the Commissioner has failed, he will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 300.
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1980 (5) TMI 18 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... tained in s. 2(15) of the 1961 Act, again the exemption of any trust having for its objects any object involving the carrying on of an activity for profit. This aspect requires to be looked into by the authorities before the assessee s claim for exemption can succeed. We, therefore, leave this aspect of the matter completely open for re-determination by the Tribunal either by itself or by remand to the lower authorities. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in each case by saying that the claim for exemption of the assessee under ss. II and 12 of the 1961 Act has to be allowed in the light of the trust deed as amended by the court s order in each of these cases but that it is not possible for us to say to what extent the assessee is entitled to the above exemption because there is, no material before us to show how the activities of the trust were being conducted between 1949 and. 1972. The references are answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Connection, Deemed Accrual, Non-resident, Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... only because the type of spare parts required for the foreign machinery could be better picked up by these personnel, who have experience in running the machinery. It is merely an assistance provided to the Indian company, the foreign personnel being treated as the employees of the Indian company. Having gone through the terms of the agreement in full, we are satisfied that there are no operations in India attributable to the foreign company which can give rise to any profits being earned in India. The agreement itself says that the terms of the payments were in Germany. Thus, there is absolutely no operation in India which would give rise to tax liability in India as far as the foreign company is concerned. The assessment for the years under consideration were rightly set aside by the AAC and by the Tribunal. The question referred is accordingly answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. One set.
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1980 (5) TMI 16 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... IT 1975 99 ITR 375. The learned counsel stated that subsequent to the order of this court the Tribunal had set aside the order of the Commissioner and upheld the original assessment. The learned counsel for the respondent stated that he is not aware of the final result and that he is not in a position to give details regarding the assessment of Gee Vee Construction Pvt. Ltd. We may remark that this point made by the learned counsel for the petitioner also has relevance to the merits of the reassessment and not to the question of jurisdiction which is before us. It is certainly open to the petitioner to place before the ITO the details regarding the assessment in the case of Gee Vee Construction and satisfy the ITO that the sale consideration has been correctly stated in the deed. For the reasons above discussed, we are of the opinion that the civil writ petition has to be dismissed. We direct accordingly. The respondents will be entitled to their costs Counsel s fee Rs. 200.
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1980 (5) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Bonus Shares, Capital Gains, Cost Of Acquisition Of Capital Asset ... ... ... ... ..... re concerned with the cost or the value of the subsequently acquired bonus shares, subsequently in the sense that bonus shares acquired by virtue of the holding of the original bonus shares to the shareholder in question. Secondly, at the time when the valuation was made, which was taken at the option of the assessee as fair market value, which the assessee elected was only in respect of the original shares. Therefore, this principle would not be applicable, in view of the facts and circumstances of this case, to the instant case. Having regard to the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case referred to hereinbefore and in view of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion and the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (5) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ordinary sense, this provision for depreciation of investment should be considered, in the facts and circumstances averred to the Tribunal and the AAC, as reserves which should be included in the capital computation for the present Act. So far as bad and doubtful debts are concerned, as we have noted, that the provision made was far in excess of the bad and doubtful debts which had been provided for in the balance-sheet from year to year, which has been noticed by the AAC which we have set out hereinbefore. From this aspect of the matter, the facts, in the instant case, are different from the facts with which the Division Bench of this court in the case of A. P. V. Engineering Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 937 was concerned. In these lights, therefore, we are of the opinion that both the questions should be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, in the facts and circumstances of the case. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (5) TMI 13 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Mitakshara HUF, The Constitution ... ... ... ... ..... e of profits of firm in which the assessee was a partner. This provision was challenged as ultra vires. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and held that the said provisions were enacted for preventing tax evasion and were well within the competence of the Federal Legislature under the Govt. of India Act, 1935, and did not violate the fundamental right of equality before the law as it made a reasonable classification having regard to the object of preventing evasion of tax nor did the provision impose restriction on the fundamental rights under art.. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken in the above cases and would accordingly hold that S. 34(1)(c) of the Act is valid and does not violate art. 14 of the Constitution of India. No other point was raised before us. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. But I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs. S. Roy J.--I agree.
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1980 (5) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... f respondent No. 1 either that income of the firm had escaped assessment or that such escapement was due to any failure on the part of the firm to disclose fully and truly any material facts relevant for the assessment. In my view, there was also no independent exercise of mind or formation of belief by respondent No. 1 so as to enable him to exercise his power under s. 147(a) of the Act. Respondent No. 1 has proceeded solely on the opinion of the departmental valuer resting on further opinion of the assessee s valuer. On the view that I have taken, it is not necessary to go into the other points raised on behalf of the parties. For all the above reasons, the petitioners succeed in this rule. The impugned notices under s. 148 of the I.T. Act, 1961, are quashed and the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. This order will govern the other rule in C. R. No. 2494(W) of 1978. Operation of the order will remain stayed for a period of three weeks as prayed for.
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1980 (5) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income, Perquisite ... ... ... ... ..... f the rent restriction legislations and, therefore, if the property was sold in the open market it would not fetch such price as it would have fetched had it not been wholly tenanted. Respondent No. 1 not knowing that the property was wholly tenanted did not consider this aspect in determining the fair market value of the property. Thus, in my opinion, respondent No. 1 had no material to form his belief as required under s. 269C(1) of the Act and the conditions proceedings for the initiation of the proceedings for acquisition of the property were not satisfied and the proceeding was, therefore, without jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider or decide the other points raised by Mr. Bajoria. The proceeding initiated by the notice bearing No. AC-5/R-11-Cal/72-73, dated the 30th March, 1973, under s. 269D(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, issued by respondent No. 1 is, therefore, quashed and the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... stant case was right in allowing the writ petition and in quashing the said impugned notice. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. Mr. Pal asks for a certificate on the ground that an important question of law as to the power of the appeal court to look into and consider a particular document which was not produced before the learned trial judge but has been referred to in the affidavit, arises for determination in the instant case. Questions of law relating to reopening of an assessment are well settled by a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court. This question of law relating to the power of the appeal court, as contended for by Mr. Pal, in our opinion, is in the facts and circumstances of this case not such a question of general importance as will require to be determined by the Supreme Court and in that view of the matter we are unable to grant the certificate. DUTT J.-I agree.
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1980 (5) TMI 9 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... r. (12) On receipt of the application under sub-section (10) the Board, or on receipt of the application under sub-section (11) the notified authority, may, after giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it thinks fit. These provisions provide an adequate opportunity to the petitioners to get back any property that might have been wrongly seized and even the order under s. 132(5) of the Act can be re-examined. Moreover, s. 132B shows the manner in which the retained goods have to be used. In this case, the retained property is only cash and it has to be utilised to recover income-tax or penalty levied in an assessment. It, therefore, appears to us that there is an adequate remedy of appeal and provision even otherwise for dealing with any wrongful retention of the cash which may have resulted in this case. No circumstances are disclosed calling for our interference under art. 226 of the Constitution. So, we dismiss the writ petition with costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 8 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case, the activity which resulted in a profit for the society was not an activity for profit carried on by the society. It was an activity the dominant object of which was only to subserve the primary or dominant purpose of the society which, as already pointed out, is clearly charitable in nature. It was not the intention of the society to make a profit by letting out parts of the building such activity was only incidental to the carrying out of the primary purpose of the society. The Tribunal, after considering all the surrounding circumstances, has arrived at this conclusion and we see no grounds for interfering with this factual conclusion. We are, therefore, of opinion that both under the 1922 Act as well as the 1961 Act, the assessee-society was rightly held to be entitled to exemption. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in all the years in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs in one of the references Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (5) TMI 7 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncome-tax or capital gains tax. But unless the statute places the burden on the assessee for the purposes of penalty proceedings, the mere non-explanation or even a false explanation could not be penalised. From the fact that the assessee failed to prove that the income was from agriculture, no inference could be made either of concealment or of wilfulness in furnishing inaccurate particulars. There is no material or evidence apart from the assessment order from which it could be reasonably inferred that the assessee concealed the particulars of his income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars in respect of the same. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, the penalty of Rs. 5,000 ought not to have been imposed. We answer the question in the negative and are of the opinion that there was no circumstance by which the Tribunal, in law, would be justified in imposing penalty on the assessee under s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961.
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1980 (5) TMI 6 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at it was an accretion to the capital and that such an income was not liable to be taxed. The excess of the money received by profit from sale of land is ordinarily taken to be accretion to the capital. The assessee was, therefore, under a bona fide belief that such income is not liable to income-tax. This indeed is a vexed question and it cannot be attributed to the assessee that he had wilfully tried to suppress his income from the sale of land. In our opinion the case would be covered by the rule in Hindustan Steel Ltd. s case 1972 83 ITR 26 (SC). We are, accordingly, of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no penalty was imposable for filing the return belatedly. We answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in imposing a penalty under s. 271(l)(a) of the I.T. Act, 1961, on the assessee for filing the return late. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 5 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the partner of the firm, M/s. Chandulal Gaurishankar, and in holding on that basis that the share of profits arising in the hands of the minor sons of the assessee in the said firm were not includible in the assessment of the assessee under section 64(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? We have very carefully perused the order of the Tribunal and find that there is a categorical finding recorded by the Tribunal to the effect that Shri Gaurishankar Agarwalla, although he was a member of the HUF, yet since 1964, he formed his own HUF with his wife and minor daughters. This finding has been recorded by the Tribunal, and, therefore, we find that the question sought to be called for from the Tribunal does not arise out of the impugned order as the same is based on the findings of facts by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we are not inclined to call for a statement of case on the question of law sought to be raised by the petitioner from the Tribunal. Hence, these petitions are rejected.
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1980 (5) TMI 4 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Therefore, on the day when the banking business was transferred the difference between the value of the assets and the value of the shares allotted to the Maharaja has been appropriately treated as share premiums following the Standard Vacuum s case 1966 59 ITR 685 (SC). We do not think that, on the basis of Bharat Fire and General Insurance s case 1964 53 ITR 108 (SC), the share premium could be held to be revenue liable to be taxed in the year of their accrual. No other point has been urged. The main contention of the learned counsel for the Department has been that such accruals are profits on the, basis of Bharat Fire and General Insurance s case. We do not agree with such contention. We would, therefore, answer this question in favour of the assessee holding that the Department was not justified in taxing the sum of Rs. 42,53,148 as revenue profits in the hands of the assessee-company for the assessment year 1959-60. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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