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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 172 Records
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1980 (8) TMI 216 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... sion in the Arts the Commerce College affiliated to Poona University could be described as 'valuable security' as the expression is defined in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code. We therefore alter the conviction under the aforesaid sections to one under Section 471 reads with Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we set aside the sentences passed against the appellant and remit the matter to the trial Court to consider, as provided in Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, whether the appellant should be given the benefit of Section 4 of the said Act. If the trial Court does not find it expedient to release the appellant on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of that Act, it should then pass proper sentences on the appellant for the offences of which the appellant has been found guilty. The fine Imposed on the appellant, if paid, shall be refunded. The appeal is disposed of as above.
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1980 (8) TMI 215 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tmental Authorities have not recorded a finding that the properties standing in the name of the Petitioner were acquired by the Petitioner out of his own funds and that the properties stood ostensibly in the name of the wife. 18. Non-consideration of the evidence favourable to the Petitioner, admission of inadmissible evidence and non-application of mind to the material aspects of the case have resulted in manifest injustice. This is therefore pre-eminently a fit case in which this Court instead of substituting its own findings should send back the case to the appellate authority for fresh disposal. 19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority are quashed. The case is remanded to the appellate authority (O.P. No. 3) for fresh disposal according to law In the light of the observations made above after giving an opportunity to the Petitioner of being heard. We direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1980 (8) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Our attention is drawn by Mr. Bhandare, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, to the fact that there was a proposal to introduce Clause 12A in Order 41 providing for admission of appeal as to a part by that clause does not seem to have found its way into the statute. We would, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench affirming the order of Mr. Justice S.K. Desai as also the order of Mr. Justice S.K. Desai and remand the appeal to the High Court so that the High Court may consider whether the appeal should be admitted wholly or rejected wholly. There will be no order as to costs of the present appeal.
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1980 (8) TMI 213 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed for the first time in second Appeal and must be rejected. 17. Both the contentions raised by Sri Chatterjee having been found to be devoid of merit, the appeal must be dismissed. In view of the conclusion at which I have arrived it is not necessary to consider the other contention of Sri Ghosh namely, that the period of limitation governing this case was not that laid down in Article 14 or that even if Article 14 applied, on the finding of facts arrived at by the lower appellate Court limitation was saved by the provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act or that at any rate, the petitioner was entitled to recovery of the amounts of the three cheques which were dishonoured the cause of action being the failure of the consideration under the three cheques on the lines on which the alternative relief was granted by the Bombay High Court in the Bombay case referred to above. 18. In the result, the appeal is without merit and it is, accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1980 (8) TMI 212 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th a signature of the executant, provided the evidence satisfies the Court that the second sheet was in fact used at the very time the instrument was drawn. The expression “such instrument shall be written on each sheet so used” in Rule 7 of the C. P. & Berar Stamp Rules, 1942, does include within its meaning the lines drawn cancelling the sheet or signature of the executant put thereon indicative of utilization of the paper. Section 13 of the Stamp Act is duly complied if the evidence of cancellation or utilization is such that the same sheet cannot be applied to any other instrument. In this view of the matter, we are constrained to say that the construction placed by Bhave, J. on Section 13 of the Stamp Act read with Rule 7 of the C. P. & Berar Stamp Rules, 1942, is too narrow and stringent. The view taken in the three authorities cited above has out respectful concurrence. The Civil Revisions may now be placed before the appropriate Bench for hearing.
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1980 (8) TMI 211 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot be sustained and is hereby reversed and it is held that the respondent was selling milk ice. 18-A. The test carried out by the Public Analyst revealed that the milk fat of the constituents of the sample was 4.16 per cent as against the maximum prescribed standard of 2 per cent and on that ground it was found to be adulterated. The sample does not conform to the definition of the milk ice and the constituents given therein. The respondent is thus guilty of an offence for selling adulterated food article. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the order under appeal acquitting the respondent is set aside and Bhagwan Dass respondent is convicted of the offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act read with Section 7. He is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,000. In default of payment of fine he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. 20. I agree, Satya Parkash Goyal, J. 21. I also agree.
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1980 (8) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... are vacant. 36. We, therefore, direct that a seniority list be prepared in the light of the principles laid down by us. It is not for the court to find out how many among the temporary Assistant Engineers are eligible for permanency, how many have cleared all the requirements regarding regular appointments even in temporary vacancies-in short, how many must be deemed to have been appointed in a substantive vacancy though temporary. That will be worked but by the State in the light of what we have laid down. We do not agree with the High Court in the partly misleading reasoning it has adopted, but do concur in the conclusion that the seniority list deserves to be set aside. We do so in partial allowance of the appeals and dismiss the writ petitions. Parties will be 'heard' by Government through written or oral representations as it chooses, when it prepares a seniority list but the principles we have put down shall govern. The parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1980 (8) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cumstance to be taken into account for determining whether the delay in supplying the copies, has, in fact, prejudiced the detenu's right to make a speedy and effective representation. According to the petitioner his lawyer by a letter, dated February 1, 1980, sought an interview to enable him to draft his representation. But no application for obtaining copies of the material documents had been made by the detenu till February 15118, 1980, when it was put in a course of communication to the Government, while permission for interview with the lawyer was granted on the 20th February. In short, on a consideration of all the circumstance of this particulars case, we are of opinion that the delay of 17 days in question, was not so unreasonable as to amount to an infraction of the constitutional imperatives in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. These, then, are the reasons in support of our order, dated May 9, 1980 by which we dismissed the writ petition. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (8) TMI 208 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... otherwise, vital facts bearing on the decision is bad in law. Likewise, any action which irrationally digs up obsolete circumstances and obsessively reaches a decision based thereon, cannot be sustained. Legality depends on regard or the totality of material facts viewed in a holistic perspective. For these reasons, the order challenged is obviously bad and we quash it. It is, however, open to the A.G. to take a fresh decision based on legal material and guided by legal principles. The appellant has, by now, reached the age of superannuation in the normal course. The result is that the consequence of any fresh order may only be financial. It is for the A.G. to consider whether in the circumstances, a fresh evaluation for the purpose of compulsory retirement is called for. We merely allow the appeal, quash the order of compulsory retirement and leave the law to take its course. The appellant will be entitled to costs which we quantify at ₹ 2,000. N.K.A. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (8) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eliminary objections more or less on the same reasons as given by us though not in such details. It is, however, not necessary for us to remand the matter to the trial court for decision of the case on merits because the Solicitor General having agreed to give two years' time to the appellant to vacate the premises on filing the usual undertaking, the appellant does not want to contest the proceedings before the Estate officer, LIC and has undertaken to give vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent on August 1, 1982. Meanwhile, the appellant shall keep on paying the usual rent. The appellant shall also file an undertaking accompanied by an affidavit to the effect that it shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent on or before August 1, 1982 and-shall not induct any tenant on the premises. The undertaking shall be filed within three weeks from today. The subject matter of the appeal is accordingly disposed of finally. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (8) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as unreasonable delay of more than a month in supplying the copies to the detenus, of the material that had been relied upon or referred to in the 'grounds' of detention. There was thus an infraction of the constitutional imperative that in addition to the supply of the grounds of detention, all the basic material relied upon or referred to in those 'grounds' must be supplied to the detenu with reasonable expedition to enable him to make a full and effective representation at the earliest. Of course, what is "reasonable expedition" is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. In the peculiar facts of the instant case, we are of opinion that the delay of more than a month, in supplying the copies of the basic materials and documents to the detenus has vitiated the detention. 20. It was on this short ground, we, by our Order, dated April 23, 1980, had allowed the writ petitions and directed the release of the detenus.
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1980 (8) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h different objects in view. 1953 Act neither trenches upon 1912 Act nor supersedes or supplants any provision of it. Therefore, some provisions of 1953 Act cannot override or supersede the provisions of 1912 Act and by mere reference to the provisions of 1953 Act the High Court was in error in totally overlooking and ignoring the provisions in 1912 Act and the rules enacted thereunder. However, in view of our finding that the dispute brought before the Civil Court in this case was not a dispute between a society and its officer and, therefore, one of the conditions for attracting rule 115 having not been satisfied, the civil court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. For these reasons the decision of the High Court is confirmed. Accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. As the dispute is very old, we hope that it would be expeditiously disposed of by the learned district judge to whom the matter was remanded by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (8) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es were evidently too enfeebled to enable him to enter into a transaction which, in law has a religious-cum-spiritual significance and which, in a worldly way, affects valuable rights to property. The High Court has examined every facet of the evidence with great care and we are in agreement with the learned Judge that Mansaram was not in a fit state of mind when he executed the deed of adoption. He could not have, possibly, understood the nature and consequences of what he was doing. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. May we add that this judgment, properly understood, will not be a charter for interference by the High Courts with findings of facts recorded by the final Court of facts. The situation, here, was of an exceptional character where evidence which was incapable of supporting more than one conclusion was considered as justifying a conclusion which no reasonable tribunal could rationally reach. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (8) TMI 203 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... or of Enforcement. In this case apart from the fact that the cause title in the memorandum of grounds of appeal shows only the Director of Enforcement as the appellant, no material has been placed before the court, even after the question of maintainability has been raised, to convince the court that the Central Government actually decided to appeal against the order of the Appellate Board and instructed the Director of Enforcement to file the appeal on their behalf. In those circumstances, I am inclined to hold that the appeal filed by the Director of Enforcement against the order of the Appellate Board cannot be maintained. 6. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed as not maintainable. There will be no order as to costs. The dismissal of this appeal is, however, without prejudice to the right of the Government of India to file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Board, if they are so advised, with a Petition to excuse the delay if it is possible. 7. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (8) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n Bhoi . This was a case under the Employees' Provident Funds Act. The following observation occurs on page 39 of the report It may be that the deduction and retention of the employees' contribution is a trust crested by virtue of that very fact, or by virtue of a provision in statute or statutory rule. But even apart from the latter, the more fact of telling the employees that it is their contribution to the provident fund scheme and then making a deduction or recovery and retaining it, constitutes the offence of criminal breach of trust. 3. This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the position and we also agree with the learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that "this is so obvious that nothing more need be said about it." We therefore think that the impugned order quashing the charge against the respondents is obviously wrong. The appeal is allowed, the order complained of is set aside as this is an old case, the trial shall be expedited.
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1980 (8) TMI 201 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e persons specified in sub-s. (3). It is pertinent to note that the AAC was of the opinion that the aggregate of the funds invested in Goodwill India Ltd. did not exceed 5 per cent. of the capital of that company as capital meant equity capital as opposed to loans etc. He, therefore, felt that the saving provision of s. 13(4) would apply and exempted the interest income from the total income of the assessees. However, on appeal, the Tribunal refused to interfere with the order of the AAC on the basis that nothing had been lent to any of the persons interested in the trust without adequate security or interest. For the reasons outlined above, question No. 2 in the case of Eternal Science of Man's Society and M/s. Daulat Ram Public Mission, New Delhi, are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessees. In the result, all the questions are answered in favour of the assessees who would be entitled to costs from the revenue. Counsel's fee, one set ₹ 500.
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1980 (8) TMI 200 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... show that the affixing of the censor certificate to the original manufactured film brings about a new and distinct manufactured product. As indicated above, it is only a legal requirement that is complied with by affixing of the censor certificate to the original film. The Legislature has merely prescribed a particular procedure for display of a certificate in compliance with the provisions of the Cinematograph Act and the rules framed thereunder. The argument of Mr Dalal which assumes that a new manufactured product comes into existence as a result of affixing of the trade mark cannot be accepted. We, therefore, reject the argument of the learned Counsel that the censorship length of the film is liable to duty under Entry No. 37. 12. For the above reasons, we uphold the decision of the learned trial Judge that the censorship certificate length of the film is not liable to duty under Entry No. 37 and dismiss the appeal with costs which are quantified at ₹ 600/-.
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1980 (8) TMI 199 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
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... ... ..... establishing a new Industrial Undertaking in Goa for the manufacture of automobile tyres and tubes under Rule 7 of the Registration and Licensing Industrial Undertakings Rules, 1952, and subsequent developments taking thereunder or in that connection could not also be pressed into service for claiming the exemption. The question of the claim for exemption is to be decided with reference to law contained in the Central Excise Act. No aid could also be derived from the Notification, similar to the one in the case, issued granting exemption as pointed out during the course of arguments and as contained in (x) of paragraph 6 of the writ petition. 8. For the reasons stated above I am therefore unable to hold that the interpretation put by the Revenue on the Notification dated 17-3-1972 is in any way erroneous. 9. In the result, the petitioners are not entitled to any of the reliefs asked for in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed with costs as admissible.
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1980 (8) TMI 198 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ocent accused by accepting the plea of guilty or let off a guilty accused with a light sentence, thus, subuersing the process of law and frustrating the social objective and purpose of the anti-adulteration statute. This practice would also tend to encourage corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute to the lowering of the standard of justice. The conviction of an accused based on a plea of guilty entered by him as a result of plea bargaining with the prosecution and the Magistrate must be held to be unconstitutional and illegal. Judicial Officer must discharge his judicial functions with the greatest sense of responsibility, particularly when it concerns the liberty of a person.” 16. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. The impugned judgments are set aside. The conviction and sentence of the respondents are also set aside and the cases are remanded back to the trial Court for re-trial, in the light of the observations made herein above.
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1980 (8) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a raising contractor of a coal mine is an owner within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972?
Whether the fixed assets like machinery, plants, equipment and other properties installed or brought in by such a raising contractor vest in the Central Government?
Whether subsidy receivable from the erstwhile Coal Board established under s. 4 of the Coal Mines (Conservation, Safety and Development Act, 1952) upto the specified date, from a fund known as Conservation and Safety Fund, by such raising contractor prior to the appointed day, can be realised by the Central Government by virtue of their powers under sub-s. (3) of s. 22 of the Nationalisation Act, to the exclusion of all other persons including such contractor and applied under sub-s. (4) of s. 22 towards the discharge of the liabilities of the coking coal mine, which could not be discharged by the appointed day?
Held that:-Partly allowing the claim of the petitioners with regard to the subsidy amount of ₹ 4.50,000 is set aside, and the writ petition is dismissed: Accordingly, the appeal of the Union of India is allowed and that of the Industrial Supplies Pvt. Ltd., is dismissed with costs throughout.
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