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Showing 21 to 40 of 208 Records
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1980 (9) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a tax of a certain kind can be levied on entry of goods in certain local areas, the classification of local areas, if found to be reasonable, the levy of tax would not be invalid on the ground that choosing certain areas only excluding some others would violate Article 14?
Held that:- Tax under the impugned legislation would be levied on scheduled goods either manufactured or produced within Karnataka State or imported from outside on their entry in a local area. Thus, this tax is non-discriminatory in that it does not discriminate between scheduled goods manufactured or produced within Karnataka State or those imported from outside. And the microscopic discrimination relied upon by the respondents that there is differential treatment accorded to goods produced within a local area and those imported from outside the local area is hardly relevant for the purpose of Art. 304(a). The High Court was accordingly right in concluding that the impugned tax satisfies the requirements of Art. 304(a).
It would be useful to recall the observations of this Court in Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. case [1963 (12) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] that the power conferred on this Court to strike down a taxing statute if it contravenes the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 or 301 has to be exercised with circumspection, bearing in mind that the power of the State to levy taxes for the purpose of governance and for carrying out its welfare activities is a necessary attribute of sovereignty and in that sense it is a power of paramount character. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the levy imposed an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce.
As has been repeatedly observed by this Court, the taxes generally are imposed for raising public revenue for better governance of the country and for carrying out welfare activities of our welfare State envisaged in the constitution and, therefore, even if a tax to some extent imposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed, that by itself is not sufficient either to stigmatise the levy as unreasonable or not in public interest.
Thus the impugned tax is not discriminatory in character as envisaged by Art. 304(a) and it does impose restrictions but the restrictions imposed are reasonable and in public interest and the Act subsequently having received the assent of the President, the proviso to Art. 304(b) is complied with and, therefore, the impugned Act is saved by Art. 304 and could not be struck down on the ground that it was violative of Art. 301. The contention must accordingly be negatived.
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1980 (9) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
Writ of habeas corpus for the release of the detenu
Held that:- The detenu has a constitutional right under Article 22(5) to be furnished with copies of all the materials relied upon or referred to in the grounds of detention, with reasonable expedition. Delay tends to stultify the detenu's right to make an effective representation and, to have it considered speedily by the authority concerned. The delay in supplying the copies to the detenu, in the facts of the instant case, being inordinate and unreasonable, had vitiated the continuance of his detention. It was on this short ground, we had by our Order dated May 7, 1980 allowed this writ petition and ordered the release of the detenu - allowed this writ petition and ordered the release of the detenu forthwith.
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1980 (9) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioner who has been detained in pursuance of an order dated the 29th May 1980 issued by the Government of Maharashtra in exercise of the powers conferred on it by clause (a) of section 5 of the Conversion of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 shall be immediately released from custody which, according to him, is illegal?
Held that:- It is now settled law that the detaining authority is bound to give opportunity to the detenu to make a representation against his detention and also to consider the same as early as possible and that any unreasonable delay in furnishing to the detenu copies of documents which form the basis of the grounds of detention amounts to denial to him of such opportunity.
And it goes without saying that such denial of opportunity makes the detention itself illegal. That precisely is the situation which obtains in the present case and the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be released forthwith. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (9) TMI 270 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any breach of the requirements of Article 22 clause (5) of the Constitution and Section 3, sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, for that is the breach which is claimed by the petitioner as invalidating the continued detention of the detenue?
Held that:- The time of 12 days taken up by the Assistant Collector of Customs was therefore unreasonably long for which no explanation at all was forthcoming from the detaining authority. We must in the circumstances hold that there was unreasonable delay on the part of the detaining authority in supplying to the detenu copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention and the continued detention of the detenu was accordingly illegal and void and the detenu was entitled to be released forthwith from detention.
It is also necessary to point out that there was unreasonable delay in considering the representations of the detenu dated 9th June 1980 and 26th June 1980. It was not necessary for the detaining authority to wait until after the copies of the tapes were supplied to the detenu, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the detaining authority was guilty of unreasonable delay in considering the two representations of the detenu, and particularly the representation dated 9th June 1980. This ground is also in our opinion sufficient to invalidate the continued detention of the detenu. These were the reasons for which we allowed the writ petition and directed immediate release of the detenu from detention.
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1980 (9) TMI 269 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the dealer within Madhya Pradesh and the property in the goods also passed within the State but passing of the property is not the test for deciding whether a sale is an inter-State sale under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The facts of the instant case are similar to the facts of the case in State of M.P. v. Bengal Paper Mills 1979 44 STC 347 1979 MPLJ 478. In that case, bamboos were purchased by the buyer for use in its paper mills in West Bengal. Although the property in the goods passed within the State it was held that as the buyer could not use the goods except for manufacture in its paper mills in West Bengal, the sale occasioned the movement of goods from Madhya Pradesh to West Bengal and was an interState sale. The same principle applies in the instant case also. 5.. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions referred in the affirmative in favour of the dealer and against the department. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (9) TMI 268 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f gunny bags is concerned, we think, the assessing officer was absolutely right. There is an agreement under which the agent is entitled to charge a price for the gunny bag and that has been taken on quintal basis. There is a clear finding that the assessee had as a fact charged at the rate of Rs. 3.25 for gunny bag. The Assistant Commissioner went wrong in holding that it was labour charges for packing. 7.. Our answer, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was not justified in vacating the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner merely on the basis of the report of the Inspector of the Food Corporation of India. This answer would cover both the questions referred by the Additional Sales Tax Tribunal. So far as the other question is concerned, our answer is that the dealer was liable to tax on sale of gunny bags as estimated by the assessing officer. There will be no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree.
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1980 (9) TMI 267 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ill continue to be a mill-made cloth. The Tribunal would do well to remit the matter to the assessing authority for a fresh disposal with a direction that he should look into the specimen articles to find out whether on account of the fittings of embroidery work, the saree has become a new commodity, namely, a chumki or embroidered saree, and can no more be referred to as a mill-made cloth, whether by the process of alteration or conversion, the millmade saree becomes a chumki or embroidered saree and the exemption would no more be available and the sale of the article would be liable to tax. The Sales Tax Officer would investigate into the matter properly and thereafter determine whether sale of such sarees continues to be free of tax being mill-made cloth or would attract liability to be taxed as an article of embroidery. In the circumstances, we decline to answer the question referred to us. We make no order as to costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference declined to be answered.
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1980 (9) TMI 266 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o pass an order of assessment assessing the amount of the tax due from the dealer, then the return furnished has to be taken as correct and complete. As in the present case with the dissolution of the firm, there is no jurisdiction to make the assessment for the amount of tax due from the dealer, the result is that the returns furnished have to be taken as correct and complete with the result that the computation of the tax made in the returns itself and the amount deposited in the Government treasury has to be taken as tax due on the basis of the selfassessments. The view taken by the authorities under the Central Act/local Act rejecting the applications of the petitioners for refund is clearly supportable in law. It is, therefore, not necessary to go into the other questions raised by the parties during the hearing. For the above reasons, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 265 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lal, S/o Basorelal v. State of M.P. 1971 28 STC 130 that no penalty was imposable for delay in filing of return and payment of tax. 5.. Now, the Board, in our opinion, has rightly observed that it has no jurisdiction to entertain any objection to the vires of any provision of the Act. The question of vires of any provision of the Act cannot be gone into even in a reference before this Court. As section 17(3) of the Act was given retrospective operation, the Board was justified in holding that the order imposing penalty was legal and proper. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Fairdeal Motors v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. (M.C.C. No. 304 of 1976 decided on 16th October, 1979) 1982 49 STC 164 and we see no cogent reason to differ from that view. 6.. For all these reasons, our answers to the questions are in the affirmative and in favour of the department. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1980 (9) TMI 264 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... take in a generic expression like gold jewel or gold jewellery . As a matter of fact, a specific question put by us to the learned counsel was, if the learned counsel is to approach a jewellery shop and ask for a gold jewel, what exactly is the article or the form of gold jewellery that will be supplied to him? The only answer the learned counsel gave was that there will be a further question from the seller as to what form or type of jewellery he wanted and afterwards, he will have to specify a particular form of jewellery which could be offered by the seller. We are mentioning this merely for the purpose of illustrating the far-fetched nature of the argument put forward by the learned counsel. Having regard to the use of the language in section 7-A(1)(a) and the ordinary conception as to what constitutes a gold jewellery, we have no hesitation whatever in agreeing with the Tribunal and dismissing this tax revision case with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 263 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purchased, along with him in person from one place to another. Therefore, on the finding of the Tribunal itself in this case that the dealer carried with him in person the articles in question from Madras to Bombay, it cannot be held that the articles in question were despatched from the State of Tamil Nadu to Bombay. If so, section 7-A(1)(c) of the Act has no application to the transaction in question, with the result that the said turnover, has to be excluded from the taxable turnover. After excluding this turnover, the Tribunal will have to decide the liability of the petitioners to payment of sales tax under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and under the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970. For the purpose of working out this liability on the basis of our conclusion in this behalf, the matter will stand remanded to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Madurai. There will be no order as to costs in any of these cases. Ordered accordingly.
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1980 (9) TMI 262 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e incurred by the assessee, this amount cannot come within the scope of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, at all as a turnover liable to tax, whether as sales turnover or as purchase turnover. Consequently, we make it clear that the remand is only with reference to the other amount of Rs. 90,525 and the sum of Rs. 2,00,990.56 cannot be made subject to any tax whatever in view of the fact that the amount is outside the scope of the Act itself. Under these circumstances, the revision is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside, subject to the qualification mentioned above and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal with a direction that the Tribunal should consider the question regarding the liability to tax of the value of the coupe, namely, Rs. 90,525, with reference to the controversy raised by the parties and, in particular, the stand taken by the assessee in the grounds of appeal before the Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1980 (9) TMI 261 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w 1.2 decimetre (1.2 M) long would not be considered as timber. It is considered as firewood only. The same has been signed by the Forest Range Officer, Coonoor Range, Coonoor. The language in the certificate does not indicate with reference to what test or for what purpose the Forest Range Officer sought to make a distinction between timber and firewood . As far as assessment to general sales tax is concerned, what is relevant is how a particular commodity is generally known amongst the public and once a particular article or material is known as timber or firewood, no amount of certificate given by a Forest Range Officer, like the present one, can be of any value. Having regard to the reasoning given by the Board of Revenue on the basis of the admitted fact, whose correctness is not questioned, we see no justification whatever to hold that the Board of Revenue committed an error. Hence the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 260 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ach. An oral application has been made by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We consider that a substantial question of law of general importance is involved, viz., where foodstuffs are supplied by restaurants whether attached to a hotel or not and the food-stuffs are consumed in the restaurant itself, whether the transaction is exigible to sales tax as constituting a sale, and if so in what circumstances. Hence leave is granted. W.P. Nos. 2815, 2822, 3588 and 3589 of 1980.-In these writ petitions Sri T. Ramakrishna Rao makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, in so far as our judgment is against the petitioners therein, by holding that the sales across the counter are liable to sales tax. We do not consider that to be a substantial question of law of general importance which requires consideration by the Supreme Court. Hence the application for leave is dismissed. Petitions partly allowed.
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1980 (9) TMI 259 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at one stage that we should remand the matter for investigating this aspect. We are, however, not inclined to accede. Having failed to adduce any material establishing that those charges were postsale charges, the assessee cannot at this stage and at this distance of time, ask for a remand. Accordingly, this contention too is rejected. The tax revision cases, therefore, fail and are dismissed, with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Mr. T. Anantha Babu, the learned counsel for the petitioner makes an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are, however, not satisfied that this case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which requires consideration by the Supreme Court. The oral request is accordingly rejected. Stay of collection of tax which was granted on terms by this Court will continue for a period of one month so as to enable the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court and obtain suitable orders. Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 258 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d counsel for the petitioner cited the decisions in Asbestos Cement Ltd., Podanur v. Government of Tamil Nadu(1), Balabhagas HulasChand v. State of Orissa(2) and The Co-operative Sugars (Chittur) Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu(3), but the decisions in those cases were rendered with reference to the facts in those cases. But one thing is clear that in all these cases it has been held that if the parties had contemplated or agreed at the time of sale that the goods shall be transported from one State to another, the transaction is an interState sale and cannot be considered to be a local sale. Since, on the facts, we have come to the conclusion that there was no delivery of goods to the buyer in this State and that the sale had occasioned the movement of goods, necessarily it follows that the transaction is an inter-State sale liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. The petition accordingly fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 257 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... act of sizing of the timber cut from the trees in order to facilitate easy transport (sic) would not make it a commercial article so as to make the assessee a dealer in that commercial article. As is seen from the above observations, that decision was rendered on the facts of that case and, in the present case, as we pointed out already, the facts are different. In the first place, the appellant had registered itself as a dealer in timber. In the second place, the timber was sawn and cut into suitable sizes and they were carried after obtaining declarations in form XX from the assessing officer and those forms had been used for the purpose of transport. Thirdly, the timber so cut had been sold to buyers in Bombay even. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the decision relied on by the learned counsel is not of any assistance to support the contention of the appellant in the present cases. Consequently, these appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 256 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the First Schedule to the Act has to be gathered from the language used therein by the legislature. There is no difficulty in the matter of interpretation of the concerned entry since the language employed by the legislature is quite plain and unambiguous. Even in cases where there is any difficulty in the matter of interpretation of an entry, such difficulty will have to be resolved by the court and any notification issued by the State Government concerning the matter will not bind the Tribunal or the court in the matter of determining the true meaning and scope of the entry contained in the schedule to the statute. 5.. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that turpentine will not fall within the scope of entry 27 of the First Schedule to the Act, and the turnover relating to the said article is taxable only at the general rate. The revision is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 255 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he rate at which it is assessable, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of five years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates, reassess the tax due after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary and after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such reassessment. In this case, as we pointed out already and as admitted, the entire sales turnover relating to the tanned hides and skins had been assessed at 1 1/2 per cent under item 7(b) and the sales turnover was assessable only under that item. Only if the whole or any part of this turnover had escaped such assessment, the whole or any part of the turnover can be said to have been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which the same was assessable so as to attract the provisions of section 16(1)(b). That not being the case, the order of the Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous in law and consequently the tax revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (9) TMI 254 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unal in regard to this matter is therefore perfectly correct and sound. 8.. Though an argument was advanced by the learned Government Pleader that the appellate authority while issuing the impugned direction to the Sales Tax Officer to extend to the assessee the benefit of section 7 has not considered the crucial question as to whether the assessee had made out sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the filing of such application, we do not find any substance in this contention, because a clear finding has been recorded by the appellate authority which has also been concurred in by the Tribunal that a valid and adequate explanation had been furnished by the assessee for the failure on his part to file the application within the prescribed time. 9.. It follows from the foregoing discussion that no interference is called for with the decision of the Tribunal. This tax revision case is accordingly dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
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