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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 203 Records
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1981 (2) TMI 216 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he use of the purchased goods is concerned, used identical language. That the relief claimed in the said clause (e) was available both to a dealer who purchased goods of the required description for use by him in the manufacture of goods for sale by him as also to one who purchased such goods for use by him in the manufacture of goods for sale by others. In view of this, the respondents would be entitled to the full amount of set-off as held by the Tribunal. We may mention that by an amendment made on 15th January, 1976, in rule 41-A(1), before the purchasing dealer becomes entitled to a setoff under the said rule 41-A the goods manufactured have to be sold by him. In the result, we answer the question submitted to us in each of these two references in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of these two references quantified in all at Rs. 300. References answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (2) TMI 215 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d by a dealer. Assuming that the language of the explanation is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning, it is a well-settled principle of interpretation that in such a case the interpretation which favours the assessee should be adopted by the court, more particularly where the provision relates to the imposition of penalty see Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal I v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 I.T.R. 192 (S.C.). We may, however, add that we do not find the language of the explanation either ambiguous or capable of any interpretation other than the one which we have put in the context of the relevant sections of the Act and the Rules made under the Act and the scheme of the Act and the Rules. In the result, we answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessees and against the department. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (2) TMI 214 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... limitations. These limitations are that the revising authority should not trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act or the Rules to other authorities and should not ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers. In the present case, the Assistant Commissioner while seeking to exercise his revisional powers has clearly encroached upon the powers reserved to the assessing authority under rule 71 and as such the power exercised is invalid. For the reasons recorded above, our answer to the first question referred would be in the negative, i.e., against the department and in favour of the assessee. Similarly our answer to the second question would also be against the department and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answer to the first two questions, questions Nos. (3) and (4) do not arise and need not be answered. Considering the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (2) TMI 213 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... isions of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act and, similarly, the Tribunal was also in error in not considering the said contention on merits. We are also satisfied that as regards both the contentions the assessee had not been given sufficient time by the Commercial Tax Officer to substantiate his claim for exemption. 9.. For the reasons aforesaid, we make the following order (i) the order of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in S.T.A. No. 253 of 1976 dated 25th August, 1977, the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Bellary, dated 28th January, 1976, and the order of the Commercial Tax Officer, I Circle, Bellary, dated 24th December, 1973, in so far as they relate to the commission agency turnover, are set aside and (ii) the case is remitted to the assessing authority to determine the question afresh after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of the claim for exemption. Ordered accordingly.
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1981 (2) TMI 212 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct. This may be so. As a disputed question if fact I do not say anything more about it. 3.. The petitioners, however, must succeed in having the demand notices quashed inasmuch as there is no assessment made under the provisions of the Act to make the demand. The learned Government Pleader has not brought to my notice any other provision of the Act or the Rules made thereunder which empowers the 1st respondent to issue the demand notices. It is well-settled law that no demand notice can issue unless assessments are completed. Without assessment proceedings a demand notice would be illegal. Therefore, on being satisfied that there are no assessment proceedings in the case of the petitioners, the impugned demand notices are hereby quashed. But, the 1st respondent is free to issue fresh demand notices after proper assessment proceedings are held and assessments are completed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 4.. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 211 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll No. 3842 dated 23rd April, 1966, for Rs. 1,02,778 and bill No. 3843 dated 10th May, 1966, for Rs. 1,20,375? As mentioned above, for answering the above question as reframed the first point which will have to be determined would be the genuineness of these two transactions in the sense as to whether these were sales made to the said Messrs. H. Amrutlal and Company or made to a third party, the said Messrs. H. Amrutlal and Company merely playing the role of furnishing a certificate to make these two sales not exigible to tax. For this purpose the statement of the case made by the Tribunal is wholly insufficient and inadequate, and accordingly under sub-section (3) of section 61 of the said Act we refer back this case to the Tribunal and direct it to make a supplemental statement of the case setting out therein the facts on the record having a bearing on the question of the genuineness of these transactions in the sense mentioned above and its finding thereon. Case remanded.
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1981 (2) TMI 210 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... persons were put up merely to lend their names and give false certificates. In such a case the transaction would not be genuine. We fail to see how this authority is relevant for our purposes, because, as mentioned earlier, it has not at any time been the department s case that any of the transactions of sale by Sulekha Enterprises to the applicants were not genuine and, as stated earlier, the learned Advocate-General himself stated that the genuineness of these transactions was not in doubt and was not disputed. For the reasons set out above, we answer the question submitted to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the applicants and against the respondents. Considering the length of time which the hearing of this reference has taken, in our opinion, a fair order for costs would be that the respondents should pay to the applicants Rs. 750 by way of costs. The applicants will be entitled to a refund of the fee of Rs. 100 paid by them. Reference answered in the negative.
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1981 (2) TMI 209 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... red to us, with the corrections mentioned above, as follows Question No. (1) In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department. Question No. (2) In the affirmative, with this modification that where the Tribunal or any taxing authority seeks to make use of the order of cancellation of a registration certificate or licence, authorization, recognition or permit of one dealer to the prejudice of another, or any document or statement in the registration or other record of such dealer to the prejudice of another dealer, the dealer who is sought to be so prejudiced would be entitled to take inspection of the relevant file and controvert the statement sought to be used against him. Question No. (3) In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessees. There will be no order as to the costs of this reference. The applicants will be entitled to a refund of the fee of Rs. 100 deposited by them. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (2) TMI 208 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... laced on account of wear and tear. Nor are they required for use in an emergency. In any case, the grills sold by the applicants cannot be so used because they have to be processed before they can be fitted to transistor radios of Philips India Ltd. In these circumstances, it is not possible to consider the grills in question as spare parts of transistor radios. They cannot, therefore, be considered as falling under entry 65 in Schedule C, as then in force. It is agreed between the parties that if the grills in question do not fall under entry 65 in Schedule C, then they fall under entry 19A, clause (b), in Schedule E, as then in operation. 8.. In the premises, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessees and against the department. The respondents to pay to the applicants costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 300. The amount of Rs. 100 deposited by the applicants to be refunded to them. Reference answered in the negative.
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1981 (2) TMI 207 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at one commodity has been consumed in the manufacture of another, and that although it has undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity. In respect of the commodity involved in that case, namely, sliced pineapple, the Supreme Court has further held that where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the processing stage it cannot be said that it has been manufactured. Applying this principle the Supreme Court held that although a degree of processing is involved in preparing pineapple slices from the original fruit, the commodity continues to possess its original identity, notwithstanding the removal of inedible portions, the slicing and thereafter canning it on adding sugar to preserve it. The reasoning applies to the present case in all fours and we are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Tribunal in its order. In these circumstances, the tax revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 206 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e find that the applicants could legitimately say that they treated the sales as inter-State because even a certificate was given by the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the police authorities that they were in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Of course the certificate by the governmental agencies cannot make the sales inter-State if in law they are not as we have found. We may in this connection mention that the applicants apparently acting on the certificate by the governmental agencies have presumably not collected the sales tax on these sales treating them as being exempt from the gross turnover. If, however, the applicants are made liable to pay any sales tax on these sales on account of their being not treated as inter-State sales we have no doubt that the governmental agencies which would in the first course have paid the tax would consider the desirability to reimburse this amount which in any case was their liability. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (2) TMI 205 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was held, where information regarding certain turnover, which was not charged to tax, was already in the records and the assessing authority and the Commissioner knew about it, and there being no subsequent external information, applicability of section 11A of the Act does not arise to reassess the dealer on that turnover . In the present case the notice clearly states that chargeability of the turnover is based on the material already on the record which was before the assessing authority. The only thing that has happened is that the Commissioner is of the view that the decision of the assessing authority that the turnover was liable to tax under the Central Act is erroneous and needs correction. To such a situation, provisions of section 20(3) of the local Act alone would be applicable. In that view of the matter, we would allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 204 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the amended form 29 for the purpose of taking action against the respondents under the provisions of section 37 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. At no time did the respondents have any protection of any substantive law against forfeiture. There can, therefore, be no question of taking away that protection. 21.. The respondents had raised some other contentions before the Tribunal and had argued that, on the facts of the case, the amount in question was not liable to be forfeited. We are not concerned with those contentions in the present case. Those contentions may be considered by the Tribunal when the matter goes back to it for consideration in the light of the answer given by us to the question referred to us. 22.. In the premises, the question is answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the department and against the assessees. The respondents to pay to the applicant the costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (2) TMI 203 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... volved. The tax which was shown according to the return was paid in full. The amount which was paid by the applicants in November-December, 1965, could not be said to be an amount paid by them under or towards the amount of tax due from them according to the return in question. This was an amount which was paid by them in anticipation of the amount of tax to which they were going to be assessed, in view of the said determination by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, in case they had failed in their appeal to the Tribunal. Thus, this was an amount paid in advance towards the tax which might be assessed and not the amount paid under or according to the return. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department. The respondents will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants will be refunded to them. Reference answered in the negative.
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1981 (2) TMI 202 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ended that the authorities should not have relied on the statement of the partner of the firm who was a nontechnical partner and had made an erroneous statement. The same contention was raised before the learned District judge who found as a fact that the statement made by the partner was not erroneous and the petitioner-firm was trying to change the stand at a later stage. The findings recorded by the Additional District judge are pure findings of fact and are not liable to be disturbed in these proceedings. We entirely agree with the conclusions arrived at by the learned District Judge that the sarees embroidered with zari and meena would not change the nature of the fabric which would remain a pure silk. For the reasons recorded above we answer the question referred, in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. However, considering the facts of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (2) TMI 201 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e by the Merchants Association and the Chamber of Commerce to the Government, no penalty was intended to be levied on tax arrears due prior to 1st September, 1976. 5.. In the instant case the 11th instalment fell due in July, 1976, as the 1st instalment commenced on 1st September, 1975. If it is not disputed that the assessee has paid all the instalments in accordance with the Commissioner s order in his favour, then on 1st September, 1976, there were no tax arrears due by the petitioner. Section 3-A of the Act not only enjoins that the subordinate officers should obey the instructions of the Government but also that of the Commissioner. 6.. In this view of the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned demand notice at annexure C is without the authority of law and therefore liable to be quashed. 7.. In the result, the rule is made absolute and the impugned demand notice at annexure C is hereby quashed. 8.. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.
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1981 (2) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Delhi Development Authority is a 'local Authority' whose employees are taken out of the purview of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965, by Sec. 32(iv) of that Act, which provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to employees employed by an establishment engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of any Department of the Central Government or State Government or a Local Authority?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Delhi Development Auhority is a Local Authority and therefore, the provision of the Payment of Bonus Act are not attracted.
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1981 (2) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
The appellant continued to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9, 1966 gave a combined notice demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on November, 10, 1966. On his failure to comply with the requisitions contained in the notice the respondents filed a suit against the appellant seeking eviction as well as recovery of rents and mesne profits.
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1981 (2) TMI 198 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Charges – Registration of, Winding up – Fraudulent preference. ... ... ... ... ..... mmovable property only by registered document. In my opinion this proposition of law is no longer good law, in view of the later pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Abdul Jabbar s case, AIR 1969 SC 1147 and M. C. Chacko s case, AIR 1970 SC 504. Reference to Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Rali Ram, C. A. 460 of 1966, decided by the Supreme Court on 28th January, 1969, can also be of no assistance to the respondent because that case was concerned with section 49 of the Registration Act. In the present case the document need not be referred to at all for coming to the conclusion that there was a creation of charge by the company. The charge can be created orally. It is not compulsory for the creation of a charge that there should be a document in writing duly registered. For the aforesaid reasons, I allow the application and hold that the petitioner is a secured creditor and has a charge in respect of the property No. 20/2, Manorama Ganj, Indore. Parties to bear their own costs.
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1981 (2) TMI 190 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... inal Procedure Code for the condonation of delay was made by the respondent in which the order was made ex parte in violation of the principles of natural justice and also in violation of this court s order of injunction on 4th November, 1980. In these circumstances, the said order is of no effect and a nullity and without jurisdiction and, therefore, it cannot be taken any notice of. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that any criminal proceeding was pending as no cognizance of the offence was taken of before the present application was made and an ad interim order was passed as hereinbefore stated. Therefore, I have no hesitation in passing an order confirming the ad interim order and relieving the petitioners from the consequences of the alleged default under section 295 of the Companies Act, which has already been made good by refund of the loan and resignation of the common director. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, I am making no order as to costs.
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